The military campaign of Genghis Khan's grandson Batu to the West began in 1235. Then a kurultai, a military council, was held, which gave rise to the attack on Eastern Europe. Quite quickly the Mongols were able to conquer fragmented Rus'. Europe could face the same fate.

Having walked through Rus', devastated largest centers, the Mongols did not rejoice idly for long. They scrupulously collected information about Western Europe. The Mongols knew everything that could be physically known: the economic, political, social situation of Europe at that time. The Europeans only heard rumors about the Mongols told by refugees.

Disposition of forces before the invasion

The famous Mongol commander Subudai, who commanded the Mongol army, left only 30 thousand soldiers to control Russia, while a 120 thousand army was preparing for the invasion of Central Europe. He realized that together Hungary, Poland, Bohemia and Silesia could field an army much larger than the Mongol army.

Moreover, an invasion of Central Europe could well lead to conflict with the Holy Roman Empire. But the information obtained by the Mongol spies encouraged Subudaia and Batu - in Europe at that time there were too strong contradictions between the centers of power: the Pope and the Emperor, England and France. And the Balkans with the eastern border of Central Europe were not a conflict-free space. The Mongols expected to deal with everyone one by one.

Before the Mongol invasion, eastern Central Europe and the northern Balkans were constantly at war. Serbia barely held back the aggression of Hungary, Bulgaria and what was called Byzantium before the Fourth Crusade. The expansion of Bulgaria was stopped only due to the invasion of the Mongols.

Defeat at Legnica

Reading detailed reports of military operations, you are amazed at the swiftness of the Mongols. In a matter of weeks from January to March 1241, dozens of Polish cities fell. Sowing horror and panic, the Mongol tumens (detachments of 10 thousand soldiers) reached Silesia. The Europeans estimated that the Mongol army numbered more than 200 thousand people.

In northeastern Europe, they believed in the terrible stories about the Mongols, but were still ready to fight to the last. The Silesian prince Henry the Pious gathered 40 thousand Germans, Poles and Teutonic knights. They took up positions near Legnica. The Bohemian king Wenceslas I hurried to unite with Henry and also sent 50 thousand soldiers to Legnica.


Wenceslas I did not have time for the decisive attack of the Mongols. Only two days were not enough. The King of Poland was killed, Henry's army was defeated, and his remnants fled to the west, the Mongols did not pursue them. The northern detachments of the Mongols, operating on the Baltic coast, won a victory there and turned south to unite with the main army in Hungary. Along the way they devastated Moravia.

Defeat of the Hungarians

Wenceslas's army moved to the north-west to join the hastily recruiting detachments of German knights. At the same time, in the south the Mongols were no less effective. After three decisive battles, by mid-April 1241, all European resistance in Transylvania was broken.


Battle of the Chaillot River. Miniature 13th century

Hungary at that time was one of the main military-political forces in Eastern Europe. On March 12, the main Mongol troops broke through the Hungarian barriers in the Carpathians. Upon learning of this, King Bela IV convened a military council in the city of Buda on March 15 to develop a plan to repel the raid. While the council was meeting, the Mongol vanguard had already arrived on the opposite bank of the river. Without giving in to panic and taking into account that the advance of the Mongols was restrained by the wide Danube and the fortifications of the city of Pest, the king, at the cost of incredible efforts, gathered almost 100 thousand soldiers.


Hungarian King Bela IV flees from the Mongol army

In early April, Béla IV marched with an army east of Pest, confident that he would be able to drive out the invaders. The Mongols feigned retreat. After several days of careful pursuit, Béla encountered them near the Sajó River, almost 100 miles northeast of modern Budapest. The Hungarian army unexpectedly quickly recaptured the bridge across Shayo from a small and weak Mongol detachment. Having built fortifications, the Hungarians took refuge on the western bank. From loyal people Bela IV received exact information about the enemy’s forces and knew that his army was much larger than the Mongolian one. Shortly before dawn, the Hungarians found themselves under a hail of stones and arrows. After a deafening “artillery barrage,” the Mongols rushed forward. They managed to surround the defenders. And after a short time, it seemed to the Hungarians that a gap had appeared in the west, where they began to retreat under the pressure of the attack. But this gap was a trap. Mongols rushed from all sides on fresh horses, slaughtering exhausted soldiers, driving them into swamps and attacking villages where they tried to hide. Literally a few hours later, the Hungarian army was almost completely destroyed.

Crossing the Alps

The defeat of the Hungarians allowed the Mongols to gain a foothold throughout Eastern Europe from the Dnieper to the Oder and from the Baltic Sea to the Danube. In just 4 months, they defeated Christian armies that were 5 times larger than their own. Having suffered a crushing defeat from the Mongols, King Bela IV was forced to hide, finding refuge on the coastal islands of Dalmatia. Later, he managed to restore central power and even increase the power of the country. True, not for long - he was soon defeated by the Austrian Margrave Friedrich Babenberg the Grumpy and never achieved success in the long war with the Bohemian King Ottokart II. Then the Mongols invaded the lands of Bukovina, Moldova and Romania. Slovakia, then under Hungarian rule, suffered seriously. In addition, Batu also advanced west to the Adriatic Sea, invaded Silesia, where he defeated the army of the Duke of Silesia. It seemed that the path to Germany and Western Europe was open...

In the summer of 1241, Subudai consolidated his power over Hungary and developed plans to invade Italy, Austria and Germany. The Europeans' desperate efforts to resist were poorly coordinated and their defenses proved woefully ineffective.


At the end of December, the Mongols advanced across the frozen Danube to the west. Their advance detachments crossed the Julian Alps and headed to Northern Italy, and scouts approached Vienna along the Danube Plain. Everything was ready for the decisive assault. And then the unexpected happened... From the capital of the Great Mongol Empire, Karakorum, news came that the son and successor of Genghis Khan, Ogedei, had died. Genghis Khan's law clearly stated that after the death of the ruler, all descendants of the clan, no matter where they were, even 6 thousand miles away, must return to Mongolia and take part in the election of a new khan. So, in the vicinity of the mortally frightened Venice and Vienna, the Mongolian tumens were forced to turn around and move back to Karakorum. On the way to Mongolia, their wave swept through Dalmatia and Serbia, then east through northern Bulgaria. Ogedei's death saved Europe.

