This battle in the West is called tank Tsushima. In our country it is known as the tank battle of Dubno, Lutsk, Brody.
The largest tank battle at that time. The battle involved 3,300 tanks. 2,500 from our side and 800 from the German side.
The battle took place from June 23 to June 29, 1941. Progress of the battle.
As a result of the offensive of the German Army Group South, by June 23, in the Rovno direction, a gap fifty kilometers wide had formed between the Soviet 5th and 6th armies. Formations of the first tank group under the command of Colonel General Kleist immediately rushed into the gap. There was a threat of a deep breakthrough by German troops and envelopment by them from the north of the main forces of the Southwestern Front.
In order to eliminate this threat and eliminate the enemy strike force, the command of the Southwestern Front organized a counterattack. Combined-arms formations and 6 mechanized corps were brought in to carry out the counterattack.
The first to strike the flanks of the enemy group were the 22.4 and 15 mechanized corps. Then the 9,19 and 8 mechanized corps, advanced from the second echelon, were introduced into the battle.
The corps entered the battle after a 200,400-kilometer march in parts, without waiting for the concentration of forces and the approach of combined arms formations. Even on the march, the corps suffered heavy losses from the actions of enemy aircraft. The rear fell behind and the tanks were not properly supplied with ammunition and fuels. Due to the complete superiority of enemy aviation There was no aerial reconnaissance. The mechanized corps fought virtually blindly, which had a detrimental effect in the oncoming battle.
On June 26, 9 and 19 mechanized corps from the Lutsk region, Rivne, and 8 and 15 mechanized corps. corps from the Brody area struck the flanks of the enemy tank group, which had by that time broken through to Lutsk and Dubno. The 19th corps managed to push back the enemy’s 11th tank division 25 kilometers to the South-West. However, due to the enemy’s great superiority in forces and poor interaction with each other The 9th and 19th mechanized corps were forced to retreat to Rivne by the end of June 27. Tank battles continued here until June 29.
The actions of the southern attack group of our troops were more successful. The 8th Mechanized Corps especially distinguished itself. On June 26, it moved 10-20 km, defeating German formations in the area north of Brody. Due to the aggravated situation in the Dubno area, on June 27, the 8th Mechanized Corps was assigned new task: Strike from the Berestechko area in the direction of Dubno.
Having defeated units of the enemy's 16th Panzer Division, the corps moved 30-35 km and entered Dubno. Thus, it found itself in the rear of the enemy's 3rd Motorized Corps. This ended the offensive capabilities of the corps. The Germans introduced 7 fresh divisions into the battle in the Rivne direction.
The counterattack of the Soviet mechanized corps inflicted significant losses on the German troops. It thwarted the plan for the rapid capture of Kiev. It removed the threat of encirclement of the main forces of the Southwestern Front.
Every Soviet person has memorized the
I was learning the date July 12, 1943. On this day, as stated
official Soviet historiography, in the Prokhorovka area took place
The greatest tank battle of World War II. On both sides
About one and a half thousand tanks took part in it. Ridge
was broken by fascist tank troops. Final
the myth of Hitler's propaganda about
that “summer is the time for victories of the German army.”
However, there was another "Greatest"
tank battle"… Describing the combat
actions on the Southwestern Front in June 1941
year, Marshal Zhukov makes it Soviet
historians a serious note: "Our
historical literature somehow in passing
concerns this greatest border
battles of the initial period of the war with Nazi Germany.
It would be necessary to examine in detail the operational feasibility
the use here of a counterattack by mechanized corps against
the main enemy group that had broken through and the organization itself
counterstrike. Indeed, as a result of precisely these actions of our troops,
Ukraine was thwarted at the very beginning by the enemy’s plan for a rapid
breakthrough to Kyiv. The enemy suffered heavy losses and became convinced
the tenacity of Soviet soldiers, ready to fight to the last drop
blood" ("Memories and Reflections", p. 259). The problem is that
The guiding and guiding line in the history of the war is clearly defined:
The greatest battle took place near Prokhorovka. Therefore no
a detailed analysis of that greatest battle that the PC mentioned.
Zhukov, there was no response. And so everything is clear. Only after
fifty years, a true assessment was given to the events that took place
in June 1941 in the Dubno area.
So, on June 23, 1941, as a result of the wedging of the 1st Tank
Kleist group at the junction between Vladimir-Volynsky and Strumilovsky
The fortified areas created a large hole in the Soviet front line.
The gap in the zone of the 5th and 6th armies could not only be used
enemy to reach their rear. His main danger was
that it could become a convenient springboard for a rapid
German attack on Kyiv. Command of the Southwestern Front,
well aware of the impending threat, took appropriate
urgent measures. These measures were clearly formulated in the directive
No. 3: the troops go on a counteroffensive with all their might and move
military operations into enemy territory. Moreover,
the balance of forces promised quick and decisive success. Therefore neither
representative of the High Command Headquarters, nor the front commander
had no doubt that they would defeat the presumptuous
aggressor a grandiose victory.
“The current situation,” recalled G.K. Zhukov, “was detailed
discussed at the Front Military Council. I suggested to M.P. Kirponos
immediately give a preliminary order to concentrate
mechanized corps to launch a counterattack on the main
grouping of Army Group South, which broke through in the Sokal area. TO
counterattack attract all front aviation and part of the distant
bomber aviation of the High Command. Command and
the front headquarters, quickly preparing preliminary combat orders,
handed them over to the armies and corps" (Ibid., p. 252). Only the chief
front headquarters, Lieutenant General M.A. Purkaev, as they said then,
"succumbed to alarmist sentiments", proposing instead of an offensive
put the main forces of the front on the defensive. But the majority on Voyenny
The council rejected his proposal. Indeed, what kind of Purkaev
was there any reason to panic? 1st Panzer Group Kleist total
had 700 combat vehicles. And at the disposal of the command of the South-
On the Western Front there were six mechanized corps, in
which consisted of about 4,000 tanks. True, with this
overwhelming superiority, which was a huge plus,
there was also a minus - the scattering of units and units of mechanized corps on
very considerable distance from each other. Therefore before
thrown into battle, they should have been assembled into strike groups.
According to the plan developed by the command of the Southwestern Front, 4-
th, 8th and 15th mechanized corps with attached rifle units should
were to strike the right flank of the German tank-mechanized
noi group from the Brody area to Radekhov and Sokal, as well as to provide
assistance to the encircled 124th Infantry Division. 9th, 19th and 22nd
mechanized corps, 36th and 27th rifle corps and 1st anti-tank
brigade attacked the left German flank from the Lutsk - Rivne area
Vladimir-Volynsky, among other things, having the task of rescuing from
encirclement of the 87th Infantry Division. But the harsh reality
forced me to literally correct the seemingly on the fly
a carefully calibrated plan. 4th Mechanized Corps, commanded by
Major General A.A. Vlasov, was on the left flank of the front, in
area of Lvov, operating in the zone of the 6th Army. From its composition
the command intended to allocate the core - the 8th Panzer Division.
