The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (VChK) was formed. All-Russian Emergency Commission The main function of the All-Russian Emergency Commission is

On December 7 (20), 1917, by the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars, the Cheka was organized - the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission under the Council of People's Commissars for the fight against counter-revolution and sabotage (VChK).

Managers

The Cheka was headed by a chairman and a board.
The board, as in other people's commissariats, included deputy chairmen of the Cheka and heads of main departments.
The functions of the board included determining the main directions of work, as well as resolving the most important issues.

	Dzerzhinsky Felix Edmundovich - from December 7 (20), 1917 to July 7, 1918; from August 22, 1918 to February 6, 1922.
	Peters Yakov Khristoforovich - from July 8 to August 21, 1918.

Tasks of the Cheka

Suppression and elimination of attempts at counter-revolution and sabotage throughout Russia;
- bringing all saboteurs and counter-revolutionaries to trial by a revolutionary tribunal;
- development of measures to combat them;
- conducting preliminary investigations on all pending cases.

Adopted at the 2nd All-Russian Conference of Extraordinary Commissions and finally edited by the Cheka on December 1, 1918, the “Instructions for Local Extraordinary Commissions” read:
“The tasks of the commission include the following:
a) A merciless fight against counter-revolution, crimes in office and profiteering with the available forces at the disposal of the Commission.
b) Observation of the local bourgeoisie and the direction of counter-revolutionary work among them.
c) Bringing to the attention of local and central authorities about ongoing unrest and abuses and suppressing them.
d) Conducting inquiries into state crimes.
e) Conducting research in a state of emergency.
f) Surveillance of persons traveling across the border.
g) Observation of foreign intelligence officers.
h) Search and surveillance of persons hiding from the authorities.
i) Participation in maintaining public peace in the absence of police officers and assisting the latter in restoring the broken Revolutionary Order.
j) Execution of orders in the highest provincial Soviet bodies for conducting inquiries into crimes, when deemed necessary.
k) Participation in some meetings necessary for the fight.
m) Monitoring and registration of all those traveling across the border and careful checking of documents for the right to enter and exit, etc.
m) Strict monitoring of the implementation of decrees and orders of the Soviet government.”

Cheka status

The newly created secret service had civilian status.
It was an administrative and political body for searching, suppressing and preventing counter-revolutionary crimes, as well as a preliminary inquiry body.
The Cheka had the right to apply administrative measures against counter-revolutionaries such as confiscation, deportation, deprivation of food cards, publication of lists of enemies of the people, and so on.

Structure of the Cheka

Since its creation, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission has had three main divisions:
- Information department (collection of political and operational information);
- Organizational department (organization of the fight against counter-revolution throughout Russia);
- Struggle Department (direct fight against counter-revolution and sabotage).
During the work of the Cheka, a number of transformations were carried out, and by the spring of 1918 its structure acquired the following form:
- Chairman;
- Deputy chairmen;
- Secretary;

Out-of-town department;

Department for combating counter-revolution;

Department for combating crimes by position;

Department for combating profiteering;

Information Bureau.

In addition to the listed units, there were a number of auxiliary departments in the central apparatus of the Cheka:
- economic;
- prison;
— communications;
- general;
- commandant;
- automobile and others.

In December 1918, Special Departments were created - bodies of the Cheka in the Red Army and Navy.
In February 1919, the Secret Department (SO) appeared within the Cheka, whose functions included the fight against anti-Soviet parties, political groups and organizations.
On January 14, 1921, the Secret Operational Directorate (SOU) of the Cheka was created, headed by the former head of the Special Department, Menzhinsky.
The functions of the departments were distributed in it as follows:
- Special department - the fight against espionage and counter-revolution in the army and navy, as well as against political banditry;
- Secret department - operational work on anti-Soviet and monarchist parties and organizations and among the reactionary clergy;
- Operations department - external reconnaissance (surveillance) and operational installation;
- Information department - organization of information work to cover the political and economic situation of the republic;
- Foreign department - operations abroad.
Gradually, the Cheka concentrated in its hands the search, investigation, pronouncement and implementation of the verdict.
As of January 1, 1921, the staff of the Cheka was 2,450 people, of which only 1,415 employees were available. Compared to 1918, the organizational structure of the All-Russian Emergency Commission has changed beyond recognition:
- Chairman of the Cheka;
- Vice-chairman;
- Special department under the presidium of the Cheka;
- Investigative unit under the Presidium of the Cheka;
- Management of the affairs of the Cheka:

A common part:

Coffee table;

Cipher Bureau;

Personnel Department;
- Accounting and registration department:

Commandant's Office;

Desk for issuing passes and certificates;

Arrested Reception Desk;

Telephone exchange;

Communication service:

Auto repair shop;

Storerooms;

Horse base;

Medical unit;

Management of VChK houses;

Expedition;

Club of the Cheka and MChK;

Administrative and organizational management (AOU):
- Secretariat;
- Administrative department:
- Office;
- Distribution department;
- Accounting department;
- Department of personnel;
- Cheka courses;
- Organizational department:
- Control and instructor subsection of the Financial Department of the NKVD and the Cheka;
— Economic management (ECU):
- Office;
- Department of supervision and public prosecution;
- Statistical and Economic Department;
- 1 special department (People's Commissariat of Railways);
- 2nd special department (Supreme Council of National Economy);
- 3rd special department (Foreign trade and foreign concessions);
- 4th special department (apparatus of the Defense Council Extraordinary Commissioner for Army Supply);
- 5 special department (post and telegraph);
- 6 special department (gold - currency - valuables);
- 7th special department (People's Commissariat of Education and Tsentropechat);
- 8th special department (People's Commissariat of Food);
- 9th special department (Main Directorate for Food Supply of the Red Army and Navy under the People's Commissariat of Food);
- 10th special department (Centrosoyuz);
- 11th special department (People's Commissariat of Health);
- 12th special department (People's Commissariat of Agriculture);
- 13th special department (People's Commissariat of Finance);
- 14th special department (People's Commissariat for Military Affairs);
- 15 special department (special);
- library;
- editorial staff;
— Secret Operational Directorate (SOU):
- Operations department;
- Secretariat;
- Secretariat;
- Operational department;
- Technical department;
- Active part;
- Materials processing department;
- Processing Bureau;
- Printing Bureau;
— Registration and statistical department:
- Registration Office;
- Inquiry Office;
- Tracing Bureau;
- Bureau of Statistics;
— Special Department (DS):
- Employees for errands;
- 13th special department (counterintelligence work against Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania);
- 14th special department (counterintelligence work against Eastern countries);
- 15th special department (counterintelligence work against the countries of the “Great Entente”);
- 16th special department (counterintelligence work in the Red Army);
- 17th special department (counterintelligence work among former officers);
- Information part;
— Secret Department (SO):
- 1st department (work against anarchists);
- 2nd department (work against the Mensheviks);
- 3rd department (work against the right Socialist Revolutionaries);
— 4th department (work against right-wing parties);
- 5th department (work against the left Socialist Revolutionaries);
— 6th department (work against the clergy);
— 7th department (work against different parties);
- 8th department (informant);
- 9th department (work against Jewish anti-Soviet parties);
— Special department (Special department):
- 1st department (monitoring the preservation of state secrets by all government agencies, party and public organizations);
- 2nd department (theoretical development of cryptography issues, as well as the compilation of ciphers and codes for the Cheka and all other institutions of the country);
- 3rd department (conducting cipher work and managing this work in the Cheka);
- 4th department (opening foreign and anti-Soviet ciphers and codes and deciphering documents);
- 5th department (interception of encryption of foreign states, radio monitoring and identification of illegal and spy radio installations, as well as training of radio intelligence officers);
- 6th department (production of secret documents);
- 7th department (chemical research of documents and substances, development of recipes, examination of handwriting and photographing documents);
— Foreign department (INO):
- Office;
- Agent department;
- Visa Bureau;
- Transportation Department:
- Secretariat;
- Secret operational unit;
- Registration and information part;
— Part of the supply of clothing allowances;
- Control Commission of the Administration of the Cheka.
This marked the end of the period of final formation of the structure and functions of the operational units of the USSR state security agencies. For many years thereafter, all their reorganizations were based on the milestone achieved in 1921.

