I continue the topic started in the previous post Russian - Japanese war 1904 - 1905 and her final battle Tsushima sea battle on May 14 - 15, 1905 ... This time we will talk about the warships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, which took part in the battle with the Japanese fleet, and their fate. (The date in brackets after the name of the ship means its launching after construction)
In addition, for everyone who is interested in the history of the Fatherland, I think it will be interesting to see how the military Russian ships more than a hundred years ago.

1. The flagship - the battleship "KNYAZ SUVOROV" (1902)
Killed in battle

2. Armored cruiser OSLYABYA (1898)
Killed in battle


3. Armored cruiser "ADMIRAL NAKHIMOV" ( 1885)
Killed in battle

4. Cruiser of the 1st rank "DMITRY DONSKOY" (1883)
Flooded by the crew

5. Cruiser of the 1st rank "VLADIMIR MONOMAKH" (1882)
Flooded by the crew

6. Battleship "NAVARIN" (1891)
Killed in battle

7. Squadron battleship "EMPEROR NICHOLAS THE FIRST" (1889)
Surrendered. Later joined the Japanese fleet

8. Battleship coast guard"ADMIRAL USHAKOV" (1893)
Flooded by the crew

9. The battleship of the coast guard "ADMIRAL SENYAVIN" (1896)

10. Battleship of the coast guard "GENERAL-ADMIRAL APRAKSIN" (1896)
Surrendered. Entered the Japanese Navy

11. Squadron battleship "SISOY THE GREAT" (1894)
Killed in battle

12. Battleship "BORODINO" (1901)
Killed in battle

13. Cruiser of the 2nd rank "DIAMOND" (1903)
Was the only cruiser to break through to Vladivostok

14. Armored cruiser 2nd rank "PEARL" (1903)
He left for Manila, where he was interned, after the end of the war he returned to the Russian fleet.

(The same applies to all Russian ships that were able to break away from the pursuit of the Japanese
fleet and reached the ports of neutral states)

15. Armored cruiser of the 1st rank "AURORA" (1900)
Gone to Manila

16. Battleship "EAGLE" (1902)
Surrendered. Joined the Japanese Navy

17. Armored cruiser of the 1st rank "OLEG" (1903)
Gone to Manila

18. Battleship "EMPEROR ALEXANDER THE THIRD" (1901)
Killed in battle

19. Armored cruiser 1st rank "SVETLANA" (1896)
Flooded by the crew

20. Auxiliary cruiser "URAL" (1890)
Flooded by the crew

21. Destroyer "BEDOVY" (1902)
Surrendered. Joined the Japanese Navy

22. Destroyer "BYSTRY" (1902)
Blown up by the crew

23. Destroyer "BUYNY" (1901)
Killed in battle

24. Destroyer "BRAVY" (1901)

25. Destroyer "BRILLIANT" (1901)
Flooded by the crew

26. Destroyer "LOUD" (1903)
Flooded by the crew

27. Destroyer "GROZNY" (1904)
Managed to break through to Vladivostok

28. Squadron destroyer "PERFECT" (1902)
Killed in battle

29. Destroyer "BODRY" (1902)
Gone to Shanghai

Thus, in the Battle of Tsushima, out of 29 warships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron in battle, fighting to the end, 17 ships were killed (including those that did not want to surrender to the enemy and were unable to continue the battle, were blown up by their own crew or flooded by the discovery of the Kingstones, so as not to get to the enemy). 7 ships valiantly fighting the Japanese, after everything was over, in various ways managed to survive as combat units, leaving for neutral ports, or breaking through to their own in Vladivostok. And only 5 ships surrendered to the Japanese.
There will be no output this time. Do it yourself if you are interested in the history of our country, which consists not only of victories, but also of defeats.

Sergey Vorobyov.

It's hard to say what and how it really was. None of those who were at that moment with Admiral Rozhdestvensky on the bridge of the flagship battleship, except for the admiral himself, survived the battle. And Admiral Rozhdestvensky himself remained silent on this matter, so nowhere and never explaining the motives and reasons for his actions in the battle. Let's try to do it for him. By offering his own version of these events. Events that have so strongly affected the fate of Russia.

In May 1905, the Russian squadron slowly entered the Tsushima Strait. And it seemed that everything had been done to ensure that the enemy's patrol ships would find her. The squadron was accompanied by several transport and auxiliary vessels. Which limited her speed to 9 knots. And two hospital ships, according to the requirements of that time, shone with all the lights, like Christmas trees... And the first line of Japanese patrols discovered Russian ships. And it is for these "trees". Japanese radio stations immediately began to operate, transmitting information about Russian ships. And the main forces of the Japanese fleet came out to meet the Russian squadron. Radio stations, which also worked incessantly. Realizing the danger, the commanders of the Russian ships suggested that the squadron commander, Admiral Rozhdestvensky, drive away the Japanese scouts. And the commander of the auxiliary cruiser "Ural", which had a first-class radio station for its time, proposed to drown out the work of the Japanese radio stations.

Hospital ship "Eagle".

Ural auxiliary cruiser. Four more similar ships separated from the Russian squadron and began raiding operations off the coast of Japan. The Ural remained with the squadron.