The rest of the corps had to continue fighting for earlier
occupied areas.
15th Mechanized Corps Major General I.I. Carpezo was located in the area
Brody and part of his forces had already become involved in the fighting. 22nd Mechanized
corps under the command of Major General S.M. Kondrusev was
concentrated in the Lutsk region. But the other three had to
make marches of 200-300 kilometers to the front line in order to have
opportunity to take part in the upcoming battle. 8th mechanized corps
Lieutenant General D.I. Ryabyshev began moving from Drohobych,
which is 300 kilometers from the designated concentration point. About
The 9th Mechanized Corps had to cover 150 kilometers under
command of Major General K.K. Rokossovsky. But worst of all
belonged to the 19th Mechanized Corps, commanded by Major General N.V.
Feklsnko. His corps was located 400 kilometers from the front line, in
Vinnytsia region.
Forced marches not provided for by any regulations
standards, led to excessively high non-combat losses of materiel
from breakdowns and accidents, stretching and lagging units, and
means - to the initial loss of full control of mechanized corps
their commanders. Not to mention higher headquarters. That's why
The attacking troops could not be gathered into a single, powerful group.
In agreement with a representative of the Headquarters of the High Command on
On the Southwestern Front, without waiting for a number of mechanized corps to approach, in the morning
On June 24, the 15th Mechanized Corps went on the offensive.
General I.I. Carpezo. Because it's time to concentrate everything
the units subordinate to him did not work out, Carpezo carried out
the task assigned to the corps to capture Radekhov with the forces of the 10th
tank division of Major General S.Ya. Ogurtsova. The rest are only
pulled up to the battle area. In addition, Ogurtsov’s division acted
not in full force. Its battalion of heavy tanks, which had
armed with KV, hopelessly lagged behind on the march. The situation was getting worse
lack of accurate information about the enemy.
Former battalion commander Z.K. Slyusarenko wrote in
memories of how his battalion instead
Radekhov was sent to Brody: “We had to
walk about 60 kilometers. Average speed
KV 20-25 kilometers per hour. The road is sandy,
hot day... In such conditions, no less often than
after an hour of engine operation it is necessary
wash oil filters... Order,
Of course, we did it, but at what cost!
More than half of the cars were stuck on the road due to technical problems
malfunctions. The intelligence service I sent ahead returned with
message that the enemy in Brody and its environs is not
discovered. Before we had time, as they say, to catch our breath, we received
new order - immediately return back to the previous area
defense, go on a forced march. Three days were allotted for preparation.
hours" ("The Last Shot", Voenizdat, 1974, p. 27).
Ogurtsov's tankers fought selflessly, but suffered
irreparable losses and were forced to withdraw from the battle. Rest
parts of the corps entered the battle as they arrived at
starting positions June 25, 26 and 27. Then come to their aid from the area
The 8th Tank Division of the 4th Mechanized Corps approached Lvov. German
command, having noticed the advance to its right flank of large
enemy forces, abandoned the tactics of oncoming battles and engaged
organization of strong anti-tank defense. Therefore, attackers
Soviet tank units managed to wedge into the defensive
German orders are only a few kilometers away. Further
advance was countered by fierce resistance
German troops concentrated on the defensive line. All attacks
units of the 4th and 15th mechanized corps only led to huge losses in
manpower and technology.
The fighting of the 22nd Mechanized Corps took place in a similar way.
the left flank of the enemy tank wedge northwest of Lutsk. TO
At the beginning of the attack, General Kondrusev was unable to gather all his troops.
The 41st Tank Division of the Corps was separated from the main forces in
area Maciejów – st. Koshary and did not take part in the
offensive As noted above, the Germans calculated their intentions
Soviet command and prepared for the attacking units
Kondrusev's corps proper anti-tank defense. How
only all the available forces of the 22nd mechanized corps were drawn into a protracted battle,
The 14th German Panzer Division undertook a flanking maneuver and
collapsed the enemy's left flank. Soviet troops, having suffered
significant losses, retreated across the Styr River.
While fierce fighting was taking place on the flanks of the 1st Panzer Group,
Kleist continued in the center to develop a breakthrough into operational depth.
On June 25, German tanks broke into Dubno, having covered about
150 kilometers. The development of the German offensive forced General
Colonel M.P. Flog Kirponos in a fever and throw him to the flanks
the enemy, all fresh forces newly arrived in the battle area. In the morning 26
June 9th Mechanized Corps from the Klevan-Olyka area launched a counterattack in
direction Dubno. He was opposed by the same 13th and 14th German
tank divisions, which the day before repelled the offensive of the 22nd mechanized corps.
Their modus operandi has not changed. Putting on a tough defense, the Germans
were able to hold back the attacks of the 9th Mechanized Corps. All subsequent days in the strip
The 9th Mechanized Corps experienced protracted, positional battles. Moving forward
was insignificant. Only the 20th Tank Division of Colonel M.E.
Katukov had a notable success. In his memoirs he wrote: "The first
the victory at Klevan cost us dearly... In this unequal battle we
lost all our “batushki” (“At the forefront of the main attack”, Voenizdat,
1976, p. 82). The 13th Tank, which fought against the tankers of Katukova
The enemy division also suffered heavy losses. But this one is separate
success could not change the situation as a whole.
The offensive of the 19th mechanized corps of Major General N.V.
Feklenko was supposed to support the 36th Rifle Corps of General
Major P.V. Sysoeva. Since before arriving at the front the corps
Feklenko had to make a march of almost 400
kilometers, with his concentration the same story repeated itself.
On the morning of June 26, we managed to reach our starting positions in the Rivne area.
only the 43rd Tank Division of Colonel I.G. Tsibina. Others' approach
parts could be expected no earlier than in a day, or even two. But
Of course, there was no time. However, the tankmen of the 19th Mechanized Corps
I had to spend several hours putting the equipment in order
and to rest after a hard march. In the afternoon came
part of the 40th Tank Division Colonel M.V. Shirobokova.
The offensive began around 18:00 and had initial success.
Soviet tanks approached almost the outskirts of Dubno, pressing on the 11th
enemy tank division.
However, the Germans destroyed the crossings across the Ikva River in time.
Therefore, a rapid breakthrough on the shoulders of the retreating enemy
lost his temper. Since neither the 9th nor the 22nd mechanized corps succeeded
were able to, the Soviet command was afraid of exposing the right flank
Feklenko's corps jumped far ahead and gave the order to retreat
to the starting positions. On June 26, a new blow hit the right
German flank, where the 4th and 15th had already been defeated
mechanized corps. The 8th went on the offensive from the Brody area
mechanized body. The task to General D.I. Ryabyshev was
delivered more intelligently. Since a deep
German breakthrough, Ryabyshev’s corps was not aimed at Radekhov and
Sokal, where the Germans were ready to meet his blow with pleasure, and
on Berestechko, with access to the rear breaking through to Dubno mobile
enemy units.
