Novorossiysk catastrophe of 1920. More on the "Historical Events" fan. Evacuation officials

While the all-great wandered through the Kuban villages, in Novorossiysk the "united indivisibles" made a safe nest for themselves.

In February, trains came here continuously. Everything that was related to the great and indivisible was hastily evacuated to the very last stage.

Here the sea was blue by my side. Dozens of ships, Russian and foreign, in the event of a forfeit in the Kuban, could instantly accommodate five or ten patented patriots and take them far away from the Bolsheviks.

Many migrated here directly from Rostov. Others - after a short stop in Yekaterinodar.

"Evening Time" by Boris Suvorin was right there and never stopped saving Russia.

"The smoking-room is alive!" wrote the democratic "Morning of the South" in Yekaterinodar, devoting an epigram to the cheerful Russian:

Careless and fervent, Not knowing worries, Again Boris Suvorin Publishes a newspaper.

Living in Novorossiysk, He saves Russia with a cry. As of old Capitoline Restless Goose.

Again burns with anger, And in a fighting pose Again he threatens with the left His front line.

Have mercy: should he grieve and grieve: he can publish a Newspaper in Istanbul too.

Yes, I do not lose hope of publishing Vechernee Vremya in Constantinople, and I will have nothing against the cooperation of the author of this epigram, - answered the reckless Suvorin-son.

Volunteer power has already fallen around Novorossiysk. Gangs of greens circled around the city like hungry winter packs of wolves around a human dwelling.

On the night of February 21, all the prisoners, including four hundred people, went to the mountains from the prison. The officer company ran on alarm and arrived at the prison, but found it empty.

If it were not for the British, the greens would have ruled the city for a long time.

Only British dreadnoughts and a detachment of Scottish riflemen guarded the last point of Denikin's state in the Caucasus.

“Novorossiysk is the last center of monarchism,” wrote Free Kuban back in January.

It would be more correct to say:

In Novorossiysk, as in a huge cesspool, all the impurities of the white camp were gathered.

Legal deserters, philanthropic acrobats, unemployed administrators, politicians and other rear squads "formed" "crusader squads" to cash in on a profitable business and to justify their eternal stay in good cities at a good distance from the front.

“In order to strengthen our heroic army,” reported Vechernee Vremya on January 10, “the formation of crusader detachments began in Novorossiysk. One of the leaders of this organization, Major General Maksimov, reports: six months ago in Odessa, a group of public and political figures founded the brotherhood of St. John the Warrior, which initially set up an ideological struggle against the Bolsheviks. However, life soon suggested that one ideological struggle, that is, agitation, was not enough, and that it was necessary to fight the Bolsheviks with weapons (!). A project arose to organize a detachment of crusaders, inspired not only by political, but also by religious ideals. The commander-in-chief agreed, and the recording yielded tangible results. The crusaders are already a real force, which is getting stronger and stronger every day. In the near future, the crusaders will be reduced to a large combat unit and then will go to the front with weapons in their hands and with a cross in their hearts. Our distinguishing mark is the eight-pointed cross on the chest. The mood of the crusaders is complete selflessness and a willingness to give everything in the name of the motherland. In the consciousness of the feat ahead of them, the crusaders decided to impose a three-day fast on themselves, to confess and commune with St. secrets. The first official performance of the crusaders in the ranks of the troops is expected on January 12, when they will take part in the solemn procession on the occasion of the stay of the miraculous icon of the Kursk Mother of God in Novorossiysk ”.

In the oath of the "crusaders" were significant words:

"I pledge not to appropriate anything from the spoils of war with impunity and to keep the faint of heart from violence and robbery."

Prince Pavel Dolgoruky also "formed".

“In Novorossiysk,” wrote Vechernee Vremya on February 29, “a society for the formation of combat detachments was opened to send them to the front to replenish parts of the Volunteer Army. The task is to call on all Russian people who are capable of carrying weapons, in the hour of threat for Russia, not to shy away from duty and join the detachments. Membership fee - 100 rubles. Members can be both men and women. Chairman of the Board, Prince. Pavel Dolgoruky. Chairman's comrades: Gen. Obruchev and Professor Makletsov. Members of the board of N.F. Ezersky, P. P. Bogaevsky, V. I. Snegirev ".

Boris Suvorin himself also made an assassination attempt on a philistine's pocket; collecting donations for the "army", which fled, throwing its last pants, and refused to defend against the green carts with their own goods.

But the fools in Novorossiysk got out.

“Nobody donated anything,” the businessman complained sadly, “but in Yekaterinodar, a certain swindler who extorted money from businessmen by means of a forged circular, in which there was a threat that, if the required amount was not paid, the perpetrators would be brought to court-martial collect about a million rubles.

Suvorin in vain referred to Yekaterinodar and the past.

Such "donations" were collected with great success right there in Novorossiysk by all sorts of "crusaders", ranks of military detachments and other rescuers of the fatherland, who demonstrated their combat readiness in church processions.

“Yesterday afternoon,” wrote the same “Evening Time” on March 10, “on Serebryakovskaya Street, several persons in officer's uniform approached groups of speculators and asked if they had currency. After an affirmative answer, persons in officer's uniform demanded to show the currency, and then ... calmly put it in their pocket, saying: "We will show you, so and so, how to speculate." Currency speculation, of course, cannot be called a worthy occupation, but robbery in broad daylight can hardly be called such a name. "

Denikin without a twinge of conscience called Novorossiysk a "rear nativity scene."

The Reds were already approaching the city, but the Suvorins were not discouraged. The great and indivisible one that fed them, it turns out, has not yet perished. K. Ostrozhsky on March 10 firmly declared:

“Pessimists, whose number is increasing every day, whisper at all intersections:“ You see! You see: the results are good. " But it doesn't matter. The idea of ​​a fight still hasn't died. As long as there is at least one person in Russia who does not want to submit to the dictatorship of the proletariat, the idea of ​​combating violence has not died. It is too early to sum up the final results. The army is now going through its most difficult way of the cross. But a bright, joyful resurrection awaits her. "

For the complete impossibility of deluding themselves with victories over the Bolsheviks, the rear nativity scene boasted of successes in the war with the Greens. The headquarters of the commander-in-chief, who had moved here, on March 9, with the most serious air, reported:

“Our detachment, continuing the offensive from Kabardinka (twenty versts from Novorossiysk) to Gelendzhik (thirty-five versts from the same city), fought the whole day with the green, occupying the heights, and by the evening occupied Maryina Roshcha. Prisoners captured. Continuing the offensive, our units knocked down the green from the heights and drove them into the mountains. "

The Greens, who were so eager to make their army of the SR, could still be beaten by the Denikinites.

Finally, in Novorossiysk, the air began to clear.

As soon as the Reds went around the Crimean, as all sorts of "crusaders", "shapers", generals-from-speculation, headquarters and chief hooligans, priests, robbers, patroness ladies, ladies-prostitutes poured into the steamers prepared for them, dragging mountains of property acquired under the banner of Denikin. When the frenzied stream of fugitives reached Novorossiysk, the city was already empty. Everything that had anything to do with Volunteering had either already sailed to the shores of Crimea and Constantinople, or was sitting on ships, admiring the tragedy, the first act of which took place on the morning of March 13th.

General Kelchevsky, chief of staff of the Don Army, who is also the Minister of War in the South Russian government, flew to Novorossiysk by airplane to bother about steamers for the Donets. Politics was already forgotten. The Don wave rolled uncontrollably towards Novorossiysk. No force - neither Sidorin, nor the chieftain, nor all three hundred members of the Circle - could turn it off the torn road and direct it to the Sochi highway, bypassing Novorossiysk. Denikin promised ...

When the all-great came to Novorossiysk, he was given ... one steamer!

Do not forget the morning of March 13 in life. Tens of thousands of people, horse and foot, blocked the port embankment, attacking the wharves, near which the remains of the great and indivisible were loaded. But the Don people everywhere saw before them volunteer machine guns or bayonets of Scottish riflemen.

And more and more thousands floated out of the mountains. People quickly jumped off the carts, threw all their belongings and one by one rushed to the piers.

In insane terror, some threw themselves into the water. The stubborn were thrown from the docks. The Kornilovites drowned the Don colonel:

A self-styled bastard! Climbed up to the guard.

The all-great, with the roar of the English cannons that frightened the greens, darted from side to side. They were looking for the chieftain.

But he dug in at a cement plant, far from the city. The cadets of the Ataman School guarded his person from expressions of love by his subjects. The British secured a place for him on the steamer Baron Beck. Despair gripped the crowds of the red-blazers.

So what kind of bastards were we going for? Where are they, leaders? What cracks have crawled into?

It was judgment day. Great, last judgment. The Don Cossacks received retribution for that faith, for the blindness with which they fought "until victory", following the call of ambitious generals and politicians entrenched in the rear.

Denikin and Romanovsky did not trust the "democratically organized Cossacks" and were afraid to take them with them. For too long, the politicians of the great were breaking down, whether to lead their "people" to the general's Crimea or to the "fraternal" Menshevik Georgia.

Satanel and General Kutepov. In the Kuban, he, the head of the "colored troops", had to obey the Don commander! This he could not forget.

Seated on the steamers, Volunteer enjoyed her terrible revenge. She settled scores with the leaders and politicians of the Don Cossacks. The lower classes paid for the sins and mistakes of these latter.

Some of the donors rushed to the disastrous hike along the Sochi highway, along the coast of the sea. An insignificant number of them managed to submerge. Head of the British Mission, Gen. Holman, took pity on the great, allowing them to take them to the British warships.

And where is this stuff? Get out! - he shouted, noticing that sacks with banknotes were being dragged onto the steamer.

About 100,000 people were taken prisoner by the Reds in Novorossiysk itself and 22,000 in Kabardinka. A huge percentage of the local captives were Donets.

I drove out miraculously.

I was overwhelmed by the crowd near the pier of the Russian Society of Shipping and Trade. Several times I flew into the sea, two times I was knocked down. Finally, having somehow reached the stone wall that bounds the embankment, I climbed up to the top of it and got out to the English warehouses.

There was no crowd. Individuals ruled here. Who was dragging a heap of greatcoats or service jackets. Who immediately changed clothes, throwing horrible rags onto the asphalt floor and pulling out any shirt, any pants from the bales.

A good uncle, the king of England, brought here a lot of all the rubbish left over from the world war in exchange for Kuban bread.

The British were already gone from here.

Having got out to the station, I trudged into the city, crossing hundreds of sidings and crawling under empty carriages, near which lay piles of all kinds of property.

I walked parallel to the embankment, behind the back of the crowd. Thousands of abandoned horses, thirsty, roamed right there. Tossing from side to side, they crumpled heaps of all the household rubbish left on the ground. Their hooves often trampled on bowls and plates, then priestly vestments and various objects of worship. Saving skins, mad people left everything to their fate.

A dull indifference to my future fate has long overtaken me. Previous deprivations, a series of sleepless nights, chronic hunger, complete physical exhaustion devalued life, and, like a hand, removed the feeling of fear of captivity.

Staggering with fatigue, I passed Serebryakovka and turned right along Velyaminovskaya Street. Having got out of town, I found a separate house in which my old friend, the postal officer of N.'s, lived, and, barely entering the apartment, I thumped on my bed and fell into oblivion under the crackle of English cannons.

Get up and run now.

A candle shines dimly in the room. There is silence on the street.

What time is it now?

It's eleven o'clock at night. Don't hesitate.

I look at my friend in amazement and cannot recognize his face. It is cold, cruel, unforgiving.

Get up and leave quickly.

The Bolsheviks enter the city. Go away, for God's sake.

But where?

Wherever you want, only from my apartment. They'll find you here, and I can't do it.

Is it possible to take offense at the philistine cowardice of people who are not involved in civil strife? Each dear to his own life, his own little prosperity.

A sigh of relief escapes my friend as I rise from the couch.

Bon voyage ... Forgive me for being so ...

But I'm already outside the door. Outside. Alone in the darkness of the night.

One, as if rejected from all mankind.

Damp ... Disgusting ... The watery mist was cut only by the glow of a huge fire in the port. The warehouses were on fire English good, which they did not manage to load.

Stop! Who goes? - An energetic shout is heard almost over the ear.

This is the outpost of the Markovites. They guard the entrance to the city. I named myself. We missed it.

Through the block again the outpost. Here are the same Markovites, but they speak more rudely.

Back! Can't miss. No Pedestrians.

Fortunately for me, an armored car made its way past the outpost on the street, heading to the city piers near the pier. I ducked from the side and slipped through.

A handful of people are swarming along the embankment. I hesitate to approach. I think they will drive. And suddenly they sang in an undertone the Don "national" anthem.

I was taken aback.

What's the part here?

Markovsky regiment.

What are the Donets in the Markov Regiment?

We've only been Markovites since midday. "Nibilized". They caught us in the streets. They say: we must take you into our hands, then you will become soldiers. There is a whole Don platoon of us, in the 2nd company.

Where is your steamer?

Here near the breakwater. Steamer "Margarita". The regiment had already sunk. The first battalion is on patrol. In two hours, the posts will be removed and with God on the road.

How would I, villagers, with you?

We will be glad, happy. After all, his colonel will be at his side. It's easier with yours. And then there is someone else's lads.

The Cossacks showed me where to find the regiment commander, Captain Marchenko. He was a lanky, very arrogant youth.

I declare to you that from now on you are a soldier of the 1st Markov Officer Regiment. We need people.

Welcome to the ranks, - he declared to me and shouted to a handsome, intelligent officer who was standing nearby:

Captain Nizhevsky! You have mobilized donors, I have now mobilized a commander for them.

Having listened to these speeches with great amazement, I began to stutter about my unsuitability for the formation and about my main profession, but Captain Marchenko vigorously besieged me:

Now there is no one to judge. Now we have to fight. Fight until victory.

And he ordered to supply me with a rifle and cartridges.

That's good! - the Cossacks were delighted to learn that I was also "nibilized". - Why do they, the bad ones, think that we will stay to serve them? God would have given us to get to some volosts, and there in no time we are evacuated from the white hats. Al we will not be able to? Are we, the all-merry army of the Don?

In the company of good-natured "kozuns" I spent the rest of the night on the street. They got me a mug, a spoon, and an English bag, picking up this stuff somewhere nearby, right from the ground. And when, before dawn, the outposts were removed, I went up the gangway to the deck of the "Margarita" with them and fit in the stern, with which a swarm of machine guns were looking at the city.

The same newspaper, no. 488, art. "Results" of Ostrozhsky.

Gene. Keis, an assistant to Holman, announced in advance that the British ship's artillery would not allow anyone to prevent the boarding of the army of Gen. Denikin.

All Don Cossacks wear red stripes on trousers and trousers.