At the beginning of 1241, the first reliable news reached the peoples of Europe that the wild Tatars, who had emerged from the depths of Asia and had passed through the entire Russian land with fire and sword, were now coming at them. A terrible alarm gripped all of Europe. This fear was so great that many kings and dukes, countries and cities were paralyzed and were unable to take any measures to repel the common enemy.

Already for a quarter of a century, Europeans had heard in fragments alarming rumors about the formation of a centralized Mongolian state led by Genghis Khan, about the aggressive campaigns of the Mongol khans, as a result of which China, Khorezm and other countries ceased to exist. But, in particular, they were worried about the news about the war of the Mongols against the Polovtsians and the Russian principalities. All this indicated that a terrible and cruel enemy was just around the corner. Some European monarchs, whose possessions were in close proximity to the theater of military operations, sent their spies to the Mongols. Their information was clear and accurate: the Mongols would not stop there, but would try to invade Europe. But no one took it seriously. Everyone wanted to believe that the war would rush past him. And in vain. Eight centuries ago, the ancestors of the Mongols - the legendary Huns - led by their king Attila, nicknamed the Scourge of God, made all of Europe tremble.
The most informed (due to circumstances) of the European monarchs was, of course, the Hungarian king Bela IV. In his letters, Batu Khan repeatedly demanded from him an expression of submission, tithing in everything and the expulsion of the Cumans, threatening otherwise with a military invasion. That is why Bela sent numerous Franciscan and Dominican monks to the east, to the Volga, to obtain the necessary information “first-hand.” One of the monks, Julian, managed to collect extensive and fairly reliable information about the Mongols, which, unfortunately, was not properly assessed. All the attention of the careless and arrogant Bela was focused on strengthening the alliance with the Cumans and the fight against the separatism of the feudal lords, who were secretly and openly supported by the Austrian Duke Friedrich Babenberg.
At the beginning of the alarming year 1241, news of the Mongols reached not only Eastern, but also Central Europe. Thuringian Landgrave Heinrich Raspe wrote to the Duke of Brabant, warning about the Mongol danger, which was taking on more and more clear outlines
In Europe of the 13th century. there was no centralized monarchy: the states were divided into kingdoms and duchies, which only fought with each other. The largest state in Europe
- The Holy Roman Empire of the German nation - consisted of many small kingdoms, electors and duchies.
On the eve of the Mongol invasion, Europe was divided into two warring camps: the Guelphs, supporters of the Pope, and the Ghibellines, supporters of the German Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen. “Therefore, the Mongols tried to use the conflict between these two forces for their political purposes. In particular, Batu Khan wrote in his letter to Frederick II: “I am coming to take your place.” Friedrich wrote in response: “I know falconry well and am ready to become your falconer.”
But the Mongols, open and straightforward Mongols, untrained in ambiguous words, took the emperor's answer literally. In fact, Frederick, not having the opportunity to cross arms with the Mongols on the battlefield, decided to mock Batu Khan in order to somehow amuse himself.
By the time of the Mongol invasion, the centuries-old conflict between the papal tiara and the imperial crown had reached its climax. Every emperor, like every pope, sought to become the master of all Europe. This desire did not pass by both Frederick and Gregory. The representative of the Hohenstaufen dynasty, considered one of the most educated people of that time, in his book “Three Fraudsters: Moses, Christ and Mohammed” not only criticized the founders of the faith, but also directly wrote that only a fool can believe that a virgin can give birth to a child . For this essay, the Pope once again, for the third time, placed a curse on the blasphemer catholic church.
The invasion of the Mongol hordes forced Pope Gregory IX to look around him differently. Putting aside personal ambitions, he invited Frederick, as a secular sovereign, to lead the army of the crusaders and move against the Mongols. Along with this, Gregory promised to take under his direct protection everyone who goes to crusade and forgive sins. But dad didn’t go further than appeals.
And Frederick, having completely forgotten the warlike traditions of his ancestors, decided to seek happiness not in battle, but in flight. Taking refuge in Sicily, he wrote to the English king:
“Thus fear and trembling arose among us, prompted by the fury of these swift invaders.”
Gregory followed his august example. Leaving the palace, where the vicars of Christ lived for more than a thousand years, the pope fled to Lyon. It is difficult to describe the horror that gripped Europe. Kings and dukes, when the Mongols approached, were ready to abandon their subjects to the mercy of fate and flee somewhere far away.
There is a tendency to interpret the Mongol invasion of Europe as the desire of Batu Khan to punish the Hungarian king Bela and punish the Cumans. However, we do not have the right to ignore the will of Genghis Khan, according to which the Mongols “must subjugate the entire land and should not have peace with any people unless they are first subjected to submission.”
And the monk Julian warned his king Bela:
“The Tatars are conferring day and night on how to penetrate and capture the kingdom of the Christian Hungarians. For they say they have an intention to conquer Rome and beyond.”
The victorious Mongol army of Batu Khan entered European territory in several directions. The nine-tailed black banner of Genghis Khan - Sulde - fluttered in the wind. The Mongols believed that the spirit of the Holy Warrior lived in the banner, which brought victory, so they sacredly revered and took care of it.
The essence of Subedei-baatur's plan was, as always, simple: he intended to defeat the European kingdoms one by one, preventing them from uniting forces. Two tumens of troops under the command of Genghisid Baydar Khan had the goal of invading Poland and Silesia and defeating the army of King Henry. Another chiigisid - Hadan - was supposed to cover Hungary from the south, cutting it off from the southern kingdoms and go to join the main forces. Batu the Magnificent himself, at the head of the main forces, headed straight for the heart of Hungary - Buda and Pest. The most important goal of Batu Khan was the liquidation of Bela and the entire Hungarian kingdom, which not only gave shelter to the Polovtsian Khan Kotyan and his 40 thousand tents, but also treacherously destroyed the Mongol embassies.
“Now I would like to emphasize the following: after the murder Mongolian ambassadors and merchants by the Khorezmians, because of which the war in Central Asia began, the Mongols could generally stop sending envoys to the enemy. Even a modern person would not condemn them for this. But the Mongols, with enviable tenacity, continue to send ambassadors to every fortress, although the latter were killed in the cities of Balkh and Kozelsk, before the battle on the river. Kalka, etc. This time the Mongolian ambassadors were killed by the Hungarians. What does this mean? Great Mongols of the 13th century. persistently sought to establish new civilized rules for conducting international affairs in the wild world of that time. After all, only thanks to these rules, the visits of ambassadors P. Carpini, G. Rubruk and the traveler M. Polo with their brothers, who moved comfortably along safe communications, became possible Mongol Empire
Yes, undoubtedly, the grandson of Genghis Khan acted as the punisher. But he intended to begin the conquest of all of Europe as soon as he created a convenient bridgehead in its eastern part.
Poland was the first European kingdom to experience the power of Mongol weapons. Now the Europeans have had the opportunity to get to know the steppe people better: what are these notorious Mongols like?
The Polish monarch Boleslaw III, who died before the Mongol invasion, divided his kingdom between four heirs. However, since then, strife has torn apart the once glorious and strong Poland, which has lost centralized power. King Bolesław IV, who inherited his father's throne but had no real power, ruled in Lesser Poland with his capital in Krakow and the largest city of Sandomierz. His uncle Konrad Mazowski was the sovereign of modern Warsaw and its environs. Henry II inherited Greater Poland (the cities of Gosz, Poznan and Kalisz and nearby territories) and Silesia with its capital in Wroclaw. His brother Mieczyslaw, or Mieszko, ruled two counties - Lower Silesia, or Oppole, and Ratibar.
Unable to unite to repel the enemy, the Poles, however, killed the Mongol ambassadors who arrived to them, demanding, as usual, an expression of submission. In January 1241, the corps of Baydar and Hajdu invaded Poland, crossed the Vistula and captured Lublin and Zawichost , and one of the flying detachments fought their way to Racibórz. A month later, the Mongols directed their attack on Sandomierz, which was taken and plundered, and on February 13, near Tursk, the Lesser Poland knights were defeated. But these raids were only reconnaissance.
In the early spring of 1241, the invasion of the entire Mongol army into Europe began. On March 12, at the head of the main forces, Batu Khan crossed the border of the Kingdom of Hungary. Thus, the Mongolian Tumen invaded the territory of Hungary, Poland and Silesia (Šlaska), posing a threat to Dalmatia, Moravia, Croatia and even Germany and Italy.