Local bodies of the Cheka

Since April 1918, the local bodies of the Cheka have become provincial and district Chekas (from January 1919, political bureaus in the districts as part of the local police, and from December 19, 1921, the status of district
The Politburo was promoted, they became independent departments of the executive committees).
Their typical internal structure consisted of:
- investigative commission;
- secret part;
- department for combating counter-revolution and department for combating profiteering.
However, the forces and means available to the Cheka were not enough to effectively carry out repressive tasks, therefore, on December 10 (23), 1917, the Collegium of the Cheka at one of its meetings considered the issue “On armed force” and turned to the Council of People's Commissars for assistance in this matter.
The resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of January 14, 1918 is legislative
granted the Cheka the right to organize special detachments, and on March 7, 1918, the Board of the Cheka invited territorial bodies to form similar units within their composition. The civil department acquired its own armed forces, and from June 1918, all scattered detachments in the center and locally were consolidated into the Corps of Cheka Troops.
By the time of its formation, it consisted of 35 battalions with a staff strength of 750 people each with machine guns and artillery, mostly stationed in places of the most active opposition to the new government.

Intelligence activities of the Cheka

The struggle of the Cheka bodies with counter-revolutionary organizations was, as a rule, of a forceful nature. However, in the course of it, methods of intelligence activities were also used. Bodies of the Cheka carried out undercover penetration into hostile organizations, obtained information about their plans, personnel composition, and carried out work to disintegrate these organizations from the inside.
From the available archival materials it is clear that already from the first months of the existence of the Cheka, attempts were made to conduct intelligence work abroad.

Counterintelligence activities of the Cheka

None of the units of the Cheka carried out counterintelligence activities, and Dzerzhinsky made several attempts to create a corresponding service within the department subordinate to him.
The first of them dates back to January 1918, when the chairman of the Cheka was addressed with a letter by K. A. Shevaro-Votsitsky, a specialist with almost ten years of experience in Russian counterintelligence and human intelligence, who trained and sent agents behind the lines of German troops and himself repeatedly participated in "field" operations.
At the suggestion of Shevaro-Voitsitsky, a Counterintelligence Bureau (KRB) was organized as part of the Extraordinary Commission to conduct external and internal counterintelligence.
Its 35 employees began operations in Petrograd and Moscow, and also tried with considerable professionalism to begin operating in Finland.
However, already in March, the life of Shevaro-Voitsitsky was tragically cut short, and with it the very existence of the KRB ceased. The commander of the sailor detachment assigned to the Counterintelligence Bureau, Polyakov, suspected his boss of counter-revolutionary activities and, without much delay, ordered his subordinates to shoot him...
At the end of May 1918, a small secret Department to counter German espionage was organized as part of the Department for Combating Counter-Revolution of the Cheka. Eighteen-year-old left Socialist-Revolutionary Ya. G. Blyumkin, an adventurer by nature, who called his structure the “Department for Combating International Espionage,” was appointed its chief.

Yakov Grigorievich Blyumkin (Simkha-Yankev Gershevich Blyumkin pseudonyms: Isaev, Max, Vladimirov; date of birth February 27, 1900, executed by decision of the OGPU Board of November 3, 1929) - Russian revolutionary and terrorist, Soviet security officer, intelligence officer and statesman, adventurer.
One of the founders of the Soviet intelligence services.
Possible prototype of the young Stirlitz.
Rehabilitated posthumously.

Blumkin immediately began, in his own words, to “entangle the German embassy in espionage networks.”
However, the Department for Countering German Espionage did not last long.
At one of the parties, Blumkin, in the company of writers, declared that he had the right to shoot any person he wanted.
Osip Mandelstam, who was present there, was outraged by such arbitrariness and complained to his acquaintances - prominent Bolsheviks Fyodor Raskolnikov and his wife Larisa Reisner, and then Dzerzhinsky invited the poet to his place.
After a conversation with him on July 1, 1918, “Iron Felix” immediately closed the Department for Countering German Espionage...
From that moment on and for a long time, the most important priority of the main Soviet secret service was the fight against counter-revolution, profiteering and crimes in office, that is, the problems not of counterintelligence, but of the political police.

Transformation of the Cheka

By decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of February 6, 1922, the Cheka was transformed into the State Political Administration (GPU) under the NKVD of the RSFSR.

Information sources:

1. Primakov “History of Russian foreign intelligence: Essays: In 6 volumes.” volume 2
2. Wikipedia website
3. Directory “Higher bodies of state power and administration of Russia in the 9th-20th centuries.”
4. Lander “Unspoken Wars. History of special services 1919-1945"

Articles in the VChK category

Against gangs and formations that arose as a result of a split in society, as well as against persons accused of counter-revolutionary activities. The majority of people accused of this were former White Guards and other persons who did not agree with the new government and fought against it in the form of sabotage, directed primarily against the civilian population.

It had territorial units to combat bandit formations on the ground.

It is from the abbreviation “Cheka” that the word “chekist” comes.

In particular, the work of the Cheka to destroy gangs and formations is especially clearly shown in the film by N. Mikhalkov “One among strangers, a stranger among friends.”

Tasks of the Cheka

V.I. Lenin, the main ideologist of its formation, called the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, without which “the power of the working people cannot exist as long as there are exploiters in the world...”, “our devastating weapon against countless conspiracies, countless attempts on Soviet power by people who were infinitely stronger than us."

Structure of the Cheka

History of Soviet state security agencies
Cheka under the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR (1917-1922) GPU under the NKVD of the RSFSR (1922-1923) OGPU under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (1923-1934) NKVD USSR (1934-1941) GUGB NKVD USSR (1941-1943) NKGB USSR (1943-1946) MGB USSR (1946-1953) Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR (1953-1954) KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR (1954-1978) KGB USSR (1978-1991)

Memorial sign of the Cheka-KGB

From December 22, 1917 to March 1918, the Cheka was located in Petrograd on Gorokhovaya Street. , no. 2 (now the Museum of Russian Political Police).

The administrative apparatus of the Cheka was headed by a collegium. The governing body was the Presidium of the Cheka, headed by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Cheka, who had two deputies; document flow was provided by 2 personal secretaries.