Further destinies South Russian counterrevolutionary armies are described in the books of the same author: "Under the banner of Wrangel", 1925, Leningrad, publishing house "Priboy", and "In the country of brothers", 1923, Moscow, publishing to the "Moscow Worker".

When Denikin's headquarters moved to Novorossiysk, the city looked like a torn up anthill. As Denikin recalled, “its streets were literally crowded with young and healthy soldiers-deserters. They raged and organized rallies reminiscent of the first months of the revolution - with the same elementary understanding of events, with the same demagoguery and hysteria. Only the composition of the protesters was different: instead of comrades the soldiers were officers. " Those thousands of officers, real or even self-proclaimed, who have never been seen at the front, and who have recently overwhelmed Rostov, Novocherkassk, Yekaterinodar, Novorossiysk, creating a stable caricature stamp of a "White Guard" who wastes his life, shedding drunken tears about dying Russia. Now the "military organizations" they created were enlarged, merging together with the aim of seizing ships. The struggle for places on the departing ships reached fights. Denikin issued an order to close all these amateur organizations, introduce field courts and register those liable for military service. He pointed out that those who deviate from the registration will be left to their own devices. Several front-line volunteer units were summoned to the city (later this was interpreted by the Cossack leaders as the seizure of steamers by volunteers - their version was also picked up by Soviet literature). The front-line "heroes" hiding behind their backs were obviously not favored by the front-line soldiers, and they quickly put things in relative order in Novorossiysk. In the meantime, new streams of refugees, Don and Kuban villagers poured in. They had no intention of going anywhere, either abroad or to the Crimea. They just walked from the Bolsheviks and reached the end - there is nowhere to go from. And they were located on the streets, squares. Typhus continued to mow down people. For example, the Markov division lost two of its chiefs from him in a short time - the general. Timanovsky and Colonel Bleish. General Ulagai was also out of action due to illness.

As the situation at the front worsened, it became clear that through the only port, Novorossiysk, it would not be possible to evacuate everyone. There was no possibility even to systematically submerge the entire army - it would have been necessary to abandon artillery, horses, property. Denikin found a way out - continuing the evacuation of Novorossiysk, the troops were to withdraw not here, but to Taman. The peninsula was convenient for defense. Its isthmuses, crossed by swampy estuaries, could be blocked by naval artillery. For the evacuation, large transports would not even be needed - the Kerch port flotilla would gradually drag the army across the narrow strait. Denikin ordered to transfer additional watercraft to Kerch. An order has already passed through the headquarters to prepare riding horses for the operational part of the Headquarters - the Commander-in-Chief decided to go to Anapa and then follow along with the army. On March 20, Denikin's last combat order was issued. Since the Kuban army had already abandoned the borders of Laba and Belaya, it was ordered to hold on to the river. Kurga, the Don army and volunteers - to defend themselves from the mouth of the Kurga to the Sea of ​​Azov. The volunteer corps, occupying positions in the lower reaches of the Kuban, were ordered to partly occupy the Taman Peninsula and cover it from the north. This order was no longer carried out by any of the armies. The environment is completely out of control. The Kuban chieftain and the Rada, on the basis of the latest resolution of the Supreme Circle, announced their disobedience to Denikin. The Reds, having crossed the Kuban in Yekaterinodar, tore the White forces in two. The Kuban army and the 4th Don corps, which had joined it, cut off from their own, retreated to the mountain passes, to the south. And the 1st and 3rd Don corps moved west, towards Novorossiysk. They no longer represented any fighting force. The Cossacks had only a feeling of dull, indifferent hopelessness and fatigue. There was no longer any question of obedience. They walked in droves, obeying the general inertia. The units got confused, all communication between the headquarters and the troops was lost. The corps mixed with the streams of refugees, turning into a continuous sea of ​​people, horses and carts. In the middle of this sea, trains barely moved, including the train of Commander General Sidorin. Some gave up or went green. Many threw down their weapons as if they were an extra burden. There were also individual feats, but again - it was the heroism of the doomed. So, the Ataman regiment was completely killed, having entered a fight against two Soviet divisions. Such outbreaks drowned without a trace in the general chaos and no longer had any effect on those around them. The Reds, due to the solid mass that flooded the roads, were also deprived of the possibility of any maneuvers. All they had to do was follow them at a certain distance, gathering stragglers and surrendering. The Taman Peninsula frightened volunteers. It's one thing to keep the defense on it alone. But after all, an uncontrollable avalanche of the Donets and refugees, capable of crushing any defense, would have rushed there. And with the red ones on the tail. And the volunteers did not smile at being in a cramped space with the wavering Cossacks, who still do not know what they would think up. The approaching mass of the bottoms threatened to flood the rear Volunteer Corps , cut it off from Novorossiysk, and the units were worried that this would not happen. The main forces, both intentionally and instinctively, pulled back to the railway to Novorossiysk, covering the Krymskaya junction and thereby weakening the left flank. On March 23, the "greens" raised an uprising in Anapa and the village of Gostogaevskaya - just on the way to Taman. At the same time, the Reds began to force the Kuban near the village of Varenikovskaya. The part that defended this crossing and found itself in a semi-circle due to the uprisings in the rear was thrown back. Barbovich's cavalry attacks on Anapa and Gostogaevskaya did not yield any results. Yes, they were conducted indecisively, looking back, as if the Cossack streams were not cut off from Novorossiysk. And in the meantime, the red ones managed to approach the "green" ones. First, the cavalry, and by evening from the crossing to Anapa, infantry regiments were already marching. The Bolsheviks took into account the danger of the White withdrawal to Taman and specially sent the 9th Infantry and 16th Cavalry Divisions to block this path. Taman was cut off. On March 24, the Volunteer Corps, two Don divisions and the Kuban division that joined them, which remained loyal to Denikin, concentrated in the area of ​​the Krymskaya station, 50 km from Novorossiysk, heading towards him. The catastrophe became inevitable. Remained cruel, but the only decision - to save the army. And first of all, those parts that have not yet decomposed and want to fight. In general, the resources of the Crimea were limited. Transporting there simply extra “eaters” looked not only senseless, but also dangerous ... However, even for this limited purpose, there were not enough available transports. The steamers allocated for the evacuation of refugees abroad were idle for a long time in quarantines and were delayed. Sevastopol hesitated to send ships, citing malfunctions in cars, lack of coal, etc. - as it turned out later, they were again held back in case of their own evacuation. The arrival of the British squadron of Admiral Seymour became a salvation for many. The admiral agreed to Denikin's request for help, warning that the ships were military, so he could take no more than 5-6 thousand people. General Holman intervened and, speaking with Seymour, assured him in his presence: "Be calm. The Admiral is a kind and generous man. He will be able to cope with technical difficulties and will take much more." This help became Holman's "farewell gift". London's policy was changing more and more abruptly, and with its new direction, Holman, who had a close relationship with the whites, was clearly out of place. He still remained in office, but it was already known that he was waiting only for a successor. Diplomatic representation of the general. Kiz was already intriguing with might and main, entering into backstage negotiations with the Kuban self-styledists, then with the leaders of the "green", then with the zemstvo leaders and inventing projects of "democratic" power, such as the Irkutsk Political Center, with the provision of white chiefs only military issues. In the last days of Novorossiysk, Keyes asked Kutepov about the attitude of his corps to the possibility of a military coup. Finally, General Bridge visited Denikin with a message from the British government, according to which the position of the whites was hopeless and evacuation to the Crimea was impracticable. In this regard, the British offered mediation in making peace with the Bolsheviks. Denikin replied: "Never!" Looking ahead, it should be noted that in August 20, the London Times published Curzon's note to Chicherin. In particular, it said: "I used all my influence on Gen. Denikin to persuade him to give up the struggle, promising him that if he did so, I would use all my efforts to make peace between his forces and yours, ensuring the inviolability of all of his comrades-in-arms, as well as the population of Crimea. General Denikin eventually followed this advice and left Russia, transferring command to General Wrangel. " Denikin, already in exile and outraged by this lie, published a refutation in the same "Times": “1) Lord Curzon could not have any influence on me, since I was not in any relationship with him. 2) I categorically rejected the proposal of the British representative for an armistice and, although with the loss of material, transferred the army to the Crimea, where I immediately began to continue the struggle. 3) The note of the British government about the beginning of peace negotiations with the Bolsheviks was, as you know, given not to me, but to my successor in command of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia, gene. Wrangel, whose negative answer was published in the press at one time. 4) My resignation from the post of Commander-in-Chief was caused by complex reasons, but had no connection with Lord Curzon's policy. As before, and now I consider an armed struggle against the Bolsheviks inevitable and necessary until their complete defeat. Otherwise, not only Russia, but the whole of Europe will turn to ruins. ”Interestingly, Holman immediately turned to Denikin with a request to further clarify to the readers that the British representative who proposed peace with the Bolsheviks was“ not General Holman. ”This Englishman considered the very possibility such negotiations are a stain on their honor. .. His promise was fulfilled, Seymour's squadron really took much more than promised, crammed to capacity. Transport ships began to arrive one after another. Evacuation commission of the gen. Vyazmitinova allocated the first 4 steamers to the Volunteer Corps, 1 to the Kuban people. Difficulties began with the bottoms. Sidorin, who arrived in Novorossiysk on March 25, reported on the hopeless state of his units. He said that the Cossacks, most likely, would not go to Crimea, since they did not want to fight. It should also be remembered that the position of the Crimea itself remained unreliable - if the Reds were able to overturn Slashchev's corps, and the peninsula would become a trap worse than Novorossiysk - from where, at least, there was a way to the mountains and to Georgia. Sidorin expressed concern only about the fate of 5 thousand Don officers, who were threatened with reprisals by the Bolsheviks or their own corrupted subordinates. He was assured that such a number of places on the ships would be provided. There were still transports, new ones were expected to arrive. But the Don commander was mistaken - having reached Novorossiysk, all his troops rushed to the ships. Sidorin has now turned to the headquarters demanding the courts "for all." This was no longer feasible, especially since many of the Don units really threw down their weapons and ceased to obey their superiors or even lost their organization, mingling in uncontrollable crowds. Kutepov was appointed head of the defense of Novorossiysk. His volunteers had to not only cover the city, but also keep a real line of defense in the port, holding back the human element. Novorossiysk was in agony. Filled with crowds, it became impassable. Quite a few citizens, even those who had the right to land, could not carry it out only because they were unable to break through the crowds into the port. Others - Donets, stanitsa, were in a state of spiritual prostration. Having reached the "end" and having heard that there was no further way, we settled down right there - to wait for this "end". Bonfires were burned. Warehouse doors were open and people were pulling boxes of canned food. Wine cellars and alcohol tanks were also destroyed. On March 26, Kutepov reported that it was impossible to stay further in Novorossiysk. The red ones were already approaching. The situation in the city, which had long gone out of control, threatened with a spontaneous explosion. Volunteers - both in positions and covering the evacuation, were on the nervous limit. It was decided to leave Novorossiysk at night. Sidorin again demanded the missing steamers. He was offered three solutions to choose from. First, occupy the nearest approaches to the city with combat-ready Don units and hold out for 2 days, during which the late ships must arrive. Secondly, personally lead their units and lead them along the coast to Tuapse. The road there was blocked by about 4 thousand people of the Black Sea Red Army from deserters and "greens", and it was not so difficult to disperse them. In Tuapse, there were stores of supplies, and it was possible to turn the transports going to Novorossiysk there by radio, or send the existing ones after unloading in the Crimea. And thirdly, to rely on a case - on the fact that some ships, possibly, will arrive on the 26th and on the night of the 27th. And load onto the British squadron. Sidorin rejected the first two options and chose the third. Although later he began to spread the version of "the betrayal of the Don army" by volunteers and the main command.

The next night there was an intensive landing of the army. The guns, carts, and the quartermaster's property were naturally left behind. But almost the entire Volunteer Corps, the Kuban and four Don divisions were loaded onto the ships. They took whoever they could, from the troops, from the refugees connected with the army, filling up all the available floating facilities - barges, tugs, etc. The Donets and a small part of the volunteers who did not get on the ships moved the coastal road to Gelendzhik and Tuapse. On the morning of March 27, the ships with the White Army left Novorossiysk and headed for the Crimea. The last to leave the port was the destroyer Captain Saken with Denikin and his headquarters on board, still picking up everyone who could fit from those who wanted to leave. And the last battle to the Reds entering the city was given by General Kutepov on the Pylky destroyer - having learned that his 3rd Drozdovsky regiment, covering the withdrawal, had lagged behind on the shore, he returned to the rescue, pouring fire on the enemy's forward units with guns and machine guns. About 30 thousand soldiers, Cossacks and officers made their way to Crimea. The operation to transfer the core of the White forces came as a complete surprise to the Bolshevik leadership. It was believed that the White Guards, pinned to the sea, faced inevitable death, so the campaign to Novorossiysk was considered and promoted in the Red Army as the end of the civil war.

Thousands of officers, soldiers, White Army Cossacks and civilians were killed. In total, they managed to take out about 33 thousand people.

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Chronology of events

By March 11, 1920, the front line passed only 40-50 kilometers from Novorossiysk. The Don and Kuban armies, by that time completely disorganized, were retreating in great disarray. The defense was held only by the remnants of the Volunteer Army, by that time reduced to the Volunteer Corps, but they barely held back the onslaught of the Red Army. The Cossacks failed to break through to Taman, and as a result, many of them ended up in Novorossiysk with the sole purpose of getting on the ships. In total, the grouping of the Armed Forces in the South of Russia in the Novorossiysk region on the eve of the evacuation consisted of 25,200 bayonets and 26,700 sabers. Meanwhile, there were not enough steamers. Some of them were late due to stormy weather, some were unable to come to the rescue in time due to the quarantine established in foreign ports (all ships arriving from Russia with another batch of refugees were kept in quarantine for a long time due to the terrible typhus epidemic, therefore they did not have time to make the required number of flights).

The command ordered the priority loading of the wounded and sick servicemen, but in reality it was not possible to transport the hospitals, since there was no transport. Moreover, the military who flocked to Novorossiysk began to unauthorizedly occupy the steamers, and the officials were more concerned about the export of property that could be sold at the end of the war.

On the night of March 26 in Novorossiysk, they burned down warehouses, oil tanks and detonated shells. The evacuation was carried out under the cover of the second battalion of the Royal Scots Fusiliers and an Allied squadron under the command of Admiral Seymour, which shelled the mountains, preventing the Reds from approaching the city.

Evacuation officials

• The last commandant of Novorossiysk (from February to March 1920) was Major General Korvin-Krukovsky, Alexey Vladimirovich.
• The commission for organizing the evacuation was headed by General Kutepov.
• At the last moment (after March 20), the head of the communications service, Major General M.M. Ermakov, was engaged in the issues of evacuating troops to the Crimea.
• The head of the Black Sea province and the department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the South Russian government was N. S. Karinsky.