While some are trying to prove that Genghis Khan’s conquest did not happen, and Batu is Alexander Nevsky in disguise, others are writing studies about this based on historical sources.

Here, for example, is a text describing Batu’s campaign in Hungary.
The invasion of Batu's armies into Hungary began in March 1241. The Tatars easily overcame the so-called Russian Gate - the Veretsky Pass in the Carpathians, which separated Hungary and Rus'. “They had forty thousand soldiers, armed with axes, who walked ahead of the army, cutting down forests, paving roads and removing all obstacles from the path,” says Archdeacon Thomas of Splitsky. - Therefore, they overcame the rubble, built by order of the king, with such ease, as if they had been erected not from a pile of powerful firs and oaks, but folded from thin straws; in a short time they were scattered and burned, so that it was not difficult to pass them. When they met the first inhabitants of the country, at first they did not show all their ferocious cruelty and, driving around the villages and taking away the loot, did not carry out large beatings.”

But that was just the beginning. Tatar troops attacked Hungary from several directions. Ogedei's son Kadan (who particularly distinguished himself during this campaign) and Chagadai Buri's grandson moved from Galicia, south of Batu's main forces. Having passed through the forests “between Russia and Cumania” for three days, they captured royal residence Rodna, inhabited mainly by German miners who mined silver here, and 600 Germans led by Count Aristald, “more skilled than other warriors,” joined their army (they would later be resettled by Buri to the city of Talas [See amendment in the comments regarding the name of the city], now Dzhambul, in Kazakhstan). Moving further through gorges and rapids, the Tatars unexpectedly approached the large episcopal city of Varad (now Oradea, in Romania). The Italian Rogerius, later Bishop of Split and Salona, ​​author of the “Plamentary Song” about the devastation of the Hungarian land, one of our main sources on the history of the Hungarian war, served as a deacon here. “The Tatars... quickly captured the city and burned most of it, in the end they left nothing outside the walls of the fortress and, having captured the booty, killed young and old men and women in squares, in houses and in fields,” wrote Rogerius (he himself then hid from the Tatars in the forest, but was later captured by them). “...Having done all this, the Tatars unexpectedly retreated, taking all the booty with them.” Another Mongol commander, Bakhatu, crossed the Seret River even further south, in Moldavia; “having defeated the people gathered for battle, the Tatars began to completely occupy this land.” As for Batu himself, he, as already mentioned, acted in the central direction. “The main Mr. Batu, after he crossed the gate (Veretsky Pass - A.K.), began to burn villages, and his sword did not spare either gender or age.”

As always, the Tatar armies included detachments from previously conquered lands. Contemporaries, describing with horror what was happening, called first of all the Cumans - Polovtsians, as well as other neighboring peoples. The Tatars, “uniting with the bloodthirsty people of the Comans, ravaged the country with terrible cruelty,” reported the author of the Cologne Chronicle; “The majority of this vile people, with an army consisting of everyone who joined them, are devastating Hungary with unheard-of cruelty,” Count Henry of Thuringia wrote to his father-in-law, the Duke of Brabant. The Mordovian detachments, operating (as in Poland) in the vanguard of the Mongol troops, were particularly ferocious. “Ahead of them are certain tribes called Mordans, and they destroy all people indiscriminately,” a certain Hungarian bishop reported to the Parisian Bishop William (Guillaume) III. “Not one of them dares to put shoes on his feet until he kills a man... Without hesitation, they ravaged all the lands and destroyed everything they came across...” “...Their numbers are increasing day by day,” a certain Franciscan brother reported about the Tatars from Cologne, - ... peaceful people who are defeated and subjugated as allies, namely a great many pagans, heretics and false Christians, [they] turn into their warriors.” By “heretics” and “false Christians,” the Latin monastic authors could also mean Christians of the Greek rite, that is, Orthodox Christians, primarily, probably, Alans and Russians. However, we can speak quite definitely about the participation of Russian troops in the war in Hungary. Actually, the Galicia-Volyn Chronicle unambiguously makes it clear that the campaign in this country took place not without the participation of Russian governors (remember the Kyiv thousand-man Dmitry). “Rutenov” (Russians) are also mentioned as part of the Mongol army by the Croatian chronicler Thomas of Splitsky, a contemporary and eyewitness of the Tatar invasion: one of these “Rutenov” defected to the Hungarians on the eve of the decisive battle.