But, like Feklenko’s corps, the 8th mechanized corps had to join
battle on the move, after a grueling 300-kilometer march. General
Ryabyshev was not given time either to gather all his forces or to
organizing proper intelligence. The corps before entering the battle
suffered unexpectedly high non-combat losses from breakdowns and accidents.
Unlike their hapless predecessors from the 4th and 15th
mechanized corps Ryabyshev's corps had an undoubted initial
success. In the first hours of the battle, holding the right in this sector
The flank of the 48th motorized corps of the 57th German infantry division was defeated.
Overcoming fierce enemy resistance, Ryabyshev's tanks
By the end of the day we had moved forward 20 kilometers. Actually
The combat mission assigned to the 8th Mechanized Corps was completed.
The Nazis were forced to throw everything against our counterattack.
their aviation, which alone saved them from defeat.
By the end of June 26, the Germans managed
stop further progress
Ryabyshev's building. Everywhere
unsuccessful attacks by mechanized corps forced
Front Military Council at last
listen to the arguments of M.A. Purkaeva.
Southwestern Front Command
was inclined to decide to stop
useless counterattacks by the forces of the 27th,
The 31st and 36th Rifle Corps will create a strong defense, and
take the mechkorlus to the rear and prepare for the next
counteroffensive. But since there are no instructions from Moscow about cancellation
directive No. 3 was not received, located at front headquarters
the Headquarters representative continued to demand its implementation. G.K. himself
Zhukov motivated his demands as follows: “In connection with the release of advanced
enemy units in the Dubno area, General D.I. Ryabyshev received
an order to turn his 8th Corps there. 15th Mechanized Corps
aimed the main forces in the general direction of Berestechko and beyond
also in Dubno. Approaching 36th troops were also sent to the Dubno area
rifle and 19th mechanized corps. Fierce battle
in the Dubno region began on June 27."
So, to the corps scattered on a wide front near Berestechko
Ryabyshev had to leave the battle in a matter of hours without rest or sleep,
pack up and move 50 kilometers north to new starting points
positions. In its place was supposed to be the Carpezo Corps, quite
battered in previous battles near Radekhov. And step on him
faced a well-organized enemy defense. Although this
This did not mean at all that an easier task awaited the 8th Mechanized Corps.
The German command had no doubt that the Russian attacks on
Dubno will continue, and took care of the organization
corresponding meeting. In addition, repeat all your
Kondrusev’s right-flank corps faced counterattacks,
Rokossovsky and Feklenko.
Obviously, by the 9 a.m. appointed by front headquarters on June 27
The 8th Mechanized Corps could not arrive in the designated area. But since
the order had to be carried out, it had to be based on what was at hand
units - 34th Tank Division Colonel I.V. Vasiliev, one
tank and one motorcycle regiment to form a mobile
group under the command of brigade commissar N.K. Popel and
throw it on the offensive. One way or another, but previously disentangled under
Dubno porridge was brewed again. Beginning on June 27, fierce fighting
continued on the 28th, 29th and 30th. The Germans had to
additionally transfer the 55th Army Corps to the battle area.
Increased pressure on the flanks forced them to stop their
tank wedge, the tip of which reached Ostrog, which is 60 kilometers away
east of Dubno. The Germans were saved only by the complete absence
interactions between attacking Soviet units. That's why,
holding back one of the mechanized corps with positional battles, they threw
its moving parts on another.
As a result, on June 29, part of the 8th mechanized corps, which was under
Ryabyshev's command, she found herself surrounded. June 30 Germans
closed a ring around Popel's mobile group. Since three
days earlier, a representative of the Headquarters left for Moscow, the command
The Southwestern Front decided to withdraw as soon as possible
the remaining mechanized corps from the battle. So on July 1 this greatest thing ended
tank battle of World War II. Word from G.K. Zhukov: "To ours
the troops failed to completely defeat the enemy and stop
his offensive, but the main thing was done: the enemy strike
the group, rushing to the capital of Ukraine, was detained in the area
Brody - Dubno and exhausted" (Ibid., p. 256). But in the memoirs of G.K.
Zhukov does not mention one very important event. Next time
the day after the end of the battle of Dubno, a member of the Military
Council Commissioner N.N. Vashugin. Why did he do this if she was eager to
capital of Ukraine, the enemy strike force was detained and
exhausted?
This is how Marshal P.A. recalled this battle. Rotmistrov:
"The mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front entered into this
battle after 200-400 kilometer marches in conditions of dominance in
enemy air forces. Bringing these corps into battle
was carried out without proper organization of the offensive, without reconnaissance
enemy and terrain. There was no aviation and proper
artillery support. Therefore, the enemy had the opportunity
repulse the attacks of our troops one by one, maneuvering part of their forces,
and at the same time continue the offensive against uncovered
directions" ("Time and Tanks", Voenizdat, 1972, p. 46). Genuine
the task of the Dubna battle was to defeat the Germans
strike groups. She went far beyond the usual
counter-strikes. Four thousand tanks is too much for a counterattack. But in
just right when trying to seize the initiative from the enemy and
turn the tide of hostilities in your favor.
There is no doubt that the chances of winning were absolutely real. Even
without more powerful aircraft. No additional rifle corps.
The available forces were more than enough. It was only required not
dispose of them in a fire rush. Thankfully, nothing special
threatening on the Southwestern Front in the first two days of the war
happened. Therefore, there was some time in stock. First of all
one fundamental point. After all, from the very beginning and the command
front, and it was clear to the Headquarters representatives that a one-time
concentration of mechanized corps is impossible. Yes, the situation did not allow
wait. To wait meant to give the enemy a free hand. But none of this
it followed that we had to hastily throw into battle what we ourselves
was at hand at the moment. It could have been different
solution.
G.K. Zhukov mentioned in his memoirs that the chief of staff of the front
M.A. Purkaev sharply objected to the directives sent from Moscow.
But he could not help but know that Zhukov was not one of those people who could
object sharply. Purkaev’s motives are clear: being experienced and
a competent General Staff officer, he must have bitten his elbows out of frustration
to the fact that he is being deprived of the opportunity to win a sure victory.
The meaning of his proposals was quite simple. While the mechanized corps will be
pull up to the starting positions, delay the movement of the German
tank wedge by organizing a strong anti-tank defense.
After all, it was precisely for these purposes that mobile vehicles were created even before the war.
artillery brigades. Deploy them on the directions of movement
enemy tanks were possible within several hours. And then
while the Germans would be engaged in breaking through our defenses, collect everything
mechanized corps into one fist.