Evacuation vessels

Russia

Italy

Great Britain

• battleship "Emperor of India"
• Hannover (captured from the Germans after World War I).
• merchant steamer Bremerhaven (captured from the Germans after the First World War).
• cruiser "Calypso" (HMS Calypso (D61))
• air transport "Pegasus" (HMS Pegasus (1917))
• 5 destroyers

France

• dreadnought
• armored cruiser "Waldeck Russo"
• destroyer???
• gunboat???

Greece

• destroyer "Ierax"

USA

• destroyer???
• cruiser "Galveston" (USS Galveston (CL-19))

Massacre of prisoners

Covering the evacuation of the Volunteer Corps, the 3rd Kalmyk Don Regiment, consisting of the Salsk Cossacks-Kalmyks, was left on the shore and, together with their families, who were traveling in the regiment's wagon train, was captured by the Reds. The captured Kalmyks were "passed" through the formation, chopping every second with sabers. Many of the remaining officers in Novorossiysk The armed forces Southern Russia committed suicide, not wanting to be captured, and many of those who were still captured were executed. Here are typical memories of those events:

The moment we were captured by the Bolsheviks defies description; some immediately preferred to commit suicide. I remember the captain of the Drozdovsky regiment, who was standing not far from me with his wife and two children, three and five years old. Having crossed and kissed them, he shoots each of them in the ear, baptizes his wife, in tears says goodbye to her; and now, shot, she falls, and the last bullet into herself….

The road went past the infirmary. The wounded officers, on crutches, begged us to take them with us, not to leave them red. We walked in silence, looking down and looking away. We were very ashamed, but we ourselves were not sure whether we would be able to board the steamers.

By the time the front retreated for the Kuban, the question of the future prospects of the army acquired extremely serious importance. In accordance with my decision - in case of failure on the line of the Kuban River to withdraw troops to the Crimea - a number of measures were taken: the new main base in Feodosia was intensively supplied; in January, it began organizing food bases on the Black Sea coast, including floating ones for ports to which troops could withdraw; the unloading of Novorossiysk from the refugee element, the sick and wounded, was hastily completed by evacuating them abroad. According to the terms of the tonnage and the morale of the troops, the simultaneous, systematic evacuation of them through the Novorossiysk port was unthinkable: there was no hope of the possibility of loading all the people, not to mention the artillery, wagon train, horses and supplies that were to be abandoned. Therefore, in order to preserve the combat effectiveness of the troops, their organization and material part, I mapped out another path - through Taman. Even in the directive of March 4, when retreating across the Kuban River, the Volunteer Corps was entrusted, in addition to defending its lower reaches, with part of the forces of the Taman Peninsula at Temryuk. The reconnaissance of the route between Anapa and the Tamanskaya station gave quite favorable results; the peninsula, enclosed by water barriers, was a great convenience for defense; all the way there was under the cover of ship artillery, the width of the Kerch Strait is very insignificant, and the transport flotilla of the Kerch port is powerful enough and could be easily reinforced. I ordered to hurry up the vehicles to Kerch.

At the same time, it was ordered to prepare riding horses for the operational unit of the Headquarters, with which I intended to go to Anapa and then follow the coastal road to Taman with the troops. On March 5, I introduced General Sidorin, who had arrived at Headquarters, into my assumptions, who treated them with doubt. According to his report, the Don units have lost their combat capability and obedience and are unlikely to agree to go to the Crimea. But in Georgiye-Afipskaya, where the Don headquarters was located, a number of meetings were held, and the Don faction of the Supreme Circle, as I have already mentioned, invalidated the decree to break with the commander-in-chief, and the meeting of the Don commanders eventually joined the decision to lead troops to Taman. Although the transition to Taman was supposed only in the future, and the directive of the Headquarters required so far to hold the line of the Kuban River, the 4th Don Corps, which stood across the river above Yekaterinodar, immediately withdrew and began to go west. On March 7, I gave my last directive at the Caucasian theater: the Kuban army, which had already abandoned the line of the Belaya River, to hold on to the Kurga River; The Don Army and the Volunteer Corps to defend the line of the Kuban River from the mouth of the Kurga to the Akhtanizovsky estuary; The volunteer corps, now part of its forces, bypassing the roundabout route, occupy the Taman Peninsula and cover the northern road from Temryuk from the Reds (when retreating beyond the Kuban, the corps did not cover it). None of the armies complied with the directive. Kuban troops completely disorganized, were in complete retreat, making their way through the mountain roads in Tuapse. Communication with them was lost, not only operational, but also political: the Kuban Rada and the ataman, on the basis of the latest resolution of the Supreme Circle, in addition to senior military commanders who remained loyal to the commander-in-chief, encouraged the troops to break with the Headquarters. The Bolsheviks easily crossed the Kuban with insignificant forces and, almost without encountering resistance, reached its left bank near Yekaterinodar, cutting the front of the Don army. The corps of General Starikov, torn off from it to the east, went to join the Kuban. Two other Don corps, almost without stopping, moved in discordant crowds in the direction of Novorossiysk. Many Cossacks threw down their weapons or moved in whole regiments to; everything was messed up, confused, all communication between the headquarters and the troops was lost, and the train of the commander of the Don army, already powerless to control the troops, daily being in danger of being captured, slowly made its way west through the sea of ​​people, horses and carts.

That mistrust and that hostile feeling that, due to the preceding events, lay between the volunteers and the Cossacks, now flared up with special force. The moving Cossack avalanche, threatening to flood the entire rear of the Volunteer Corps and cut it off from Novorossiysk, caused great excitement in its ranks. Sometimes it broke through in very sharp forms. I remember how the chief of staff of the Volunteer Corps, General Dostovalov, during one of the meetings on the Stavka train, said: - The only troops willing and able to continue the fight are the Volunteer Corps. Therefore, he must be provided with all the necessary vehicles, without reckoning with anyone's claims and without stopping, if necessary, before using weapons. I stopped the speaker abruptly. The movement to Taman with the prospect of new battles in the narrow space of the peninsula, together with the hesitating Cossack mass, embarrassed the volunteers. The Novorossiysk port was irresistibly attracted to itself, and it was impossible to overcome this desire. The corps weakened its left flank strongly, focusing its main attention on Krymskaya - Tunnelnaya, in the direction of the railway line to Novorossiysk. On March 10, an uprising was raised in Anapa and Gostogaevskaya stanitsa and captured these points. The actions of our cavalry against were indecisive and ineffectual. On the same day, the Bolsheviks, having thrown back the weak part that covered the Varenikovskaya crossing, crossed the Kuban. In the afternoon, their cavalry units appeared at Gostogaevskaya, and in the evening from the crossing in the direction of Anapa, columns of enemy infantry were already moving. The cavalry offensive of generals Barbovich, Chesnokov and Dyakov, repeated on March 11, on Gostogaevskaya and Anapa was even less energetic and had no success. The routes to Taman were cut off ... And on March 11, the Volunteer Corps, two Don divisions and the Kuban division that joined them without a directive, under light enemy pressure, concentrated in the area of ​​the Krymskaya station, heading with all their solid mass to Novorossiysk. The catastrophe was becoming inevitable and inevitable.

Novorossiysk of those days, to a large extent already unloaded from the refugee element, was a military camp and a rear nativity scene. Its streets were literally crowded with young and healthy soldiers-deserters. They rampaged, staged rallies reminiscent of the first months of the revolution, with the same elementary understanding of events, with the same demagogy and hysteria. Only the composition of the protesters was different: instead there were officers. Under the guise of lofty motives, they set about organizing, the hidden goal of which was to seize ships if needed ... And at the same time, the official stated with satisfaction: At first, due to the absence of a reliable garrison in Novorossiysk, it was difficult. I summoned volunteer officers' units to the city and gave an order to close all those that arose on the basis of the collapse of the military, to establish field courts for their leaders and deserters, and to register those liable for military service. These measures, in connection with the limited number of ships in the Novorossiysk roadstead, somewhat defused the atmosphere. And typhus reigned in the city, death mowed down. On the 10th I saw off to the grave the chief of the Markov division, the bravest officer, Colonel Bleish. The second Markovite was leaving in recent weeks ... Recently in Bataysk, among the line of retreating carts, I met a wagon wiped out in their mass, carrying a coffin with the body of General Timanovsky, who had died of typhus. Iron Stepanich, an associate and friend of General Markov, a man of extraordinary, cold courage, who led the regiments to victory so many times, despised death and was struck down by it at the wrong time ... Or at the right time? A wretched cart with expensive luggage, covered with a torn tarpaulin, is like a silent and impassive symbol. Stunned by defeat and poorly understanding the complex reasons, his officer environment worried and loudly called the culprit. He was already named a long time ago - a man of duty and impeccable moral honesty, on whom the army and some public circles - some out of ignorance, others for tactical reasons - dumped the main burden of common sins. Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, General I. P. Romanovsky. At the beginning of March, Protopresbyter Father Georgy Shavelsky came to me and urged me to release Ivan Pavlovich from his post, assuring me that due to the mood that had developed in the officers, his murder was possible. Father George wrote to me about this episode later: Ivan Pavlovich listened calmly, as if dispassionately, and only asked me. Ivan Pavlovich dropped his head in his hands and fell silent. Indeed, what they did not throw on his poor head: he was considered a predator when I know that in Yekaterinodar and Taganrog, in order to find livelihoods, he had to sell his old things that had been taken out of Petrograd; he was announced when he was always the most faithful son of the Orthodox Church; he was accused of selfishness and arrogance, when, for the sake of the good of the cause, he tried to completely obscure his self, and so on. I now begged Ivan Pavlovich to leave business for a while, while the minds sober up and the anger subsides. He answered me that this was his greatest desire ... You know how odious the name of Ivan Pavlovich was then in the army; perhaps you hear that his memory has not ceased to be vilified even to this day. It is necessary to dispel the vile slander and the hatred combined with it, which persecuted this pure person during his lifetime, and did not leave him even after death. I would be ready, as his confessor, whom he believed and to whom he opened his soul, to testify before the world that this soul was pure as a child, that he was strengthened in the feat that he carried, by faith in God, that he selflessly loved the Motherland, served her only out of ardent, boundless love for her, that, not looking for his own, he forgot about himself, that he vividly felt human grief and suffering and always rushed towards him. It was hard for me to talk with Ivan Pavlovich about these issues. We decided with him that it would not be long to be patient: after moving to Crimea, he would leave his post. Several times General Holman appealed to me and to Quartermaster General Makhrov with a convincing request to move the train or persuade General Romanovsky to switch to an English ship, since. This intention, apparently, was close to being realized: on March 12, a person close to the Kornilov division appeared on my train and announced that a group of Kornilovites was going to kill General Romanovsky today; General Holman came. In the presence of Ivan Pavlovich, he excitedly asked me again to the chief of staff to transfer to an English ship. “I won't do that,” said Ivan Pavlovich. “If this is the case, I ask Your Excellency to relieve me of my post. I'll take a gun and volunteer for the Kornilov regiment; let them do with me what they want. I asked him to go at least to my carriage. He refused. Blind, cruel people, why? British relations were still ambivalent. While General Keyes's diplomatic mission was inventing new forms of government for the South, the chief of the military mission, General Holman, put all his strength and soul into helping us. He personally took part with British technical units in the battles on the Donetsk front; with all his energy he sought to strengthen and streamline material assistance; contributed to the organization of the Feodosia base - directly and influencing the French.

General Holman, with the power of British authority, supported the Southern government in its conflict with the Cossacks and made attempts to influence the raising of the Cossack mood. He identified our interests with his own, warmly took our troubles to heart and worked without losing hope and energy until the last day, presenting a sharp contrast with many Russian leaders who had already lost their hearts. He also showed touching attention in his personal relations with me and the chief of staff. The atmosphere that gripped Novorossiysk in recent days did not give Holman any peace. It was useless to talk to us about this, but not a day passed that he did not appear to the Quartermaster General with reproaches and advice on this matter. Together with him, he secretly took some precautions, and clearly showed attention to the commander-in-chief, presenting to me the British landing and ship crews for review. However, I even before today I think that for me personally, all these precautions were unnecessary. A great calamity befell the South. The situation seemed hopeless, and the end was near. London's policy changed accordingly. General Holman remained in office, but the name of his successor, General Percy, was already unofficially called ... London decided to speed it up. Obviously, such an order was morally unacceptable for General Holman, since on one of the days before the evacuation, not he, but General Bridge came to me with the following proposal of the British government: since, in the latter's opinion, the situation is catastrophic and evacuation to the Crimea is impracticable, then the British offer me their mediation to conclude an armistice with the Bolsheviks ... I answered: never. This episode continued several months later. In August 1920, the newspaper published Lord Curzon's note to Chicherin on April 1. In it, after considerations of the aimlessness of further struggle, which, Curzon said. It is not known what was more surprised: the lie that Lord Curzon made, or the ease with which the British Foreign Office moved from real assistance to the White South to moral support of the Bolsheviks by formally condemning the White movement. In the same I immediately printed a refutation:

I categorically rejected the proposal (of the British military representative for an armistice) and, although with the loss of material, I transferred the army to the Crimea, where I immediately began to continue the struggle. As you know, the note from the British government on the commencement of peace negotiations with the Bolsheviks was handed not to me, but to my successor in command of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia, General Wrangel. The negative answer of which was published in the press at one time.

My resignation from the post of commander-in-chief was caused by complex reasons, but had no connection with Lord Curzon's policy. As before, and now I consider an armed struggle against the Bolsheviks inevitable and necessary until their complete defeat. Otherwise, not only Russia, but the whole of Europe will turn to ruins.

To characterize General Holman, I can add: he asked me to clarify in addition that General Holman was not the one who proposed an armistice with the Bolsheviks. I willingly fulfilled the desire of a man who, as he informed Churchill, was ready. The armies rolled from the Kuban to Novorossiysk too quickly, and there were too few ships in the roadstead ... The steamers engaged in the evacuation of refugees and the wounded stood idle for a long time in foreign ports under quarantine rules and were greatly delayed. The headquarters and the commission of General Vyazmitinov, directly in charge of the evacuation, strained all efforts to collect ships, encountering great obstacles in this. Both Constantinople and Sevastopol showed extraordinary slowness under the pretext of a lack of coal, malfunctioning mechanisms and other insurmountable circumstances. Having learned about the arrival of the commander-in-chief in the East, General Milne, and the British squadron, Admiral Seymour, in Novorossiysk, on March 11, I boarded General Holman's train, where I met both British commanders. Having outlined the general situation to them and pointed out the possibility of a catastrophic fall in the defense of Novorossiysk, I asked for assistance in the evacuation of the British fleet. Met with sympathy and willingness. Admiral Seymour said that according to technical conditions, he can take on board his ships no more than 5-6 thousand people. Then General Holman spoke in Russian and translated his phrase into English: - Be calm. The Admiral is a kind and generous person. He will be able to cope with the technical difficulties and will take a lot more. “I’ll do my best,” Seymour replied.