The Cheka apparatus had the following departments and divisions:

to combat counter-revolution
foreign department (December 20, 1920)
counterintelligence department
international relations department
to combat speculation
for combating crimes by position
prison department
out-of-town department
organizational department
railway department (since July 27, 1918).
military department (since July 27, 1918)
Secret department to combat “the hostile activities of the clergy” (since February 1919), later called the 6th department
Commission for Combating Smuggling (since December 8, 1921)

In December 1917, the Cheka apparatus consisted of 40 people, in March 1918 - 120 employees.

In March 1918, the central apparatus of the Cheka was transferred, together with the Soviet government, to Moscow. Since 1919, he occupied the building of the Rossiya insurance company (Building of state security bodies on Lubyanka).

Territorial and specialized units

Territorial railway "Gubchek" at large railway stations and junctions;
Front and army emergency commissions (until February 21, 1919)
Special departments for combating espionage and counter-revolution in units and institutions of the Red Army (since February 21, 1919).

In 1918 there were 40 provincial (known as GubChK) and 365 county emergency commissions.

The organs of the Cheka in the Red Army were created at the end of 1918 to organize the fight against counter-revolution in the army and in the front line, espionage and conducting reconnaissance behind enemy lines.

Since August 1918, the border, railway and water transport authorities of the Cheka have been functioning.

Authority

Initially, the functions and powers of the Cheka were defined rather imprecisely, which, for example, is reflected in the report of F. E. Dzerzhinsky on December 7, 1917, where he said “The commission is conducting only a preliminary investigation, since this is necessary for suppression.”

From the moment of its formation, the Cheka acquires legislative (direct participation in the development of legislation), judicial (legal proceedings) and executive (intelligence, operational and investigative work) functions in one department. Administratively, direct measures of influence are applied, which were initially quite mild: depriving counter-revolutionaries of food cards, compiling and publishing lists of enemies of the people, confiscation of counter-revolutionary property and a number of others.

With the outbreak of the civil war, the Cheka received emergency powers, measures according to which were taken in relation to counter-revolutionaries and saboteurs, persons suspected of profiteering and banditry.

Starting with the first executions of Reds captured by Whites, the murders of Volodarsky and Uritsky and the assassination attempt on Lenin (in the summer of 1918), the custom of arresting and often executing hostages became universal and was legalized. The Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Profiteering and Sabotage, which carried out mass arrests of suspects, tended to personally determine their fate, under the formal control of the party, but actually without anyone’s knowledge.

At the same time, the very fact of counter-revolutionism could be interpreted in two ways, since the definition of this term was rather imprecise:

This definition of counter-revolutionary speeches is given by the Decree of the Cassation Department of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of November 6, 1918.

On April 17, 1920, “Circular Letter of the Cheka No. 4 on the relationship of emergency commissions with tribunals” was adopted in secret, which, in particular, contains the following recommendation:

The Cheka simultaneously informs its comrades that special instructions are being developed for the tribunals [on] the so-called “simplified procedure for considering” cases, which, being strictly built on the basis of the articles of the published law, but when all legal proceedings will be reduced to the reading of the indictment, interrogation of the accused and sentencing.

The abolition of the Cheka was preceded by the speech of V.I. Lenin on December 23, 1921 at the IX All-Russian Congress of Soviets:

...the situation that has created in our country imperatively requires limiting this institution to the purely political sphere, ...it is necessary to subject the Cheka to reform, define its functions and competence and limit its work to political tasks...

Special powers

From February 21, 1918 - according to the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR "The Socialist Fatherland is in danger!" “Enemy agents, speculators, thugs, hooligans, counter-revolutionary agitators, German spies are shot at the scene of the crime.”

However, it is reported that until July 1918, the Cheka used the right to execute only a few criminal elements and large speculators, while not yet applying this rule to political criminals.

From September 5, 1918 - the right to directly eliminate spies, saboteurs, and other violators of revolutionary legality.

. Rights and obligations to shoot “all persons connected with White Guard organizations, conspiracies and rebellions” and to directly carry out the Red Terror.

The resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars on the abolition of the use of capital punishment (execution) dated January 17, 1920: 104–105, signed by Lenin and Dzerzhinsky, was overshadowed by the unauthorized nightly liquidation of Cheka prisoners in Petrograd and Moscow before the document came into force: 124,247. The repeal did not last long; on January 28, 1920, Dzerzhinsky sent a secret telegram to all front-line Cheka about their rights of “direct reprisal, i.e. execution for crimes mentioned in the resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of June 22, 1919”, on February 12 sends a telegram to Bokiy about the non-extension of the abolition to Turkestan, and at the beginning of the Polish intervention on March 6, 1920 in Belarus, already on March 7 telegrams to special departments of fronts and armies, including civilian tribunals granting the right to execute.

On January 2, 1922, due to the unstable situation in Siberia, Dzerzhinsky asked for powers equal to the supreme judge with a telephone message to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to expand the powers of the chairman of the Cheka until he received the personal right to sanction the verdicts of all tribunals.

Activity

Performance results

Identification and liquidation of large underground organizations (“Union for the Defense of the Motherland and Freedom”, “All-Russian National Center”), conspiracies of foreign intelligence and specialized services were eliminated.

Criticism of the Cheka

When the Central Committee of the RCP (b) discussed the issues of amending the legislative acts regulating the activities of the Cheka on October 25, 1918, a number of party delegates condemned “the absolute power of an organization that places itself not only above the Soviets, but also above the party itself,” at the same time Bukharin , Olminsky and People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Petrovsky demanded the elimination in the activities of the Cheka of “the arbitrariness of an organization stuffed with criminals, sadists and decayed elements of the lumpen proletariat.” Kamenev, as Chairman of the Political Control Commission, was more radical, proposing an extreme measure - the actual abolition of the Cheka as a structure.

V.I. Lenin made a statement about the full support and protection of the structure, “which, for some of its actions, was subjected to unfair accusations from the limited intelligentsia, ... unable to look at the issue of terror from a broader perspective,” and the Central Committee of the RCP (b) at his proposal issues a Decree of December 19, 1918, legally enshrining the ban on any criticism of the activities of the Cheka:

On the pages of the party and Soviet press, malicious criticism of Soviet institutions cannot take place, as was the case in some articles about the activities of the Cheka, whose work takes place in particularly difficult conditions.

Dzerzhinsky was aware of the scale of dissatisfaction with the powers and work of the department, which was reflected in official documents, quote.

The tasks of the Cheka included the elimination of homelessness and neglect among children.

IN AND. Lenin, the main ideologist of its formation, called the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, without which “the power of the working people cannot exist as long as there are exploiters in the world...”, “our devastating weapon against countless conspiracies, countless attempts on Soviet power by people who have been endlessly stronger than us."

Structure of the Cheka

Memorial sign of the Cheka-KGB

The administrative apparatus of the Cheka was headed by a collegium; the governing body was the Presidium of the Cheka, headed by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Cheka, who had two deputies; document flow was ensured by two personal secretaries.