The ideal scenario was to prepare several
defensive anti-tank lines. And the mechanized corps should
hold. Let the Germans find themselves in a situation where they need
time after time to break through the defenses prepared on their way.
A natural barrier for the enemy are five large rivers -
Turya, Stokhod, Styr, Goryn, Sluch, not to mention the many
small. All that remains is to wait for the enemy to stop on one of the
boundaries, no matter which one - second, third or fifth. Main -
force him to waste his strength in positional battles, to become exhausted,
exhaust reserves, of which there are not many. And that's when it becomes clear that
the Germans gave their all, to fall upon them with united power
six mechanized corps. And drive, drive, drive! Hanging over their shoulders. Not
give them a chance to catch their breath, somewhere to catch on, to put them in order
battered troops and organize defense.
The consequences of such a development of events could simply be
catastrophic. Indeed, from the very first days the troops of the army group
"Center" went far ahead, surpassing Runstedt's troops by several
hundred kilometers. Guderian was already beyond the Dnieper when Kleist had just
took Rovno. What if I didn’t take it? If, according to plan
Purkaeva, would he have been stuck near Rovno or near Dubno? Moreover, if only
him, who lost at least 50 during the breakthroughs of our defenses
percent of their tanks, a whole armored armada would suddenly strike
of the six Soviet mechanized corps? Where would they end up in this case?
Kleist's tankers and Reichenau's infantrymen in early July? And not
we must call Maxim Alekseevich Purkaev a dreamer. Enough
remember that for every German soldier the Southwestern Front could
place two of your own in the field, and for each artillery and
The enemy's mortar barrel accounted for two of ours.
Then the fun would begin. Since the troops of the South
The Western Front, with this course of action, had the opportunity to
unlike the enemy, maintain your main forces in front of them
very tempting prospects opened up. In the north were
The rear communications of Army Group Center are open to attack. On
south - the open flank of the German 17th Army. There was enough strength for
delivering both main and auxiliary strikes. It is clear that
The main blow should have been delivered to the rear of von Bock's armies. Besides
time, the strike forces of Army Group "Center" were located like this
far enough to fend off the blow of three or four Soviet mechanized corps
the Germans simply had nothing. What an extremely bad situation
German troops could be on the main strategic
direction! All supply lines were cut off in one fell swoop,
Rear communications were cut. Fighters near Smolensk
the soldiers of Guderian and von Kluge would have been left without shells and ammunition,
no sausages and schnapps, no fuel, no supplies of medicines, no
evacuation of the wounded. Moreover, Army Group Center was turning into
a nut clamped in a vice, which was squeezed on one side
raiding the rear of the mechanized corps of the Soviet Southwestern Front, and
on the other, troops of the Western and Reserve Fronts. Very interesting
imagine how the Germans would have to get out
from such a situation.
The primary task for the Germans was to restore order
in their rear, restoring supply lines. They continue to advance
they couldn't anymore. But here’s the question: would the tank groups of Hoth and
Guderian to go more than 300 kilometers from Smolensk to clean up
your rear? After all, simply by the nature of their actions, they could not carry
carry significant reserves of fuel. Perhaps the Germans would have to
blow up some of the tanks before meeting the enemy. One way or another, but
all this meant the complete failure of the Eastern Campaign in the summer of 1941
of the year! And we wouldn’t have to, choking on blood, for three
for many years to drive the Germans out of their land.
FROM BREST TO BERLIN
Poetic epic
Dubno, Lutsk and Brody remember, 1
Like a week in those places
The battle was fought by steel horses,
How they were pressed by a strong enemy.
Where are you tanks, our tanks?
Where are you, our corps?
You were torn like foot wraps,
They cut down like forests:
Eight hundred for those days
Out of two thousand eight hundred!
How many of you have died, sons!
Who will present the mournful account?
How many were killed
In the southwestern regions?
How many were burned alive?
In those desperate battles?
“How many tanks did we knock out?” –
“Almost two hundred.” - “Total?”
Or were we not taught that way?
Or didn’t you understand what?
Or Zhukov was not with us
And he didn’t direct 2
Those first battles
Where did the enemy beat us like that?
Or there were few tanks,
Few tank brigades
What the Nazis gave us
Firmly many times in a row?
Yes, really like that
The world did not know until then:
No matter the battle, we are beaten again,
No matter the tank, the fire burns.
And although four times
There were more tanks, we
So many times and even more
We were foolish in those days.
Member of the Military Council
He shot himself - he burned with shame. 4
Zhukov rushes to Moscow - he sees summer -
Stalin called on the carpet:
What a tank drama! –
“In front of Minsk at this hour
Surrounded as if in a hole,
Our armies now."
There is a different situation.
Here, further south, everything is different:
Enough strength and skill
Not enough for attacks.
Couldn't do it with one hit 5
Eight of our buildings
Go into battle. In the end for nothing
We laid down the fighters.
Eight days - and counterattacks
We choked. That's how it is.
Consolation in this fight -
The enemy was detained for six days.
That's how we will be this summer
Retreat until the enemy
We won't learn to hit hard
From the General Staff to the shooter.
Surrendering millions into captivity,
Retreat endlessly
And under Russian swearing and groans
Water the earth with blood.
----------
1 The Battle of Dubno - Lutsk - Brody is the largest tank battle in world history, including the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, which took place in June 1941 in the triangle of cities of Dubno - Lutsk - Brody. About 3,200 tanks took part in the battle on both sides: 2,803 Soviet and 718 German. The 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th, 22nd mechanized corps, 27th, 31st, 36th, 37th rifle corps, 109th infantry division and 14th cavalry division tried to flank destroy von Kleist's tank wedge with blows from the north and south. During the period from June 23 to June 30, 1941, our losses amounted to about 800 tanks, the Germans - 150 - 200.
2 By order of Stalin, the operation was led by Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, who arrived at the headquarters of the Southwestern Front on the evening of June 22 and left for Moscow on Stalin’s call on the evening of June 26, 1941.
3 G.K. Zhukov in his book “Memories and Reflections” wrote about this battle: “Our historical literature somehow casually touches on this greatest border battle of the initial period of the war with Nazi Germany. It would be necessary to analyze in detail the feasibility of using here counterattacks of mechanized corps against the main enemy group that had broken through and the organization of the counterattack itself. Indeed, as a result of these very actions of our troops in Ukraine, the enemy’s plan for a rapid breakthrough to Kyiv was thwarted at the very beginning. The enemy suffered heavy losses and became convinced of the resilience of Soviet soldiers, ready to fight to the last drop of blood.” Zhukov did not write about our fourfold losses.
4 Unable to bear the shame of defeat, on June 28, 1941, Corps Commissar N.N., a member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front, shot himself. Vashugin.
