Grevs is an American adventure in siberia. Who are you, General Grevs? The objectives of the military intervention in Siberia

Grevs... American Adventure in Siberia, translated from English, Voengiz, 1932.

I. Chieftain in Siberia and the Far East

... Semenov came to me, who later turned out to be a murderer, robber and the most dissolute scoundrel. Semyonov was financed by Japan and had no convictions, except for the awareness of the need to act at the behest of Japan. He always remained in the field of vision of the Japanese troops. He did this because he could not have held out in Siberia for a week if he had not relied on the support of Japan. Semenov always talked about the "rebirth of the homeland."

In Khabarovsk, I first met this famous killer, robber and thug Kalmykov. Kalmykov was the most notorious villain I have ever met, and I seriously think that if you carefully leaf through the encyclopedic dictionary and look at all the words that define various types of crimes, you will hardly be able to find such a crime that Kalmykov would not have committed. Japan, in its efforts to "help the Russian people" supplied Kalmykov with weapons and financed him. I deliberately talk about this, as I have evidence that should satisfy every sane person. Where Semenov ordered others to kill, Kalmykov killed with his own hand, and in This is the difference between Kalmykov and Semyonov. Kalmykov was - to use the Russian expression - “liquidated” (killed) by the Chinese when, after his expulsion from Siberia, he tried to find refuge in China. As for Semyonov, he was also later expelled from Siberia and found himself shelter in Japan, where he still lives.

In 1919 Semenov sent a captain of his staff to Washington. Not only did this captain not encounter any difficulty in entering the United States, but I read in the newspapers that some of the prominent American personalities arranged interviews for him about events in Siberia while he was on the road from San Francisco to Washington. I do not know the purpose of this visit of agent Semyonov, but he himself boastfully stated that one of the purposes of his visit to America was to force me to remove from my post as commander of the American forces. When this captain returned to Vladivostok, he stated that the military department was very attentive to him, assigned Colonel Cronin to him as a guide and helped him meet with some prominent figures. He also stated that when he was leaving Washington, Colonel Cronin assured him that I would be removed from office before he arrived in Vladivostok. This man represented Semyonov in America, and there is every reason to believe that he possessed the same criminal features as his boss. Washington knew perfectly well what Semyonov was; therefore, it should be assumed that when deciding whether the Russians should be allowed to enter the United States, such data were not paid attention to, but were considered only for political reasons.

I received credible reports stating that one of the Japanese officers tried to induce Semyonov to declare himself the dictator of the Trans-Baikal region and seize the railways and tunnels, on November 28, that is, ten days after Admiral Kolchak became dictator in Siberia. I received a message that seemed plausible to me that Semyonov from Tokyo had been given directives to march against Kolchak and that Japanese representatives in Siberia followed this policy. As far as we knew, Japan supported Semyonov in Chita and Kalmykov in Khabarovsk with troops and money; in addition, it was known - at least in Siberia - that Japan did not at all want the situation in Siberia to be settled and a strong and stable government came to power. In March 1918, Japan turned to the allies with a request to allow her alone to occupy the Sino-Eastern and Amur railways, as well as Vladivostok, if the allies consider it necessary to occupy Eastern Siberia. Despite the fact that this proposal failed due to the position of the United States, Japan did not give up hope of achieving this goal when the Allies sent their troops to Siberia.

The soldiers of Semyonov and Kalmykov, under the protection of Japanese troops, flooded the country like wild animals, killed and robbed the people, while the Japanese could have stopped these killings at any time if they wanted. If at that time they asked what all these brutal murders were for, they usually received the answer that the killed were Bolsheviks, and this explanation obviously satisfied everyone. Events in Eastern Siberia usually presented themselves in the darkest colors, and human life there was not worth a penny.

In Eastern Siberia, there were horrific murders, but they were not committed by the Bolsheviks, as is usually thought. I will not be mistaken if I say that in Eastern Siberia for every person killed by the Bolsheviks, there were 100 people killed by anti-Bolshevik elements. While I was in Siberia, I believed - and I still think the same - that, encouraging all these killings, Japan hoped that the United States would get tired of this whole situation, they would withdraw their troops and ask Japan to clarify the situation. of things,

Kalmykov received power in the spring of 1918, after he was elected ataman of the Ussuri Cossacks. These latter authorized him to obtain a loan from the allies to help the Cossacks to carry out spring crops. Japan, provided them with such a loan on the condition that the Ussuri Cossacks would not join the Bolsheviks. The money paid by Japan gave Kalmykov the opportunity to go to the Pogranichnaya station and recruit a Cossack division there, under which a Japanese major was an adviser on the organization of troops. This information was reported by Kalmykov's agents in Vladivostok.