But the admiral forbade everything. And open fire on Japanese intelligence officers and drown out the work of their radio stations. Instead, he ordered to rebuild the squadron from a marching order to a combat one. That is, from two columns, into one. But 40 minutes before the start of the battle, Rozhdestvensky ordered to rebuild the squadron again. Quite the opposite, from one column to two. But now these columns of battleships were stepped to the right. And as soon as the Russians finished rebuilding, the smoke of the ships of the main forces of the Japanese fleet appeared on the horizon. The commander of which, Admiral Togo, was finishing a maneuver that guaranteed him victory. He only had to turn to the right. And put the formation of their ships across the movement of the Russian squadron. Unleashing the fire of all their guns on the enemy's lead ship.

Admiral Togo

But when he saw that the Russian battleships were marching, instead, Admiral Togo, turning to the left. On rapprochement with the weakest ships of the Russian squadron. Intending to attack them first. And right there, the Russian squadron began rebuilding in one column. And opening fire, literally bombarded the Japanese flagship with a hail of shells. At some point in the battle, six Russian ships fired simultaneously on the Japanese flagship. In a short 15 minutes, the "Japanese" was hit by more than 30 large-caliber shells. Admiral Rozhestvensky, did what the commander exists for in the fleet, he led his squadron without loss and outplayed the Japanese admiral. Forcing him to expose his ships to the concentrated fire of the rapidly approaching Russian battleships.

Scheme of the beginning of the Tsushima battle.

Rozhestvensky did what he wanted, taking advantage of the only chance to win. He made it possible for the enemy to identify the squadron, made it clear that it is slow-moving and goes through the eastern, narrow strait. He did not interfere with the transmission of information by intelligence officers. And the work of the radio stations of the main forces of the Japanese. And at the last moment, before the collision, he rebuilt the squadron. By accurately timing the collision. Knowing that Admiral Togo will no longer have time to receive decrypted information about his maneuver.

The battleship "Sagami" leads a convoy of ships

Most likely, Admiral Rozhdestvensky also counted on the two armored cruisers in Vladivostok. Which three days before the Tsushima battle left the port. According to the official version, to check the operation of radio stations. But just in time to approach the Tsushima Strait together with the main forces of the Russian fleet. But then an accident intervened. A year earlier, the Japanese had placed a minefield in the fairway. Several times Russian cruisers passed this minefield freely. But it was on the eve of the Tsushima battle that the flagship of this detachment, the armored cruiser Thunderbolt, touched a mine and went out of action. The detachment returned to Vladivostok. Having deprived the opportunity of Admiral Rozhdestvensky to strengthen his squadron already during the battle. The fact that this was planned is indicated by the presence of the same auxiliary cruiser "Ural" in the squadron. Designed for raider operations on communications and not at all adapted for the battle of squadrons. But with the best radio station in the squadron. With the help of which he was supposed to take the cruiser from Vladivostok to the battlefield.

Armored cruiser "Thunderbolt" in the dry dock of Vladivostok.

Admiral Rozhestvensky did this, knowing exactly where the Japanese squadron was. And the Japanese themselves helped him in this. More precisely, their radio stations. Experienced radio operators, by the strength of the radio signal, or by the "spark", as they said at the time, can determine the distance to another radio station. The narrow strait indicated the exact direction to the enemy, and the signal strength of the Japanese radio stations showed the distance to him. The Japanese expected to see one column of Russian ships. And they saw two, and hastened to attack the weakest ships. But the Russian columns stepped to the right. This made it possible for Rozhdestvensky to rebuild the squadron and try to attack the weakest Japanese ships himself. Covering which the admiral Togo was forced to continue the maneuver. Literally deploying their battleships in sequence. Than he substituted his flagship, under the concentrated fire of the best Russian ships. At this moment, about 30 large-caliber shells hit the Japanese flagship. And the next battleship in the ranks 18. In principle, this was enough to disable the enemy ships. But to the greatest regret, only in principle.

Damage to the Russian and Japanese battleship in the battle.

Paradoxically, the biggest Japanese secret of the time was Russian shells. More precisely, their negligible effect on enemy ships. In pursuit of armor penetration, Russian engineers reduced the weight of the projectile, by 20%, in relation to a foreign projectile of a similar caliber. This predetermined the higher speed of the shells of the Russian guns. And to make their shells safe, they were equipped with explosives based on gunpowder. It was assumed that, having pierced the armor, the projectile would explode behind it. For this, very coarse fuses were installed, which did not explode even if they hit an unarmored part of the side. But the power of the explosives in the shells was sometimes not enough, even to break the shell itself. As a result, the Russian shells hitting the ship left a neat round hole. Which the Japanese quickly repaired. And the fuses of the Russian shells were not up to par. The striker turned out to be too soft and did not prick the primer. And Rozhestvensky's squadron was generally supplied with defective shells. With a high moisture content, in explosives. As a result, even the shells that hit the Japanese ships did not explode en masse. It was the quality of the Russian shells that predetermined that the Japanese ships withstood the massive Russian fire. And they themselves, taking advantage of the speed of the squadron, began to cover the head of the Russian column. Here even a doubt arises that if the Japanese did not know about the mediocre quality of Russian shells, then Togo would have risked performing his risky maneuver. No, he could not have known about the disgusting quality of the shells supplied by the second squadron. But it is quite possible that he correctly assessed the risk to his ships and made his maneuver. Which will then be called a genius, but which no naval commander in his right mind will do. As a result, the Japanese won the Tsushima battle. Despite the heroism of the Russians and the victory of Rozhdestvensky at the maneuverable stage of the battle.