5 The shock formations of the Southwestern Front were unable to carry out a unified offensive. The actions of the mechanized corps were reduced to isolated counterattacks in different directions. The result of the counterattacks was a week's delay in the advance of the 1st German Tank Group and the disruption of the enemy's plans to break through to Kyiv and encircle the 6th, 12th and 26th armies of the Southwestern Front in the Lvov ledge. The German command, through competent leadership, was able to repel a counterattack and defeat the armies of the Southwestern Front.
Above is the cover of Vladimir Tyaptin's new book. It includes 39 poems and 14 poems and songs dedicated to the heroic struggle of the Soviet people against the Nazi invaders during the Great Patriotic War of 1941 - 1945, which reflect the main battles on all fronts of this great war, starting from the border battles of 1941 . before the storming of Berlin and the Victory Parade in Moscow on June 24, 1945. The book is rich in historical material included in 309 notes. Essentially, these are two books - poetic and prose, united under one title. It presents 156 specific individuals, including 96 war heroes, from ordinary soldiers to Marshal Zhukov and Generalissimo Joseph Stalin. The book was designed by Yuri Lobanov, laureate of the State Prize of the Udmurt Republic.
Date and place
June 23-30, 1941, area of the cities of Dubno (now the regional center of the Rivne region), Lutsk (regional center of the Volyn region), Brody (district center of the Lviv region).
Characters
The Soviet Southwestern Front, deployed on the basis of the Kyiv Special Military District (KOVO), was commanded by Colonel General Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos (1892-1941; participated in the Civil War under the command of N. Shchors, commanded a regiment, 1935 brigade commander, 1939 division commander , in March of the following year, during the war with Finland, at the head of the 70th Infantry Division, he successfully bypassed the Vyborg fortified area on the ice of the Gulf of Finland, contributing to the capture of Vyborg, the same year, lieutenant general, commander of the Leningrad Military District, in the spring of 1941, colonel general, commander of KOVO ); the chief of staff of the front was a competent staff officer, Major General Maxim Alekseevich Purkaev (1894-1953, from 1939 the chief of staff of the KOVO, in the fall of 1941 the commander of the 3rd Shock Army, in August 1942 - April 1943 the commander of the Kalinin Front, in 1943-1945 he commanded the Far Eastern Front and the Far Eastern military district). A significant negative role in planning the timing and direction of the counterattack was played by Headquarters representative Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov and corps commissar Nikolai Nikolaevich Vashugin (1900-1941; from 1920 to 1941. He went from commissar of a regimental school to a member of the military council of the Kyiv Special Military District, in June 1941 g.. was a member of the military council of the Southwestern Front, after the failure of the Soviet counterattack he shot himself).
The mechanized corps that carried out counterattacks were led by: 9th - in the future, one of the best Soviet commanders Konstantin Konstantinovich (Ksaverievich) Rokossovsky (1896-1968), 15th - Major General Ignatius Ivanovich Karpezo (1898-1987), 8th - Lieutenant General Dmitry Ivanovich Ryabyshev (1894-1985), 19th - Lieutenant General Nikolai Vladimirovich Feklenko (1901-1951), 22nd - Major General Semyon Mikhailovich Kondrusov (1897-1941). The powerful 4th mechanized corps, which held back the attacks of the German 17th Army west of Brody, was commanded by one of the best Soviet commanders at the beginning of the war and the future commander of the ROA, Major General Andrei Andreevich Vlasov (1901-1946), among the commanders of tank divisions it should be noted one of the best future Soviet tank commanders, Colonel Mikhail Efimovich Katukov (1900-1976).
The German Army Group South was commanded by the experienced and conservative Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt (1875-1953; 1939 commanded Army Group South in the war with Poland, 1940 - Army Group A, which played a major role in the defeat of France, in During Operation Barbarossa from June to November 1941, the commander-in-chief of Army Group South, in November 1944 - March 1945, inflicted defeat on the Allies at Arnhem, despite initial successes, lost the Battle of the Ardennes), opposed Soviet tank commanders at the head of the 1st Tank Group Colonel General Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist (1881-1954; successfully acted against Poland, 1940 commanded the first tank army in history - Panzer Group Kleist, 1942 participated in the 2nd Battle of Kharkov, from November 1942 commanded the Army Group “A” in the Caucasus, after 1945 accused of war crimes, died in a Soviet prison). The corps were commanded by: 3rd Motorized - Cavalry General Eberhard von Mackensen (1889-1969), 48th Panzer - one of the best German tank commanders of World War II, Panzer General Werner Kempf (1886-1964).
Background of the event
From the very beginning of the war, the course of hostilities in the southern sector of the Soviet-German fort had a slightly different character than in the center and north. This was due to the noticeable advantage of the forces of the Soviet Southwestern Front over the Germans in artillery, large in tanks and noticeable in aviation. On June 22, the Soviet side was inferior in men, but the front received reinforcements during the fighting. The striking force of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) on this front were 8 mechanized corps of KOVO. Near Dubno - Lutsk - Brody, or in the Lviv direction, there were 6 of them, which were armed with 3.7 thousand tanks and 760 armored vehicles. The mechanized corps were not very well equipped with automobile transport - they had up to 9.8 thousand cars. On the German side, units of 5 tank divisions could be involved in the battle; they included 728 tanks and 84 assault guns. Significantly inferior in numbers, the Germans had a definite advantage in tanks in the directions of the main attack.
On June 22 at 3.30, fighting began along the entire front line. During the day, the German 11th Panzer Division successfully broke through the Soviet defenses at the junction of the 5th and 6th armies and began advancing towards Dubno and Ostrog, which created a serious threat of encirclement of the 5th Army. The front headquarters, under pressure from M. Vashugin and the Headquarters representative G. Zhukov, saw the only way out - powerful counterattacks.
Progress of the event
At dawn on June 24, the 24th tank regiment of the 20th tank division of Colonel M. Katukov from the 9th mechanized corps attacked units of the 13th German tank division on the move, capturing about 300 prisoners.
The 15th mechanized corps under Major General I. Karpezo advanced to Radzechów. During clashes with the German 11th Panzer Division, some of the tanks of the mechanized corps were immediately lost due to aviation and technical malfunctions. The 19th mechanized corps of Major General Feklenko on the evening of June 24 reached the Ikva River in the Melnichnaya area. The 43rd Tank Division of the Mechanized Corps rushed to the Rivne area, but suffered heavy air strikes. The Soviet 15th Mechanized Corps, exhausted by forced marches and partially drained of blood, failed to take Radzechów and stop the Germans. The same applies to the actions of the 22nd mechanized corps of Major General S. Kondrusov, which attacked the enemy west of Lutsk. 72% of the tanks and vehicles of the mechanized corps were lost on the march. The corps commander died in battle, the corps was virtually drained of blood. During the first three days of the war, the Germans advanced 100 km into the Soviet defense in some sectors of the front. On June 24, the 19th tank and 215th motorized rifle divisions of the 22nd mechanized corps went on the offensive north of the Vladimir-Volynsky - Lutsk highway. The attack was unsuccessful, as the division's tanks ran into German anti-tank defenses. The corps lost more than 50% of its tanks and began to retreat scatteredly to the Rozhishche area. The 1st anti-tank artillery brigade of K. Moskalenko also moved here, and successfully defended the highway.