The Cheka apparatus had the following departments and divisions:

to combat counter-revolution
to combat speculation
for combating crimes by position
prison department
out-of-town department
organizational department
railway department (from July 27 of the year).
military department (from July 27 of the year)
Commission for Combating Smuggling (since December 8, 1921)

In December 1917, the Cheka apparatus consisted of 40 people, in March 1918 - 120 employees.

Territorial and specialized divisions.

Territorial railway "Gubchek" at railway junctions and stations
Front and army emergency commissions (until February 21, 1919)
Special departments for combating espionage and counter-revolution in units and institutions of the Red Army (since February 21, 1919).

In 1918, there were 40 provincial and 365 district emergency commissions.

The Cheka bodies in the Red Army were created at the end of 1918 to organize the fight against counter-revolution in the army and in the front line, espionage and reconnaissance behind enemy lines.

Since August 1918, the border, railway and water transport authorities of the Cheka have been functioning.

Authority

However, initially the functions and powers of the Cheka were defined rather imprecisely, which, for example, is reflected in the report of F. E. Dzerzhinsky on December 7, 1917, where he said “The commission is conducting only a preliminary investigation, since this is necessary for suppression.”

However, in fact, from the moment of its formation, the Cheka has both investigative and operational functions. Direct measures of influence are also applied administratively, which were initially quite mild: depriving counter-revolutionaries of food cards, compiling and publishing lists of enemies of the people, confiscation of counter-revolutionary property and a number of others. Since at this time execution as capital punishment was abolished in the RSFSR, execution was not used by the Cheka authorities.

At the same time, the very fact of counter-revolutionism could be interpreted in two ways, since the definition of this term was rather imprecise:

This definition of counter-revolutionary speeches is given by the Decree of the Cassation Department of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of November 6, 1918.

Special powers

From February 21, 1918 - according to the Decree of the SKN of the RSFSR “The Socialist Fatherland is in danger!” “Enemy agents, speculators, thugs, hooligans, counter-revolutionary agitators, German spies are shot at the scene of the crime.”

However, it is reported that until July 1918, the Cheka used the right to execute only a few criminal elements and large speculators, while not yet applying this rule to political criminals.

The Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of June 20, 1919 “On the exclusion from general jurisdiction in areas declared under martial law” gives the Cheka bodies the right to directly shoot persons involved in arson, explosions, deliberate damage to railway tracks and other actions with counter-revolutionary intentions.

Performance results

Criticism of the Cheka

This position did not receive any party resonance at all and did not have wide support, since the most respected leaders of the RCP (b), in particular, its ideologist V.I. Lenin, the three leaders - I.V. Stalin, Trotsky, Sverdlov harshly criticized the softness of opponents of terror .

Repression of Cheka employees

With the actual transfer of control and management of state security bodies from the political party to I.V. Stalin in the implementation of their internal political functions experienced a significant deformation, expressed in the emergence of waves of repressions, including repressions against his own employees, the search for internal enemies, as a result of which approximately 20 thousand security officers were shot and killed, including former senior officials of the Cheka, who were considered “comrades-in-arms of Dzerzhinsky”: A. X. Artuzov, G. I. Bokiy, M. Ya. Latsis, M. S. Kedrov, V. N. Mantsev, G. S. Moroz, I. P. Pavlunovsky, Ya. X Peters, M. A. Trilisser, I. S. Unshlikht, V. V. Fomin.

Notes

Literature

TsGA RSFSR. “Higher bodies of state power and central government bodies of the RSFSR (1917-1967)”: Directory (based on materials from state archives)
Legget G. The Cheka: Lenin’s political police. - Oxford. 1981.
Sankovskaya, O.M. Formation of personnel of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, 1917-1922. : On the materials of the central apparatus of the Cheka: diss. ...cand. ist. Sciences: 07.00.02 - Arkhangelsk, 2004. - 273 p.
Ratkovsky I.S. Red terror and the activities of the Cheka in 1918. - St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg State University Publishing House, 2006. - 279 p.
Kapchinsky, O.I. Cheka: organizational structure and personnel composition. 1917-1922 : diss. ...cand. ist. Sciences: 07.00.02 - M., 2005. - 276 p.
Cheka Archive: Collection of documents / Responsible. ed. V. Vinogradov, A. Litvin, V. Khristoforov; comp.: V. Vinogradov, N. Peremyshlennikova. M.: Kuchkovo pole, 2007. - 719 p.: ill. - 3000 copies.

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See what the “All-Russian Extraordinary Commission” is in other dictionaries: - (VChK) in 1917 the 22nd body created to combat counter-revolution and sabotage. Founded (headed by F. E. Dzerzhinsky) in December 1917. In 1918, local bodies of the Cheka were created: provincial, district (abolished in January 1919), transport, front and ... ...

Big Encyclopedic Dictionary - (VChK; full All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Profiteering and Sabotage, later All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Profiteering and Crimes ex officio) in 1917 1922 body... ...

Political science. Dictionary. - (VChK) in 1917 1922 a body created to combat counter-revolution and sabotage. Founded (headed by F.E. Dzerzhinsky) in December 1917. In 1918, local bodies of the Cheka were created: provincial, district (abolished in January 1919), transport, ... ...

To Combat Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (VChK), created in December 1917 in Petrograd (headed by F. E. Dzerzhinsky). Since March 1918 in Moscow, it was located on Bolshaya Lubyanka Street (hence the common noun: get to Lubyanka). In 1918 local... ... Russian history

All-Russian Extraordinary Commission- see VChK... Encyclopedia of Law

ALL-RUSSIAN EMERGENCY COMMISSION- (VChK) in 1917 1922 a body created to combat counter-revolution and sabotage. Founded in December 1917. In 1918, local bodies of the Cheka were created: provincial, district (abolished in January 1919), transport, front and army Chekas. VChK... ... Legal encyclopedia

On December 20, 1917, by resolution of the Council of People's Commissars, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission under the Council of People's Commissars for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (VChK) was created...

The non-triumphant march of Soviet power

VChK - for some, behind these three letters lies a gloomy sect of pathological sadists and murderers, which has committed to the extermination of its fellow citizens. For others, these letters mean a kind of “order of warriors of Light” who fought without fear or reproach for a fair future for workers and peasants.

The image of the security officers is mythologized both by adherents of Soviet power and by its opponents. In fact, the birth of the Soviet security agencies, like many things in our country, happened almost by accident, chaotically, and sometimes simply curiously.

The Bolshevik Party was distinguished by a powerful organizational structure, representing, in Lenin’s apt expression, the “headquarters of the revolution.” But even at this “headquarters” they did not really understand what they would face after coming to power and how to resist the counter-revolutionaries, whose appearance, oddly enough, was unexpected for many in the party.

The idea that the gains of the revolution should be resolutely defended was supported by everyone in the Bolshevik leadership. But what is hidden behind this “resolutely”? In Soviet textbooks, the period immediately after the victory of the armed uprising in Petrograd was called the “Triumphal March of Soviet Power.”

In practice, everything did not look so triumphant. Indeed, there was almost no active resistance to the Bolsheviks on the ground, with the exception of Moscow, where heavy fighting took place. But the lack of resistance was caused not so much by the active support of the Bolsheviks, but by the complete disorganization of any local government institutions at all.