Already at the beginning of April, the Mongol forces were ready to unite. Their forward detachments, as happened in all campaigns, acted against the main enemy forces, concentrated at that time near the city of Pest (part of present-day Budapest, the capital of Hungary). The Tatars “sent forward a cavalry detachment, which, approaching the Hungarian camp and teasing them with frequent forays, incited them to fight, wanting to test whether the Hungarians had the courage to fight them,” wrote Thomas Splitsky. King Bela, believing that his troops outnumbered the enemy, gave the order to move forward. As one might expect, the Tatars immediately retreated; The Hungarians began pursuit and soon reached the Shajo River (or Solo; Russian chroniclers called it the Solona River), the right tributary of the Tisza, where they met the main forces of the Tatars. They were located on the opposite bank of the river, but in such a way that “the Hungarians were not completely visible to them, but only in part.” The Hungarians were still very afraid of them. “Seeing that the enemy troops had gone across the river,” continues Thomas, “[they] set up camp in front of the river... The king ordered that tents be set up not far from each other, but as close as possible. Having thus arranged the carts and shields in a circle like camp fortifications, they all settled down as if in a very close enclosure, as if covering themselves on all sides with carts and shields. And the tents turned out to be piled up, and their ropes were so intertwined and twisted that they completely entangled the entire road, so that it became impossible to move around the camp, and they all seemed to be tied up. The Hungarians believed that they were in a fortified place, but it was the main reason for their defeat.”

Here, on the banks of the Chayo, near the town of Mohi, a battle took place that decided the fate of Hungary. It took place on April 11, 1241 - just two days after the equally fateful Battle of Legnica, in which the forces of the Polish prince Henry were defeated. The coordination of the actions of individual Mongol units is amazing! In just three days, they defeated the armies of the strongest rulers of Central Europe and conquered two powerful and previously prosperous states!

The Battle of Chaillot was characterized by extreme ferocity, and success did not immediately come to the side of the Mongols. All the main leaders of the Mongol army who were then in Hungary took part in the battle - Batu himself, his first commanders Subedei and Buraldai, princes Kadan, Shiban and others. For us, the battle of Chaillot is of particular interest, since it was then - the only time during the entire Western Campaign! - the sources reflect Batu’s personal participation in hostilities and his role in achieving victory. Researchers reconstructing the course of the battle are generally lucky. A detailed story about him has been preserved in various and completely unrelated sources - both Western, Latin, and Eastern - Persian and Chinese. These stories complement each other well, allowing you to see the key moments of the battle through the eyes of both the Hungarians themselves and their opponents, the Tatars. (This is also the only case of its kind in the history of the Western Campaign.) Moreover, in the description of many details, the sources are unanimous: they all agree that initially the preponderance of forces was on the side of King Bela; that the key moment of the battle was the battle for the bridge over the river; that, finally, Batu’s personal intervention in the events significantly influenced their course. However, it is difficult to reconstruct the overall picture of what happened - and only through a scrupulous comparison of sources, their “overlay” on each other. Batu’s actions are especially difficult to interpret. Let's talk about them in more detail, especially since we are given the opportunity to look at it directly in a combat situation for the first and last time.

According to Archdeacon Thomas of Split, on the eve of the battle Batu, “the senior leader of the Tatar army,” “climbed a hill and carefully examined the location of the Hungarian army.” This reconnaissance predetermined the outcome of the battle. Returning to the army, Batu made an inspired speech, and in it he touched upon the numerical superiority of the Hungarians, which obviously embarrassed his soldiers.

My friends,” this is how the Split chronicler reports Batu’s speech, “we must not lose courage: even if there are a great number of these people, they will not be able to escape from our hands, since they are governed carelessly and stupidly. I saw that they, like a flock without a shepherd, were locked as if in a cramped enclosure.

Having said this, Batu “ordered all his troops, formed in their usual order, to attack the bridge that connected the banks of the river and was located not far from the Hungarian camp that same night.”

How reliable is this evidence? In answering this question, we must take into account that the theme of “carelessness” and “stupidity” of the rulers of the Hungarian land is key in the work of Archdeacon Thomas, who never tires of denouncing the inactivity and disunity of the Hungarian barons and King Bela himself. And therefore, the speech he put into the mouth of the leader of the Tatar army obviously belongs to the Split chronicler himself; in any case, its content fully corresponds to his view of what is happening. However, another contemporary of the events, the Franciscan monk Giovanni del Plano Carpini, also reports on Batu’s speech before the battle (or even during the battle). The latter believed that if the Hungarians had not flinched at the decisive moment and “courageously resisted” the Tatars, they “would have left their borders, since the Tatars had such fear that everyone tried to escape.” They were stopped by Batu, who, “drawing his sword in their face, resisted them.” Carpini conveys the speech of Batu Plano in such very pompous and not entirely clear expressions:

Don't run, because if you run, no one will escape, and if we must die, then it is better that we all die, since what Genghis Khan predicted will come true, that we must be killed; and if now the time has come for this, then we’d better be patient.

“And thus they were inspired, stayed and ruined Hungary.”

Plano Carpini does not provide any other details of the battle. But his companion, a participant in the same embassy Benedikt Polyak, on the contrary, reports a lot of interesting things about the battle of Chaillot, and such that it finds correspondence in sources coming from the camp of the Tatars themselves. Referring to their stories, Benedict also writes that Batu, after the Tatars fled from the Hungarians, “drawn his sword and forced them to return to battle.” True, there is not a word about Batu’s speech here.