From Lutsk and Dubno on the morning of June 25, the Soviet 9th and 19th mechanized corps attacked the left flank of von Kleist’s tank group, which rejected parts of the German 3rd motorized corps southwest of Rivne. The 43rd Tank Division of the 19th Mechanized Corps broke through the defensive positions of the German 11th Tank Division and at 6 o'clock in the evening broke into the outskirts of Dubno. But due to the retreat of its neighbors, both flanks of the 43rd Division became unprotected and it retreated. The German 11th Panzer Division, supported by the left flank of the 16th Panzer Division, at this time reached Ostrog, advancing deep into the rear of the Soviet troops.
From the south, from the Brod area, the 15th Mechanized Corps continued its difficult offensive towards Radzechow and Berestechko. The 37th Tank Division of the Mechanized Corps crossed the Radostavka River on June 25 and advanced forward. The 10th Panzer Division encountered German anti-tank defenses and was forced to withdraw. The corps formation was subjected to a massive German air raid, during which Corps Commander I. Karpezo was seriously wounded. German infantry units began to flank the corps' positions.
The 8th Mechanized Corps, having marched 500 km since the beginning of the war and left half of its tanks and artillery on the road from breakdowns and air strikes, found itself in the Busk area, southwest of Brody, on the evening of June 25. On the morning of June 26, the mechanized corps entered Brody with the task of advancing on Dubno. On the morning of June 26, the 12th Tank Division of Major General T. Mishanin attacked and captured the city of Leshnev before 16:00. By the end of the day, the divisions of the 8th Mechanized Corps advanced 8-15 km in the direction of Berestechko, displacing units of the enemy’s 57th Infantry and 16th Tank Divisions, retreated and secured a position behind the Plyashivka River. Realizing the threat to the right flank of their 48th Motorized Corps, the Germans transferred the 16th Motorized Division, the 670th Anti-Tank Battalion, and a battery of 88-millimeter guns to the area. By the evening, the enemy was already trying to counterattack parts of the mechanized corps, which on the night of June 27 received an order to withdraw from the battle.
Vlasov's 4th mechanized corps was used in units in fierce battles in various directions against the German army of Stülpnagel. On June 27, the commander of the 5th Army M. Potapov, by order of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front, decided in the morning to launch an offensive of the 9th and 19th mechanized corps on the left flank of the German group between Lutsk and Rivne in a converging direction towards Mlynov and the 36th Rifle Corps on Dubno. Units of the 15th Mechanized Corps were supposed to leave for Berestechko and return to Dubno.
However, the Germans were faster again - during the night of June 26-27, they transported infantry units across the Ikva River and concentrated the 13th Tank, 25th Motorized, 11th Infantry and parts of the 14th Tank Division against the 9th Mechanized Corps. Finding fresh units in front of him, K. Rokossovsky did not attack. At the same time, the German 298th and 299th divisions began an offensive near Lutsk, supported by tanks of the 14th division. The Red Army had to transfer the 20th Panzer Division to this direction, which stabilized the situation until the beginning of July. M. Feklenko's 19th Mechanized Corps was also unable to go on the offensive, retreating to Rivne and then to Goshcha under attacks from the 11th and 13th Panzerwaffe divisions. During the retreat and under air strikes, some of the tanks, vehicles and guns of the mechanized corps were lost. The 36th Rifle Corps was weakened by the battles and was also unable to go on the attack. From the southern direction at 2 o'clock in the afternoon on June 27, only the hastily organized combined detachments of the 24th Tank Regiment of Lieutenant Colonel P. Volkov and the 34th Tank Division under the command of Brigade Commissar M. Popel were able to go on the offensive, which achieved the greatest success during the battle.
The attack in the direction of Dubno came as a surprise to the Germans - having crushed the defensive barriers, M. Popel’s group entered the outskirts of Dubno in the evening, capturing the rear reserves of the 11th Panzer Division and several dozen undamaged tanks (which later had to be abandoned). During the night, the Germans transferred units of the 16th motorized, 75th and 111th infantry divisions to the breakthrough site and closed the breakthrough, interrupting the supply routes of Popel’s group. Attempts by units of the 8th Mechanized Corps to break through the German defenses failed, and the corps itself went on the defensive. On the left flank, having broken through the defenses of the 212th Motorized Division of the 15th Mechanized Corps, about 40 German tanks reached the headquarters of the 12th Panzer Division. The division commander, Major General T. Mishanina, sent a reserve to meet them - 6 KV tanks and 4 T-34s, which managed to stop the breakthrough, bringing the German tanks down and without suffering losses - the German tank guns could not penetrate their armor. The 8th Mechanized Corps managed to retreat in an organized manner to the Zolochevsky Heights line, breaking through the German barriers. By the morning of July 5, the corps divisions had completed their concentration in Proskurov. On June 29, the 15th Mechanized Corps was ordered to change with units of the 37th Rifle Corps and retreat to the Zolochevsky Heights in the Bely Kamen - Zolochev - Lyatskaya area. M. Popel's detachment remained cut off deep behind enemy lines. Having taken up a perimeter defense in the Dubno area until July 2, after which, having destroyed the equipment, the remaining detachment successfully reached its own. The Soviet tank battle is no longer over.
Consequences of the incident
The result of the counterattacks was a week's delay in the advance of the 1st Tank Group and the disruption of the enemy's plans to quickly break through to Kyiv and encircle the armies of the Southwestern Front in the Lvov salient. The German command managed to repulse the counterattack and defeat the mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front, without stopping its offensive. The Soviet side irretrievably lost up to 2.5 thousand tanks, von Kleist’s group suffered an order of magnitude smaller, but still large losses - at the time of the end of these battles there were up to 320 combat-ready tanks, but failed vehicles were quickly repaired. There is information about the irretrievable losses of the von Kleist group on September 4, 1941 - 186 vehicles, most of which were lost near Dubno - Lutsk - Brody. The human losses on both sides in this battle are unknown. The Southwestern Front lost 165.5 thousand people killed and captured, and up to 658 thousand wounded in all battles between June 22 and July 5. The German Army Group South (without the Romanians and Hungarians who acted with it) during the same period lost 5.5 thousand killed and missing, 17.2 thousand wounded.
Historical memory
In Soviet times, one of the largest tank battles in history was completely forgotten (for example, the IS-2 tank monument installed at the exit from Dubno has no relation to the battle). In the 1990s. Interest in the event has revived both in Ukraine and in Russia, primarily thanks to scientists, amateur historians, search groups, local historians, etc. Today in Ukraine, the battle is well known to lovers of national history; it is present in all textbooks and general works concerning the Second World War. world war. However, there are no noticeable events to honor the memory of those killed in the battle.