Organized Chaos

When it became clear that the Bolsheviks were determined to remain in power for a long time, their opponents began to resist. Moreover, this opposition occurred not only locally, but also in Petrograd itself.

The capital of the former empire was plunged into chaos. Paralyzed and destroyed, the old law enforcement agencies were unable to maintain even basic order on the streets. In addition to ordinary criminal offenses, pogroms of wine warehouses became a headache for the Bolsheviks, in which the very workers for whose “better future” the Leninist party fought were actively involved.

But the most formidable problem for the Bolsheviks who took power was the sabotage of government officials.

Figures from the displaced Provisional Government, as well as from bourgeois parties, very quickly found an effective method of influencing the new regime. The total refusal of government officials and banks to work under Bolshevik rule threatened to plunge the country into complete chaos. The paralysis of state bodies made the new government untenable and threatened its fall in the shortest possible time.

During these days, the Bolsheviks tried to take control of government bodies. However, the party simply did not have the required number of managers. The appointment of a conscientious sailor or soldier to the position of head of the bank looked revolutionary, but had no practical meaning - without knowledge and experience, such a “manager” could only aggravate the matter.

"Emergency measures are needed..."

Therefore, it was necessary to return the “old personnel” to work, and to solve this problem quickly enough.

For the first weeks, all functions of the fight against criminal elements, pogromists and saboteurs were in the hands of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee. However, this structure, created to organize the coordination of an armed uprising, was not adapted for new functions.

In December 1917, the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee was dissolved, but the question arose about creating a new structure that would take over the functions of combating sabotage.

From the note Vladimir Lenin to Felix Dzerzhinsky:

« The bourgeoisie commits the worst crimes, bribing the dregs of society and degenerate elements, soldering them for the purpose of pogroms. Supporters of the bourgeoisie, especially among senior employees, bank officials, etc., sabotage work, organize strikes in order to undermine the government in its measures aimed at implementing socialist transformations. It even goes so far as to sabotage the food supply, threatening millions of people with starvation. Emergency measures are needed to combat counter-revolutionaries and saboteurs..."

On December 18, 1917, the Bolsheviks intercepted a telegram from the Small Council of Ministers of the former Provisional Government, calling on all officials to commit sabotage on an all-Russian scale. In this situation there was no time to hesitate.

"Robespierre" and "Saint-Just"

The question of who should be entrusted with the creation and management of the new structure was decided by Lenin. Having rejected the volunteer candidates, the leader chose someone who was not very keen on this role - Felix Dzerzhinsky.

In his new position, Lenin needed a person who was selflessly and fanatically devoted to the ideals of the revolution, but at the same time not burdened by a craving for punitive methods. This is exactly the kind of person Dzerzhinsky was.

Yakov Peters, Dzerzhinsky’s deputy at the Cheka, later recalled:

« At the meeting of the Council of People's Commissars, where the question of the fight against counter-revolution arose, there were those who wanted to head the Commission. But Lenin called Dzerzhinsky... “a proletarian Jacobin.” After the meeting, Felix Edmundovich sadly noted that if he is now Robespierre, then Peters is Saint-Just, apparently. But both of us are not laughing..."

Felix Dzerzhinsky (right) and Yakov Peters (left).

In the protocol No. 21 of the meeting of the Council of People's Commissars of December 20, 1917, it was written that the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission was called upon to solve the following tasks:

1. Suppress and eliminate all counter-revolutionary and sabotage attempts and actions throughout Russia, no matter who they come from.

2. Bring all saboteurs and counter-revolutionaries to trial before a revolutionary tribunal and develop measures to combat them.

3. Conduct only a preliminary investigation, as this is necessary to suppress sabotage.

These three points limited the definition of the goals, methods and tasks of the Cheka. The structure was not given any punitive powers. The maximum that the Cheka could do was to identify the saboteur, detain him, determine the degree of his involvement in illegal activities and either release him or transfer him further into the hands of the tribunal.

23 security officers throughout Russia

The building of the former mayor of Petrograd, located at Gorokhovaya, 2, was allocated for the new structure. The same Jacob Peters described his impressions of the first working day:

“Yesterday we were on Gorokhovaya. The house of the former mayor is empty, with broken windows. We are twenty-three people, including typists and couriers. The entire “office” is in Dzerzhinsky’s meager folder; the entire “cash register” is in my leather jacket pocket. Where to begin?"

We started with everything at once. On December 23, Izvestia TsIK published a message about the creation of the Cheka, indicated its location and called on conscientious citizens to come with complaints about speculators, saboteurs and other counter-revolutionary elements.

The people came in droves. And the first security officers had to listen to complaints about rising prices, scandalous neighbors, everyday problems - in general, a classic story from the series “they wanted the best.”

The naivety of the early days of the Cheka also had more sinister consequences. The revolutionaries fundamentally rejected intelligence work, focusing only on open statements of citizens about crimes. Petrograd residents willingly went to the new government, reported bandits who had become unruly, and then the bodies of the applicants were found in ditches. The criminals, who remained indifferent to the arrival of the “new life,” simply exterminated the “informers” as a warning to others. The security officers learned from bitter experience to protect witnesses.

To understand what the work of the Cheka looked like in the first months of its existence in Petrograd, and then in Moscow, it is enough to read this note from Dzerzhinsky:

« Check the information that speculators often gather and gamble in the apartment at B. Kozikhinsky Lane, 12».

Having received such an assignment, the security officer went to the headquarters of the Red Guard, where he asked for a detachment of revolutionary-minded soldiers and sailors, with whom he went out for the “operation.”

Dzerzhinsky in the courtyard of the Cheka building 1918

There was no talk of any professional training - sometimes security officers came under heavy fire from criminals and suffered serious losses. Even more often, no one was caught at all by such a signal.

The case of the "Union of Unions"

Well, what about sabotage and the fight against it? Yes, these matters were a priority for the Cheka. The first of these was the case of the “Union of Unions of State Employees”.

Despite the tautology in the name, the “Union of Unions” turned out to be a very effective “sabotage headquarters”. Not only did organizational activities take place through him, but also funds were distributed to maintain the “fighting spirit” of officials who did not go to work.

The “Union of Unions,” however, was also imperfect and ignored the rules of secrecy, which allowed the security officers led by Dzerzhinsky to arrest the leaders of the organization. The investigation into the “Union” case, headed by an official of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Kondratiev, was personally led by Felix Dzerzhinsky.

The outcome of the case, from the point of view of today's ideas about the Cheka, is completely unexpected. By March 1, 1918, out of 30 detainees, 29 people were released on bail or released for other reasons. The only one who found himself before the investigative commission of the revolutionary tribunal was Kondratiev himself.

However, he was released after interrogation. That is, the fact of sabotage was revealed, investigated, confirmed, but the Cheka and the revolutionary tribunal completed this case “without trial or application of punishment.”

First executions

It is no coincidence that these first months of the Cheka’s existence are called the “romantic period.” Moreover, not only the employees of the Cheka are romantics, but also its leader himself. In a note written in January 1918, Dzerzhinsky asks the headquarters of the Red Guard to be sent to work in the banking department of the Cheka " 5–10 comrade Red Guards, aware of their great mission as revolutionaries, inaccessible either to bribery or the corrupting influence of gold.”