Plano Carpini's version is even more puzzling than Thomas Splitsky's story. The words they attributed to Batu seem completely unthinkable. In fact, Europeans could talk about the inevitable death of the Mongols (and strongly hope for it!), but not the leader of the Mongol army. The mentioned imaginary prediction of Genghis Khan, the essence of which is revealed by Plano Carpini a little higher (“... they (the Mongols. - A.K.) must subjugate the whole earth... until the time comes for their killing: namely, they fought for forty-two years and must first reign for eighteen years after this, they say, they should be defeated by another people, which, however, they do not know, as it was predicted for them"), is based on calculations of the estimated time of the reign of the Antichrist and those apocalyptic peoples whose invasion should herald his appearance; These calculations were extracted by Christian writers from the works of the Church Fathers - both authentic and apocryphal, written on their behalf later. It is clear that mythical predictions of the destruction of the Mongol kingdom based on such calculations could not have arisen among the Mongols themselves. And in general, this whole scene, written in the traditions of the knightly saga, with fiery speeches (the domestic reader probably remembered the famous: “The dead have no shame...” by the Russian prince Svyatoslav), does not fit at all with the customs of the Mongols, for whom retreat is a military technique, worthy of approval and not condemnation. A complete misunderstanding of the enemy and the logic of his actions forced European chroniclers to often describe what did not actually happen. So it is here: Batu’s actions received an interpretation that was completely inconsistent with reality. But was there still something behind his “speeches” addressed to the soldiers? And in fact, at some point the outcome of the battle might have seemed unclear and the Mongols had the idea of ​​retreating or even fleeing?

The picture is partly clarified by Persian authors who were in the service of the Mongols, in particular Juvaini and Rashid ad-Din. They report the following. Intending to exterminate the “Kelars and Bashgirds,” that is, Christian Hungarians, Batu gathered a significant army. But the enemy army was also extremely large (Juvaini, and after him other authors, call absolutely fantastic figures of 400 or even 450 thousand horsemen). At the forefront of his army, “for reconnaissance and patrol,” Batu sent his younger brother Shiban (according to Juvaini, with a 10,000-strong detachment). A week later, Shiban returned and informed his brother that there were twice as many enemies as the Mongols, “and all the people were brave and warlike.” It was then that the scene, described but not understood by European chroniclers, probably took place. After “the troops came close to each other,” Juvaini continues, Batu “climbed the hill and for a whole day did not speak a word to anyone, but prayed fervently and cried loudly. He also ordered the Muslims (let me remind you that this is written by a Muslim author - A.K.) to all gather and pray. The next day they prepared for battle. Between them there was a large river...” Rashid ad-Din, who repeated Juvaini’s story, adds that Batu did this “according to the custom of Genghis Khan.” Wassaf, a younger contemporary of Rashid ad-Din, colors the picture somewhat, but he does not report anything new in essence; Moreover, in his presentation, the pagan Batu looks almost like a devout Muslim: “having ascended to the top of the hill,” he “humbly and weakly prayed to the Almighty, the only giver of blessings, stayed awake all night with a heart flaming like a lamp, and with a soul that , like the morning cool, spent the night until the day came.”

So, the point was not in developing a plan for the upcoming battle, or even in banal encouragement of his warriors on the eve or during the battle. Batu's actions were of a clearly ritualistic nature. But Muslim authors did not interpret them entirely correctly. Obviously, by performing sacred acts on the top of the hill, Batu sought to achieve the favor of the heavenly forces - that same “Eternal Sky”, by whose power and blessing the Mongols explained all their victories. It should be taken into account that Batu offered his prayers on one of the especially dark nights, almost on the new moon (that month it fell on the next night, April 12), - and this time was especially celebrated by the Mongols. Important affairs “they begin at the beginning of the moon or at the full moon,” wrote Plano Carpini, and therefore they “call [the moon] great emperor, kneel before it and pray.”

As is known, Genghis Khan and his descendants in the male line traced their descent directly from Heaven itself (for one of Genghis Khan’s ancestors, Bodonchar, was born to his mother, Alan-Goa, when she was husbandless - in her own words, from some heavenly light, penetrated into its bosom; this story was canonized by the Mongols and included in their sacred chronicle - “The Secret Legend”) (2). Like the rulers of other nomadic communities, the Chingisids perceived themselves as intermediaries between the divine Heaven and their own subjects, and believed in their ability to provide heavenly protection and prosperity to the people (modern researchers translate the medieval Mongolian term “suu jali”, which denoted such a supernatural ability, with the word “charisma” ). Batu obviously demonstrated these qualities on the night before the battle, inspiring the soldiers to victory. At the same time, he followed the custom of his grandfather Genghis Khan, who often did the same on the eve of important battles - the testimony of Rashid ad-Din in this regard seems key to understanding the essence of what was happening. It is appropriate to note that the episode of Shayo seems to be the only description of such a ritual in the history of the Mongol conquests. And the fact that he is connected specifically with Batu is probably not accidental. The leader of the Western Campaign managed to prove himself not just as a commander, but as a bearer of sacred properties, the very charisma of power that could ensure victory for his army. And this quality, in the eyes of the Mongols themselves, was much more significant than the simple ability to correctly lead troops, especially since Batu did not lack talented and energetic military leaders. Modern researchers even believe that the possession of such sacred qualities, such charisma initially contributed to the advancement of Batu from among other princes, and in particular his primacy among the Jochids.

It is curious that another contemporary, a Western European writer of the mid-13th century, Dominican monk Vincent of Beauvais, author of the “Historical Mirror,” also reported on some prayer actions of Batu during his invasion of Hungary, but interpreted them, naturally, in a completely different way , eschatological key. Batu, in his words, “made a sacrifice to the demons, asking them if he had the courage to walk on this earth. And the demon living inside the idol gave the following answer: “Go carefree, for I am sending three spirits ahead of your deeds, thanks to whose actions your opponents will not be able to resist you,” which is what happened. These spirits are: the spirit of discord, the spirit of mistrust and the spirit of fear - these are three unclean spirits, similar to toads, which are spoken of in the Apocalypse.” (Compare in the description of the “end times” in the Revelation of John the Theologian: “And I saw coming out of the mouth of the dragon and out of the mouth of the beast and out of the mouth of the false prophet three unclean spirits like frogs: these are demonic spirits doing signs; they go out to the kings of the earth the whole world, to gather them together for the battle of that great day of God Almighty"; Rev. 16:13-14.)