During the Ussuri campaign, from July to September 1918, Kalmykov's Cossacks took part in hostilities and entered Khabarovsk together with Japanese troops on September 5-6. Kalmykov remained in Khabarovsk and established a regime of terror, extortion and bloodshed there; this, perhaps, was the reason that his troops rebelled and turned to American troops for help. Under the pretext of eradicating Bolshevism, Kalmykov resorted to head-to-head arrests of wealthy people, tortured them to force them to give him money and valuables, and executed some of them on charges of Bolshevism. These arrests became such a daily occurrence that they terrorized all classes of the population: there were many hundreds of people shot by Kalmykov's troops in the vicinity of Khabarovsk. We established the facts of the murders from the stories of the peasants and from the testimony under oath local authorities... Finally, Kalmykov's troops began to flog and beat their own commanders, and on December 6, one of the intelligence officers of the 27th Infantry Regiment reported that the situation was becoming serious. Of course, the fact that on December 28, part of Kalmykov's troops appeared at the main apartment of the 27th regiment and asked for permission to join the ranks of the United States army cannot be called a betrayal, and many of them asked to help them get out of Khabarovsk.

The Japanese first turned to me with a request to return to Kalmykov the horses, weapons and equipment given by his soldiers to Colonel Steier, but I declined this request. I was told that all this property belongs to Japan. To this I replied to the chief of the Japanese staff that if Japan informs me in writing that it armed this killer, that nothing was paid for all this property by the Kalmykovs, and if Japan can prove the identity of this property and issue a receipt for it, then I will issue this property. All this was done, and the receipt was sent by me to war department together with the report.

In my reports and telegrams, I have always pointed out not only the excesses of Semyonov and Kalmykov, but also the behavior of Kolchak's Russian troops operating under the direct leadership of Ivanov-Rinov. The behavior of these troops, since we are dealing with various kinds of attacks and robberies, almost approaches in scale to the atrocities of the troops of Semyonov and Kalmykov, although the troops of Ivanov-Rinov and Horvat killed fewer people than the Kalmykov did.

The Japanese, holding under their control Semenov in Chita, Kalmykov in Khabarovsk and exerting a decisive influence on Ivanov-Rinov in Vladivostok, actually kept the whole of Eastern Siberia under their control. If they were able to conclude a business agreement with Kolchak, they could at least to some extent eliminate the causes of friction between them, on the one hand, and the British and French, on the other. These frictions arose from the moment when power in Siberia passed into the hands of Admiral Kolchak.

II. The relationship of allies - Japan, England and France in the Far East and Siberia

England, France, and Japan acted in concert, since the goal was to eradicate Bolshevism; however, England and France believed that the main task was an equally intense struggle against the threat of Bolshevism in all parts of Siberia and the use of Kolchak to combat this danger. Japan spent large sums of money in Eastern Siberia, and its main goal was to fight against Bolshevism here in the Far East, and to use, if the opportunity presented itself, any situation that might arise; as for the struggle against Bolshevism west of Lake Baikal, compared with its interests in Eastern Siberia, this was only a secondary task for Japan.

"Regiment. Morrow informed Semyonov to take his armored car out of the American section; otherwise, he will output it himself. Japanese General Ioshe told Morrow that “the Japanese will oppose the withdrawal of American troops from the Semyonovsky armored car section by force.” Slouter telegraphed that Sukin (Omsk Foreign Minister) informed him that he considered the incident indicative of the Japanese desire to cause a clash between the Americans and the Russians. Even before receiving this message from Sloughter, Smith (the American representative on the Inter-Allied Railroad Committee) said that Regiment Robertson, the current British High Commissioner, had informed him very confidentially yesterday that he believed this clash between Semyonov and the Americans was inspired by the Japanese.

There is no doubt that all of Semenov's serious performances were inspired by the Japanese. I have already informed the War Department that when considering Far Eastern issues, the Cossacks and the Japanese should be regarded as a single force. I have no reason to change this opinion.

Some Japanese would have been happy to see the American Forces clash with the Russians, but others were more cautious because they knew I had enough information to prove Japan's connection to any hostile action by Semyonov or Kalmykov against the Americans.

Around August 20, the ambassador and I left Omsk and set off for Vladivostok. We stayed in Novonikolaevsk, Irkutsk, Verkhneudinsk and Harbin. Nothing interesting happened until we reached the Semenov territory.

At that time, it was widely known that Semyonov had established something called "death stations" and openly boasted that he could not sleep at night if he did not kill someone during the day. We stopped at a small station, and entered our carriage two Americans from the Russian service squad railways... They told us about the murder of the Russians, carried out by the Semyonov soldiers two or three days before our arrival, in a freight car with 350 people.I don't remember whether there were only men or men and women on the train.