Dzerzhinsky, who himself spent many years imprisoned in tsarist prisons, actually acted in the first months as chairman of the Cheka as a strict advocate of compliance with the law, called for humane treatment of detainees and was in no way a supporter of repression.

F.E. Dzerzhinsky among the employees of the Cheka. Photo from 1918

But there is no need to harbor rosy illusions - the tougher the situation became, the more violent the civil conflict in Russia became, the further romance faded from the actions of the security officers.

In connection with the offensive of the German army, a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars was adopted on February 21, 1918, “The Socialist Fatherland is in danger!” It stated that “enemy agents, speculators, thugs, hooligans, counter-revolutionary agitators, German spies are shot at the scene of the crime.”

This document for the first time gives the Cheka the authority to carry out extrajudicial executions. It was first used on February 26, 1918. It was not political opponents of the Bolsheviks who were executed, but bandits - the self-proclaimed Prince Eboli (aka de Gricoli, Naydi, Makovsky, Dalmatov) and his accomplice Britt.

This couple was well prepared to be shot - the raiders, posing as employees of the Cheka, committed a number of robberies and murders. During a search of the apartment where the “prince” lived, looted jewelry, gold, and unique works of art stolen from the Winter Palace were discovered.

Romance was replaced by terror

The second execution took place two days later - two more raiders were executed, also posing as employees of the Cheka. Until June 1918, the total number of death sentences will not exceed 50. Again, we are talking about bandits, speculators, counterfeiters, and not about political enemies.

But the process, as they say, has begun. The turning point in the history of the Cheka was the revolt of the left Socialist Revolutionaries in July 1918, and then the murder of Uritsky and the attempt on Lenin committed by the Socialist Revolutionaries.

Announcement of executions by the Vitebsk Cheka. 1918

In response to this, the Bolsheviks declared “Red Terror,” the implementation of which was entrusted to the Cheka. Felix Dzerzhinsky, previously removed from his post, after the Left Socialist Revolutionary rebellion (during which the Cheka showed itself to be a structure ineffective in combating threats to the state system), returns to the leadership of the security officers and with an iron hand brings down that same punishing sword on the head of the right and the guilty...

The “romantic period” ended, the bloody everyday life of the civil war began...

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Oh, these myths. However, in Soviet times, the concept of “a real Chekist” was the highest assessment of the activities of our KGB law enforcement officers. And among THOSE there were truly honest and decent people, exceptionally devoted to both the protection of law and order and the preservation of our very...Soviet statehood.
Whatever one may say, under the Soviets the STATE...of workers and peasants WAS A REALITY. Another thing is that it was led by the party nomenklatura. But the entire INTERNAL policy of our state was built precisely on the subject of PROTECTING this system, as we then considered - FAIR and socially oriented.
We all lived with the attitude that there SHOULD NOT BE RICH people in our society.
However, only many decades later we realized that it would be better if we lived with the attitude that THERE SHOULD NOT BE POOR. Text hidden

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→ “However, only after many decades did we understand that it would be better if we lived with the attitude that there SHOULD NOT BE POOR people” - this was whispered to us by the 40 who recently met with Putin, according to the law of communicating vessels, if it leaked from somewhere, then it flowed somewhere, but they don’t tell us about it and there is a feeling that these laws will not be taught soon, the stupider the people, the richer the “cream” Text hidden

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→ And to the end, as always, the most interesting thing. One of the most sinister figures surrounding the Father of Nations. The most terrible Bolshevik ghoul! It won't be until nightfall! “A living component of the Stalinist guillotine” - according to D. Volkogonov.
Ulrich Vasily Vasilyevich (1889 - 1951) - was born into a decent, wealthy family, his mother was a writer. He joined the revolutionary movement in 1908, in 1910 he joined the RSDLP, a Bolshevik. Since 1918 he worked in the bodies of the Cheka - NKVD. Together with Ya. S. Agranov (Sorenson Yankel Shmaevich) in 1919 he participated in the development of provocative operations. Among them are Operation Whirlwind and Sebezh Affair. Since 1919 - Commissioner of the Headquarters of the Internal Security Troops. In February 1922, he led the mass executions of naval officers of the White armies who remained in Crimea. In 1926 - 1948 - Chairman of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR (replaced V.A. Trifonov in this post) and at the same time in 1935-38 - Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR. Each defendant's case was heard for an average of 15 minutes. The sentence was carried out immediately and immediately. (Khodorkovsky only had his sentence read for two weeks! – This is a real political trial! Well done, Comrade Ustinov! A worthy follower of Comrade Ulrich)
He presided over the trial of the “king of terror” Boris Viktorovich Savinkov. In 1930-31, he presided over rigged trials of “bourgeois specialists and engineers.” He was also the chairman of the largest political trials of the era of the “Great Terror” - in the cases of the “anti-Soviet united Trotskyist-Zinoviev bloc” (August 19-24, 1936), the “parallel anti-Soviet center” (January 23-30, 1937), the “anti-Soviet center” (2-13 March 1938), “right-Trotskyist center”, “counter-revolutionary military-fascist organization” - the case of Tukhachevsky-Yakir (01 June 1937) and others. The board under his chairmanship on September 27, 1938, “dealt with” the case of S.P. Korolev in 15 minutes. He signed sanctions for the execution of Yagoda, and then Yezhov. His signature is on the death sentences of the most famous “enemies of the people” - Bukharin, Rykov, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Tukhachevsky, Blucher, Yakir...
One of the main organizers of terror. He received instructions on the punishment for the defendants personally from Stalin. By 1937, Ulrich's reports to the leader became almost daily. The discreet three-story house No. 23 on 25 October Street, where the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR met, was called the “Execution House.” (Immediately behind the Nautilus shopping center, slightly to the left of the monument to the pioneer printer Ivan Fedorov). A long tunnel leads into the courtyard of this terrible house directly from the courtyard of the Lubyanka prison.
Plump, outwardly intelligent, radiating self-satisfaction, Ulrich usually announced a break after a few minutes of hearing the case. And the court, as required by law, retired for a meeting, and after another two or three minutes returned and the defendant was sentenced. Those sentenced to death were shot here, in the remote and dark basements of the Military Collegium building in the very center of Moscow. Ulrich personally shot his good friend, People's Commissar of Justice Nikolai Krylenko.
In 1938, Ulrich informed L.P. Beria that from October 1, 1936 to September 30, 1938, the Military Collegium headed by him and visiting collegiums in 60 cities sentenced 30,514 people to death and 5,643 people to imprisonment. According to historians, Ulrich sentenced as many people to death and hard labor as no other person in the entire history of mankind had sentenced. The Duke of Alba and Torquemada are resting! The "Bloody" Duke of Alba, Ferdinand Alvarez de Toledo, horrified Europe by executing 1,800 people in the rebellious Dutch states! The Grand Inquisitor Thomas Torquemada burned more than 10,000 people in Spain in his auto-da-fe (acts of faith) and remained for centuries a symbol of bloody massacres! And the “polite, taciturn” and inconspicuous Latvian Ulrich shot 15,000 people a year! 41 people per day! (if there are no days off).
On September 8, 1941, without initiating a criminal case, without conducting a preliminary investigation or trial, in absentia, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, chaired by Ulrich, passed a verdict against 161 prisoners serving their sentences in the Oryol prison, condemning everyone under Article of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR No. 58-10, part 2 to capital punishment - execution. Based on a written order from Ulrich, received by the head of the NKVD for the Oryol region, the sentence was carried out on September 11, 1941. According to Lev Razgon, “All those killed were gagged with specially sewn gags, their hands were tied, they were told that they would now be shot, then they were put in trucks and sent 11 kilometers into the forest, where ditches had already been dug for the corpses.” Among those executed: Olga Okudzhava, 63 years old, “Socialist Revolutionary Mother of God” - Maria Spiridonova, 57 years old - half-blind, disabled after torture and 10 years of Nerchinsk hard labor (the first political person to be exposed to Soviet punitive psychiatry), Olga Kameneva, 59 years old, Rakovsky, 68 years old, professor Pletnev is 69 years old... And the criminals managed to be transported to other prisons!
In 1948, for excessive leniency towards Ukrainian peasants (they were not shot, but only exiled to Siberia), he was dismissed by Stalin. In 1950 he was arrested and died on May 7, 1951 of a stroke in prison. He was buried at the Novodevichy cemetery. The obituary said: “Comrade Ulrich always combined merciless repressiveness towards the enemies of the people with the principles of revolutionary legality.” He was married to Anna Davydovna Kassel (1892-1974), a member of the RSDLP since 1910, an employee of the secretariat of V. I. Lenin. Personal life was not successful. He sent his parents to the House of Revolutionary Veterans, divorced his two wives, and was not interested in his son. For most of his life he lived not at home, but in a luxury room at the Metropol Hotel, not far from the Execution House. He often took prostitutes there who were scared to death. The only passion that consumed him was collecting butterflies and beetles. Like all executioners, he had the most simple-minded appearance - a kind bald man with a Chaplin mustache.
I couldn’t find any data: is Ulrich considered repressed? His teacher and first sidekick Yankel Shmulevich Agranov-Sorenson almost ended up under rehabilitation. In 1955, the Main Military Prosecutor's Office nevertheless refused to review the case of Ya. S. Agranov as involved in organizing mass repressions.
All attempts by the Memorial to evaluate Ulrich's activities were unsuccessful. “In accordance with paragraph 8 of Article 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR, a criminal case against V.V. Ulrikh for the facts of his unjust sentences cannot be instituted, and the instituted case (about execution in the Oryol prison) is subject to termination: “in relation to the deceased, except for cases when the proceedings are necessary for the rehabilitation of the deceased or the initiation of proceedings against other persons due to newly discovered circumstances.” Text hidden It would be better if you did not mention this Memorial. This is a pro-American company. And here we are getting through with money from the US State Department.
If our zealous human rights activists were not fussing in the human rights field in the interests of ALL the people, I would just take off my hat.
But, unfortunately, ALL of them, these human rights activists, eat the Yankees out of their hands. And they exist comfortably. But they don’t mow and they don’t reap. So where does the money come from for such activities?
Here, one of my comrades once wrote to me, telling me not to touch the Memorial and Alekseeva, because, how senile this old woman is, it turns out, she hired lawyers for him and saved him from trial. And this comrade doesn’t care that they protected him with money from the State Department. How disgusting. And we HAVE lawyers who defend people in courts for FREE.
And this Memorial... Typical State Department SHIT. Text hidden