But this is only one side of the matter. The role of Batu cannot be reduced only to ritual actions on the eve of the battle. Judging by the evidence of the sources, he directly led (or at least tried to lead) his troops - and this, I repeat once again, is the only case of this kind in his entire biography, as it is presented in the written sources that have reached us. But Batu’s actions as a commander received a far from unambiguous assessment in the sources. As it turns out, these are the reasons for the failures that almost led to the defeat of the Mongols at the Battle of Chaillot.

According to Foma Splitsky, a certain Russian defector warned the Hungarians about the plans of the Tatars. Having learned about the upcoming attack, King Bela's brother Koloman and Bishop Khugrin of Kaloch with their troops approached the bridge over Chayo. It turned out that some of the Tatars had already begun crossing the river; a fight ensued. The Hungarians overthrew the enemy with a swift blow, “put down a lot of them, and threw others, who were breaking through back to the bridge, into the river.” An important detail is reported by the Franciscan monk Benedict Polyak: Koloman “in the very first battle, he personally threw the main leader of the Tartars from the bridge over this river, along with his horse and weapons, into the abyss of death.” This fact is confirmed by eastern sources, from which we learn the name of the deceased Mongol leader - he was the governor Batu Bakhatu, who led one of the columns of the Mongol army during the invasion of Hungary (more about the circumstances of his death will be discussed later). Koloman “withstood their second and third onslaught,” continues Benedict, “and fought until the Tartars took flight.”

Success in the first stage of the battle remained with the Hungarians - this is confirmed by all sources. But what happened next? Foma Splitsky gives this version of events. After the detachment of Koloman and Hugrin moved away from the bridge, the Tatars brought seven siege weapons here and, throwing huge stones and shooting arrows, drove away the guards left by the Hungarians. So they managed to cross the river without hindrance, after which they rushed to the camp of the Hungarians, who did not expect an attack and for the most part behaved very carelessly (this, let me remind you, is the favorite theme of the Split chronicler). The Pole Benedict puts the matter differently: according to his information, the outcome of the battle was decided by the roundabout maneuver that Batu took. The leader of the Mongols “sent an army across the river in its upper reaches at a distance of one or two days’ journey, so that they would unexpectedly attack the opponents fighting on the bridge from the rear... As a result, the outcome of the matter took an unexpected turn. And after the Hungarians ignored the warning of King Coloman, the Tartars crossed the bridge.” Sources of eastern origin also report the roundabout maneuver of the Mongol troops; True, it is not entirely clear whether it took place downstream or upstream of the river.

Subsequently, the battle unfolded near the Hungarian camp. This had fatal consequences for them. “A large Tatar horde, as if in a round dance, surrounded the entire Hungarian camp,” says Foma Splitsky. - Some, drawing their bows, began to shoot arrows from all sides, others hurried to set fire to the camp in a circle. And the Hungarians, seeing that they were surrounded from everywhere by enemy troops, lost their reason and prudence and no longer understood at all how to deploy their formations, or how to rouse everyone to battle, but, stunned by such a great misfortune, they rushed around in a circle, like sheep in a fold, seeking salvation from the teeth of wolves." Seized with horror, they rushed to escape - but then they came across “another evil, created by them and familiar to them. Since the approaches to the camp were very dangerously blocked due to tangled ropes and piled-up tents, during a hasty escape, some pressed on others, and the losses from the crush, caused by their own hands, seemed to be no less than those caused by the enemies with their arrows.” . In this situation, the Tatars resorted to another technique that they often used: they “as if opened a certain passage for them and allowed them to leave. But they did not attack them, but followed them on both sides, not allowing them to turn either here or there.” And when the Tatars saw that the Hungarians retreating in disarray “were already exhausted by the difficult road, their hands could not hold weapons, and their weakened legs were unable to run further, then they began to hit them from all sides with spears, chop them with swords, sparing no one, but brutally destroying everyone...” The pitiful remnants of the Hungarian army were pressed against some kind of swamp, and those who escaped the sword of the Tatars drowned in the quagmire. In this terrible massacre, Bishops Hugrin Kalochsky, Matvey Esztergomsky, Gregory of Gyorsky, many other magnates and countless ordinary soldiers died. The king's brave brother Koloman, seriously wounded at the beginning of the battle, fled to Pest, and then went across the Drava River to Croatia (a short time later he died from his wounds). As for King Béla IV, he, having barely escaped death or captivity, found refuge in the possessions of the Austrian Duke Frederick II Babenberg, but he simply robbed him, luring him out of the sum of 10 thousand marks, and then, as a pledge of this sum, took him from his region in western Hungary. From the Austrian possessions, the king moved to Zagreb, where he remained throughout the summer and autumn, and by winter, fearing the Tatars, he fled with his family to the Dalmatian coast and took refuge on one of the islands of the Adriatic Sea.

A look at what is happening from the other side is presented by Juvaini and Rashid al-Din. According to their version, the decisive role in the victory of the Mongols was played, firstly, by the persistence and determination of the Shiban and Buraldai detachments operating in the vanguard, and secondly, by the same outflanking maneuver of Batu, which we have already talked about.

That same night, Batu “sent one part of the army around,” says Juvaini, “and the army of Batu himself crossed the river from this side. Shibakan, Batu's brother, personally moved into the middle of the battle and launched several attacks in a row. The enemy troops, being strong, did not move, but that army (sent in a detour) went around them from behind. Then Shibakan with his entire army attacked them at once, rushed at the fences of the royal tents, and they cut the ropes of the tents with swords (a detail known to us from the story of Thomas of Splitsky. - A.K.) (3). When they overturned the fences of the royal tents, the army of Kelars (Hungarians - A.K.) became embarrassed and fled; no one escaped from this army... It was one of many great deeds and terrible massacres.” Rashid ad-Din adds that Batu, together with Emir Buraldai (whose name Juvaini does not mention), himself crossed the river at night; Buraldai launched an “attack with all troops at once.” The Mongols “rushed towards the tent of the kelar (king - A.K.), who was their king, and cut the ropes with swords. As a result of the fall of the tent, their army (the Hungarians - A.K.) lost heart and fled. Like a brave lion that rushes at its prey, the Mongols chased after them, attacked and killed, so that they destroyed most of that army.” (Subsequently, the richly decorated tent of the Hungarian king served Batu himself.) Another detail, although hardly reliable, is contained in the “Book of Victories” by the 15th century Persian writer Sheref ad-Din Ali Yezdi. The latter reports that Batu “personally entered the battle itself and carried out several attacks in a row.” However, it is unlikely that Yezdi had any unique sources on the history of the Hungarian war from which he could extract this information. He used the works of authors known to us (primarily, the “Collection of Chronicles” by Rashid ad-Din), and the news of Batu’s personal participation in the battle was most likely conjectured by him.