If you gather Military historians from different countries at a round table and ask them the question of which tank battle was the greatest in the world, then the answers will be different... A historian of the Soviet school, of course, will name KURSK ARC , there the number of tanks and self-propelled guns, according to average data, was from the Red Army - 3444 , from the Wehrmacht - 2733 combat vehicles. ( Although the figures given by different researchers are given with such a spread that it is not easy to even average, we can only mention that even in our sources, our losses in tanks vary by 100% ).
The Israeli will say that it was Yom Kippur War in October 1973. Then on the Northern Front 1200 Syrian tanks attacked 180 Israeli, and lost at the same time 800 . And on the Southern Front 500 The Egyptians fought against 240 IDF tanks. (The Egyptians were luckier than the Syrians, they lost only 200 tanks). Then hundreds of Iraqi vehicles arrived (according to some sources - up to 1500 ) and everything started to spin to the fullest. In total, during this conflict, the Israelis lost 810 armored vehicles, and Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Algeria and Cuba - 1775 cars But, as I said above, the data in different sources varies greatly.
Well, in real life such a battle took place on June 23-27, 1941 - the largest tank battle in the history of the War took place in the area of Dubno, Lutsk and Rivne. In this battle, six Soviet mechanized corps faced a German tank group.
It really was largest tank battle in world history , which lasted a week. More than four thousand tanks mixed in a fiery whirlwind... On the Brody-Rovno-Lutsk section, the Soviet 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th, 22nd and 4th mechanized corps and the German 11th mechanized corps collided. 13th, 14th, 16th and 9th tank divisions.
According to averaged data from various sources, the balance of forces was as follows...
Red Army:
The 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th, 22nd corps consisted of 33 KV-2, 136 KV-1, 48 T-35, 171 T-34, 2,415 T-26, OT -26, T-27, T-36, T-37, BT-5, BT-7. In total - 2,803 combat vehicles. [Military Historical Journal, N11, 1993]. West of Brody, their flank was covered by the 4th Mechanized Corps, which was the most powerful of the then mechanized corps of the Red Army and the whole World. It contained 892 tanks, of which 89 KV-1 and 327 T-34. On June 24, the 8th Tank Division (325 tanks, including 50 KV and 140 T-34s as of June 22) from its composition was reassigned to the 15th Mechanized Corps.
TOTAL: 3,695 tanks
VERMACHT:
In the 4 German tank divisions that formed the backbone of the Wehrmacht tank group, there were 80 Pz-IV, 195 Pz-III (50mm), 89 Pz-III (37mm), 179 Pz-II, 42 BefPz. (commander), and on June 28 in The 9th German Tank Division entered the battle, this also includes 20 Pz-IV, 60 Pz-III (50mm), 11 Pz-III (37mm), 32 Pz-II, 8 Pz-I, 12 Bef-Pz).
TOTAL: 628 tanks
By the way, Soviet tanks were mostly either no worse than German ones, or superior to them in armor and caliber. Otherwise, look at the comparison table below. The numbers are given by gun caliber and frontal armor.
This battle was preceded by an appointment June 23, 1941 ., Georgy Zhukov , member of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. It was as a representative of the Headquarters on the Southwestern Front that Army General G.K. Zhukov organized this counterattack. Moreover, his position was very comfortable. On the one hand, he was a representative of Headquarters and could give any order, and on the other, M.P. Kirponos, I.N. Muzychenko and M.I. Potapov were responsible for everything.
Experienced wolves of war confronted our generals Gerd von Rundstedt And Ewald von Kleist . The first to attack the flanks of the enemy group were the 22nd, 4th and 15th mechanized corps. Then the 9th, 19th and 8th mechanized corps, advanced from the 2nd echelon of the front, were introduced into the battle. By the way, the 9th Mechanized Corps was commanded by the future Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, released from prison a year ago. He immediately showed himself to be a knowledgeable and proactive commander. When he realized that the motorized division under his command could only follow... on foot, Rokossovsky, at his own peril and risk, took all the vehicles from the district reserve in Shepetovka, and there were almost two hundred of them, put infantry on them and moved them like motorized infantry them in front of the body. The approach of his units to the Lutsk region saved the aggravated situation there. They stopped the enemy tanks that broke through there.
The tankers fought like heroes, sparing neither their strength nor their lives, but the poor organization of the High Command brought everything to naught. Units and formations entered the battle after a 300-400 km march in parts, without being able to wait for the complete concentration of forces and the arrival of combined arms support formations. The equipment on the march broke down, and there was no normal communication. And orders from front headquarters drove them forward. And all the time German aircraft were hovering over them. Here, the consequences of stupidity or betrayal of those responsible for aviation in this theater of operations were felt. Just before the war, most of the front-line airfields began to be modernized, and numerous aircraft were assembled at the few remaining suitable sites, and there was an order to place the planes wing to wing, supposedly for better protection from saboteurs. At dawn on June 22, 1941, this oil painting "Junkersam" I really liked it, but our aviation has greatly decreased in number.
And the saboteurs from the regiment "Brandenburg" these measures, by the way, did not interfere at all. Well, front-line air defense was then generally in its infancy in the Red Army. So, even before entering the battle with German ground units, our tanks suffered heavy losses from air raids. How many of our 7,500 aircraft died without taking off is still a mystery, shrouded in darkness. And German air defense was used very competently, although not quite standardly. Von Rundstedt and Von Kleist remembered how Guderian came up with the idea of putting the FlaK 88 into battle formations. Although the armor of the Russian KV monsters was much thicker than the French boxes, the anti-aircraft guns (albeit not from a kilometer like Renault) were quite able to stop the Russian tanks, although they could knock out the KV with Almost no one succeeded in the first projectile.
On June 26, the 9th and 19th mechanized corps from the Lutsk region, Rivne, and the 8th and 15th from the Brody region attacked the flanks of the German group that broke through to Lutsk and Dubno. Units of the 19th Mechanized Corps pushed back the 11th Nazi Panzer Division 25 km. However, as a result of weak interaction between the 9th and 19th mechanized corps and the slow reaction to the rapidly changing combat situation of the front headquarters, our advancing tanks were forced to stop by the end of June 27 and retreat to Rivne, where tank battles continued until June 29. The actions of the 8th Mechanized Corps were more successful: on June 26, it, having defeated enemy troops north of Brody, moved forward 20 km. But then the Headquarters woke up, and due to the aggravated situation near Dubno, on June 27, the 8th Mechanized Corps was given a new task - to strike from Berestechko in the direction of Dubno. And then the Soviet tank crews behaved like heroes, completely defeating units of the 16th Panzer Division, the corps fought 40 km, liberated Dubno and went to the rear of the 3rd German Motorized Corps. But the command was unable to provide the corps with fuel and ammunition, and their offensive capabilities were exhausted. By this time, the German command introduced an additional 7 divisions into the battle in the Rivne direction.