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How many of the best representatives of the Russian intelligentsia: philosophers, poets, writers, artists, doctors, scientists, simply honest people - were killed by two Latvian half-educated Vahlaks with their own hands or the hands of their executioners! How can we calculate now: how many millions of dollars should Latvia pay us for Florensky, Kharms, Gumilevs Nikolai and Lev, Vladimir Narbut, Artyom Vesely, Platonov, Pilnyak, Shalamov, Mandelstam, Babel, Tsvetaeva, Yesenin, Mayakovsky, in total - more than 1000 Soviet writers, Meyerhold, Zhzhenov, Vera Fedorova, Ruslanova, Maretskaya. What names!!! The list goes on and on...
I wonder what compensation Russia could demand from Latvia for the destruction of the “cultural layer” of its population in 1918-1923?

And now, for contrast, name at least ten names of Latvian cultural figures! Janis Rainis, Vilis Lacis (writer - many know about him, but no one has read anything), Raimonds Pauls, Vija Artmane, Laima Vaikule, Kalnins Ivars - actor, famous fan of Grand coffee, Blaumanis - founder of the Latvian theater and some Is Rosenthal either an artist or an actor? Is this for their entire history?!

But completely different Latvians are well known. Almost everyone knows these names well. Latvia can rightfully be proud of him! Here they are - valiant representatives of the Latvian people who made a significant contribution to the development of the history of the USSR! Meet me.

Peters Yakov Khristoforovich (1886 - 1938) - during the October putsch of 1917 - member of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee. One of the founders of the Cheka, chairman of the Revolutionary Tribunal. "Bloody security officer." He insisted that the Cheka was not under the control of the party and the government. One of the leaders of the liquidation of the Left Socialist Revolutionary rebellion. In 1920-1922, the representative of the Cheka in Turkestan was in the midst of the fight against the Basmachi. Since 1923 - member of the OGPU board. “Very often Peters himself was present at executions. They shot them in batches. The Red Army soldiers say that his son, a boy of 8–9 years old, always runs after Peters and constantly pesters him: “Dad, let me!” (“Revolutionary Russia” No. 4, 1920). He received his well-deserved vyshak in 1938, it’s a pity that not earlier... For some reason he was rehabilitated... (Although by his own - “gebiem”...)

Latsis Martyn Ivanovich (Jan Friedrichovich Sudrabs) (1888 - 1938) is also a graduate of the Central School of Music. An active participant in the October putsch of 1917 - a member of the Vyborg regional headquarters for the preparation of the uprising, a member of the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee, from 1917 a member of the NKVD board, from 1918 - a member of the VChK board (one of the organizers of the VChK). One of the most convinced supporters of strengthening the punitive functions of the Cheka, an apologist for the “Red Terror,” was distinguished by unprecedented cruelty even among the butchers from the Cheka. He constantly demanded from the Cheka more and more executions, emphasizing that in order to impose a death sentence there is no need to prove the guilt of the arrested person, and that the “Chekreka” should be guided only by “revolutionary consciousness.” He stated that “The Cheka is not an investigative board or a court, it is a fighting organ of the party of the future, the communist party. But this is not a guillotine, cutting off the head by order of the tribunal. No, it either destroys without trial, catching them at the crime scene, or isolates them from society, imprisoning them in a concentration camp. What a word is is a law.” Since 1928 - deputy. head department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for work in the countryside. One of the leaders of collectivization and dispossession operations. Imagine what rivers of blood this “collectivizer” shed in our Russian villages! They slapped their own in 1938, and in 1956 he was rehabilitated by his own. His son, journalist Alexander Latsis, wrote numerous enthusiastic memories of “one of the best, proven communists” in the Soviet press.