The admiral, with his cordial attitude towards the fate of the white army, fully justified the characterization given to him by Holman. His promise could be trusted, and this help greatly eased our plight. In the meantime, ships were arriving. There is a hope that in the next 4-8 days we will be able to raise all the troops wishing to continue the fight on the territory of Crimea. Vyazmitinov's commission assigned the first four transports to the Volunteer Corps units, one steamer for the Kuban people, the rest were intended for the Don army. General Sidorin arrived in the morning on March 12. He was depressed and looked at the position of his army completely hopeless. Everything fell apart, everything flowed wherever the eyes were looking, no one wanted to fight anymore, obviously they would not go to Crimea. The Don commander was mainly concerned about the fate of the Don officers, who were lost in the agitated Cossack mass. They were in mortal danger if they surrendered to the Bolsheviks. Sidorin estimated their number at 5 thousand. I assured him that all the officers who could get to Novorossiysk would be put on ships. But as the wave of the Don people rolled up to Novorossiysk, the situation became clear more and more, and moreover, in a sense unexpected for Sidorin: the hesitation gradually dissipated, and the entire Don army rushed to the ships. For what - it is unlikely that they then realized a clear account. Under the pressure of demands addressed to him from all sides, General Sidorin changed his tactics and, in turn, turned to the Headquarters with the demand for ships for all units in sizes that were clearly impracticable, just as a systematic evacuation of troops that did not want to fight, led by the commanders who ceased to obey, is impracticable. Meanwhile, Novorossiysk, overcrowded beyond measure, literally impassable, flooded with human waves, hummed like a ruined beehive. There was a struggle for - a struggle for salvation ... Many human dramas were played out on the haystones of the city during these terrible days. A lot of bestial feeling poured out in the face of impending danger, when naked passions drowned out the conscience and man became a fierce enemy to man. On March 13, General Kutepov, appointed chief of defense of Novorossiysk, came to me and reported that the morale of the troops, their extremely nervous mood did not make it possible to stay in the city any longer, that it was necessary to leave him at night ... The ships continued to arrive, but they were still there. not enough to lift everyone. General Sidorin again made a sharp demand for transport. I offered him three solutions:

1. To occupy the nearest approaches to Novorossiysk with the remaining Don troops in order to win two days, in which the missing transport will undoubtedly arrive. Sidorin did not want or could not do this. In the same way, he refused to put up at least a training brigade that had preserved its combat capability.

2. Lead your units personally by the coastal road to Gelendzhik - Tuapse (the path was blocked by about 4 thousand deserters), where the approaching steamers could be folded and new ones sent after unloading them in the Crimean ports. Sidorin did not want to do this.

3. Finally, it was possible to surrender to the will of fate, counting on those transports that would arrive on that day and on the night of the 14th, as well as on the assistance of the British ships promised by Admiral Seymour.

General Sidorin dwelt on this decision, and to his subordinate superiors, then told the press about what had been done by the high command. This version, accompanied by fictitious details, was very convenient, shifting all the odium, all personal sins and the consequences of the collapse of the Cossack army on someone else's head. In the evening of the 13th, the headquarters of the commander-in-chief, the headquarters of the Don army and the Don ataman were put on a steamer. After that, I, with General Romanovsky and several staff members, went over to the Russian destroyer. The landing of troops continued throughout the night. Some of the volunteers and several regiments of the Donets, who did not get on the ships, went along the coastal road to Gelendzhik. A sleepless night has passed. It was beginning to get light. A terrible picture. I went up to the bridge of the destroyer, which was standing at the pier. The bay is empty. Several English ships were stationed in the outer roadstead, and even farther away could be seen the vague silhouettes of transports carrying Russian army to the last piece of native land, to an unknown future ... Two French destroyers were peacefully standing in the bay, apparently unaware of the situation. We approached them. My request was conveyed to the megaphone: - Novorossiysk has been evacuated.

The commander-in-chief asks you to take on board as many people as possible from the number of people remaining on the shore. The torpedo boats quickly withdrew and left for the outer roadstead ... (Later they took part in the rescue of people walking along the coastal road south of Novorossiysk.) There is only one in the bay. People crowded on the shore near the wharves. People sat on their belongings, broke cans of canned food, warmed them up, warmed themselves by the fires made right there. These are those who have dropped their weapons - those who have not already looked for a way out. The majority have a calm, dull indifference - from everything they have experienced, from fatigue, from spiritual prostration. From time to time we heard from the crowd the cries of individuals asking to be taken on board. Who are they, how to rescue them from the crowd squeezing them? .. Some officer from the northern pier called loudly for help, then threw himself into the water and swam to the destroyer. They lowered the boat and raised him safely. Suddenly, we notice that a military unit is lined up on the pier in an emphatically orderly manner. The eyes of people with hope and supplication are directed at our destroyer. I order you to come to the shore. A crowd poured in ... - The destroyer takes only armed teams ... They loaded as many people as possible and left the bay. Along the road, not far from the coast, in the open sea, a huge barge swayed on a fresh wave, brought out and left there by some steamer. All over the place, to the point of crush, to the point of insanity, crammed with people. They took her in tow and brought her to the English battleship. Admiral Seymour kept his promise: the English ships took significantly more than they promised. The outlines of Novorossiysk stood out still sharply and distinctly. What was going on there? .. Some destroyer suddenly turned back and flew at full speed to the piers. The guns thumped, machine guns crackled: the destroyer entered the battle with the advanced units of the Bolsheviks, who had already occupied the city. It was on which General Kutepov, having received information that the 3rd Drozdovsky regiment, covering the landing, was not yet loaded, went to the rescue. Then everything was quiet. The contours of the city, the coast and the mountains were enveloped in fog, going into the distance ... into the past. So hard, so painful.

The fate of the troops remaining in the North Caucasus and the Caspian flotilla

The formidable recent Armed Forces of the South have disintegrated. The units that moved by the seashore to Gelendzhik, at the very first clash with a detachment of deserters who occupied Kabardinskaya, could not stand it, they rallied and dispersed. A small part of them were picked up by ships, the rest went to the mountains or were handed over to the Bolsheviks. Units of the Kuban Army and the 4th Don Corps, which reached the Black Sea coast in mountains, settled between Tuapse and Sochi, deprived of food and fodder, in an extremely difficult situation. The hopes of the Kuban people for and for the help of the Georgians did not come true. The Kuban Rada, the government and the ataman Bukretov, who sought command of the troops (the command was united in the hands of the commander of the Kuban corps, General Pisarev, to whom the 4th Don Corps was also subordinate), demanded a complete break with and tended to conclude peace with the Bolsheviks; the military commanders vehemently opposed this. This strife and complete disorganization of the upper classes brought even greater confusion to the Cossack masses, which were finally entangled in their search for a way out and ways to salvation. Information about decomposition, hesitation and clashes in the units gathered on the Black Sea coast came to Feodosia and caused agonizing doubts: what to do with them further? These doubts worried Headquarters and were shared by Cossack circles. The rate indicated to transport only those who were armed and willing to fight. The Don rulers looked more pessimistic: at their stormy meeting in Feodosia, it was decided to refrain at all from transporting the Don to the Crimea. The motives for this decision were: on the one hand, the collapse of parts, on the other, fear for the strength of the Crimea.

Such an uncertain position of the Don-Kuban corps on the coast continued after my departure for about a month, ending tragically: the Kuban chieftain Bukretov through General Morozov concluded an agreement with the Soviet command to surrender the army to the Bolsheviks and himself fled to Georgia. Most of the troops really surrendered, the smaller one managed to cross over to the Crimea (according to General Wrangel's Headquarters, out of 27 thousand, about 12 thousand were transported). In early March, the exodus from the North Caucasus began. Troops and refugees reached out to Vladikavkaz, from where on the 10th of March they crossed the Georgian Military Highway into Georgia. The troops and refugees disarmed by the Georgians (about 7 thousand troops, 3-5 thousand refugees) were then interned in the Poti camp. Still further east, along the coast of the Caspian Sea, the Astrakhan detachment of General Dratsenko retreated to Petrovsk. This detachment boarded ships on March 16 in Petrovsk and, together with the Caspian Flotilla, sailed to Baku. General Dratsenko and the commander of the flotilla, Admiral Sergeev, concluded an agreement with the Azerbaijani government, by virtue of which, at the cost of transferring weapons and materiel to Azerbaijan, the troops were allowed to enter Poti. The military flotilla, without raising the Azerbaijani flag and maintaining its internal control, assumed the coastal defense. But when the ships began to enter the harbor, a deception was revealed: the Azerbaijani government announced that the person who signed the agreement did not have the authority to do so, and demanded an unconditional surrender. On this basis, excitement began in the fleet; Admiral Sergeev, who went to Batum to get in touch with the Headquarters from there, was declared deposed by the officers, and the ships under the command of Captain 2nd Rank Bushen left for Anzali in order to surrender there under the protection of the British. The British command, not wanting a clash with the Bolsheviks, invited the crews of the ships to be considered interned and ordered the removal of parts of the guns and vehicles. And when the Bolsheviks thereupon made a sudden landing, the strong British detachment occupying Anzali turned into a hasty retreat; our naval teams were forced to join the British. One of the participants in this retreat, a Russian officer later wrote about the feeling of some moral satisfaction that was experienced at the sight of how. Collapsed public education South, and its fragments, scattered far, rolled from the Caspian to the Black Sea, carrying human waves.

The stronghold that covered from the north the ephemeral forces of the South that tirelessly undermined the forces of the South collapsed, and all their weakness and lack of vitality was strikingly revealed ... In a few days it fell, it existed for no more than a week, and Azerbaijan was soon swept away. It was the turn of the Georgian Republic, the existence of which, for reasons of general policy, was allowed by the Soviet government for some time. All that remained of the Armed Forces of the South was concentrated on the small Crimean peninsula. The army, which came under my direct command, was consolidated into three corps (Crimean, Volunteer, Donskoy), the Consolidated Cavalry Division and the Consolidated Kuban Brigade. All other units, teams, headquarters and institutions that had gathered in the Crimea from the entire former territory of the South were to be disbanded, and all their combat-ready personnel went to staff the active forces. The Crimean corps, with a force of about 5 thousand, still covered the isthmuses. The Kerch region was secured from the landing from the Taman side by a combined detachment of 11/2 thousand (the combined Kuban brigade, the Consolidated Alekseevsky brigade, the Kornilovsk cadet school). All other units were located in reserve, on vacation: the Volunteer Corps in the Sevastopol-Simferopol region, the Donets - in the vicinity of Evpatoria. I placed my headquarters temporarily in quiet Feodosia, far from Sevastopol, seething with passions. The immediate task assigned to the army was to defend the Crimea. The army consisted of 35-40 thousand soldiers, was armed with 100 guns and up to 500 machine guns. But she was shaken morally, and the troops that arrived from Novorossiysk were deprived of material parts, horses, carts and artillery. The volunteers came, all armed, brought with them all the machine guns and even a few guns; the Donets arrived unarmed. From the very first day, a hasty work on reorganization, staffing and supply of units began. Some rest soothed my extremely excited nerves. Until then, within a year and a half, the units were scattered along the front over great distances, almost without leaving the battle. Now the concentrated disposition of large military formations opened up the possibility of direct and close influence of senior commanders on the troops.

The enemy occupied the northern exits from the Crimean isthmuses along the line Genichesk - Chongarsky bridge - Sivash-Perekop. His forces were small (5-6 thousand), and the presence in the rear of Makhno's detachments and other rebel bands held back his offensive impulse. From the side of the Taman Peninsula, the Bolsheviks showed no activity. The movement of the main forces of the South to the shores of the Black Sea by the Soviet command was regarded as the last act of struggle. The information about the state of our troops, about the mutinies raised by the troops and commanders, very exaggerated, strengthened the Bolsheviks in the conviction that the White army, pinned to the sea, was inevitable and final death. Therefore, the operation of transferring significant forces to the Crimea, the readiness and ability to continue the struggle there came as a complete surprise to the Soviet command. Not enough attention was paid to the Crimea, and the Soviet government subsequently paid dearly for this oversight. It was necessary to streamline and reorganize the civil administration, which is too cumbersome for the Crimea. Melnikov, having arrived in Sevastopol, immediately fell into an atmosphere of deep and organic hostility that paralyzed all of his activities. The government - by its genesis, as created as a result of an agreement with the Supreme Circle - for this reason it was odious and caused great irritation, ready to pour out into wild forms. Therefore, in order to prevent unwanted excesses, I decided to abolish the government even before I left. On March 16, I gave an order to abolish the Council of Ministers. In return, M.V.Bernatsky was instructed to organize it.

The order confirmed that. This order, unexpected for them, made a very painful impression on the members of the government ... I do not justify the form, but the essence of the reorganization was dictated by the obvious necessity and personal safety of the ministers. On the same day, the 16th, the members of the government left Sevastopol on the steamer provided to them and, before leaving for Constantinople, stopped in Feodosia to say goodbye to me. After a short word from N.M. Melnikov, N.V. Tchaikovsky turned to me: - Let me ask you, General, what prompted you to carry out a coup d'etat? I was surprised by this formulation of the question - after the break with the Supreme Circle and, most importantly, after the catastrophic one that broke out over the entire white South ... - What a coup there! I appointed you and I relieved you of your duties - that's all. After that, FS Sushkov pointed out: for several days of its stay in Crimea, the government, according to him, deserved recognition not only of public circles, but also of the military environment. So everything foreshadowed the possibility of his fruitful work ... - Unfortunately, I have completely opposite information. You, apparently, do not know what is going on around. In any case, in a few days everything that happened will become clear to you ... General Holman, a constant well-wisher of the army, was leaving his post. In his parting speech, he said: Under the new policy of London, General Holman would really be out of place. I also parted with my faithful friend IP Romanovsky. When I dismissed him from the post of chief of staff, I wrote in the order: History will brand with contempt those who, for their own selfish motives, weaved a web of vile slander around his honest and pure name. May God give you strength, dear Ivan Pavlovich, to continue the hard work of state building in a healthier environment.