Well, the picture turns out to be impressive and, at first glance, quite objective. We could have limited ourselves to it - if we had not had at our disposal another source that sheds light on the circumstances of the defeat of the Hungarians, hidden from prying eyes. It turns out that there was some kind of dispute, even a conflict, between the main commanders of the Mongols, and Batu’s actions almost led to disaster. Fortunately for the Mongols and unfortunately for their opponents, a commander who had an exceptional understanding of the situation and a true military genius took part in the battle, along with Batu.

What remained outside the knowledge of Latin chroniclers and Persian historians is described in the “Biography of Subedei,” which is read in the Chinese chronicle “Yuan-shi.” According to this source, Subedey was in the vanguard of the army that fought in Hungary, “together with the Zhuvans (here: members of the “Golden Family.” - A.K.) Batu, Hulagu (whose name is not mentioned in connection with the Western campaign in other sources . - A.K.), Shiban and Kadan.” All these commanders advanced “along separate five roads.” The clash with the main forces of King Bela did cause confusion among the Mongol leaders. “The king’s army is full of strength, we will not be able to advance easily,” they said. Then Subedey “put forward an excellent plan,” the essence of which was to lure the Hungarian army to the river (its name is given in a Chinese source as Ho-ning, but in meaning it undoubtedly refers to the Shayo River). It was Subedey, and not Batu, who came up with the idea of ​​a workaround maneuver; He commanded the troops that were moved behind enemy lines. “The troops of all the princes were located in the upper reaches, where shallow water and horses could ford; in addition, there was a bridge in the middle,” the author of his biography in “Yuan-shi” explains Subedei’s plan. - In the lower reaches the water is deep. Subedey wanted to tie the rafts for a secretive, underwater (? - A.K.) crossing, leading to the enemy’s grasp from behind.” An indispensable condition for success, as always with the Mongols, was to be the synchronization of the actions of individual Mongol detachments - both the one that advanced head-on to the Hungarian units defending the bridge, and the one that came from behind and had to cross the river downstream, where it The Hungarians expected the least. However, this time there was no coordinated action. Batu hurried - perhaps overestimating own strength, or maybe not wanting to share the laurels of the winner with his elderly, but still undefeated mentor. The Chinese source directly blames “Zhuwang” Batu for hasty and ill-considered actions, which led to excessive losses among the attackers, not only among the “conquered peoples,” but also among the Mongols themselves: “Without waiting for the crossing, Zhuwang was the first to ford the river to fight. Batu's army began to fight for the bridge, but instead of using it, every thirtieth of the soldiers drowned; His subordinate commander Bakhatu died along with them. Immediately after the crossing, Zhuwang, in view of the increasing enemy army, wanted to demand the return of Subedei, belatedly counting on him. Subedey said this: “Van wants to return - let him return himself. Until I reach the city of Pest on the Danube River (both names are given in transcription corresponding to the Hungarian original - A.K.) - I will not return!” and rushed towards the city. (Here the Chinese source is somewhat ahead of the events: the city of Pest was taken by the Mongols after the defeat of the Hungarian forces at Shayo. - A.K.) All the princes also went to the city, as a result of which they attacked together, captured it and returned back.” When the victory was finally won and the troops united, Batu made claims to Subedei:

During the battle near the Ho-nin River, Subedey was late to help, my Bahatu was killed.

But Subedei rejected the accusations brought against him, essentially convicting Batu of not understanding the basic truths of the Mongol military tactics:

Zhuwan, although he knew that there was shallow water in the upper reaches, still took possession of the bridge in order to cross and fight, not knowing that I had not yet completed tying the rafts in the lower reaches. And today he says to himself - I’m late, and thinks that this is precisely the reason.

We must give Batu his due: he managed to admit that he was wrong. (“Then Batu also understood how it was,” says the source.) Later, at the traditional gathering of princes and emirs, when everyone “drank mare’s milk and grape wine,” Batu confirmed this: “Speaking about the events during the campaign against the king , Batu said this: “Everything that was captured at that time was the merit of Subedei!”

It is worth noting that subsequently Batu always paid tribute to both Subedei himself and his son Uriankhatai - and, in turn, could count on their support, including in very important delicate matters concerning his relationships with relatives. If he was distinguished by vindictiveness, then to the same extent he also had the ability to value people for their true merits. This character trait - inherent only in truly outstanding politicians - invariably brought him dividends.

Notes

1. The article is an abbreviated fragment from the book: Karpov A. Yu. Batu. M., 2011 (series “ZhZL”). There you can also find footnotes to sources and literature.

2. This story, from the words of the Tatars themselves, was known in other countries; see the stories of Rashid ad-Din and the Armenian historian, contemporary of the events of Kirakos Gandzaketsi.

3. In all likelihood, it was this battle that was remembered in Khiva legends, recorded in the 17th century by the Khiva khan and historian Abu-l-Ghazi, a descendant of Shiban. These legends also told how brother Batu cut the iron chains and wooden carts with which the enemy camp was cordoned off; however, the capital of Russia, Moscow, is named as the site of the battle (an obvious anachronism). The Persian author of the early 14th century, Wassaf, following mainly Juvaini, names instead of Shiban - obviously by mistake - the son of Batu Sartak: the latter “with one fog rushed towards the enemy; this detachment descended the mountainside exactly like a mountain stream. Like a disaster predetermined by fate that befalls people, which no one is able to repel, they rushed to the enemy’s camp and cut the ropes of the tent fences with their swords...”

Having conquered the vast space from the Sea of ​​Japan to the Danube by the early 1240s, the Mongols came close to central Europe. They were ready to go further, but their progress suddenly stopped.