A painting dedicated to the heroic death of the coastal defense battleship "Admiral Ushakov"

And yet Rozhestvensky is personally to blame for this defeat. As chief of the Main Naval Staff, he personally oversaw technical issues in the fleet. And it was on his conscience that these unusable shells turned out to be. And as part of the Japanese fleet, there were 2 ships that could have been part of its squadron. But which he personally so recklessly refused. 2 armored cruisers were built in Italy, for Argentina. The ships were already ready when the customer refused them. And the Italians offered these ships to Russia. But Rozhestvensky, being the chief of the Naval Staff, refused them. Motivating by the fact that these ships are not suitable for the Russian fleet in type. They approached the Japanese fleet. The Japanese bought them immediately. And as soon as these ships reached Japan, the war began. At the same time, a squadron of two battleships, three cruisers and more than a dozen destroyers was stationed in the Mediterranean. Walking on Pacific Ocean... And the idea was put forward to accompany these ships with their ships. And under the threat of the destruction of these ships, not to allow war to arise until our fleet is strengthened. But for this, it was necessary to leave the destroyers, without the care of large ships. And Rozhestvensky, forbade accompanying the Japanese, ordering the escort of destroyers. As a result, this squadron, before the start of the war, did not sing to strengthen our Pacific Fleet. And the armored cruisers bought by the Japanese were in time.

Armored cruiser "Kasuga", which could serve in the Russian Imperial Navy

Admiral Rozhdestvensky, quite rightly, could show himself as one of the greatest naval commanders Russia. Which led the fleet without loss across three oceans, and did everything to defeat the Japanese. But as an administrator, he lost the war before it even started. Having missed the opportunity to strengthen your fleet, weaken the enemy's fleet. And failing to provide the forces entrusted to him with ammunition of the proper quality. Than he disgraced his name. In the end, being captured by the Japanese.

The ship lives up to its name. On it, Admiral Rozhdestvensky was captured by the Japanese.

As you know, ignorance of history leads to its repetition. And the underestimation of the role of defective shells in the Battle of Tsushima once again played a negative role in our history. In a different place and at a different time. In the summer of 1941, at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War... Then our main tank and anti-tank ammunition was a 45-mm projectile. Which was supposed to confidently penetrate the armor of German tanks up to 800 meters. But in reality, our tanks and anti-tank guns of this caliber were useless from 400 meters. The Germans immediately identified this and set a safe distance for their tanks at 400 meters. It turned out that in pursuit of an increase in the release of shells, there was a violation of the technology and their manufacture. And there were massively overheated, and therefore more fragile shells. Which simply shattered when they hit the German armor. Without causing much harm German tanks... And they allowed German tankers to shoot our soldiers almost without hindrance. Just like the Japanese of our sailors at Tsushima.

Projectile dummy 45mm

00:05 - REGNUM From the very first days of the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese fleet, surpassing the Russian squadron by Far East, took over the strategic initiative. From February to May 1904, the Japanese made three attempts to block the entrance to Port Arthur's harbor from the sea. They also carried out an offensive overland. The Japanese command did everything to seize Port Arthur as soon as possible and destroy the Russian squadron there. On June 10 (23) and July 28 (August 10), the Port Arthur squadron twice tried to break through to Vladivostok, but both attempts failed.

Ivan Shilov © IA REGNUM

The 1st Pacific Squadron was too weak to contain the onslaught of the Japanese, so in April 1904 it was decided to strengthen the fleet of the Far East by sending the 2nd Pacific Squadron from the Baltic Sea. It was assumed that this action would help seize the advantage at sea and release Port Arthur. The 2nd Pacific squadron was formed in Kronstadt and Revel, and the vice admiral was appointed its commander Zinovy ​​Rozhdestvensky, who previously served as chief of the Main Naval Staff. However, it was possible to prepare the squadron only by September.

Japanese attacks on Port Arthur intensified day by day. They made several assault attempts, but the Russian garrison heroically repulsed the enemy's advance. The 2nd Pacific Squadron left Libava only on October 2 (15), 1904. She had to go 32.5 thousand km, and she did not manage to get to the theater of military operations in time. December 20, 1904 (January 2, 1905), 329 days after the start of the war, the Port Arthur fortress was surrendered to the Japanese. The ships of the 1st Pacific Squadron, which remained in service, were sunk, and the Japanese received time to prepare for a collision with the 2nd Pacific Squadron. They were engaged in rearmament of ships, retraining on a new method of shooting.

Despite the fact that Port Arthur fell, the fleet was ordered to move on. Nicholas II set the task of seizing the Sea of ​​Japan, and Rozhdestvensky decided to break through to Vladivostok along a short route through the Tsushima Strait. In any case, the order to seize the sea looks almost impracticable, because the squadron was not only significantly inferior to the Japanese fleet in number, but also arrived at the battlefield after several months of a difficult campaign.

The 2nd Pacific Squadron consisted of 8 squadron battleships, 3 coastal defense battleships, 1 armored cruiser, 8 cruisers, 1 auxiliary cruiser, 9 destroyers, 6 transports and 2 hospital ships. Japanese fleet under the command of an admiral Heihachiro Togo far outnumbered the forces of the squadron. For the battle with the Russians were ready 4 squadron battleships, 8 armored cruisers, 16 cruisers, 6 gunboats and coastal defense ships, 24 auxiliary cruisers, 21 destroyers and 42 destroyers.

The Japanese fleet was superior to ours not only quantitatively: the Russian ships were in many ways inferior to the Japanese. The Japanese artillery was faster (360 rounds per minute versus 134), the Japanese shells were 10-15 times superior in high-explosive action to the Russians, the armor of the Japanese ships was better.