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Text hidden All-Russian Extraordinary Commission

(VChK), was created on December 7 (20 according to the new style) 1917 by a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) of the RSFSR, on the initiative of V.I. Lenin.

The basis for the decision to create the Cheka was the report of F.E. Dzerzhinsky, made to the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR the day before, December 6, dedicated to the problem of sabotage of orders of the Soviet government by civil servants and the problem of “intrigues of counter-revolution” in general.

On January 7, 1918, the Board of the Cheka was replenished, as well as representatives of the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party: V.D. Volkov, M.F. Emelyanov, P.F. Sidorov, V.A. Aleksandrovich; the latter became deputy chairman of the Cheka. Later, Alexandrovich was replaced by G.D. Zaks.

At the beginning of 1918, the Cheka was divided into the following departments:
– fight against counter-revolution () .
Within this department, a small department was created to combat foreign spies in the RSFSR, headed by Yakov Blumkin;
– political consequence(later – the investigative part of the Cheka; Mantsev);
– combating banditry;
– combating sabotage and profiteering;
– border protection.

Reached leading positions Special department, who was directly involved in suppressing political resistance to Soviet power, organizing the Red Terror and working in the army. This department was headed by Mikhail Kedrov, and at the end of the Civil War -.

For operational work (acquisition and management of agents) it is created Secret political department, led by Nikolai Skrypnik, and to work with local branches of the Cheka - Nonresident department, led by Grigory Moroz. He was in charge of the personnel of the Cheka Administrative department(Moses Braginsky). It was also created Case Management(Genrikh Yagoda).

In 1918 it was created Prison department, responsible for all places of detention of prisoners, the head of which was also the commandant of the VChK investigative prison - Butyrskaya, then Lefortovo, as well as the internal prison at Lubyanka itself. Its first boss was Evseev, later - Byalogorodsky. On January 24, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars decided to introduce forced labor in places of detention, and on April 15, 1919. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopts a Resolution on the creation of forced labor camps ( concentration camps ), whose system was administered Prison department of the Cheka. This is exactly how it was born GULAG

- main camp management. In 1919, the Cheka was created Special Department for Technical Affairs and Supervision within the Bolshevik party itself, which was headed by Sahak Ter-Gabrielyan, who was later replaced by the former head of the Petrograd Cheka. “Technical matters” included reading correspondence, wiretapping telephone conversations, conducting external surveillance and recruiting internal agents within the ranks of the party apparatus. Was involved in the government apparatus (Soviets, etc.) Department for Combating Counter-Revolution

. The registration department, which was in charge of recording cases, was headed by Rotzen. In 1920 it was created(INO) VChK - foreign policy intelligence, headed by Yakov Davtyan. In its work, the INO relied on the capabilities of the Comintern. The organization of foreign intelligence (in adjacent territories) was also carried out by Border Protection Department– by the forces of border detachments. Then he appeared in the Cheka Legal department. Finally, in the same 1920, Department of Protection of Government Officials(future “Nine”) led by Yakov Belenky. On In practice, this meant placing the country's leadership - including Lenin - under KGB control. Dzerzhinsky tried to take control of military intelligence, but its specifics did not allow this, moreover, in this case, the Cheka would become the only source of external information for the country's leadership.

According to the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of December 21, 1917, the priority tasks of the Cheka were:
– suppression of acts of sabotage and any counter-revolutionary actions;
–trial by the Revolutionary Tribunal everyone guilty of such and the development of measures to combat them;
– conducting a preliminary investigation and taking preventive measures against suspected persons.

A main attention This decision ordered to pay attention to:
– seal(censorship);
– sabotage(The Cheka received the right to arrest “violators of labor discipline”, and it became possible to arrest for being late for work or marriage - long before the 30s);
– cadets(fight against open opponents of the Bolsheviks);
– right socialist revolutionaries(the fight against yesterday’s allies; the Mensheviks were soon added to the right Socialist Revolutionaries, anarchists from April 1918, and left Socialist Revolutionaries from July 1918. In 1920, the Bundists joined the list. Work against the nationalists of the outskirts was carried out separately: in the Special Department of the Cheka a corresponding Direction was created in 1919. Such Directions were created for each party, as necessary);
– strikers(strike suppression).
Later - in the spring of 1918 - the fight against the church.

The measures that the Cheka could apply against guilty or suspected persons were called by Lenin):
– confiscation of property;
– expulsion(eviction from home);
– deprivation of food cards(actually meant starvation);
– publication of lists of enemies of the people(it was tantamount to a death sentence).

All these measures were extrajudicial, and were applied by the Cheka at its discretion.

Thus, the Cheka received essentially unlimited police powers. Since there were no criteria determining who was an “enemy of the people” and who was not, arbitrariness became inevitable. The Red Terror was now just a matter of time, or rather, a matter of the reason for its start. The apparatus for its implementation, represented by the Cheka, had already been created and received all the powers.

As we can see, the Cheka was initially created not as a state security agency, but as a body to suppress political opponents of the Bolshevik Party. This The peculiarity - the political and repressive nature of the created special service - remained until the end of the Soviet era.

On December 21, 1917, the Council of People's Commissars decided that the activities of the Cheka should be monitored by the People's Commissariat of Justice, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the Presidium of the Petrograd Soviet, but this was nothing more than an appearance. In fact, only Lenin and KGB can control the security officers: the first - as the head of the government, the second - as the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the RSFSR. But the most interesting thing is that the activities of the Cheka were to be carried out on the basis of instructions developed by itself. That is, Dzerzhinsky received from Lenin carte blanche for any actions, and another distinctive feature was laid into the very foundation of the Soviet intelligence services: lack of control.

Initially, the Cheka did not have the right to impose death sentences, but already on February 26, 1918, the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars gave this right to the Cheka.

On June 26, 1918, the Cheka received the right to execute on the spot, as well as the right to administratively arrest citizens for an indefinite period - without evidence of their guilt - on suspicion. In 1920, it was clarified that the period for which the Cheka could arbitrarily arrest citizens should not exceed two years.

Initially, the number of the Cheka apparatus was small: only 40 employees, not counting technical personnel. By July 1918 120 people worked there. But this is only formal: the performance of security functions (including arrests, searches, interrogations and executions) was often provided to persons who were not serving in the Cheka. And by the end of the Civil War, the Cheka was already a structure of many thousands, permeating the entire society with its influence.

The exact number of victims of the KGB terror during the Civil War is still unknown. The Cheka published the magazine “Red Terror” (editor –), in which lists of those executed were printed, and opinions were exchanged on methods of executions and interrogations.

For the period from 1917 to 1922. The Cheka has undergone an evolution - from an “armed detachment of the party” to practically the master of the situation in the country. The Cheka actually began to exert a decisive influence on the policy of the Soviet state.
Such a situation could not be tolerated, and on February 6, 1922, by decision of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Cheka was liquidated, and its powers were transferred to the NKVD, within which the State Political Administration (GPU) was created.

This, however, was not at all about restoring the rule of law or protecting human rights. “The court should not eliminate terror, but justify and legitimize it in principle, clearly, without falsehood and without embellishment. It must be formulated as broadly as possible...” (Lenin).