In the place of General Romanovsky, I appointed General Makhrov, who was in the post of Quartermaster General, as Chief of Staff. Holman, intending to leave for Constantinople on the next day, invited Ivan Pavlovich to go with him. The threads connecting with the past were torn, it became empty around ... Late in the evening of the 19th, General Kutepov arrived in Feodosia on an important matter. He reported: To this I replied that he was mistaken about the mood of my corps. I will not take part in any conference without the permission of the commander-in-chief, and, attaching great importance to everything that he said to me, I consider it necessary to immediately report all this to General Denikin. After these words of mine, I got up and left. Leaving the platform, I got on the train and ordered to be taken to Feodosia. What I heard did not surprise me. General Slashchov did this work not for the first day and not in one direction, but in four directions at once. He sent messengers to Baron Wrangel, convincing him (that is, Wrangel and Slashchov), and through Duke S. Leuchtenberg, he entered into contact on this issue with the officer's naval circles. In his relations with the right, mainly the public, he tried to direct her choice in his own favor. At the same time, through General Borovsky, he entered into contact with generals Sidorin, Pokrovsky, Yuzefovich and agreed with them about the day and place of the meeting to remove the commander-in-chief. In whose favor it was kept silent, since the first two were Wrangel's antagonists and also had no desire to lead themselves by Slashchov. Finally, at the same time, almost every day, Slashchov telegraphed to Headquarters with a request to allow him to come to me for a report and said that he was not allowed to go to. General Sidorin strenuously watched and telegraphed the Don chieftain that this view was shared. He decided and demanded the immediate arrival of the ataman and the government in Yevpatoria (Sidorin's telegram to General Bogaevsky dated March 18).

I already knew about the role that Bishop Benjamin played in the uprising of the turmoil, who led the opposition of the extreme right, but to what extent his zeal reached, it became known to me only a few years later ... The next day after arriving in Sevastopol, the bishop appeared to the chairman his. N.M. Melnikov tells about this visit: it is necessary to force General Denikin to lay down power and hand it over to General Wrangel, for only he, in the opinion of the bishop and his friends, can save the Motherland under these conditions. The bishop added that, in fact, everything is already ready for them to carry out the planned change, and that he considers it his duty to turn to me on this matter only in order not to introduce unnecessary temptation to the masses and to provide legal support if possible. under the enterprise, for if he authorizes the intended change, everything will go smoothly ... Bishop Benjamin added that, whether he agrees or disagrees, the deed will still be done ... This invitation to take part in the coup, made by the bishop, was like this unexpectedly for me, who at that time had seen the conspirator in a cassock for the first time, and so outraged me that, standing up, I stopped further outpouring of the bishop. Bishop Benjamin then visited the Minister of the Interior, V.F. , and one should not interfere with this now fully ripe impulse. It is necessary to promote this in every possible way - it will be a work pleasing to God. Everything is ready: both General Wrangel and the whole party of patriotic real sons of their Motherland, which is in touch with General Wrangel, are ready for this. Moreover, General Wrangel is the dictator by God's grace, from whose hands the anointed one will receive power and kingdom ...

The bishop was so keen on supporting the conversation that he ceased to maintain restraint and simple caution and reached the point where he was ready to immediately wait for immediate decisions from the government (from a note by V. F. Seeler). Sidorin, Slashchov, Benjamin ... All this, in fact, was of little interest to me. I asked General Kutepov about the mood of the volunteer units. He replied that one division was quite solid, in the other the mood was satisfactory, in two it was unfavorable. Criticizing our failures, the troops mainly blame General Romanovsky for them. Kutepov expressed his opinion that it was necessary to take urgent measures against the gathering meeting and it would be best to summon the senior commanders to me so that they themselves would report to me about the mood of the troops. I looked at the matter differently: it was time to implement my decision. Enough. On the same night, together with the chief of staff, General Makhrov, I drew up a secret telegram - an order to gather the chiefs for March 21 in Sevastopol for the Military Council under the chairmanship of General Dragomirov. Among the participants, I included those who were out of work, aspirants to power known to me, and the most active representatives of the opposition. The council was to include: the commanders of the Volunteer (Kutepov) and Crimean (Slashchiv) corps and their division chiefs. Of the commanders of brigades and regiments - half (from the Crimean corps, due to the combat situation, the norm may be less). Also to arrive: the commandants of the fortresses, the commander of the fleet, his chief of staff, the chiefs of naval directorates, four senior combatant chiefs of the fleet.

From the Don Corps - Generals Sidorin, Kelchevsky and six persons in the composition of generals and regimental commanders. From the headquarters of the commander-in-chief - the chief of staff, general on duty, chief of the Military Directorate and personally generals: Wrangel, Bogaevsky, Ulagai, Shilling, Pokrovsky, Borovsky, Efimov, Yuzefovich and Toporkov. I addressed the Chairman of the Military Council with a letter (March 20, No. 145 / m): For three years of the Russian turmoil I fought, giving it all my strength and carrying power like a heavy cross sent down by fate. God did not bless the troops I was leading with success. And although I have not lost faith in the viability of the army and in its historical vocation, but internal communication torn between the leader and the army. And I am no longer able to lead her. I propose to the Military Council to elect a worthy one, to whom I will successively transfer power and command. Respectfully yours, A. Denikin. The next two, three days were spent in conversations with people devoted to me, who came to prevent my leaving. They tormented my soul, but they could not change my decision. The military council met, and on the morning of the 22nd I received a telegram from General Dragomirov: Dragomirov. I considered it impossible to change my mind and make the fate of the South dependent on temporary, changing, as it seemed to me, moods. I replied to General Dragomirov: I repeat that the number of representatives is completely indifferent. But, if the donors deem it necessary, admit the number of members in accordance with their organization. On the same day I received a telegram from General Dragomirov in reply. I ordered to inquire whether General Wrangel was at this meeting and whether he knew about this resolution, and, having received an affirmative answer, gave his last order to the Armed Forces of the South: Lieutenant General Baron Wrangel is appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia. 2. To all who walked honestly with me in a difficult struggle, - a deep bow. Lord, grant victory to the army and save Russia. General Denikin. War Council. My departure. Constantinople drama. I learned about what was happening at the Military Council only a long time later. I think that at that time both General Kutepov and I did not quite correctly assess the volunteer sentiments. I will give a description of these events, compiled by one of the participants and confirmed by other members of the council (from a note by General Polzikov): General Kutepov's note :). General Kutepov, leaving the meeting with General Vitkovsky, ordered to meet in the palace for the Military Council appointed in the evening that day, 11/2 hours earlier, in order to arrange a preliminary meeting of the senior commanders of the Volunteer Corps before the start of the Military Council. By the way, I will say that since it was alarming in the air, it was decided to take some measures, which were expressed in the following: reinforced patrols were assigned from our regiments and the artillery brigade, especially on the streets adjacent to the palace. At the quarters, duty units were assigned, which were to be awake in full readiness and had courier-speedboats in the palace. At the main entrance of the palace were teams of machine gunners. The same teams were secretly housed inside neighboring courtyards. An officer company was secretly housed in the courtyard of the palace. At a preliminary meeting chaired by General Kutepov, all the chiefs unanimously expressed the idea of ​​the inadmissibility of General Denikin leaving his post, insisted on expressing full confidence in him and on taking all measures to beg him not to leave his post.

It was decided to exert an appropriate influence on the rest of the members of the Military Council, so that the Military Council would ask and even beg General Denikin not to leave his post. General Kutepov sat sad, as if depressed, and repeatedly declared General Denikin's firm decision. Accustomed to seeing General Kutepov as an energetic, persistent and decisive chief, we were perplexed by his passivity. Rumors about his troubles with General Denikin and Fr. This was completely implausible, but nevertheless there was no explanation for the silent, passive, and therefore incomprehensible behavior of General Kutepov. None of us understood then how hard it was for him. We could not understand that he really knew the firm and adamant decision of General Denikin, we did not understand that General Kutepov, always honest and direct, knew that he could not give us hope, and, experiencing much sharper and deeper all that we were worried, could not tell us anything more than the firm decision of General Denikin to leave his post (note by General Kutepov :). It was decided, in the event of General Denikin's intransigence, to express full confidence in him and to ask him to appoint his own deputy, whose recognition, of course, would be obligatory for everyone. Opening the meeting, General Dragomirov read the order of the commander-in-chief on the appointment of the Military Council. Then there was a verification of those present at the meeting and the establishment of their right to participate in it. Now, at the end of the verification, General Slashchov announced that his corps was at the front, and therefore he could not send to the meeting all the senior chiefs who had the right to take part in it. General Dragomirov announced that this was foreseen and stipulated in the order of the commander-in-chief. General Slashchov continued to insist that his corps did not have a sufficient number of representatives at the meeting to reveal the desires and decisions of the corps, that this was injustice in relation to the valiant corps, the longest defending the last shred of white Russian land, and so on. General Dragomirov again stated that he had no right to change the order of the commander-in-chief, that fair representation was appointed for all units, that the number of those present from a certain military unit did not matter, since there was still representation from him, and in particular, concerning 2 th corps, it is clear that his voice will be sufficiently strong in the person of the corps commander and the representatives present from the corps. General Slashchov again with great excitement tried to prove the disadvantageous and circumvented position of his corps, while the 1st corps has an abundant presence of its representatives at the meeting. General Kutepov said that he agrees to reduce the number of representatives from his corps, if their presence causes such a protest about violation of justice. General Dragomirov again stated that he did not see any violation of justice in relation to any of the military units, he did not dare to change the order of the commander-in-chief, and he stopped further discussion of the issue of representation at a meeting of the Military Council. Following this, General Dragomirov announced that, in accordance with the order of the commander-in-chief, it was necessary to elect his deputy. General Slashchov was the first to ask for the floor and spoke at length about the need to establish order. In addition to General Slashchov, as I recall, General Makhrov and Vyazmitinov spoke, declaring that they were well aware of General Denikin's adamant decision to leave power. General Slashchov spoke several times. He spoke about the inadmissibility of elections, referring to the likeness of the Red Army, after the elders set an example.