“The fleet, like the army, turned out to be unprepared for the great test. It was terrifying to learn later that most of the officers left Kronstadt with a firm sense of their doom " - wrote a participant in the Russo-Japanese War, the future military agent of the Russian Empire in France Alexey Ignatiev in his book "Fifty Years in the ranks".

The Japanese were waiting for a meeting with the Russian fleet and deployed patrol ships at all three straits (La Perouse, Sangarsky and Tsushima), through which you can go to Vladivostok in order to find out in time about the approach of Russian ships. And this strategy worked. On May 14 (27) at 2:45 am, on the approaches to the Tsushima Strait, the 2nd Pacific Squadron was discovered by one of the Japanese reconnaissance officers - the auxiliary cruiser Shinano-Maru. After making sure that the Russians were heading specifically for the Tsushima Strait, the Japanese fleet began to deploy to destroy the arriving squadron.

Warships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, which took part in the battle with the Japanese fleet.

1. The flagship - the battleship "KNYAZ SUVOROV" (1902)
Killed in battle


2. Armored cruiser OSLYABYA (1898)
Killed in battle


3. Armored cruiser "ADMIRAL NAKHIMOV" ( 1885)
Killed in battle

4. Cruiser of the 1st rank "DMITRY DONSKOY" (1883)
Flooded by the crew

5. Cruiser of the 1st rank "VLADIMIR MONOMAKH" (1882)
Flooded by the crew

6. Battleship "NAVARIN" (1891)
Killed in battle

7. Squadron battleship "EMPEROR NICHOLAS THE FIRST" (1889)
Surrendered. Later joined the Japanese fleet

8. The battleship of the coast guard "ADMIRAL USHAKOV" (1893)
Flooded by the crew

9. The battleship of the coast guard "ADMIRAL SENYAVIN" (1896)

10. Battleship of the coast guard "GENERAL-ADMIRAL APRAKSIN" (1896)
Surrendered. Entered the Japanese Navy

11. Squadron battleship "SISOY THE GREAT" (1894)
Killed in battle

12. Battleship "BORODINO" (1901)
Killed in battle

13. Cruiser of the 2nd rank "DIAMOND" (1903)
Was the only cruiser to break through to Vladivostok

14. Armored cruiser 2nd rank "PEARL" (1903)
He left for Manila, where he was interned, after the end of the war he returned to the Russian fleet.

(The same applies to all Russian ships that were able to break away from the pursuit of the Japanese
fleet and reached the ports of neutral states)

15. Armored cruiser of the 1st rank "AURORA" (1900)
Gone to Manila

16. Battleship "EAGLE" (1902)
Surrendered. Joined the Japanese Navy

17. Armored cruiser of the 1st rank "OLEG" (1903)
Gone to Manila

18. Battleship "EMPEROR ALEXANDER THE THIRD" (1901)
Killed in battle

19. Armored cruiser 1st rank "SVETLANA" (1896)
Flooded by the crew

20. Auxiliary cruiser "URAL" (1890)
Flooded by the crew

21. Destroyer "BEDOVY" (1902)
Surrendered. Joined the Japanese Navy

22. Destroyer "BYSTRY" (1902)
Blown up by the crew

23. Destroyer "BUYNY" (1901)
Killed in battle

24. Destroyer "BRAVY" (1901)

25. Destroyer "BRILLIANT" (1901)
Flooded by the crew

26. Destroyer "LOUD" (1903)
Flooded by the crew

27. Destroyer "GROZNY" (1904)
Managed to break through to Vladivostok

28. Squadron destroyer "PERFECT" (1902)
Killed in battle

29. Destroyer "BODRY" (1902)
Gone to Shanghai

Thus, in the Battle of Tsushima, out of 29 warships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron in battle, fighting to the end, 17 ships were killed (including those that did not want to surrender to the enemy and were unable to continue the battle, were blown up by their own crew or flooded by the discovery of the Kingstones, so as not to get to the enemy). 7 ships valiantly fighting the Japanese, after everything was over, in various ways managed to survive as combat units, leaving for neutral ports, or breaking through to their own in Vladivostok. And only 5 ships surrendered to the Japanese.

Battle

On May 23, 1905, Rozhdestvensky's squadron made the last loading of coal. The stocks were again taken over the norm, as a result, the battleships were overloaded, deeply immersed in the sea. On May 25, all the extra transports were sent to Shanghai. The squadron was put on full alert. Rozhdestvensky did not organize reconnaissance, so as not to find the squadron.

However, the Japanese already guessed which way the Russian ships would go. The Japanese admiral Togo had been waiting for Russian ships since January 1905. The Japanese command assumed that the Russians would try to break through to Vladivostok or seize some harbor in the Formosa region (modern Taiwan) and from there conduct operations against the Japanese Empire. At the meeting in Tokyo, it was decided to proceed from defense, concentrate forces in the Korea Strait and act according to the situation. In anticipation of the Russian fleet, the Japanese carried out a major overhaul of the ships, replaced all faulty guns with new ones. Previous battles have made the Japanese fleet a single combat unit. Therefore, by the time the Russian squadron appeared, the Japanese fleet was in the best condition, united, with great combat experience, a unit that was inspired by previous successes.