The most significant of these two Americans' account is the following: “A freight train carrying the arrested passed the station to the place where the executions were widely known to have taken place. The detachment's employees went to the place of execution, but were stopped by the Semyonov soldiers. After 1 hour and 50 minutes, the empty train returned to the station. The next day, two officers went to the scene of the murder and saw evidence of a mass execution. From the cartridges scattered on the ground, it was clear that the arrested were killed by machine guns, since the empty cartridges were dumped in a heap, as is the case with machine gun fire. The bodies were piled into two pits, which were covered with fresh earth. In one pit the bodies were completely covered, in the other, many arms and legs were left untouched. "

September 13 regiment. Sargent, who served as commander at the time of my departure to Omsk, telegraphed the following to the War Department:

"Today Semenov and Kalmykov left Vladivostok for Khabarovsk."

These two Japanese henchmen went to Khabarovsk together with a special purpose. This one. the goal was to create a plan to attack the American soldiers.

Gene. Horvath, who opposed my policy of non-interference in internal affairs, visited me and warned that Kalmykov had arrived in order to destroy the American soldiers, and that if I did not concentrate the small detachments guarding the railway, I would lose some of them. He stated that Japan had authorized this and provided Kalmykov with 30,000 yen; he further announced that a telegram "to everyone, everyone" had been prepared for dispatch, indicating that the same would be done with all the Bolsheviks.

The head of the fortress regiment. Butenko had access to all telegrams going through Vladivostok. Visiting me at about the same time as the gene. Horvath, he confirmed the message of the latter and rolled that Semyonov telegraphically suggested to Kalmykov to go ahead and attack the American troops, and if he needed support, Semenov would send his troops to help him. The Japanese telegraphed Kalmykov that they would not provide him with active assistance, but would provide moral support.

In this regard, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Omsk government, Sukin, told Major Slater in Omsk the following:

“I can also tell you, if you don’t know about this, that there are not enough American troops in the Far East to overcome the difficulties that will arise if you have friction with Semyonov and Kalmykov. The fact is that the Japanese support Semyonov by all means, up to sending troops, if it seems necessary. "

“As a result of the continuing attacks of Semyonov's armored cars on the railway, the seizure of the cars, threats to railway employees, attacks on workers, continued threats against my guards, shelling and arrests of Russian troops going to the front - yesterday, June 8, at 5 pm, I had a conversation with General of the Japanese Army Ioshe, military governor Gen. Medzhik and the commander of the Russian troops in Berezovka, gene. Peshinko. Based on the above, "I demanded that they ensure the withdrawal of armored cars from the American section, and at the same time informed them that if my demand is not fulfilled within 24 hours, I will destroy these cars."

Gene. Ioshe in the presence of the regiment. Morrow agreed to remain neutral, but later sent him the following message:

"The Japanese declare that they will resist by force the removal of the armored cars of Semyonov by the American troops, they will accept the armored cars under the Japanese guard in Berezovka and will protect them there from the American troops."

III. Japanese atrocities in the Far East

After my return from Omsk, a report on the brutal and disgusting murder committed by the Japanese appeared in my office.

This report indicated that on July 27, 1919, the detachment japanese soldiers under the command of a Japanese major, he arrested nine Russians in the town of Sviyagino, which was on the section of the railway assigned to the American guard. The Japanese told the American officer that these people were suspected of Bolshevism.

The Russians were told that if they provided information about the Bolsheviks, they would be released.

Four out of nine were released. The other five were severely beaten but refused to speak.

Again, the Japanese were not responsible for Sviyagino.

The Japanese began to behave as if they intended to execute the Russians who did not testify to them, and as soon as this intention of the Japanese became clear, the American officer protested, but to no avail.

The report described the execution as follows:

“Five Russians were brought to the graves dug in the vicinity of the railway station; they were blindfolded and ordered to kneel at the edge of the graves with their hands tied back. Two Japanese officers, stripping off their outerwear and exposing their sabers, began chopping at the victims, directing blows from the back of the neck, and as each of the victims fell into the grave, three to five Japanese soldiers finished off her with bayonets, emitting cries of joy.

Two were immediately beheaded by blows of sabers; the rest were apparently alive, as the earth thrown over them was stirring. "

I am bitter to admit that several soldiers and officers of the American army witnessed this massacre.

This murder was committed by the Japanese, not because the victims were committing any crime, but only because they were suspected of Bolshevism.

I was so overwhelmed by this atrocity that I summoned the chief of the American team from Sviyagin to the main American apartment in Vladivostok and, in the presence of the Japanese chief of staff, told him that he should have used force to prevent this assassination. I also told the Japanese chief of staff that if such things ever happened on the American sections of the railroad, it would cause a conflict between the Japanese and American forces. He replied that he would like to collect information on the content of the report.

I noticed that I did not find any obstacles to making inquiries and hoped that he would inform me of the results. He promised to do it. About five weeks later, he visited my office and said that he had to admit the truth of the report.