General Toporkov spoke warmly, straightforwardly, sincerely, honestly and well. From the side of the Volunteer Corps, no one has spoken so far. General Dragomirov ordered the deputy commander-in-chief to distribute paper and pencils for a closed outline. Then the captain of the 1st rank (Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet Ryabinin, who later went over to the Bolsheviks) asked for the floor, starting with the words:, made a pathetic speech about the need to fulfill the order of the commander-in-chief and name his deputy, which is, according to the Black Sea Fleet officials, General Wrangel ... The name of General Wrangel was officially announced at a meeting of the council, but in private conversations it was already named. At that time, there was a private discussion about General Vitkovsky, who, after the order of General Dragomirov to distribute the paper, asked through General Kutepov to speak (General Kutepov's note :) and energetically and persistently stated that he and the ranks of the Drozdovskaya division found it impossible for themselves to take part in the elections and categorically refuse it. After the words of General Vitkovsky, the chiefs of the Kornilovskaya, Markovskaya and Alekseevskaya divisions and other parts of the Volunteer Corps immediately joined his statement. Representatives from the divisions supported their commanders by the fact that when they spoke up, everyone stood up. General Dragomirov in a strict manner drew attention to the inadmissibility of such a statement, since it constitutes a failure to comply with the order of the commander-in-chief. Then General Vitkovsky objected that we always carried out and will carry out the orders of the commander-in-chief and now, that we completely trust him, and if the commander-in-chief decided to resign from himself, then we obey his decision and his appointment as a deputy. But first, it is necessary to express confidence in the commander-in-chief and ask him to stay in power and immediately inform him about such a resolution of the Military Council. After these words, someone from the ranks of the Volunteer Corps shouted. Amicable and loud for a long time announced the building of the palace. After it ended and everyone sat down, General Dragomirov again tried to prove the need to carry out the order of the commander-in-chief, which could not be changed by the Military Council. Then General Vitkovsky and other ranks of the Volunteer Corps argued about the need to report to General Denikin via a direct wire about the mood of the Military Council, about expressing confidence in him and asking him to stay in power. General Dragomirov objected to all these arguments and did not agree with them. Everyone was pretty tired, and therefore many others willingly joined our request - to take a short break, and, to our delight, General Dragomirov agreed to this, announcing a break. Now we (the Volunteer Corps) have occupied one of the secluded and downstairs rooms and decided to send an urgent telegram from ourselves to General Denikin, in which we express our complete confidence and gratitude and ask him to stay in power. Some chiefs who did not belong to the Volunteer Corps, but who fully shared our views, came to the room we occupied. I don't remember who drew up the telegram, in general it was drawn up collectively (the text of the telegram :). The telegram was immediately sent to the city telegraph with one of our contacts with the order to get it immediately sent to General Denikin. The telegram was received, but it was not sent on time, because, as it turned out later, the line with the Headquarters was busy and there was an order from General Dragomirov not to send any telegrams without his permission. Upon the resumption of the meeting of the Military Council, General Dragomirov agreed to send a telegram to General Denikin and asked to draw up a text of it. General Dragomirov categorically refused to the request, addressed to General Dragomirov, to speak with General Denikin immediately via a direct wire in order to end the meeting of the Military Council after that. The next day the meeting did not begin for a long time, and we walked along the corridors in bewilderment and with various assumptions, entered the large conference room, but constantly saw the doors to the senior officers' room tightly closed; entry into this room without the permission of General Dragomirov was not allowed. We have repeatedly tried to find out when the council meeting will begin and whether it will take place in general. The answers were the most vague and uncertain. It was not possible to summon General Kutepov from the room of the senior commanders. General Vitkovsky was not allowed into this room. There was no information about General Denikin's reply to the telegram sent to him the day before. The impression was that the Military Council consisted of the highest commanders, and the rest were ignored. The complete uncertainty and uncertainty of the situation and the absence of any explanation, though, greatly irritated and displeased General Dragomirov, whose stubbornness at the previous meeting gave rise to many enemies against him. Therefore, after a while, the mood turned from nervous to definitely hostile against the room of senior officers. But it was soon dispelled by the unexpected arrival of a group of new officers accompanying several British officers. The afternoon session was not open and General Denikin's reply was not announced to us. We were told that a delegation from the British had arrived, that the proposals they made were so extraordinary and important that they completely obscure the acuteness of the events experienced, and therefore the top leaders would discuss the British proposals, and the council meeting was scheduled for 8 pm on the same day. There was also a rumor that General Wrangel had arrived in Sevastopol, who would attend the evening meeting of the Military Council. When we arrived at this meeting and, in anticipation of its opening, wandered through the corridors and rooms of the palace, after a while we noticed the presence of General Wrangel, who nervously walked along the corridor near the large hall. The doors to the senior officers' room were still closed and the meeting was in progress. General Wrangel was invited there several times, and after a short time he left there even more agitated. As it turned out, General Wrangel brought with him to Sevastopol an English ultimatum, addressed to me, but given to him on March 20 in Constantinople; in its note, the British government also proposed to enter into negotiations with the Soviet government through it. If this proposal was rejected, England threatened to cut off any further assistance. For some unknown reason, this ultimatum was not communicated to me in Feodosia, and I learned about it only abroad. General Bogaevsky writes about what was happening at the meeting - senior chiefs, up to and including corps commanders: In addition, there was no one who could at that time become the successor of General Denikin without objections from anyone. No names were given. The next day, General Dragomirov convened a conference again and read the reply telegram from General Denikin, who ordered the elections to be held nevertheless. Despite this, many protested against this, and all the firmness and perseverance of General Dragomirov was needed so that the meeting did not take the form of a rally and passed calmly (note by General Bogaevsky) ... and another of all the others. The first was to outline a successor, the second to support or reject the elected person. I was among the senior bosses. We sat in a large corner office, the rest in the hall. Our meeting dragged on. They were still arguing and could not settle on anyone's name. From the hall, where the tired and hungry chiefs of military units had been languishing for several hours, there were more than once sent with a request, what did we decide? It was necessary to end it somehow, it was no longer possible to postpone it for another day: this would inevitably immediately undermine the authority of the future commander-in-chief. Then I made a speech in which, outlining the current situation and the need to end the issue as soon as possible, I named General Wrangel as the new commander-in-chief. There were no objections, and, as it seemed to me then, not out of sympathy for him, but simply because it was necessary to elect someone and finish the difficult question. At that time, hardly anyone thought about continuing the struggle with the Reds outside the Crimea: they had to sit out, put themselves in order and go abroad if they could not keep Crimea. They believed that Wrangel would cope with this. They invited him to our office (he had just arrived from Constantinople), and here the chairman gave him something like an exam: His answers in a harsh, decisive tone, which in general boiled down to the fact that he did not think about continuing a serious struggle and would consider it his duty , if he becomes at the head of the army, did not satisfy everyone in the meeting. General Wrangel was asked to temporarily retire, with which he, apparently, remained very unhappy, and again began to discuss his candidacy. Finally, it was decided to stop at it. He was summoned again, and General Dragomirov announced our decision to him. General Wrangel accepted this outwardly calmly, but many of us - and probably he too - still had doubts whether General Denikin would approve our choice. We did not know the details, but everyone knew that there was a bad relationship between them and the fault in them did not fall on General Denikin ... By agreeing to our choice, General Wrangel surprised all of us with his decisive demand - to give him a signature that the condition his acceptance of the post of commander-in-chief will not be a transition to the offensive against the Bolsheviks, but only the withdrawal of the army with honor from the current difficult situation. To our question why this subscription, General Wrangel replied that he wants everyone - and above all his own son - not to reproach him in the future for not fulfilling his duty. All this was not entirely clear to us - such prudence, but in view of the insistent demand of General Wrangel - almost under the threat of rejection of the choice - the subscription was given (the text of this act: Under these conditions, the meeting expressed a desire to ask the commander-in-chief to appoint General Wrangel as his deputy , so that he, having assumed the main command, would achieve immunity for all persons who fought against the Bolsheviks, and would create the most favorable conditions for the personnel of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia, precisely for those who will not find it possible for themselves to accept security from the Soviet government. I got acquainted with the content of this act only abroad). After that, a telegram was sent to General Denikin. The meeting ended. General Dragomirov read the text of the telegram he had sent the day before to General Denikin. Many of us noticed that the content of the telegram was not quite the same as it had been read to us the day before in its final form. Then General Dragomirov read General Denikin's response order to her with the appointment of General Wrangel as his deputy. After reading this order, General Dragomirov proclaimed in honor of the commander-in-chief, General Wrangel (from a note by General Polzikov). Evening of March 22. A painful farewell to my closest employees at Headquarters and the officers of the convoy. Then he went downstairs to the premises of the security officer company, which consisted of old volunteers, most of them wounded in battles; with many of them I was connected by the memory of the painful days of the first campaigns. They are agitated, muffled sobs are heard ... Deep excitement seized me too; a heavy lump in his throat made it difficult to speak. They ask: - Why? - Now it is difficult to talk about it. Someday you will learn and understand ... Let's go with General Romanovsky to the English mission, from where, together with Holman, to the pier. Honor guards and representatives of foreign missions. A short goodbye. We switched to an English destroyer. The officers accompanying us, including the former adjutants of General Romanovsky, went on another torpedo boat, a French one, which arrived in Constantinople 6 hours later than us. Fatal accident ... When we went out to sea, it was already night. Only bright lights, which covered the darkness, still marked the shore of the abandoned Russian land. Fade and fade. Russia, my homeland. In Constantinople, at the pier, we were met by our military agent, General Agapeyev, and an English officer. The Englishman reports something with an anxious look to Holman. The latter says to me: - Your Excellency, let's go straight to the English ship ... The British suspected. Did our people know? I turned to Agapeyev: - Will you be embarrassed by our stay at the embassy ... with regard to the premises? - Not at all. - And in ... political terms? - No, have mercy ... We said goodbye to Holman and went to the Russian embassy house, which was partially converted into a refugee hostel. My family is there. A diplomatic representative appeared. I go out to him in the corridor. He apologizes that due to the tightness he cannot provide us with premises. I cut off the conversation: we do not need his hospitality ... Returning to the room, I wanted to talk with Ivan Pavlovich about leaving this inhospitable home at once. But General Romanovsky was not there. The adjutants had not yet arrived, and he himself went through the enfilade of the ambassadors' hall to the lobby to give orders regarding the car. The door opened, and Colonel Engelhardt, pale as death, appeared in it: - Your Excellency, General Romanovsky has been killed. This blow finished me off. Consciousness dimmed, and the strength left me - for the first time in my life. I know Romanovsky's moral killers well. The physical assassin, wearing the uniform of a Russian officer, fled. I do not know if he is alive, or the rumor speaks the truth that to hide the traces of the crime he was drowned in the Bosphorus. General Holman, shocked by the event, unable to forgive himself for not protecting Romanovsky, without insisting on our moving directly to the English ship, brought an English detachment into the embassy to protect the former Russian commander-in-chief ... Then, however, nothing could excite me any more. The soul is dead. A small room, almost a closet. There is a coffin with dear ashes in it. The face is mournful and calm. That evening, with the family and children of General Kornilov, I went to an English hospital ship, and the next day on a dreadnought we left the hateful shores of the Bosphorus, carrying in our souls inescapable grief.

NOVOROSSIYSK DISASTER (Death of the Don Army)

Andrey Vadimovich Venkov, Moscow

Photos of the evacuation of the Don Army from Novorossiysk from the personal collection of Alexei Ivanov (Great Britain).

Researchers in the history of the White movement in southern Russia have put forward many versions to explain its defeat in the fight against the Red Army. Was it a mistake or a whole chain of mistakes of one of the leaders of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia, or was it a tragic and fatal coincidence, many tactical mistakes and differences of opinion among the participants in the anti-Bolshevik resistance? Historians are engaged in the analysis of the situation that developed at that time ... What happened in Novorossiysk in March 1920, when the white units, leaving the city in a hurry, left thousands of their comrades-in-arms, including the Cossacks, on the shore, to be devoured by the red, is undoubtedly a disaster, a national tragedy. How did it become possible that even recent allies who left the same Imperial Army, having the same concepts of Honor and Dignity, mired in political squabbles and strife, allowed the loss of the combat capability of the units entrusted to them, and the units themselves indulged in panic and “selfish” interests - their own salvation and evacuation? Why did the command allow the disorganization of its troops, why weren't the proper measures taken to ensure the defense of Novorossiysk and the safe evacuation of all comers? Many of these questions remain open. The article by A.V. VENKOVA is an attempt to reconstruct the course of those events. With this publication, we open a cycle of historical research devoted to the Novorossiysk catastrophe. Almanac edition

The winter campaign of 1919-1920 was lost by the Armed Forces of the South of Russia. Volunteer army after an unsuccessful campaign to Moscow, she was reduced to a corps and was reassigned to the commander of the Don army V.I. Sidorin. The Donets, drained of blood in the war of annihilation, suffered terrible losses in February 1920 during a mediocre march to Torgovaya, the best Don cavalry froze to death in the snow-covered steppe. The Kubans did not accept the coup that was perpetrated in Yekaterinodar by Wrangel and Pokrovsky, and they threw the white front in regiments. As a result, in the last major battle on the Don land - near the village of Yegorlykskaya - the Whites were defeated and began to retreat to the Kuban and the Black Sea.

“On February 19, the Horse Group crossed the Kuga-Eya River,” recalled General Golubintsev. “From here begins our slow, but non-stop departure to the Kuban along a large, washed out by melting snow, muddy and viscous road to Yekaterinodar ... The thaw that began around February 20 turned the black earth soil into a dirty, sucking swamp.”

Artilleryman S. Mamontov, observing the retreating units of the 3rd Don Corps, recalled: “... On the side of the road, they dragged on without a formation, when in single file, when in small groups, donets without rifles and a peak. Lances and rifles lay there, thrown along the road. The Donets threw down their weapons so that they would not be sent into battle. "

February 19 (March 3) M.N. Tukhachevsky, commander of the troops of the Caucasian Front of the Reds, gave the order: “The enemy, shot down along the entire front and losing prisoners, retreats beyond the river Eya. I order the armies of the front, rapidly continuing the offensive, to bring down the enemy from the line of this river ... ". All four armies, fighting against the Donets and the "volunteers", had to fight in one direction: 8th at Kushchevskaya - Timoshevskaya; 9th - on Staroleushkovskaya - Medvedovskaya; 10th - on Tikhoretskaya - Yekaterinodar; The 1st Cavalry was to, ahead of the 9th Army, strike through Staroleushkovskaya to cut off the retreat to Timoshevskaya for the "volunteers".

The Donets in this whole operation had to retreat by dirt roads through the mud between two railway branches. Moreover, “the Kuban people shamelessly robbed the Don refugees”, robbed the Don warehouses at the stations, and the Don people were forced to call an armored train from the front to protect them. As if in revenge, the best Don division, the 1st Don, chased the Kuban rebels - "green" all February near Yekaterinodar, and on February 20 (March 4) in the village of Slavyanskaya surrounded the demonstrating Cossacks of the 3rd and 4th Taman regiments, whipped every 10th and shot every 50th (36 flogged, 6 shot).

The appeal of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia, General Denikin on February 21 (March 5) - "the cry of a sick, tortured soul" - led to the fact that the army's spirit dropped to the limit. Contemporaries believed that the white cavalry was stronger than that of the Reds, but it could not be forced to go into battle.

The Don brigade of Morozov retained its combat capability in the troops of General Y. Slashchev, who defended the Crimea. On February 24-28 (March 8-12), the "second general battle of the Crimean campaign" took place here, and the Don people in the battles at Perekop proved to be excellent, chopping and chasing the red units.

The successful battles of General Slashchev on the approaches to the Crimea and on the isthmuses themselves gave the White command the idea to leave the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus and the Kuban and take refuge with the most combat-ready units on the peninsula, expecting new uprisings against the Bolsheviks. The hopes for these uprisings were held by the entire white movement.

On the Don and Kuban, everything was much worse.

At Zlodeyskaya, the Milyutinsky regiment was overtaken and defeated by the Budennovists. The machine-gun command of the regiment with 6 machine guns, led by a full George Knight Ya. Lagutin switched to the red ones.

On February 22 (March 6), retreating through impassable mud for the Chelbas River, the 9th Don Division (the 10th, not trusting the Kuban, was transferred to Tikhoretskaya) was attacked by the Pavlovsk cavalry corps of the Redneck. I had to abandon the carts and artillery. According to I.I. Dedova, 3 regiments surrendered. The refugees, having chopped off the lines, mingled with the troops.

Having suffered several heavy defeats in a row, the Don Cossacks of General Pavlov's group were ready to rebel. General Dyakov wrote: “The mood of the Cossacks upon their return was simply dangerous to the general. Pavlov was openly hostile. At the military council of senior commanders, later called the "riot of the Don generals," the latter proposed (advised) General Pavlov, in view of the situation, to lay down his command.

General Pavlov conceded, and the command was taken over by the gene popular among the rank-and-file Cossacks. Sektev. In the form of repression, the latter was displaced by the headquarters and replaced by a gene. I. Popov ".

According to Rakovsky, the Don generals were unhappy that Pavlov “1) froze the cavalry, 2) the indiscriminate battle at Torgovaya, 3) spent the night in the open steppe after this battle, 4) his incomprehensible behavior both on February 12 and during the battles 13 -17 February, and. Having gathered for a meeting and discussed Pavlov's behavior, they decided to immediately remove him and remove him from command of the equestrian group and put General Sekretev in his place. Com. Donarmiya on February 25 agreed with this change. "

The angry Cossacks remembered Mamontov, under whom they allegedly did not know defeat. There were rumors that Mamontov was poisoned. The propaganda department of the ARSUR sent agents to the troops to clarify that Mamontov had died of typhus. The Cossacks did not believe. “When the 4th Don Corps, having learned about the death of the gene. Mamontov, was ready to go to Yekaterinodar to find the culprits of his death, to calm down the Cossacks and put the remains of the corps in order, general. I. D. Popov was appointed its commander. " On February 27 (March 11), General I.D. Popov took command.

On February 25 (March 9), when the troops retreated beyond Chelbas, Denikin's order on the upcoming evacuation of Novorossiysk became known ...

The Donets began to retreat beyond the Beysug River. Communication between the corps was unreliable. The commander of the Don Army, General V.I. Sidorin flew around the hulls in an airplane with the pilot Strelnikov. When crossing Beysug near the village of Plastunovskaya, Sidorin personally participated in the battle, rushed with General Kalinovsky between units, but only the Nazarovsky regiment of Colonel Laschenov went into battle. Sidorin, surrounded by an escort, watched the attack from the hill ...

The Nazarovites, of course, were overturned. The Reds were chasing.

An eyewitness conveys the following scene: Sidorin and Kalinovsky jumped on their horses, Sidorin was still waiting for something in thought. Podesaul Zolotarev turned to him:

- Your Excellency, it's time to go, or we will be hacked to death.

- Really? Well, let's go ...

Sidorin, overshadowed by the St. George's badge of the convoy, galloped off ...

Colonel Kislov noted that the Cossacks had lost their fighting spirit, that they were against the evacuation to the Crimea, they wanted to go to Persia or beyond the Caucasian ridge. General Kelchevsky, the former chief of staff of the Don Army, appointed by Denikin as Minister of War of the new government of the South of Russia, but remained with the Don, demanded to retreat with the "volunteers" to Novorossiysk. The corps commanders considered it necessary, first of all, to give the troops a rest. General Starikov said: "There is no other way out, we must take the Cossacks to the Kuban, give them a rest, they will come to their senses and again follow me into battle."

Sidorin believed that the Soviets were experiencing the same crisis as the Whites, the Red Army was melting, an insurrectionary movement was growing in its rear, the same Makhnovists ... He proposed to attack, support the Kuban in the battles for Tikhoretskaya, to achieve the rise of the entire Kuban Cossacks. There was the same mud under the red ones. In advancing, they stretched out their forces. In the end, they were recently beaten near Bataysk and on Manych.

Sidorin insisted, and the Don people decided to meet the Reds at the village of Korenovskaya (Tikhoretskaya had just surrendered). The army headquarters, however, was transferred to Yekaterinodar.

February 28 (March 12) Sidorin arrived at Denikin's headquarters. Denikin on that day ordered the troops to withdraw beyond the Kuban and defend Yekaterinodar and Novorossiysk. Denikin believed that the Kuban people “would soon come to their senses, feeling the full weight of the power of the communists. An uprising in the Kuban is inevitable; defending the Kuban River, we will wait for him and by common forces will chase the enemy. "

Sidorin, nevertheless, transferred to the troops to prepare for battle, before reaching the Kuban.

The most efficient unit remained the grouped cavalry. Golubintsev recalled that on February 28 (March 12) the equestrian group departed to Korenovskaya. “A message was received here that the Commander of the Don Army, General Sidorin, is arriving in an airplane tomorrow, that is, on the 29th, to manage the operations in the village of Korenovskaya. This message did not add much enthusiasm, because Sidorin was not at all popular among command staff, nor among the Cossacks, and about his military and combat qualities and, especially, political tendencies, as well as the methods of conducting operations, the opinion was far from in his favor. "

Arriving at Korenovskaya, Sidorin received a report that the enemy had disappeared. General Guselshchikov reported: "Budyonny went around the right flank."

A review was held near the village of Korenovskaya, after which Sidorin delivered “a rather empty and cliche speech about the need to win and fight. The Cossacks listened and were silent, wrapping themselves in tattered greatcoats and shifting from foot to foot in leaky wet boots and footwear. " Sidorin did not receive a "cheerful response" from the officers either.

Instead of the expected battle, according to Golubintsev's recollections, the troops in the rear heard gunfire and began a hasty withdrawal and fighting for crossings across the numerous flooded rivers.

Golubintsev, in his memoirs, described the path of the equestrian group from Korenovskaya to Yekaterinodar. He lay across Plastunovskaya, Dinskaya. At the Kachati River, covering the crossing, the 29th Cavalry Regiment went into a cavalry attack. “The sad figure of General Sidorin, wrapped in a cloak, was drawn on the mound. With a convoy of cadets, the gene went passively and helplessly. Sidorin from mound to mound, sadly listening to the firefight. "

O. Rotova recalled that the 25th Kochetovsky foot regiment was also dissatisfied with the command: “Where was our notorious commander of the Don Army, General Sidorin? Where were our Don "ministers" who talked a lot, but did nothing? In the regiment, both officers and Cossacks said that they were very capable and active in meanness, dumping generals Krasnov, Denisov and Polyakov, and on another they turned out to be not only worthless, but malicious destroyers. "

All the time, while the Donets retreated to the Kuban and beyond the Kuban, significant changes took place at the top.

Denikin all the time persuaded the Cossack "chosen ones", delegates of the Krugs and the Rada, to continue the joint struggle, but he received a blow from the other side. On February 28 (March 12), the commander of the Volunteer Corps, General Kutepov, sent him

a kind of telegraphic ultimatum, in which he demanded that a number of measures be taken "in order to evacuate the fighters for the idea of ​​the Volunteer Army," namely, from the moment the "volunteers" approached the village of Crimean transfer into the hands of the corps commander, that is, Kutepov, all power in the rear with dictatorial powers in the determination of the order of landing of units on transports and the provision of the exclusive control of the line of railways, all floating equipment and the fleet. In clause 5, Kutepov pointed out that the offices of the Headquarters and the Government should be loaded no earlier than the last “volunteer” unit loaded onto transports.

The offended Denikin replied, among other things, that "the volunteers should believe that the Commander-in-Chief will be the last to leave, if he does not die earlier." “This is the end,” said Denikin. "The moods that made such an appeal of the Volunteers to their Commander-in-Chief psychologically possible predetermined the course of events: on that day I decided to leave my post irrevocably."

Further more. On March 1 (14), the Don Troops Circle and the Kuban Rada, at their meeting, decided to unite the Don and Kuban armies and offered general command to General Kelchevsky, chief of staff of the Don army. Kelchevsky replied: “This is a riot. I won't go for it. "

On March 2 (15), Kutepov, without the permission of the headquarters of the Don Army, withdrew the Volunteer Corps from Timashevskaya. Sidorin ordered Kutepov to counterattack and restore the situation. Kutepov did not fulfill the order ... The relationship between the "volunteers" and the Cossacks rolled downhill.

On March 3 (16), the Supreme Circle of Don Kuban and Terek terminated the alliance agreement with Denikin and decided to withdraw the Cossack troops from Denikin's subordination in operational terms. Denikin, who had left for Novorossiysk, in turn withdrew the Kutepov Volunteer Corps from Sidorin's command. "Volunteers" moved to Novorossiysk. General Kutepov was appointed commandant of the city. A. Gordeev believed that by this decision "all Cossack units were cut off from the opportunity to use naval means."

Don commander Sidorin, chieftain A.P. Bogaevsky and the Don generals were against the break with Denikin. On March 4 (17), at a meeting in the village of Georgio-Afipskaya, Sidorin said: "I have a sense of duty, I will hold out to the last." Under pressure from the generals, the Don delegation of the Supreme Circle called for the renewal of the alliance with Denikin. Sidorin gave the order: “The Volunteer Corps has withdrawn from the Don Army, which, after retreating beyond the Kuban, is ordered to defend the Kuban line from the mouth of the Laba to Fedorovka, inclusive. The decision to break with Denikin is annulled. "

Having crossed the Kuban, the Donets found themselves in very unfavorable conditions: "the low and swampy bank of the Kuban River and the numerous rivers flowing from the mountains with swampy banks made it difficult to move." The foothills were full of Green troops. Donets tried to negotiate with them. So, the Consolidated Partisan Division, marching in the vanguard, tried to negotiate with them - not to touch each other.

Having crossed to the left bank of the Kuban, the Donets moved part of their forces up the river in order to get in touch with the Kuban corps.

Nevertheless, the command realized that the Kuban line could not be held, that a retreat was inevitable. 5 (18) March Sidorin flew to Novorossiysk to Denikin and discussed the ways of retreat.

Sidorin proposed to withdraw the Don army to Gelendzhik and Tuapse. Denikin urged to lead the Don people to the Taman Peninsula, covered by "volunteers" a large number of naval means and the possibility of transferring units to the Crimea.

But Sidorin objected that a large number of refugees would move to Taman along with the Cossacks, which would completely change the situation. "

Denikin insisted. On March 6 (19), at the Georgio-Afipskaya meeting of the Don commanders, the decision of the Commander-in-Chief to lead the troops to Taman was approved.

General Kelchevsky left for Denikin and reported on the decision, but asked that the 1st Don Division, located in the Crimean area, be among the first to be evacuated from Novorossiysk.

This decision was not destined to come true.

On March 6 (19), the Reds began crossing the Kuban at Ust-Labinskaya and Varenikovskaya, bypassing the Don army from both flanks, and then crossing the river in Yekaterinodar itself. General Konovalov with the 2nd Don and 3rd Kuban corps defended unsuccessfully, and the Reds cut the bottom into two parts. "Such tirelessness, energy and high activity of the Bolsheviks were completely unexpected for everyone," wrote journalist Rakovsky.

The 4th Don corps (about 17-18 thousand horsemen), cut off from the Don army (the corps kept in touch with the 1st, 2nd and 4th Kuban corps), concentrated on March 6 (19) near the village of Takhtamukai. Communication with the Don Army and the High Command was interrupted, but a message was received that “the Don Army, by order of the Army Circle, broke off all communications with the Volunteer Army. and the chiefs of brigades and divisions are encouraged to act at their own discretion independently.

Here, on the way, a meeting of senior leaders took place, at which they decided, without separating, to act together and move to Georgia, where they expected to rest and recover in order to continue the struggle again. " The temporary command of the 4th Don Corps was assumed by the chief of the 10th Don Division, General Nikolaev.

The main forces of the Don army - 1, 2 and 3 Don corps did not have time to the Taman Peninsula. The Reds blocked their way.

On March 7 (20), Denikin gave his last directive: "The volunteer corps now with part of its forces, bypassing the roundabout route, occupy the Taman Peninsula and protect the northern road from Temryuk from the Reds." That is, the Donets were still supposed to retreat to Taman, and the "volunteers" were supposed to cover their flanking march. But, contrary to Denikin's order, part of the "volunteers" who had previously covered the lower reaches of the Kuban, under pressure from the Reds went to Novorossiysk.

The 1st Don Division, stationed in the Crimean region, could restore the situation with a blow to Varenikovskaya (only 30 km from the Crimean), but did not receive such an order. 7 (20) March threw the 1st Don Division and left without warning it to Novorossiysk volunteer cavalry Barbovich. Chesnokov's brigade (Klyastitsky and Mariupol hussars and Chuguevsky uhlan regiments), formed on the Don, joined Barbovich. An eyewitness left a colorful description of this 3,000th mass of cavalry: “A surprisingly beautiful sight was presented by long chains of horsemen of various regiments with their variegated weathercocks on peaks stretching along the canvas railroad».

The Don command later considered this decision of Kutepov fatal for the Don army. "The movement of the Don corps was not only late in time, but in general it was impracticable: it was impossible to demand from the Don corps frustrated by the withdrawal to perform a kind of" chasse croise "with the Volunteer Corps, moreover, by means of a flank march in relation to the advancing enemy," I wrote. .Oprit.

On March 9 (22), three Don corps occupied Ilskaya and Abinskaya and pressed against Crimean, which was packed with "volunteers" going to Tunnelnaya. The 1st Don Division, contrary to logic, received an order on March 9 (22) to go to Taman.

The retreating Donets were "covered" by the "greens" who persuaded the Cossacks to go over to them. In Smolensk, the 4th and 5th Cavalry Brigades of the 2nd Don Corps, which was now headed by General A.M. Sutulov. But when the army passed, the brigades nevertheless moved after it, leaving the "green" 500 men with weapons. In Kholmsk, the Cherkassk regiment went to the "greens".

On March 10 (23), the vanguard of the 1st Don Division (Ataman Regiment, 6th Hundred Life Cossacks and a squadron of the Life Guards Horse Grenadier Regiment) occupied Anapa, but further to Taman the way was closed.

On March 11 (24), Anapa was attacked by the Reds (78 and 79 rifle regiments and the 16th Cavalry Division), and the 1st Don Division, having lost 44 Cossacks, retreated to Tunnelnaya. The Reds boastfully declared that they had destroyed the entire Ataman regiment.

General Dragomirov suggested that the battle-worthy cavalry that had been knocked together into a fist and thrown into a raid along the red rear, so that it, passing the Kuban and Don, came to the Crimean peninsula from the north, from the direction of Perekop. All these plans remained unfulfilled.

“On March 11, the Volunteer Corps, two Donskys and the Kuban division that joined them ... concentrated in the Crimean region, heading with their entire mass to Novorossiysk. The catastrophe was becoming inevitable and inevitable, ”summed up Denikin.

"Volunteers" (Kornilovites and Alekseevites) occupied the front from Tunnelnaya to Abrau-Dyurso. The Donets unfolded along the railroad. The headquarters of the Don army still stuck out in the Crimean one.

The pier of the cement plant in Novorossiysk

On the night of 11-12 (24-25) March in Novorossiysk, at the pier near the cement plant, Denikin's train, guarded by an English guard, stopped. On March 12 (25), next to Denikin's train, the Donskoy Ataman train stopped, guarded by cadets and an ataman escort. At 9 am Sidorin arrived in an armored train.

Barricades were erected near the ships, guarded by "volunteer" guards with machine guns. The mood of the "volunteers" was obvious: "The Russian units were better preserved than the Cossacks ... The Cossacks, in most cases, lost their formations, discipline and held meetings. They clearly expressed hostility to the main command, and it is quite understandable that the command did not want to bring the infection into Crimea. "

To guide the evacuation of Denikin, a special commission was created, headed by the "venerable general" Vyazmitinov. Sidorin also appointed an evacuation commission consisting of the Don artillery inspector General Maydel, two generals I.T. and K.T. Kalinovsky and colonel general staff Dobrynin. But the "volunteer" guards were obeyed only by General Kutepov ...

Denikin himself, on whom the assassination attempt was being prepared, was guarded by the British. But Sidorin acted according to the chain of command.

Eyewitnesses have preserved the content of the negotiations between Denikin and the Don command on March 12 (25).

Denikin: The situation, as you know, is serious. The enemy is already approaching Abrau-Dyurso. Our rearguards offer little resistance. There are few ships in the roadstead. True, the British promised that four ships were about to arrive. But we must count on the worst and keep in mind that we can only withdraw all those who are combat-ready and those who face the imminent reprisals of the Bolsheviks. Tell me how many officers you have to take out.

Sidorin: About five thousand.

Denikin: Well, we will cope with this, but all the units of the Don Army, of course, will be difficult to load, especially if the transports do not arrive in time.

Sidorin: But why are the steamers engaged in volunteers? On my way to you, I personally saw the volunteer guards at the steamers.

Denikin: Rest assured, the steamers will be distributed fairly - evenly.

Arriving in Novorossiysk, the headquarters of the Don Army first of all reported to Sidorin that all the ships were already occupied by "volunteers." Sidorin with the ranks of his staff went to General Romanovsky. He confirmed: "Yes, but there will be more ships."

Then at breakfast at Bogaevsky's, where Denikin and Romanovsky were present. Sidorin again (rather rudely) spoke about transport and loading. Annoyed Denikin left breakfast to his train.

All this time the volunteers were loading artillery and property onto the British battleship "Hanover", and their wounded on the steamer "Vladimir".

The 1st Don Division at that time was fighting at the Small Tunnel, repulsing the cavalry of the 8th Red Army.

At 6 o'clock in the evening, at a meeting with Denikin, the last to be announced was the list of ships that would fit. 4 were intended for "volunteers", 4 - for the Don, 1 - for the Kubans. Another 5 thousand people could be loaded onto British warships. The rest had to go to Gelendzhik.

From the evening of March 12 (25), Novorossiysk began to fill up with Don units. By the morning of the 13th (26), it was filled with Donets and Kalmyks. But the Don evacuation commission was able to "intercept" only one steamer "Russia" for 4 thousand people.

The Reds were restrained by the Kornilovites, the Alekseevites and the Don Consolidated Partisan Division. The 1st Don Division came to Novorossiysk.