First to the North

The first western campaign of the Mongols was carried out during the lifetime of Genghis Khan. It is crowned by the victory over the united Russian-Polovtsian army at the Battle of Kalka in 1223. But the subsequent defeat of the weakened Mongol army from the Volga Bulgaria postponed the expansion of the empire to the West for some time.

In 1227, the Great Khan dies, but his work continues to live. From the Persian historian Rashid ad-Din we find the following words: “in pursuance of the decree given by Genghis Khan in the name of Jochi (eldest son), he commissioned the conquest Nordic countries members of his house."

Since 1234, the third son of Genghis Khan, Ogedei, has been carefully planning a new campaign, and in 1236 a huge army, some estimates reaching 150 thousand people, moves to the West.

It is headed by Batu (Batu), but the real command is entrusted to one of the best Mongol commanders - Subedei.
As soon as the rivers turn out to be frozen in ice, the Mongol cavalry begins its movement towards Russian cities. One after another, Ryazan, Suzdal, Rostov, Moscow, Yaroslavl capitulate. Kozelsk holds out longer than others, but it is also destined to fall under the onslaught of countless Asian hordes.

To Europe via Kyiv

Genghis Khan planned to take one of the richest and most beautiful cities of Rus' back in 1223. What the Great Khan failed, his sons succeeded. Kyiv was besieged in September 1240, but only in December did the city’s defenders falter. After the conquest of the Principality of Kyiv, nothing stopped the Mongol army from invading Europe.

The formal goal of the campaign in Europe was Hungary, and the task was the destruction of the Polovtsian Khan Kotyan, hiding there with his horde. According to the chronicler, Batu “for the thirtieth time” suggested that the Hungarian king Bela IV be expelled from his lands defeated by the Mongols Polovtsy, but every time the desperate monarch ignored this proposal.

According to some modern historians, the pursuit of the Polovtsian khan pushed Batu and Subedey to the decision to conquer Europe, or at least some part of it.

However, the medieval chronicler Yvon of Narbonne attributed much more extensive plans to the Mongols:

“They imagine that they are leaving their homeland in order to bring to themselves the king-magi, whose relics Cologne is famous for; then to put a limit to the greed and pride of the Romans, who oppressed them in ancient times; then, to conquer only the barbarian and Hyperborean peoples; sometimes out of fear of the Teutons, in order to humble them; then to learn military science from the Gauls; then to seize fertile lands that can feed their multitudes; then because of the pilgrimage to St. James, the final destination of which is Galicia.”

"Devils from the Underworld"

The main attacks of the Horde troops in Europe fell on Poland and Hungary. During Palm Week in 1241, “devils from the underworld” (as Europeans called the Mongols) almost simultaneously found themselves at the walls of Krakow and Budapest.
Interestingly, the tactics successfully tested in the Battle of Kalka helped the Mongols defeat strong European armies.

The retreating Mongol troops gradually lured the attacking side deep into the rear, stretching it and dividing it into parts. As soon as the right moment came, the main Mongol forces destroyed the scattered detachments. An important role in the victories of the Horde was played by the “despicable bow,” so underestimated by European armies.

Thus, the 100,000-strong Hungarian-Croatian army was almost completely destroyed, and the flower of the Polish-German chivalry was also partially exterminated. Now it seemed that nothing could save Europe from the Mongol conquest.

Dwindling strength

The Kiev thousand-man Dmitra, who was captured by Batu, warned the khan about crossing the Galician-Volyn lands: “don’t stay in this land for long, it’s time for you to go against the Ugrians. If you hesitate, the mighty land will gather against you and will not let you into their land.”

Batu’s troops managed to cross the Carpathians almost painlessly, but the captive governor was right in another way. The Mongols, who were gradually losing their strength, had to act extremely quickly in lands so distant and alien to them.

According to the Russian historian S. Smirnov, Rus' could field up to 600 thousand militias and professional warriors during Batu’s western campaign. But each of the principalities opposing the invasion fell, having decided to fight alone.

The same applied to the European armies, which, many times superior in numbers to Batu’s troops, were unable to right moment consolidate.

But by the summer of 1241, Europe began to wake up. The King of Germany and Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II in his encyclical called to “open your spiritual and physical eyes” and “become a stronghold of Christianity against a fierce enemy.”

However, the Germans themselves were in no hurry to confront the Mongols, since at that time Frederick II, who was in conflict with the papacy, led his army to Rome.

Nevertheless, the appeal of the German king was heard. By the fall, the Mongols repeatedly tried to overcome the bridgehead on the southern bank of the Danube and transfer military operations to the territory of the Holy Roman Empire, but everything was unsuccessful. 8 miles from Vienna, meeting with a combined Czech-Austrian army, they were forced to retreat back.

Harsh lands

According to the majority domestic historians, the Mongol army thoroughly weakened its resources during the seizure of Russian lands: its ranks thinned by about a third, and therefore to conquest Western Europe it turned out to be not ready. But there were other factors as well.

Back at the beginning of 1238, when trying to capture Veliky Novgorod, Batu’s troops were stopped on the approaches to the city not by a strong enemy, but by the spring thaw - the Mongol cavalry was thoroughly bogged down in swampy areas. But nature saved not only the merchant capital of Rus', but also many cities in Eastern Europe.

Impenetrable forests, wide rivers and mountain ranges often put the Mongols in a difficult position, forcing them to make tedious, many-kilometer-long detour maneuvers. Where did the unprecedented speed of movement on the steppe impassability go? People and horses were seriously tired, and moreover, they were starving, not receiving enough food for a long time.

Death after death

Despite serious problems, with the onset of December frosts, the Mongol army was seriously planning to advance deeper into Europe. But the unexpected happened: on December 11, 1241, Khan Ogedei died, which opened a direct path to the Horde throne for Guyuk, Batu’s implacable enemy. The commander turned the main forces home.

A struggle for power begins between Batu and Guyuk, ending with the death (or death) of the latter in 1248. Batu did not rule for long, having died in 1255, and Sartak and Ulagchi also quickly passed away (probably poisoned). New Khan Berke in the coming Time of Troubles They are more concerned about the stability of power and peace within the empire.

The day before, Europe was overwhelmed by the “Black Death” - a plague that reached the Golden Horde along the caravan routes. The Mongols will not have time for Europe for a long time. Their later western campaigns will no longer have the same scope as they acquired under Batu.