The main forces of the Japanese fleet were divided into 3 squadrons (each with several squadrons). 1st Squadron was commanded by Admiral Togo, who held the flag on the battleship Mikaso. In the 1st combat detachment (the armored core of the fleet) there were 4 squadron battleships of the 1st class, 2 armored cruisers of the 1st class and a mine cruiser. The 1st squadron also included: 3rd combat detachment (4 armored cruisers 2nd and 3rd classes), 1st destroyer squad (5 destroyers), 2nd destroyer squad (4 units), 3rd destroyer squad (4 ships), 14th destroyer squad (4 destroyers). The 2nd squadron was under the flag of Vice Admiral H. Kamimura. It consisted of: 2nd combat squad (6 armored cruisers of the 1st class and advice notes), 4th combat squad (4 armored cruisers), 4th and 5th destroyer squads (4 ships each), 9- 1st and 19th destroyer detachments. 3rd Squadron under the flag of Vice Admiral S. Kataoka. The 3rd squadron consisted of: 5th combat squadron (obsolete battleship, 3 cruisers of the 2nd class, advice note), 6th combat squadron (4 armored cruisers of the 3rd class), 7th combat squad (obsolete battleship , cruiser 3rd class, 4 gunboats), 1st, 5th, 10th, 11th, 15th, 17th, 18th and 20th destroyer detachments (4 units each), 16th destroyer detachment (2 destroyers), a detachment of special-purpose ships (it included auxiliary cruisers).

The Japanese fleet goes to meet the 2nd Pacific squadron

The balance of power was in favor of the Japanese. For armored ships of the line, there was an approximate equality: 12:12. For large-caliber guns of 300 mm (254-305 mm), the advantage was on the side of the Russian squadron - 41:17; on other guns the Japanese had the advantage: 200 mm - 6:30, 150 mm - 52:80. The Japanese had a great advantage in such important indicators as the number of rounds per minute, weight in kg of metal and explosives. For guns of caliber 300-, 250- and 200 mm, the Russian squadron fired 14 rounds per minute, the Japanese - 60; the weight of the metal was 3680 for the Russian guns, 9500 kg for the Japanese; the weight explosive the Russians, the Japanese - 1330 kg. Russian ships were inferior in the segment of 150 and 120 mm guns. According to the number of rounds per minute: Russian ships - 120, Japanese - 300; the weight of metal in kg for Russian guns - 4500, for the Japanese - 12350; explosives for the Russians - 108, for the Japanese - 1670. The Russian squadron was also inferior in armor area: 40% versus 60% and in speed: 12-14 knots versus 12-18 knots.

Thus, the Russian squadron was 2-3 times inferior in rate of fire; in terms of the amount of metal thrown out per minute, the Japanese ships outnumbered the Russians by 2 1/2 times; the stock of explosives in the Japanese shells was 5-6 times more than in the Russians. Russian thick-walled armor-piercing shells with an extremely low explosive charge pierced Japanese armor and did not explode. The Japanese shells produced severe destruction and fires, literally destroying all non-metallic parts of the ship (there was an excess of wood on the Russian ships).

In addition, the Japanese fleet had a noticeable advantage in light cruising forces. In a direct cruising battle, the Russian ships were threatened with complete defeat. They were inferior in the number of ships and guns, and were also bound by the guard of transports. The Japanese had an enormous superiority in the destroyer forces: 9 Russian 350-ton destroyers against 21 destroyers and 44 destroyers of the Japanese fleet.

After the appearance of Russian ships in the Strait of Malacca, the Japanese command received accurate information about the movement of the 2nd Pacific Squadron. In mid-May, the cruisers of the Vladivostok detachment went out to sea, which indicated that the Russian squadron was approaching. The Japanese fleet prepared to meet the enemy. 1st and 2nd squadrons (an armored core of the fleet of 4 class 1 squadron battleships and 8 class 1 armored cruisers, almost equal in power to battleships) were stationed on the western shore of the Korea Strait, in Mozampo; 3rd Squadron - off Tsushima Island. The auxiliary cruisers of the merchant steamers formed a 100-mile guard chain, spread out 120 miles south of the main force. Behind the guard line were light cruisers and patrol ships of the main force. All forces were connected by radiotelegraph and guarded the entrance to the Korean Gulf.


Japanese Admiral Togo Heihachiro


Squadron battleship Mikasa, July 1904


Squadron battleship "Mikasa", repair of the aft tower. Reid Elliot, August 12-16, 1904


Squadron battleship "Sikishima", July 6, 1906


Squadron battleship "Asahi"

On the morning of May 25, Rozhdestvensky's squadron headed for the Tsushima Strait. The ships went in two columns with transports in the middle. On the night of May 27, the Russian squadron passed the Japanese guard chain. The ships went without lights and were not noticed by the Japanese. But, following the squadron, 2 hospital ships were illuminated. At 2 o'clock. 25 minutes they were noticed by a Japanese cruiser, himself remaining undetected. At dawn, first one, and then several enemy cruisers went out to the Russian squadron, which followed at a distance and at times disappeared in the morning fog. At about 10 o'clock Rozhestvensky's squadron reorganized into one wake column. Behind them, transports and auxiliary vessels were moving under the cover of 3 cruisers.

At 11 o'clock. 10 min. because of the fog, Japanese cruisers appeared, some Russian ships opened fire on them. Rozhestvensky ordered to stop firing. At noon, the squadron headed north-east 23 ° - to Vladivostok. Then the Russian admiral tried to rebuild the right column of the squadron into the front line, but, seeing the enemy again, abandoned this idea. As a result, the battleships were in two columns.

Togo, having received a message in the morning about the appearance of the Russian fleet, immediately moved from Mozampo to the eastern side of the Korea Strait (Okinoshima Island). From the intelligence reports, the Japanese admiral knew perfectly well the deployment of the Russian squadron. When at about noon the distance between the fleets was reduced to 30 miles, Togo moved towards the Russians with the main armored forces (12 squadron battleships and armored cruisers) plus 4 light cruisers and 12 destroyers. The main forces of the Japanese fleet were to attack the head of the Russian column, and Togo sent the cruising forces around the Russian rear in order to capture the transports.

At 13 o'clock. 30 minutes. the right column of the Russian battleships increased its speed to 11 knots and began to deviate to the left in order to reach the head of the left column and form a common column. The cruisers and transports were instructed to retreat to the right. At that moment, the ships of Togo appeared from the northeast. The Japanese ships, having a course of 15 knots, went across the Russian squadron and, finding themselves in front and somewhat to the left of our ships, began sequentially (one after the other at one point) to turn in reverse direction- the so-called "Togo loop". With such a maneuver, Togo took a position in front of the Russian squadron.

The turning point was very risky for the Japanese. Rozhestvensky got a good chance to turn the tide in his favor. Having accelerated the progress of the 1st detachment to the maximum, approached the usual distance of 15 cables for the Russian gunners and concentrated fire on the turning point of the Togo squadron, the Russian squadron battleships could shoot the enemy. According to a number of military researchers, such a maneuver could cause serious damage to the armored core of the Japanese fleet and allow the 2nd Pacific Squadron, if not to win this battle, then at least fulfill the task of breaking through the main forces to Vladivostok. In addition, the newest Russian battleships of the Borodino class could have tried to "squeeze" the Japanese ships to the convoy of older Russian battleships, slow, but with powerful guns. However, Rozhestvensky either did not notice this, or did not dare to take such a step, not believing in the ability of his squadron. And he had very little time to make such a decision.

At the time of the turn of the Japanese squadron at 13 o'clock. 49 minutes Russian ships opened fire from a distance of about 8 km (45 cables). At the same time, only the head battleships could effectively hit the enemy, for the rest the distance was too great, and the ships in front were in the way. The Japanese immediately responded by concentrating their fire on two flagships - "Prince Suvorov" and "Oslyab". The Russian commander turned the squadron to the right in order to take a position parallel to the course of the Japanese fleet, but the enemy, using greater speed, continued to cover the head of the Russian squadron, blocking the path to Vladivostok.

After about 10 minutes, the Japanese gunners took aim and their powerful high-explosive shells began to produce great destruction on the Russian ships, causing severe fires. In addition, fire and heavy smoke made it difficult for the Russians to fire and disrupted ship control. "Oslyabya" were badly damaged and at about 14:00. 30 minutes. Burying his nose to the very haws, he rolled out of order to the right, after about 10 minutes the battleship capsized and sank. Commander 1st-Class Captain Vladimir Baer was wounded at the beginning of the battle and refused to leave the ship; more than 500 people died with him. The torpedo boats and a tug lifted 376 people out of the water. Around the same time, Suvorov was severely damaged. The shell fragments hit the wheelhouse, killing and wounding almost everyone who was there. Rozhdestvensky was wounded. Having lost control, the battleship rolled to the right, and then dangled between the squadrons, trying to regain control. In the course of the further battle, the battleship was repeatedly fired upon and attacked with torpedoes. At the beginning of 18 hours. The destroyer "Buyny" removed from the ship part of the headquarters, led by the seriously wounded Rozhdestvensky. Soon, Japanese cruisers and destroyers finished off the crippled flagship. The entire crew was killed. When the battleship Suvorov died, Admiral Nebogatov took command, holding the flag on the battleship Emperor Nicholas I.


I. A. Vladimirov. The heroic death of the battleship "Prince Suvorov" in the Battle of Tsushima


I. V. Slavinsky. The last hour of the battleship "Prince Suvorov" in the battle of Tsushima

The squadron was led by the next battleship - "Emperor Alexander III". But soon he was badly damaged and moved to the center of the squadron, giving up the place of the head to "Borodino". They finished off the battleship "Alexander" at 18:50. concentrated fire from the armored cruisers Nissin and Kassuga. None of the crew (857 people) survived.

The Russian squadron continued to move in relative order, trying to escape from the Japanese ticks. But, the Japanese ships, without serious damage, still closed the way. About 15 hours. Japanese cruisers went to the rear of the Russian squadron, captured two hospital ships, engaged in a battle with cruisers, knocking down cruisers and transports in one heap.

After 15 o'clock. the sea was suddenly obscured by fog. Under his protection, the Russian ships turned southeast and parted with the enemy. The battle was interrupted, and the Russian squadron again laid down on the course northeast 23 °, towards Vladivostok. However, the enemy cruisers discovered the Russian squadron and the battle continued. An hour later, when fog appeared again, the Russian squadron turned south and drove away the Japanese cruisers. At 17 o'clock, obeying the instructions of Rear Admiral Nebogatov, "Borodino" again led the column to the northeast, towards Vladivostok. Then the main forces of Togo approached again, after a short skirmish, the fog divided the main forces. About 6 pm Togo again caught up with the main Russian forces, focusing fire on the Borodino and Orel. Borodino was badly damaged and burned. At the beginning of 19 hours. "Borodino" received the last critical damage, was all on fire. The battleship capsized and sank with its entire crew. Only one sailor was saved (Semyon Yushchin). "Alexander III" died a little earlier.

At sunset, the Japanese commander withdrew the ships from battle. By the morning of May 28, all the detachments were to assemble north of Dazhelet Island (in the northern part of the Korea Strait). The torpedo detachments received the task of continuing the battle, surrounding the Russian squadron and completing the rout with night attacks.

Thus, on May 27, 1905, the Russian squadron suffered a heavy defeat. The 2nd Pacific Squadron lost 4 of the best squadron battleships out of 5. The newest battleship Eagle, which remained afloat, was badly damaged. Other ships of the squadron were also heavily damaged. Many Japanese ships received several holes each, but retained their combat effectiveness.

The passivity of the Russian command, which did not even try to defeat the enemy, went into battle without any hope of success, surrendering to the will of fate, led to tragedy. The squadron only tried to break through towards Vladivostok, and did not conduct a decisive and fierce battle. If the captains fought decisively, maneuvered, tried to get close to the enemy for effective shooting, the Japanese suffered much more serious losses. However, the passivity of the leadership paralyzed almost all the commanders, the squadron, like a herd of bulls, stupidly and stubbornly, broke through in the direction of Vladivostok, not trying to crush the formation of Japanese ships.


Squadron battleship "Prince Suvorov"


Squadron battleship "Oslyabya" in the campaign to the Far East as part of the 2nd Pacific squadron


Squadron battleship "Oslyabya" in front of the Korea Strait, May 1905


Ships of the 2nd squadron during one of the stops. From left to right: battleships Navarin, Emperor Alexander III and Borodino


Squadron battleship "Emperor Alexander III"

Completion of the pogrom

At night, numerous Japanese destroyers surrounded the Russian fleet from the north, east and south. Nebogatov on his flagship overtook the squadron, stood in his head and moved to Vladivostok. Cruisers and destroyers, as well as the surviving transports, having not received the task, went to different sides... Remaining at Nebogatov 4 battleships ("Nikolai", "Eagle", "Admiral Senyavin", "General-Admiral Apraksin") in the morning were surrounded by superior enemy forces and capitulated. The crews were ready to receive the last battle and die with honor, but carried out the order of the admiral.

Only the cruiser "Izumrud" caught in the encirclement, the only cruiser remaining in the squadron after the battle and guarding the remnants of the 2nd Pacific Squadron from destroyer attacks at night, did not obey the order to surrender to the Japanese. "Emerald" at full speed broke through the encirclement and went to Vladivostok. The commander of the ship, Captain 2nd Rank Vasily Ferzen, who showed himself excellently during this tragic battle and breaking through the encirclement ring, made a number of serious mistakes on the way to Vladivostok. Apparently, the psychological stress of the battle affected. When entering the Gulf of Vladimir, the ship sat on the stones and was blown up by the crew, fearing the appearance of the enemy. Although at high tide it was possible to remove the ship from the shallows.

The battleship "Navarin" did not receive severe damage in the daytime battle, the losses were small. But at night he betrayed himself by the light of searchlights, and the attack of the Japanese destroyers led to the death of the ship. Of the 681 crew members, only three managed to escape. The battleship Sisoy the Great was severely damaged during the day's battle. At night she was attacked by torpedo boats and was fatally damaged. In the morning, the battleship reached Tsushima Island, where it collided with Japanese cruisers and a destroyer. The commander of the ship M.V. Ozerov, seeing the hopelessness of the situation, agreed to surrender. The Japanese evacuated the crew and the ship sank. The armored cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov" was seriously damaged during the day, torpedoed at night and in the morning it was flooded so as not to surrender to the enemy. The battleship "Admiral Ushakov" was seriously damaged in the day's battle. The ship's speed dropped and it lagged behind the main forces. On May 28, the ship refused to surrender and took an unequal battle with the Japanese armored cruisers Iwate and Yakumo. Having received severe damage, the ship was sunk by the crew. The badly damaged cruiser Vladimir Monomakh was sunk by the crew in a hopeless position. Of all the ships of the 1st rank, the Dmitry Donskoy cruiser was the closest to approaching Vladivostok. The cruiser was overtaken by the Japanese. "Donskoy" took a battle with the superior forces of the Japanese. The cruiser died without lowering the flag.


V. S. Ermyshev Battleship "Admiral Ushakov"


"Dmitry Donskoy"

Only the II rank cruiser Almaz and the destroyers Bravy and Grozny were able to leave for Vladivostok. In addition, the transport "Anadyr" went to Madagascar, and then to the Baltic. Three cruisers (Zhemchug, Oleg and Aurora) left for Manila in the Philippines and were interned there. The destroyer "Bedovy", on board which was the wounded Rozhdestvensky, was overtaken by Japanese destroyers and surrendered.


Captured Russian sailors aboard the Japanese battleship "Asahi"

The main causes of the disaster

From the very beginning, the campaign of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was adventurous. The ships had to be sent to the Pacific Ocean before the war. Finally, the meaning of the campaign was lost after the fall of Port Arthur and the death of the 1st Pacific Squadron. The squadron had to be returned from Madagascar. However, due to political ambitions, the desire to somehow raise the prestige of Russia, the fleet was sent to death.

The campaign itself from Libava to Tsushima became an unparalleled feat of Russian sailors in overcoming enormous difficulties, but the battle at Tsushima showed the entire rottenness of the Romanov empire. The battle showed the backwardness of the shipbuilding and armament of the Russian fleet in comparison with the leading powers (the Japanese fleet was created by the efforts of the leading world powers, especially England). The Russian naval force in the Far East was crushed. Tsushima became a decisive precondition for concluding peace with Japan, although in the military-strategic respect, the outcome of the war was decided on land.

Tsushima became a kind of terrible landmark event for the Russian Empire, showing the need for fundamental changes in the country, the disastrous nature of the war for Russia in its current state. Unfortunately, he was not understood, and Russian empire died as the 2nd Pacific Squadron - bloody and terrible.

One of the main reasons for the death of the squadron was the lack of initiative and indecision of the Russian command (the scourge of the Russian army and navy during the Russian-Japanese war). Rozhestvensky did not dare to harshly raise the question of sending the squadron back after the fall of Port Arthur. The admiral led the squadron with no hope of success and remained passive, giving up the initiative to the enemy. There was no specific battle plan. Long-range reconnaissance was not organized, a convenient opportunity to defeat the Japanese cruisers, which for a considerable time were separated from the main forces, was not used. At the beginning of the battle, they did not use the chance to deliver a strong blow to the main forces of the enemy. The squadron did not complete the combat formation and fought on unfavorable conditions, only the lead ships could conduct normal fire. The unsuccessful formation of the squadron allowed the Japanese to focus fire on the best battleships of the Russian squadron and quickly disable them, after which the outcome of the battle was decided. During the battle, when the head battleships were out of order, the squadron actually fought without command. Nebogatov took command only in the evening and in the morning handed over the ships to the Japanese.

Among technical reasons it is possible to distinguish the "fatigue" of ships after a long voyage, when for a long time they were separated from the normal repair base. The ships were overloaded with coal and other cargo, which reduced their seaworthiness. Russian ships were inferior to Japanese ships in the total number of guns, armor area, speed, rate of fire, weight and explosive power of the squadron's shot. There was a strong lag in the cruising and destroyer forces. The ship composition of the squadron was diverse in armament, protection and maneuverability, which affected its combat effectiveness. The new battleships, as the battle showed, had weak armor and low stability.

The Russian squadron, unlike the Japanese fleet, was not a single combat organism. Personnel, both the commander and the private, was distinguished by its variegation. The cadre commanders were only enough to fill the main responsible positions. Incomplete command staff reimbursed due to the early release of the naval corps, the call from the stock of "old men" (who did not have experience of sailing on armored ships) and transfer from merchant marine(ensigns). As a result, a strong gap was formed between young people who did not have the necessary experience and sufficient knowledge, "old people" who needed updating of knowledge and "civilians" who did not have normal military training. Sailors urgent service there was also not enough, so about a third of the crews consisted of reserves and recruits. There were many "penalties" whom the commanders "exiled" on a long voyage, which did not improve the discipline on the ships. Not better situation was also with non-commissioned officers. Most of the personnel were assigned to the new ships only in the summer of 1904, and could not study the ships well. Due to the fact that it was necessary to urgently complete, repair and prepare ships, the squadron did not go together in the summer of 1904, did not study. In August alone, a 10-day voyage was made. During the cruise, due to a number of reasons, the crews were unable to learn how to maneuver ships and shoot well.

Thus, the 2nd Pacific Squadron was ill-prepared, in fact, did not receive combat training. It is clear that the Russian sailors and commanders entered the battle bravely, fought bravely, but their heroism could not rectify the situation.


V.S.Ermyshev. Battleship "Oslyabya


A. Throne The death of the battleship "Emperor Alexander III"

Alexey Novikov, a sailor on the Orel (the future Soviet writer-marine painter), described the situation well. He was arrested in 1903 for revolutionary propaganda and, as "unreliable", was transferred to the 2nd Pacific Squadron. Novikov wrote: “Many sailors were called up from the reserve. These elderly people, clearly weaned from the naval service, lived with memories of their homeland, were sick of separation from home, from children, from wife. The war fell on them unexpectedly, like a terrible calamity, and they, preparing for an unprecedented campaign, performed work with a somber look of strangled people. The team included many recruits. Stricken and pitiful, they looked at everything with frozen horror in their eyes. They were frightened by the sea, on which they came for the first time, and even more - by the unknown future. Even among the career sailors who graduated from various special schools, there was no usual fun. Only the penalty kicks, in contrast to the others, were more or less cheerful. The coastal authorities, in order to get rid of them as from a harmful element, came up with the easiest way for this: to write them off to ships going to war. Thus, to the dismay of the senior officer, we have accumulated up to seven percent of them. "

Another good image explaining the death of the squadron was conveyed by Novikov (under the pseudonym "sailor A. Zaterty"). This is what he saw: “We were extremely amazed that this ship did not suffer in the least from our artillery. He looked as if he was now taken out of repair. Even the paint on the guns didn't burn. Our sailors, having examined the Asahi, were ready to swear that on May 14 we fought not with the Japanese, but ... what good, the British. Inside the battleship, we were amazed at the cleanliness, neatness, practicality and expediency of the device. On our new battleships of the Borodino class, a whole half of the ship was assigned for some thirty officers; it was cluttered with cabins, and during the battle they only increased the fires; and in the other half of the ship, we squeezed not only up to 900 sailors, but also artillery and lifts. And our enemy on the ship used everything mainly for cannons. Then we were strikingly struck by the absence between officers and sailors of the discord that you meet at every step in our country; in the same place, on the contrary, one could sense between them some kind of solidarity, kindred spirit and common interests. It was only here for the first time that we really learned who we were dealing with in battle and what the Japanese were. "