Denikin gave the order to send General Karpov (cadets, riflemen and machine gunners) to the rearguard of the Don training brigade, but Sidorin left the "partisans" in the rearguard.

In the morning, General Kutepov came to Denikin and reported that at night it was necessary to leave the city, since according to rumors, the red cavalry was going to Gelendzhik. Then the Donets visited Denikin again. Denikin replied to the Don delegation: “Gentlemen, wasn’t there

it would be fair if the ships were first of all provided to those who did not want to fight, and the volunteers would cover their embarkation on ships. Nevertheless, I am doing my best to take out the donuts ”.

The battle was fought at Borisovka, six kilometers northeast of Novorossiysk. White armored trains and the English dreadnought "Emperor of India" with artillery held back the advance of the Reds.

Up to 100 thousand troops have accumulated in Novorossiysk. The British landed a landing - the Scots with machine guns. There were also tanks here. But all this mass of troops, crowded three times by the weakest enemy (the 8th army was advancing on Novorossiysk, the 9th was behind at Yekaterinodar, Budyonny's cavalry turned to Maikop), did not think about defense.

The best units remained in the rearguard — the Kornilovites, the Alekseevites, the "partisans", and the regular cavalry. But as the Mariupol hussar L. Shishkov recalled, “the occupation of the position was only indicated by weak units, not united by a single command; there were no sufficient forces at the disposal of General Barbovich, the chief of defense of the northern sector of Novorossiysk, - everything that fell into the battle line in the morning tried to load itself in addition to the permission of the authorities. " The head of the Consolidated Partisan Division, Colonel Yasevich, without receiving directives and guidance, sent Captain Korev to the Kornilovsk division. He returned and reported that the Kornilov division "had already left for Novorossiysk, and at this moment the last outposts were being removed."

So, the Kornilovites and the Alekseevites came to Novorossiysk and at 6 pm they began loading.

The 1st Don Division was waiting for loading nearby, but the promised steamer did not fit. Of the entire division, 3,500 people were later loaded onto the schooner "Danube" and sent 450 officers and Cossacks of the Life Guards Cossack Regiment and 312 of the Life Guards Atamansky.

Enraged, Sidorin went with General Dyakov to Denikin, who had General Holman. The following scene played out:

Sidorin: I demand from you a direct and honest answer, will Dyakov's division be transported?

Denikin: I cannot guarantee you anything. Your units are unwilling to fight to buy time. Under such conditions, nothing can be promised.

Sidorin: However, you have found ships for the Volunteer Corps. The volunteers are ready to sail, and my army is abandoned. This is treachery and meanness! You have always deceived me and betrayed the donors.

Holman: Calm down, General. Is it possible to talk like that with the Commander-in-Chief? Calm down, I'll talk to Admiral Seymour, and I'm sure he will do everything to take your division out.

Sidorin (to Dyakov): You have heard that I cannot get anything from this general! Get on your horses and make your way to Gelendzhik ...

At 7 o'clock in the evening, the regular cavalry withdrew from their positions and, leaving the patrols, went to Novorossiysk, where they arrived at 10 pm.

Until 17 o'clock, the artillery of the Consolidated Partisan Division fired directly under the walls of the city. Then the "partisans" went to Novorossiysk, but could not submerge.

At dusk, the headquarters of the Volunteer Corps and the Don Army boarded the steamer Tsarevich Georgy. “A nightmare reigned on the shore and in the city, crammed with crowds of people and a mass of horses abandoned to their fate, which we will not describe, because it is well known enough,” wrote I. Opritz.

On the morning of March 14 (27), the headquarters were in Feodosia. On March 15 (28), here, at the Astoria Hotel, at a meeting, it was calculated that 35 thousand "volunteers" were taken out (recall that there were 10 thousand of them at the front) with all machine guns and several guns, "all volunteer rear agencies with personnel and property ". Dontsov was taken out 10 thousand without horses.

The Reds broke into Novorossiysk on March 14 (27). The first to go over to the side of the Soviets were the Kubans. Commander I. Uborevich reported: “The city was captured by a dashing raid of Ekimov's cavalry division. At about 9 o'clock, five divisions of the 8th and 9th armies entered the city ... personal feat awarded his Order of the Red Banner. "

In Novorossiysk, the Reds took 22 thousand prisoners.

The Donets considered Denikin to be the culprit for the surrender of such a number of troops and the culprit of the entire Novorossiysk catastrophe. They wrote that the transfer of the evacuation into the hands of Kutepov expressed in advance "the decision to export the Volunteer Corps at the expense of the Don Army and the doom of the latter to accelerated and complete decomposition."

If the Donets agreed to "to some extent" justify the position of Kutepov - he cared exclusively about his corps, "then the position of the Commander-in-Chief does not have such an excuse."

“General Denikin puts the blame for the non-removal of the Don corps on the Commander of the Don Army, General Sidorin, who had lost all command authority and for a long time doubted the desire of the ordinary Cossacks to go to the Crimea,” wrote Oprits. - However, after General Sidorin's report on March 5 on the result of the meeting of the Don chiefs who decided to go to the Crimea, even though through Taman, there could be no room for such a doubt.

The loss of command authority by General Sidorin was revealed many days before March 12, and nothing prevented General Denikin from asking Donskoy Ataman to promptly replace General Sidorin with another donor (Generals Guselshchikov, Abramov, Sekretev). "

The "volunteers" blamed the Cossacks for everything. S. Mamontov wrote: “Both the Don people and the Kuban people said that they did not want to go to Crimea. Actually, they themselves did not know what they wanted ... The Cossacks were ordered by General Denikin to retreat to Taman, from where they, along with horses and property, could easily be transported to Kerch. The Cossacks did not go to Taman, but went partly to Georgia, and partly to Novorossiysk, where they disorganized transport and filled the embankments. There they suddenly wanted to go to Crimea. "

Mutual accusations are as if the case needed to be resolved in one day.

Having 100 thousand soldiers and occupying excellent positions near Novorossiysk, the white command could hold out for at least another week and for several flights (from Novorossiysk to Evpatoria the steamers took 6 hours) to transport everyone from Novorossiysk to Crimea.

According to the head of the rearguard, who is also the head of the Consolidated Partisan Division, “the hasty final loading on March 13 was not caused by the real situation at the front, which was obvious to me, as the last one to withdraw. No significant forces were advancing ... If there was even a weak attempt to control by General Kutepov or Barbovich, it would have cost nothing to hold Novorossiysk for another two or three days, indicating only the line of rearguard battles and areas for those units that still did not have vehicles ... Unfortunately, neither General Kutepov nor General Barbovich not only did not seek contact with their units, but even turned their backs on me, since neither one nor the other answered who was on my right and left and what plan of action they had outlined ... Meanwhile if it weren't for this deception, that is, if I knew that there were no ships for the division, I would have stayed with the division in Kirillovka and, of course, would have held out all day on March 14, if I had armored trains with me. "

The Consolidated Partisan Division fought its last battle at Kabardinka, after the Novorossiysk disaster. The remains of it were picked up by English and French ships.

But the high command was not in the mood for defense ...

And most importantly, the resources of the Crimea and the prospects of the struggle, as the "volunteers" saw them, are not taken into account.

It was planned to leave the Cossacks in their home territory. The Reds could not shoot such a number of prisoners or even put them in camps. Moreover, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, at the request of the Congress of Labor Cossacks, announced an amnesty to all labor Cossacks in the white camp who got there after being mobilized.

The white command firmly knew that the amnesty announced by the state was one thing, and the personal scores that must inevitably appear in the villages between the defeated and newly-emerged victors was another. The Cossacks left on the coast, amnestied by the Bolsheviks, were bound to revolt. It was then that the surviving "volunteers" should have appeared from the Crimea.

But this idea was not properly worked out. Donskoy officer I. Savchenko recalled: "The volunteer army ... did not even have time to leave the secret safehouse where we, prisoners, could appear to receive directives and instructions."

The fate of the units abandoned in Novorossiysk was sad. This is what one of the officers of the Consolidated Partisan Division wrote in his diary: “We learned that everyone who could not dive went to Gelendzhik, but near Kabardinka the greens cut the road in a place where there was no way to turn around. Six times ours went on the attack, but to no avail. One hundred with a machine gun held a 20,000 army. Some rushed into the sea on horseback. They were picked up by French military ships. The Reds walked behind. The rest scattered, in all directions, over the mountains, in order to either get to the green or die of starvation. "

The same fate befell the remnants of the Life Guards of the Ataman Regiment, which moved from Novorossiysk to Tuapse, but on the way near Kabardinka were crushed by the retreating Circassians and lost 300 Cossacks and 18 officers. Podesaul Shirokov shot himself. Senior officer of the regiment esaul L.V. Vasiliev rushed into the sea right on horseback, followed by the captain Ivanov, drove up Bozhkov. Sotnik Shchepelev agreed to surrender the survivors. The captives were captives Rudakov, Klevtsov (having lost their pince-nez) and P. Losev.

“The blasphemous abuse of the Reds, the fishing out of our crowd of Kalmyks and those suspected of being officers, and their executions on the spot made a very heavy impression,” recalled P. Losev, who later ended up in the Red Army and deserted to the Poles.

Ordinary atamans were enrolled in the Red Army. The 1st hundred of the regiment in full strength became the 3rd hundred of one of the red divisions, the Cossacks of the other five hundred were assigned to the infantry companies.

The Don Plastun brigade was thrown at the pier in Novorossiysk. The head of the brigade, Colonel A.S. Kostryukov, shot himself in front of the line.

General Guselshchikov, having abandoned the rest of his corps, came to the pier with the Gundorov regiment. From the steamer "Nikolay" a certain staff officer announced: "Direction to your regiment in marching order on Tuapse." After long bickering, General Guselshchikov declared that “if the regiment is not loaded, the steamer will not leave the pier, but will be sunk together with the headquarters. The officer agreed. The gangplank was immediately lowered, and the regiment, abandoning the saddled horses on the bank, began to load onto the steamer. "

The loading ended at dawn. The steamer was leaving under the fire of the Bolsheviks. “A lot of people rushed to swim behind the steamer, but those knocked out by the Bolsheviks were drowning before our eyes,” an eyewitness recalled.

Many of the Cossacks abandoned on the shore, without postponing things on the back burner, began to ask for the Red Army, parts of which entered Novorossiysk. They immediately entered into negotiations on this matter with the 21st Rifle Division of the Red Cossacks of the 7th Don Regiment of the Young Army. 13 junior officers and 170 Cossacks of this regiment were enlisted in the Red Army and brought together into two squadrons led by their own officers.

The 4th Don Corps all this time was retreating through the village of Bakinskaya to Saratovskaya. Moreover, the donors of the 79th and 80th cavalry regiments were in their repertoire. "The Cossacks of these regiments saw silver money in canvas bags, they say that they" robbed "the carts of the Kuban Treasury stuck in a jam on the bridge so that it" did not get to the red. "

In the village of Saratov, the corps merged with the Kuban army.

General Shkuro suggested retreating to the "Maikop region, rich in bread," but a meeting of senior chiefs decided to go to the coast, on Tuapse.

Having made a difficult trip along the highway and having lost many horses, the Kuban and Don people went to Tuapse, where all dismounted and sick people were loaded onto the steamer "Tiger" and on March 19 (April 1) were sent to the Crimea.

In total, 57 thousand Don and Kuban Cossacks gathered in Tuapse. Most of the Cossacks here were Kubans. “… We kind of disappeared into the sea of ​​the Kuban people,” Golubintsev recalled 5. The Reds did not push here, and the Cossacks on the coast received almost a month's respite. In fact, for another month after the abandonment of Novorossiysk, more than 50 thousand combat-ready Cossacks held their defenses near the city, but were never transferred to the Crimea.

After the Novorossiysk catastrophe, the fate of the Don army was sealed.

On March 22 (April 4), General Denikin resigned his post. “The self-abolition of the Commander-in-Chief and his staff at the decisive moment of the Novorossiysk epic, in the conditions of the subsequent catastrophe, could not but lower the authority of General Denikin, already undermined by the winter failures of the South ... Among the Kuban and Don people, he fell irrevocably,” wrote IN. Oprits. General Wrangel, who took command, found that “the troops for months of indiscriminate retreat came out of the hands of the commanders. Drunkenness, arbitrariness, robbery and even murder have become commonplace in most parts of the camp.

The collapse has also reached the top of the army. "

General Slashchev confirmed: "It was not an army, but a gang."

The Cossacks, left without horses, were gloomy. “If we are assigned to the infantry, we will go to the Reds,” they said. The troops were poor. “There is nothing to change underwear… it costs 10 thousand pairs to buy. We don't have that kind of money, ”one of the officers wrote in his diary. He later noted that there were cases of beating the Cossacks by officers.

One of his first orders "an infinite number of military units" Wrangel brought together in three corps: Kutepov's corps from the Volunteer Corps, Slashchev's corps from the "volunteer" units that had previously withdrawn to Crimea from the territory of Ukraine, and "Don units were to make up the Don Corps."

On March 24 (April 6), 1920, the Separate Don Corps was formed from the units of the Don Army taken to the Crimea. Sidorin remained the corps commander, Kelchevsky was the chief of staff.

However, soon the Volunteer Command, in order to unconditionally subordinate the Cossacks to itself, provoked a conflict and brought the leadership of the Don corps to justice ...

Gene. Golubintsev. Russian Vendee. An outline of the civil war on the Don. 1917-1920. Munich. 1959, p. 154.

Mamontov S. Trekking and Horses // Don. 1994. No. 1. P.95.

Directives of the command of the fronts of the Red Army. T.2.M. 1972.S. 497.

Gorodovikov O.I. Memories. M. 1957.S. 100.

Oprits I.N. Life Guards Cossack E.V. regiment during the revolution and civil war. 1917-1920. Paris. 1939.S. 284.

Dedov I.I. In saber hikes. Rostov-on-Don. 1989.S. 155.

Oprits I.N. Decree. Op. P.277.

Cit. by: Buguraev M. Regarding the raid, gene. Pavlova // Darling land. No. 36, 1961, p. 8.

Padalkin A. Supplement to the work of E. Kovaleva // Dear Land. 1960. No. 31. С.11.

Its the same. in memory of General Ivan Danilovich Popov // Dear Land. 1971. No. 95. P.43.

Gene. Golubintsev Decree. Op. S. 154-155.

In the same place. P.155.

In the same place. P.157.

Rotova O. Memories // Don army in the fight against the Bolsheviks. M. 2004.S. 85.

A.A. Gordeev History of the Cossacks. Part 4. Moscow, 1993. P.331.

In the same place.

In the same place. P.329.

In the same place. P. 331.

Padalkin A. Novorossiysk - April 1920 // Native land. 1972. No. 98. S. 19.

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