And near Ostrog, parts of the 5th Mechanized Corps and the 37th Rifle Corps received orders to stop the advance of the 11th German Tank Division. But the Germans also sent the 9th Panzer Division to the left flank of the Soviet defense (in the Lvov area). Given the complete superiority of the Luftwaffe in the air, this maneuver fatally destroyed the left flank of the Soviet defense. And the most tragic thing is that by this time the Soviet tanks had almost no ammunition and fuel left.
June 27 combined squad of 34th Panzer Division Under the command of brigade commissar N.K. Popel, in the evening he struck Dubno, captured the rear reserves of the 11th Panzer Division and several dozen intact German tanks, but the 8th Mechanized Corps was unable to come to the rescue and consolidate the success. Popel's detachment remained cut off deep behind enemy lines; at first the tankers took up a perimeter defense in the Dubno area and held out until July 2, and when the shells ran out, destroying the remaining equipment, the detachment began to break out of the encirclement. Having walked along the rear for more than 200 km, Popel’s group reached their own. Nikolai Poppel, by the way, went through the entire war and retired with the rank of lieutenant general of tank forces.
The difficulties of the entire Soviet group developed into a disaster. On the morning of June 29 The 13th Panzerdivision advanced east from Rovno, while Soviet troops withdrew north and south of the city, paralleling the German movement. Soviet tanks were increasingly left without fuel, and German infantry destroyed the remnants of the 12th and 34th Panzer Divisions. On June 30, the 9th Panzer Division attacked the remnants of the 3rd Cavalry Division. She then cut off the 8th and 10th Panzer Divisions, completing their encirclement. By this time, the commander of the 6th Soviet Army ordered all his units to withdraw to positions east of Lvov. And at that time the Germans were gathering parts of the 13th and 14th Panzerdivisions south of Lutsk in order to create a fist for a strike in the direction of Zhitomir and Berdichev.
By July 1, the Soviet mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front were practically destroyed. About 10% of the tanks remained in the 22nd, 15% in the 8th and 15th, and about 30% in the 9th and 19th. The 4th Mechanized Corps under the command of General A.A. Vlasov (the same one) found himself in a slightly better position - he managed to withdraw with about 40% of the tanks.
Bertolt Brecht was right when he said that only bad generals need good soldiers to correct their mistakes with their blood. The total losses in tanks during these days amounted to about 2500 cars This includes both combat and non-combat losses. Moreover, all the tanks - knocked out, stalled, and burned - went to the Germans. And just for Great Patriotic War from 131700 tanks and self-propelled guns, BTV of the Red Army lost 96500 combat units. The Germans, accordingly, lost out of 49,500 BT units 45000 combat units, 75% of them on the Eastern Front. The figures, of course, are taken from various sources and are accurate, taking into account the delta of up to 15%.
The main thing is that our tank crews did not burn in the tanks and shed their blood in vain. They delayed the German advance for at least a week; it was precisely this week that the Germans constantly missed.
The headquarters of the Southwestern Front was unable to properly organize the management and supply of the most powerful tank group in the World at that time, and this is precisely the reason for the failure of this operation. And the inspirer and leader of the counteroffensive, Army General G.K. Zhukov, after the tank corps got bogged down and it became clear that the counteroffensive was failing, left for Moscow.
Corps Commissar N.N. Vashugin, a member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front, shot himself at the end of the battle. He did not prepare, plan or carry out this battle, he did not bear direct blame for the failure, but his conscience did not allow him to do otherwise. After the Crimean shame, Comrade Mekhlis did not shoot himself, but blamed everything on Kozlov and Tolbukhin. After the bloody and unsuccessful assault on Grozny, where thousands of boys died, Pasha Mercedes did not reach for his service pistol. Yes... Conscience is a piece of goods.
And to our Heroes Eternal Glory and Eternal Memory. Soldiers win wars.
And now I apologize for the scary photos, my heart hurt when I looked at them, but this is the Truth of History. And let the critics not tell me that I am smoothing over the sharp and unfortunate moments of Military History. True, I am sure that now they will accuse me of praising the Wehrmacht.
APPLICATION
Popel, Nikolai Kirillovich
Military commissar of the 11th mechanized (tank) brigade since 1938. Participated in the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939. Until June 3, 1940, military commissar of the 1st Leningrad Artillery School. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, brigade commissar, political commander of the 8th mechanized corps. He led the mobile group of the 8th MK in the battles for Dubno. He fought in the encirclement near Dubno and emerged from the encirclement with part of his troops.
From August 25, 1941 to December 8, 1941, member of the military council of the 38th Army. Since September 1942, military commissar of the 3rd mechanized corps. From January 30, 1943 until the end of the war, member of the military council of the 1st Tank Army (transformed into the 1st Guards Tank Army). After the war he wrote memoirs. The literary critic E.V. Cardin was involved in recording and processing the memoirs of Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Nikolai Popel. These memories eventually grew into two books: "In difficult times" And "The tanks turned west", which were released in 1959 and 1960, respectively.
88 mm anti-aircraft gun FlaK-18/36/37/41
Of all the artillery systems of the Second World War, perhaps the most famous was the German Flak 36/37 anti-aircraft gun of 88 mm caliber. However, this gun became most famous as an anti-tank weapon. The project of a semi-automatic anti-aircraft gun of 88 mm caliber with a high muzzle velocity was developed at the Krupp factories in 1928. In order to overcome the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, all work on the production of samples was carried out at the Swedish Bofors factories, with which Krupp had bilateral agreements. The gun was put into production at the Krupp factories in 1933; after Hitler came to power, Germany openly spat on the Treaty of Versailles.
The prototype of the Flak 36 was the Flak 18 anti-aircraft gun of the same caliber, developed back in the First World War and mounted on a four-wheeled towed platform. It was originally designed exclusively as an anti-aircraft gun. However, circumstances were such that several Flak 18 guns sent to Spain as part of the legion "Condor", the Germans had to use to protect their own positions from the advancing Republican tanks. This experience was subsequently taken into account when modernizing the new gun, which was produced in two versions, Flak 36 and Flak 37. An important advantage of the guns was the presence of a mechanism for automatically ejecting spent cartridges, which allowed trained personnel to ensure a rate of fire of up to 20 rounds per minute. But in order to load a gun with a 15-kilogram shell every three seconds, each gun needed 11 people, four or five of whom were exclusively engaged in feeding shells. Putting together such a large team in the field was far from easy, and receiving the position and gloves of a loader - the one who put the projectile into the gun lock - was a high honor and proof of qualifications.
Basic tactical and technical data:
