Do you remember: the army followed the army,
We said goodbye to our older brothers
And they returned to the shadow of science with annoyance,
Jealous of the one who dies
Walked past us...

On the evening of June 11 (23), 1812, the patrol of the Life Guards Cossack Regiment noticed a suspicious movement of the usurper’s troops on the Neman. When it got dark, a company of French sappers crossed the river to the Russian bank on boats and ferries, and the first firefight took place.
After midnight on June 24, 1812, the crossing began across four bridges built above Kovno. French troops through the border Neman.
At 6 o'clock in the morning on June 12 (24), 1812, the vanguard of the French troops entered Russian city Kovno.

Repetition of the mother of teaching: “Everyone knows that Kutuzov is a great commander. But few people have thought about why he is great. He fought all his life, but did not win a single famous battle, he has nothing like the resounding victories of Napoleon or Suvorov - neither Ishmael nor Austerlitz. Either defeats, then retreats, or rather controversial victories with a draw.
When you think about this, at first some unpleasant feeling arises - maybe Kutuzov’s authority is inflated? Maybe he just went with the flow, and the people and the Russian winter did everything themselves?
Tolstoy’s interpretation of his personality, it must be said, lies in line with precisely this view of this historical figure.
Napoleon, yes. The armies under his command were head and shoulders above their rivals on the battlefields. They beat everyone - Russians, English, Saxons, Austrians, Prussians, and Janissaries.
They fought with artillery, “like a man with his fists,” and huge masses of cavalry (a revolutionary innovation!) swept away both the infantry and the well-trained but small cavalry of the European armies. Napoleon’s battle tactics were advanced, Suvorov’s, and it was not without reason that Suvorov’s ardent desire was “to meet the boy in order to return everything he had taken.” By “taken” they meant Suvorov’s innovations. Suvorov beat Napoleon's marshals, but they did not meet Napoleon face to face, and the question of who is stronger remained open.

At the same time, Napoleon was a nobody as a strategist. His armies, even in Europe, even before meeting the enemy, lost up to a quarter of their strength due to disease and hunger! He was not at all interested in the fate of his soldiers. Napoleon had no idea about state structure and the characteristics of Russia. Invading Russia
The Grand Army had neither field kitchens, no tents, no normal infirmaries - already in Smolensk parchments from the city archive were used for dressings.
But even if Napoleon managed to lead his army to a general battle, nothing could be done to him - on the battlefield, he controlled his soldiers better than anyone else, and they did not let him down.
How different Kutuzov was from him! Before Borodin, Kutuzov prepared ten thousand carts for the wounded and ten thousand orderlies to evacuate them from the battlefield, and Napoleon simply abandoned his wounded.
Both Suvorov and Napoleon called Kutuzov a sly and a sly fox, respectively - such a coincidence of reviews different people says that this assessment of Kutuzov’s personality is objective, and since it comes from the commanders, it means not only the qualities of a “crafty courtier.” When, after the disaster of the Austrian army allied to us near Ulm, Kutuzov had to lead the Russian army away from destruction along the Danube Valley, from Braunau to Brunn, the French were unable to do anything with him. Kicking like a horse, Kutuzov gave nothing and did not sacrifice
no one - and retreat, whatever you say, is the most difficult type of action. Operating constantly with only part of the forces (the rest must leave), it is necessary to restrain all the enemy’s forces, and the covering parts must, constantly alternating, either be deployed into a battle formation, or turned into a marching formation, and even from an inverted front. The troops that have completed their task, without allowing any delay, must be passed into the column through the deployed replacement units. All this is technically very complex, here the commander must, first of all, be simply a military professional, but he also needs an understanding of the terrain, and composure, and, of course. cunning. The slightest hitch - and the “tail”, or even the entire army, would have been lost. I'm not even talking about such a “trifle” that the rearguard of the Russian army had to unconditionally win in every clash with the French vanguard.
This retreat is a masterpiece of military art.
But at the same time - and there is a lot of evidence about this - Kutuzov in every possible way avoided a general battle with Napoleon, even at the end of the 1812 campaign.
So that’s why we say that in general in that era Napoleon lost and Kutuzov won? The fact is that, without losing a single battle outright, Napoleon lost his main war. You can speculate on this topic as much as you like, but Napoleon lost not only the greatest (up to Hitler) all-European army, but also his life’s work, and not because of his stupidity, but because of Kutuzov’s intelligence.
Kutuzov's intelligence was manifested in the simple recognition of an obvious fact: Napoleon is the greatest tactical commander of the time, and having fought with him, at best you can resist, but you cannot defeat him by maneuvering on the battlefield, attacking. He does it better! And a battle with him that ended in a draw is not at all a guarantee that the next one will not end in disaster. Kutuzov knew how to retreat, fighting back, and, as it turned out, he could withstand Napoleon’s attack in a general battle.
They say that Kutuzov considered it risky to learn to defeat Napoleon on the battlefield during the decisive war. No, it's not about risk. Kutuzov was absolutely sure that he would inevitably be defeated if he tried to defeat Napoleon’s army.
That is why Kutuzov “built a golden bridge” for Napoleon to leave Russia, and did not try to slam his army. Yes, Kutuzov’s plans cannot be called majestic - he did not want a resounding victory, but only the complete extermination of the enemy and the salvation of the fatherland. Yes, Kutuzov retreated, dodged, he never seriously attacked Napoleon, did not destroy him with artillery fire and a brave bayonet attack. But Napoleon could not do anything with Kutuzov, that is, Kutuzov was not a bad commander! The French attacked - the Russians fought back. The French stepped up their attack - it was already hitting empty space. The French were leaving - the Russians were clinging to them from behind.
The French generals recalled with resentment that they would have made it to Maloyaroslavets before Kutuzov had he not put his soldiers on carts. This was not according to the rules, but Kutuzov had several thousand carts with draft horses at hand at the decisive moment of the war, apparently by pure chance. And the Great Army had to
to walk not along the fertile Ukraine, but along the scorched Smolensk road.
Napoleon, by his own admission, won battles because he thought through them in every detail in advance, unlike his opponents. But in the war as a whole, he acted according to his other principle: “we need to get involved in battle, and then we’ll see.” But Kutuzov had an idea, he implemented it, and this idea turned out to be correct.
Kutuzov, as I understand it, accurately calculated that Napoleon would not be able to provide more than 50 thousand horses with fodder. And the old professional turned out to be right - even before attempting to break through to the south, Napoleon had to send horseless cavalry to the West on foot.
And it was only September!
Kutuzov understood the war, but Napoleon did not. What joy does Napoleon have that he is invincible? Only 5,000 people survived from his “Grand Army”. This is from five hundred or six hundred thousand!
By the way, Kutuzov’s plan was not the plan of a lone genius - Defense Minister Barclay de Tolly held the same views as Mikhail Illarionovich. He, apparently, was the author of this plan, because in general it was Barclay de Tolly who was the generator of non-standard solutions - remember, for example, his invasion of Sweden... through the frozen Baltic! The most surprising thing was not that the operation was a success and led to the neutrality of Sweden, but how the idea itself could come to the mind of a military professional - a march an entire army for several days, with overnight stays on the ice... there have been no analogues in history either before or since and are not expected.
Let's return to the plan for the war with Napoleon: why did society as a whole not see this plan and did not accept it from the “German” (Scots Barclay), and listened to Kutuzov with great difficulty?
Because the most important prerequisite for this plan was the recognition of an unpleasant and unacceptable fact for the entire Russian society of that time: we cannot defeat Napoleon in the way that was considered correct at that time - by defeating his army in a general battle.
Kutuzov knew that this could not be done. This is why his war plan was unpopular. It couldn't Russian society come to this plan “with your own mind.” We lost one of the capitals, we lost a significant part of the country, we suffered national humiliation in the fall of 1812 - for the first time in 200 years, the enemy invaded the heart of Russia. But Kutuzov consistently and purposefully carried out his plan.
battle of Borodino was a violation of his plan, it was a concession public opinion, Kutuzov did not want a battle, but even he could not yield. The Russian army passionately wanted one thing - to die under the walls of Moscow - who could resist?
Did Kutuzov want to win at Borodino? In no case. He only hoped to save as many soldiers and officers as possible. Having saved half the army, Kutuzov won - he could now implement his plan.
* * *

Here's the dilemma - that's it Russian society was eager to fight. There was no soldier, officer, or general who was afraid of battle, who wanted to let Napoleon’s army go, and, as it later turned out, to die a natural death. But it was impossible to accept the right battle. Kutuzov recognized Napoleon's superiority in tactics and operational art - and certainly destroyed him.
Few people understood Kutuzov, but not because of his excessive wisdom - the premise of Kutuzov’s plan was offensive to every Russian, but that was the whole point. It is not always difficult to admit the real state of affairs, but sometimes it is very offensive, and the offense prevents you from acting correctly. And Sun Tzu said: “If a general is overly touchy,
it can be provoked."
After all, even Kutuzov failed to fully fulfill his duty to Russia; he failed to protect us all from a terrible mistake.
All layers of Russian society - the tsar, the nobleman, and, perhaps, the peasant - most of all wanted then to free Europe from the “usurper.” But in fact, there was no need to “liberate” Europe - the Europeans fell under Napoleon, even if they themselves tumbled with him as they wanted, what do we care? They wouldn’t have dragged “Buonaparte” to Russia on a lasso for the second time!
This was Kutuzov’s opinion, and he asked the Tsar about this on his deathbed in the spring of 1813. And the king asked for forgiveness from him for not listening. Kutuzov replied, “I will forgive, will Russia forgive?”
We know about this conversation from the words of only one person - an official for assignments, who overheard it, hiding behind a screen. Its reliability is not one hundred percent, but even if it is made up, the very idea of this dialogue could not appear out of nowhere. We had nothing to do in Europe, Kutuzov knew Europe and understood that, trying to play some role there, Russian society was mistaken.
And one can only guess what would have happened if Alexander had heeded Kutuzov’s pleas and had not followed Napoleon to Europe. It’s not even about the heavy defeats of our army in 1813 from the same French, the same Napoleon. The whole history of Russia would have turned in a different direction! If there had not been a financial crisis caused by the need to maintain the Russian army abroad, there would have been no Holy Alliance, there would have been no shameful role of the “European gendarme”, and perhaps there would have been no Crimean War.”

Knowledge about history is gleaned from documents, analyzed using logic, and conclusions are compared with what we understand from our own experience. I have been researching the topic of the War of 1812 all my life, participated in dozens of scientific conferences, as well as in talk shows on TV and radio: and I will try to write this article in extremely simple and clear terms, using exclusively primary sources, and not “water” and speculation (which my “opponents” are famous for).

It must be stated: among scientists today there are no two opinions - the Battle of Borodino is the defeat of the Russian army and the victory of Napoleon. Some budget-dependent comrades are still trying by demagogic means to call it “not quite a complete defeat of the Russians,” or “only a tactical victory for Napoleon,” but the Russian army lost almost half of its regular troops, and soon after the battle it completely disintegrated (thousands of marauders who plundered their own villages and Moscow was the first to be plundered), and the “shrine” of Moscow was forced to surrender without a fight to the mercy of the winner. Army M.I. Kutuzova fled so quickly that about 30,000 Russian wounded were abandoned there (after which her own governor-general F.V. Rostopchin burned the city, and Kutuzov himself contributed to this by ordering the removal of fire equipment). The hourly (!) history of the burning of the city has already been described by me in a previous documentary study, and now we will consider sources relating to the goals, plans and assessments of M.I. himself. Kutuzov regarding the Battle of Borodino (that is, exclusively his direct speech in personal letters and in official documents of the headquarters, not French sources and not later texts).

I will quote primary sources, documents: they must forever bury the nonsense of cheap demagogues who, taking advantage of the ignorance of ordinary readers, hang noodles on their ears, trying to convince them that Kutuzov did not want to defend Moscow from the very beginning (although he was appointed with an obligation to do so). At the same time, I’ll immediately emphasize: you never know what the mediocre general didn’t want to defend: his duty to win battles and defend his native land, especially a point of colossal material, political and moral significance. In addition, you will learn Kutuzov's own criterion for assessing the Battle of Borodino as a victory or defeat for the Russians.

So, on the day of arrival at the army (August 17, old style - 29th, new style), the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, M.I. Kutuzov wrote to F.V. Rostopchin: “In my opinion, the loss of Moscow is connected with the loss of Russia” (M.I. Kutuzov. Collection of documents. M., 1955, vol. 4, part 1, p. 90).

The next day, Kutuzov assured Field Marshal N.I. in writing. Saltykov and the Tsar himself that he would give battle to Napoleon to save Moscow. Another day he writes to the commander of the Moldavian Army (more recently it began to be called the Danube Army) Admiral P.V. Chichagov: “My real subject is the salvation of Moscow.”

I.I. Markov (chief of the Moscow militia) handed over to F.V. the day before the Battle of Borodino. Rostopchin has this definition of Kutuzov: “He (Napoleon) cannot be allowed to reach Moscow. Let him go, all of Russia will be his" ( Civil uprising in the Patriotic War of 1812: Collection of documents. M., 1962, p. 71).

Moreover, as if especially for historians, Kutuzov personally formulated his own criterion of defeat, failure - and this is a retreat. In the official disposition of September 5 (August 24, old style) he wrote: “It is not a case of failure, several roads are open, which will be connected. commander-in-chief (Barclay and Bagration) and according to which the armies will have to retreat” (M.I. Kutuzov. Collection of documents... p. 129).

I will urgently repeat the only documented criterion for assessing the results of the battle, formulated personally by Kutuzov, moreover, officially and in writing: “... if I am defeated, I will go to Moscow, and there I will defend the Capital” / from a letter to Rostopchin dated September 3 - August 22. according to Art. style/ (Moscow in 1812. Memoirs, letters and official documents from the collection of the Department of Written Sources of the State historical museum. M., 2012, p. 297).

Let's continue analyzing the results of the battle. Many Russian soldiers, who left us written evidence, recognized Borodino as the defeat of their army - and the victory of Napoleon. Among them, for example, is the brave and principled A.P. Ermolov, who declared: “the enemy won” ( Patriotic War and Russian society. 1812 - 1912. M., 1912, vol. IV, p. 29).

Soon after the battle, the adjutant of Vladimir Ivanovich Levenshtern (1777-1858), officer Fadeev, wrote to A.D. Bestuzhev-Ryumin “The enemy will certainly enter Moscow, because our army is completely destroyed.” Governor General of Moscow Rostopchin reported: “I wrote a note to the Minister of Police that I do not understand this victory, because our armies retreated to Mozhaisk...” (Ibid.).

And who declared the “victory” of the Russians? Who started the formation of a completely mentally and actually inadequate myth about “victory”, after which the army, having lost half, runs to Moscow, surrenders Moscow, and then dissolves and barely gathers in a distant camp? The answer is simple: this is the same “coffee pot Zubov”, who “slept through” the entire battle, the man who was largely responsible for the terrible defeat - Kutuzov. He very, very cunningly (in the spirit of an eighteenth-century courtier) wrote a beautiful report to the Tsar with the words “the enemy has not won a single step of land anywhere” (which, as we already know, was an absolute, one hundred percent lie). Thus, in St. Petersburg they managed to rejoice, they decided that Napoleon had been stopped, that Moscow had been saved! (Patriotic War and Russian society... p. 29).

In false joy, the Tsar granted Kutuzov a field marshal's commission and 100,000 rubles! However, when the deception about the “victory” soon became clear, Kutuzov did not return all this (although the tsar wrote him irritated letters!)...

Context

If Napoleon had won

BBC Russian Service 18.06.2015

Le Mond: Napoleon is still held in high esteem in Russia

Le Monde 19.06.2015

Why didn’t Putin quote Borodino?

InoSMI 02.06.2017

In the footsteps of Napoleon: Borodino - a Russian mirage

Le Figaro 16.08.2015

Russia and France 2012: “electoral Borodino” 200 years later

Day 05/16/2012 Let us now analyze the most important documents of eyewitnesses - letters from soldiers of Napoleon’s army, sent immediately after the battle: “Artilleryman of the Dutch army F.S. List expressed the hope that after the defeat on the Moscow River (as the French called the Battle of Borodino - my note, E.P.) and the virtual destruction of the Russian army, Emperor Alexander I should soon ask for peace.” And further: “... General Zh.L. Scherer stated in his letter: “The battle of September 7 cost the Russian army at least 50,000 people (a strikingly accurate estimate, confirmed by Russian archival records - my note, E.P.). And this despite the fortifications and a very good position,” and the chief of the battalion of the 17th regiment, J.P.M. Barrier wrote that the Russians lost 40,000 in the battle. The musician of the 35th regiment, J. Eichner, argued: “The Russians are no longer able to wage a campaign against us, since they will never find positions like at Smolensk and Mozhaisk. (...) Captain of the Old Guard K. Van Bekop, although he admitted that the French suffered heavy losses in the Battle of Borodino, argued that according to his calculations, which he made directly on the battlefield, the Russians lost six times more... Su-lieutenant L.F. Cointin counted 8 dead Russians per Frenchman. (...)...lieutenant of the quartermaster department of the 25th regiment P.O. Paradis, who in two letters - to Mademoiselle Genevieve Bonnegras dated September 20 and to his father dated September 25 - claimed that he personally counted 20 dead Russians per Frenchman" (Promyslov N.V. French public opinion about Russia on the eve and during the war of 1812. M., 2016, p. 154-155).

But the main consequence of Borodin was the catastrophe of Moscow’s capitulation! Soon the already mentioned battalion commander of the 17th linear regiment Zh.P.M. Barier reported in a letter to his wife: “On the 14th (September, my note, E.P.) we entered Moscow. They took many prisoners in the city. Their army no longer exists. Their soldiers desert, not wanting to fight, retreating all the time and seeing themselves beaten in all cases when they decide to confront us” (Zemtsov V.N. Battle of the Moscow River. M., 2001, p. 265).

This document categorically testifies to the state of complete defeat and disintegration of the Russian army after Borodin.

We also find information about mass desertion in many Russian official army documents.

When we know the evidence of the Russians, the French and outside observers, we ask ourselves: how did Napoleon himself assess the battle? We have a number of documentary evidence. The first is official: in the eighteenth bulletin Great Army, which presented a description of the Battle of Borodino as a brilliant victory for the French (“War of Feathers”: official reports on the military operations of 1812-1814: collection of documents. St. Petersburg, 2014, pp. 332-334).

The second testimony is purely personal, intimate. In a letter to his wife Marie-Louise, Napoleon said (immediately after the battle) that he “beat the Russians” (Castello A. Napoleon. M., 2004, p. 318). As for the fake phrase that was printed in Soviet propaganda and which migrated to trash Wikipedia (about “the least success achieved”), this falsification was exposed three decades ago by the doctor historical sciences ON THE. Troitsky (Troitsky N.A. 1812. The Great Year of Russia. M., 2007, pp. 295-296).

Multimedia

During the reconstruction of the Battle of Borodino, “horses and people mixed together...”

InoSMI 09/04/2012 Among other records made from the words of Napoleon already on the island. St. Helena, there is also this (about the Russians near Borodino): “... I won a victory over them in a big matter at the Moscow River; With ninety thousand I attacked the Russian army... and I completely defeated it. Fifty thousand Russians remained on the battlefield. The Russians had the imprudence to claim that they had won the battle, and, nevertheless, eight days later I entered Moscow” (The Thunderstorm of the Twelfth Year. M., 1991, p. 563).

Where did Kutuzov’s reverse phrase “with the loss of Moscow the army is not lost” come from? And it’s very simple: it was said at the council in Fili by Barclay de Tolly (Ermolov A.P. Decree cit., p. 205), who understood that if we give a new battle, then it will be narrower.

the defeated army will be completely destroyed, and all generals will face either death or a tribunal. Kutuzov heard this - and with great joy he clung to this, simply identifying with Barclay: and shifting all responsibility onto him. Moreover, Kutuzov pronounced the decision to leave Moscow in French. The general who lost everything and destroyed the army was simply trying to cover up his shame with demagoguery - but with the support of state propaganda, he succeeded.

Now let's talk about the Meaning. In Russia, many things simply lose meaning. Yes, yes - pay attention to this. You can win all the battles (as in 1812), but you will not achieve the fulfillment of the Tilsit Peace from a bald and half-deaf schizophrenic, because he has an immense meaningless space and a population of serf slaves scattered throughout it (who rebelled against the authorities - but were separated precisely by space ). You can be the great poetess Marina Tsvetaeva - but you will end up in poverty, in a noose - and you won’t even find a grave. You can be a great scientist N.I. Vavilov - but you will die in Stalin’s prison (and Stalin, as you know, was the creator of the myth about Kutuzov - until the 1940s, historians did not appreciate him and not a single monograph was published about him!). Everyone understands perfectly well that, for example, people come to the rallies organized by Navalny mainly because of the meaning, and to the return gatherings they come from state employees on a compulsory basis or marginalized people for 300 rubles. But the meaning still does not win: a huge territory, everyone is separated, then there are frosts, and if necessary, they will roll the meaning into asphalt with armored vehicles. As you know (easy to check on Youtube), I won all the talk shows, published all the documents in a monograph (back in 2004), in dozens of articles, but the propaganda machine can print propaganda textbooks in millions of copies - and lies will overwhelm the truth with quantity . In addition, the slavish, mindless biomass a priori hates the truth.

Who can blather “in the end we won”? Only a flawed creature with a complex can value not talent, not honor, not open battle, but self-immolation, deception, a terrible climate and meaningless space. Only those who live, excuse me, in shit can enviously hate those who gave civilization. Let's compare how Russians lived and live with how Europeans live in the countries from which Napoleon's Grand Army was formed? Have you compared? And this will remain so until people here learn to respect and appreciate meaning and talent, and not lies, self-immolation, etc.

InoSMI materials contain assessments exclusively of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the InoSMI editorial staff.

Push the Prussians in the trench

And stab with a bayonet, and stab with a bayonet!

And hit the Frenchman... on the hat,

He'll run, he'll run!

Soldier's Song (Y. Kim)

But which way should we go, what goal should we strive for? And why has no one found the right target? After all, if someone had offered something reasonable, would they really not have followed him? Aren't the people wise? Why doesn't he see a way out himself?

The answer, in my opinion, is obvious. The way out of the situation is not visible to society, because it does not correspond to its desires, its state of mind. But does this happen?

And have there been cases in our history when everyone wanted to act in a certain (wrong) way, but another path led to success, which was not visible to society as a whole? And why didn’t society see him?

In my opinion, we have had this situation many times, and this is perhaps one of the most striking cases.

Everyone knows that Kutuzov is a great commander. But few people thought about why it was great. He fought all his life, but did not win a single famous battle, he has nothing like the resounding victories of Napoleon or Suvorov - neither Ishmael nor Austerlitz. Either defeats, then retreats, or rather controversial victories with a draw. When you think about this, at first some unpleasant feeling arises - maybe Kutuzov’s authority is inflated? Maybe he just went with the flow, and the people and the Russian winter did everything themselves? Tolstoy’s interpretation of his personality, it must be said, lies in line with precisely this view of this historical figure.

Napoleon, yes. The armies under his command were head and shoulders above their rivals on the battlefields. They beat everyone - Russians, English, Saxons, Austrians, Prussians, and Janissaries. They fought with artillery, “like a man with his fists,” and huge masses of cavalry (a revolutionary innovation!) swept away both the infantry and the well-trained but small cavalry of the European armies. Napoleon’s battle tactics were advanced, Suvorov’s, and it was not without reason that Suvorov’s ardent desire was “to meet the boy in order to return everything he had taken.” By “taken” they meant Suvorov’s innovations. Suvorov beat Napoleon's marshals, but they did not meet Napoleon face to face, and the question of who is stronger remained open.

But even if Napoleon managed to lead his army to a general battle, nothing could be done to him - on the battlefield, he controlled his soldiers better than anyone else, and they did not let him down.

How different Kutuzov was from him! Before Borodin, Kutuzov prepared ten thousand carts for the wounded and ten thousand orderlies to evacuate them from the battlefield, and Napoleon simply abandoned his wounded.

Both Suvorov and Napoleon called Kutuzov a cunning and a cunning fox, respectively - such a coincidence of reviews from different people suggests that this assessment of Kutuzov’s personality is objective, and, since it comes from the commanders, it means not only the qualities of a “cunning courtier.” When, after the disaster of the Austrian army allied to us near Ulm, Kutuzov had to lead the Russian army away from destruction along the Danube Valley, from Braunau to Brunn, the French were unable to do anything with him. Kicking like a horse, Kutuzov gave nothing and did not sacrifice anyone - and retreat, whatever you say, is the most difficult type of action. Operating constantly with only part of the forces (the rest must leave), it is necessary to restrain all the enemy’s forces, and the covering parts must, constantly alternating, either be deployed into a battle formation, or turned into a marching formation, and even from an inverted front. The troops that have completed their task, without allowing any delay, must be passed into the column through the deployed replacement units. All this is technically very complex, here the commander must, first of all, be simply a military professional, but he also needs an understanding of the terrain, and composure, and, of course. cunning. The slightest hitch - and the “tail”, or even the entire army, would have been lost. I'm not even talking about such a “trifle” that the rearguard of the Russian army had to unconditionally win in every clash with the French vanguard.

This retreat is a masterpiece of military art.

But at the same time - and there is a lot of evidence about this - Kutuzov in every possible way avoided a general battle with Napoleon, even at the end of the 1812 campaign.

So that’s why we say that in general in that era Napoleon lost and Kutuzov won? The fact is that, without losing a single battle outright, Napoleon lost his main war. You can speculate on this topic as much as you like, but Napoleon lost not only the greatest (up to Hitler) all-European army, but also his life’s work, and not because of his stupidity, but because of Kutuzov’s intelligence.

Kutuzov's intelligence was manifested in the simple recognition of an obvious fact: Napoleon is the greatest tactical commander of the time, and having fought with him, at best you can resist, but you cannot defeat him by maneuvering on the battlefield, attacking. He does it better! And a battle with him that ended in a draw is not at all a guarantee that the next one will not end in disaster. Kutuzov knew how to retreat, fighting back, and, as it turned out, he could withstand Napoleon’s attack in a general battle. They say that Kutuzov considered it risky to learn to defeat Napoleon on the battlefield during the decisive war. No, it's not about risk. Kutuzov was absolutely sure that he would inevitably be defeated if he tried to defeat Napoleon’s army.

That is why Kutuzov “built a golden bridge” for Napoleon to leave Russia, and did not try to slam his army. Yes, Kutuzov’s plans cannot be called majestic - he did not want a resounding victory, but only the complete extermination of the enemy and the salvation of the fatherland. Yes, Kutuzov retreated, dodged, he never seriously attacked Napoleon, did not destroy him with artillery fire and a brave bayonet attack. But Napoleon could not do anything with Kutuzov, that is, Kutuzov was not a bad commander! The French attacked - the Russians fought back. The French stepped up their attack - it was already hitting empty space. The French were leaving - the Russians were clinging to them from behind.

The French generals recalled with resentment that they would have made it to Maloyaroslavets before Kutuzov had he not put his soldiers on carts. This was against the rules!

But, at the decisive moment of the war, Kutuzov had several thousand carts with draft horses at hand... And the Great Army had to march not through fertile Ukraine, but along the scorched Smolensk road.

Napoleon, by his own admission, won battles because he thought through them in every detail in advance, unlike his opponents. But in the war as a whole, he acted according to his other principle: “we need to get involved in battle, and then we’ll see.” But Kutuzov had an idea, he implemented it, and this idea turned out to be correct.

Kutuzov, as I understand it, accurately calculated that Napoleon would not be able to provide more than 50 thousand horses with fodder. And the old professional turned out to be right - even before attempting to break through to the south, Napoleon had to send horseless cavalry to the West on foot. And it was only September!

Kutuzov understood the war, but Napoleon did not. What joy does Napoleon have that he is invincible? Only 5,000 people survived from his “Grand Army”. This is from five hundred or six hundred thousand!

By the way, Kutuzov’s plan was not the plan of a lone genius - Defense Minister Barclay de Tolly held the same views as Mikhail Illarionovich. He, apparently, was the author of this plan, because in general it was Barclay de Tolly who was the generator of non-standard decisions to remember at least his invasion of Sweden... through the frozen Baltic! The most amazing thing was not that the operation was a success and led to the neutrality of Sweden, but how the idea itself could have occurred to a military professional - the march of an entire army for several days, with overnight stays on the ice... there are no analogues in history either before or since was and is not expected.

Let's return to the plan for the war with Napoleon: why did society as a whole not see this plan and did not accept it from the “German” (Scots Barclay), and listened to Kutuzov with great difficulty?

Because the most important prerequisite for this plan was the recognition of an unpleasant and unacceptable fact for the entire Russian society of that time: we cannot defeat Napoleon in the way that was considered correct at that time - by defeating his army in a general battle. Kutuzov knew that this could not be done. This is why his war plan was unpopular. Russian society could not come to this plan “with its own mind.” We lost one of the capitals, we lost a significant part of the country, we suffered national humiliation in the fall of 1812 - for the first time in 200 years, the enemy invaded the heart of Russia. But Kutuzov consistently and purposefully carried out his plan.

The Battle of Borodino was a violation of his plan, it was a concession to public opinion, Kutuzov did not want a battle, but even he could not yield. The Russian army passionately wanted one thing - to die under the walls of Moscow - who could resist?

Did Kutuzov want to win at Borodino? In no case. He only hoped to save as many soldiers and officers as possible. Having saved half the army, Kutuzov won - he could now implement his plan.

Here is the dilemma - the entire Russian society was eager to fight. There was no soldier, officer, or general who was afraid of battle, who wanted to let Napoleon’s army go, and, as it later turned out, to die a natural death. But it was impossible to accept the right battle. Kutuzov recognized Napoleon's superiority in tactics and operational art and certainly destroyed him.

Few people understood Kutuzov, but it was not because of his excessive wisdom that the premise of Kutuzov’s plan was offensive to every Russian, that was the whole point. It is not always difficult to admit the real state of affairs, but sometimes it is very offensive, and the offense prevents you from acting correctly. And Sun Tzu said: “If a commander is overly touchy, he may be provoked.”

After all, even Kutuzov failed to fully fulfill his duty to Russia; he failed to protect us all from a terrible mistake. All layers of Russian society - the tsar, the nobleman, and, perhaps, the peasant - most of all wanted then to free Europe from the “usurper.” But in fact, there was no need to “liberate” Europe; the Europeans lay down under Napoleon, even if they themselves tumbled with him as they wanted, what do we care? They wouldn’t have dragged “Buonaparte” to Russia on a lasso for the second time!

This was Kutuzov’s opinion, and he asked the Tsar about this on his deathbed in the spring of 1813. And the king asked for forgiveness from him for not listening. Kutuzov replied, “I will forgive, will Russia forgive?”

We know about this conversation from the words of only one person - an official for assignments, who overheard it, hiding behind a screen. Its reliability is not one hundred percent, but even if it was invented, the very idea of this dialogue could not appear out of nowhere. We had nothing to do in Europe, Kutuzov knew Europe and understood that, trying to play some role there, Russian society was mistaken.

And one can only guess what would have happened if Alexander had heeded Kutuzov’s pleas and had not followed Napoleon to Europe. It’s not even about the heavy defeats of our army in 1813 from the same French, the same Napoleon. The whole history of Russia would have turned in a different direction! There would have been no financial crisis caused by the need to maintain the Russian army abroad, there would have been no Holy Alliance, there would have been no shameful role of the “European gendarme”, and perhaps there would have been no Crimean War.

What I mean is that our entire society passionately wants the Russian currency to be the best. So that the world is not chasing the dollar, but the ruble, and so that the ruble is more reliable than gold. Because it is believed that the correct victory in economic competition is when the ruble is freely convertible, and, moreover, constantly growing in relation to other currencies. But are such ideas true?

In Crimea, on the way to Alushta, many of you probably saw a monument-fountain, looking at which we remember the serious injury of the future Prince of Smolensk.

In July 1774, the Turkish landing force advanced deep into the Crimea. Near the village of Shumy, a three-thousand-strong Russian detachment stopped and defeated the enemy. Kutuzov commanded a grenadier battalion, fought bravely and was seriously wounded.

« Lieutenant Colonel Golenishchev-Kutuzov of the Moscow Legion, who led his battalion, consisting of new young people, to such perfection that in dealing with the enemy he was superior to the old soldiers. This staff officer received a wound from a bullet, which, having hit him between the eye and temple, came out in the same place on the other side of his face."- General Dolgorukov wrote to the empress after the battle.

Catherine treated Kutuzov cordially and took care of his treatment. She highly appreciated the fact that this enlightened, witty officer turned out to be brave. Kutuzov received George 4th class and was sent for treatment to Austria. At the expense of the treasury.

2. Ishmael. “He was my right hand!”

You can decide on such an assault only once in your life... Everyone - from privates to generals - took a mortal risk.

During the assault on the impregnable fortress, Major General Kutuzov commanded the 6th column, which was supposed to break into Izmail through the Kiliya Gate. According to Suvorov's plan, the Kutuzov column started a battle on the rampart.

When the Turks began to push back the attackers, Kutuzov asked Suvorov for reinforcements. The commander’s response was cunning: “Ishmael has been captured. And Major General Kutuzov was appointed its commandant.”

Mikhailo Illarionovich cast aside doubts and sent reserves into battle. The fortress fell, and the Kutuzov column distinguished itself in battle.

« Major General and Cavalier Golenishchev-Kutuzov showed new experiments in his art and courage, overcoming all difficulties under strong enemy fire, climbed the rampart, took possession of the bastion, and when the excellent enemy forced him to stop, he, serving as an example of courage, held the place, prevailed strong enemy, established himself in the fortress... He walked on the left flank, but was my right hand“- wrote Suvorov, who appreciated not only the soldier’s courage, but also the diplomatic cunning of the witty general.

3. Machin. “Vivat, Lieutenant General Kutuzov!”

June 1791. This was one of the largest battles Russian-Turkish war. The Ottomans sought to prevent the Russians from crossing the Danube and concentrated an 80,000-strong army in the area of the city of Macina.

The Russian troops were commanded by Nikolai Vasilyevich Repnin - he planned to launch a pre-emptive strike against the main enemy forces. Kutuzov's corps crushed the right flank of the Turkish troops and broke into the Machinsky camp. Kutuzov also distinguished himself in pursuing the retreating Turks. He acted efficiently and quickly.

For the victory at Machin, the future field marshal was awarded the Order of George, 2nd degree.

4. Family. “I am writing to you, my friend...”

Kutuzov was a woman-loving man, like few of our outstanding commanders. And yet (unlike Rumyantsev, Suvorov, Potemkin, Miloradovich, Ermolov, Skobelev...) Kutuzov created a real family and loved his Ekaterina Ilyinichna to the death. Free morals did not shake their union. His wife gave him a son and five daughters, whose upbringing he was not indifferent to.

He wrote to her from all his campaigns. I felt a strong need for frank correspondence with my wife. She sometimes learned about military events before the emperor... Prince Smolensky was already dictating the last letter in a weakening voice. It ended with the words: “Forgive me, my friend...”.

5. Mission in Berlin. “Smart, smart! Cunning, cunning!

Under Paul the First, Kutuzov escaped disgrace, although he did not escape the highest beatings. The emperor trusted him and considered him, among other things, a resourceful negotiator.

At the beginning of 1798, Kutuzov arrived in Berlin. Shortly before this, the Prussian throne was occupied by new king– Friedrich Wilhelm III. In Prussia, Kutuzov had to not only greet the new king and get to know him, but also prepare the ground for an anti-French alliance.

At the court of the Prussian king, Kutuzov was received as a hero. His wounds inspired respect. In private conversations with the monarch, Mikhailo Illarionovich skillfully persuaded him to an alliance with Russia. He carried out his diplomatic mission brilliantly.

6. Amstetten

Rivalry with Napoleon was considered madness in those days. In the fall of 1805, after the surrender of the Austrian General Mack, the Russian army under the command of Kutuzov was forced to retreat. On November 5, the troops of Marshal Murat - the vanguard of the Great Army - attacked the Russian rearguard, commanded by General Bagration. Despite the significant numerical superiority of the French, Bagration's troops withstood the blow.

Kutuzov sent Miloradovich's corps to help him. The grenadiers of the Absheron and Smolensk regiments overthrew the French infantry. While the battle was going on, in which the Russian troops showed themselves with the best side, the main forces, according to Kutuzov’s plan, calmly retreated, crossing the Ibs River. They managed to break away from Napoleon by a considerable distance.

As often happened in Kutuzov’s biography, the question of the winner remains open. Murat argued: the Russians continued their retreat! Kutuzov retorted: but we intended to retreat, and the French failed to break the rearguard and overtake Kutuzov’s main forces.

Kutuzov accepts the army

7. Rushchuk. Count's dignity

Under the command of Kutuzov was a small army with powerful artillery. For a long time he slyly demonstrated his inaction to the Turks. He lured Ahmet Pasha and forced him to come close to the fortress. The main forces of the Russians stood not far from Rushchuk.

The Turks had a large but not very organized army. Kutuzov gave the Ottomans another idea: to cut off the Russian army from the fortress with a rush of cavalry and press it to the river. But a powerful counterattack, as well as unexpected attacks from the fortress, broke the Turks. Having lost 5 thousand soldiers, the Turks retreated. Wonderful Victoria in Kutuzov’s style!

Soon Kutuzov's army will finish off the enemy near Slobodzeya. For these important victories, achieved with minimal losses, Kutuzov was elevated to the rank of count.

8. Borodino. Ambiguous Glory

We will remember this battle more than once. Conflicting interpretations of its course will always intrigue history buffs. Until the Great Patriotic War, the Battle of Borodino remained the largest in scale among the battles that took place on the territory of indigenous Russia.

Two great forces collided near Moscow. They showed unattainable valor. There were no losers. The French won a tactical victory. There is no doubt that after the Battle of Borodino they continued to move to the East and soon occupied Moscow. Kutuzov did not give them a second general battle at the walls of Belokamennaya; he preferred to concentrate.

Mikhailo Illarionovich himself always considered the battle victorious. The Emperor hardly trusted his optimism, but was forced to reward Kutuzov, if only for propaganda purposes, in order to strengthen the morale of the army. Three days after the Battle of Borodino, Kutuzov was promoted to field marshal... However, he earned the baton a long time ago.

The end of the Battle of Borodino. Artist V.Vereshchagin

9. Maloyaroslavets

After the Battle of Borodino, this battle was the most important in the campaign of 1812. The Great Army first retreated from Moscow along the Old Kaluga Road. But then Napoleon ordered to turn to Novaya. Seslavin's partisans noticed the advance of the main forces of the Great Army towards Maloyaroslavets.

On October 23, when Napoleon spent the night in ancient Borovsk, Kutuzov’s main forces left the Tarutino camp to block the New Kaluga Road. On the morning of the 24th, the battle began in Maloyaroslavets, in which small formations initially took part. But more and more units were drawn into the vortex of the battle. The task of the Russian army is to make it impossible for the French to advance to the south of Russia, which would save Napoleon.

On the 25th, Kutuzov ordered his troops to retreat and strengthen themselves in a convenient position. An unexpected attack by Platov’s Cossacks almost ended in Napoleon’s capture. As a result, Bonaparte was forced to continue his retreat to the West along the devastated Smolensk road. This was the path to destruction.

10. The defeat of Napoleon. “We will not win, but we will deceive!”

Kutuzov entered the War of 1812 with an aphoristic program: “We will not defeat Napoleon. We will deceive him." General Bogdan Knorring joked aphoristically: “Every hour of sleep of this old man brings us inexorably closer to victory.”

The aging Kutuzov managed to spend French army to the western border Russian Empire and expelled the remnants of the Great Army. Of course, the Russian army also suffered losses - mainly not combat, but medical.