In Krasnoyarsk, I learned a thing or two about the gene. Rozanov, with whom I tried to establish a relationship in Vladivostok.

"one. Occupying villages that were previously occupied by bandits (partisans), demand the extradition of the leaders of the movement; in those villages where it will be impossible to find them, but there will be sufficient grounds to assume their presence, - to shoot every tenth of the population.

2. If, during the passage of troops through the city, the population will not inform (if possible, do so) about the presence of the enemy, monetary indemnity should be imposed on everyone without exception.

3. The villages, the inhabitants of which will meet our troops with weapons in their hands, must be burned to the ground, and the entire adult male population must be shot; property, houses, carts, etc. must be used for the needs of the army. "

We learned that Rozanov had hostages and for each killed his supporter he killed ten of them. He spoke of these methods he practiced in Krasnoyarsk as necessary in order to keep the population tight-knit, but he announced his intention to throw off his mittens when he went to Vladivostok, and to introduce other methods of government than those he used in relation to to the Krasnoyarsk population.

Such were the actions of Kolchak's supporters at a time when they were supported by foreign troops.

The text is reproduced by edition: Japanese intervention 1918-1922 in documents. - M., 1934.S. 175 - 183.

"There were terrible murders in Eastern Siberia, but they were
not the Bolsheviks, as was usually thought. I won't be mistaken if I say that in
Eastern Siberia, for every person killed by the Bolsheviks, there was
one hundred people killed by anti-Bolshevik elements "

This quote is very fond of being inserted into historical discussions by modern
neo-Bolsheviks. Usually, this is followed by a comment: he wrote this in his
memoirs "American adventure in Siberia" American general
William Greves, who commanded the American interventionists in Kolchak's army.
After such a comment, it should be clear to everyone that the given data on
"Kolchak's atrocities" are objective and independent, since they come from the mouth
american (why should he lie?), and even served with Kolchak (those
there is no more reason for him to lie!).

Let's try to figure out who the American General Grevs was and whether he had any reason to lie.

William
Grevs was born in Mount Calm, Texas. Graduated from the military academy
West Point in 1889. Served in the 7th and 6th Infantry Regiments. Promoted to senior
lieutenant in November 1896, and captain in September 1899. In 1899-1902
participated in the Philippine-American War. Then the period of the garrison
service and in 1904-1906 again service in the Philippines. In 1909 appointed
work in the general staff in Washington. Promoted to Majors in March
1911, lieutenant colonels in July 1916, colonels in June 1917 and brigade
generals in February 1918. In May-July 1917 he made a secret trip to
Britain and France, preparing for the entry of the United States into the First World War.

4
september 1918 he arrived in Vladivostok. Official task
Graves was the guard of the Trans-Siberian and the evacuation of the Czechoslovak legions from
Russia - i.e. the American government did not set him the task of helping
kolchak's army, but only to facilitate the evacuation of the Czechoslovak corps.

Graves
announced that he would pursue a policy of "non-interference in internal
affairs of Russia "and" complete neutrality ", that is, the same attitude towards
Kolchak forces and red partisans. Inter-allied
railway agreement, the Americans were assigned to guard the sites
Transsib from Vladivostok to Ussuriisk and in the region of Verkhneudinsk.

We read what G.K. Hins (business manager at
Siberian Government, then Chairman of the Economic Conference and
again the head of affairs already in the Government A.V. Kolchak) in
memoirs "Siberia, allies and Kolchak":

America in the Far East.

"On
E. In the east, the American Expeditionary Forces behaved in such a way that
all anti-Bolshevik circles, the idea that the United
The states do not want victory, but the defeat of the anti-Bolshevik government.

Here are some facts.

American
command of the Suchansk coal mines (near the mountains.
Vladivostok), without informing the administration of the enterprise,
allowed the workers of the mines to convene a general meeting to discuss the issue of
refugees from the surrounding villages. The meeting was called on 24 April by the usual
for Bolshevik rallies in a way - by hanging a red flag
on the building of the People's House. It took place in the presence of a representative
american command, an officer of the American army, who
guaranteed to speakers immunity and unlimited freedom
the words.

As it is clear from the minutes of the meeting, the participants of the meeting,
after hearing the rebellious declaration, partisan detachments "(Bolsheviks)
and messages from persons in the area of \u200b\u200boperations of Russian
government troops, decided: “to appeal to the American
command with a proposal to immediately eliminate the robber bands
kolchak residents, otherwise, we, as one person, will quit our work
and go to help our fellow peasants. "

On the second
a similar meeting on April 25th, a delegation was elected to send
Vladivostok for the purpose of reporting on the resolutions of the meetings to the American
command, and Captain Grevs, asking permission from his
colonel, kindly agreed to go to Vladivostok together with
delegation.
While the Japanese waged a vigorous struggle with
bolsheviks in the D. East and carried human victims, the Americans not only
refused to help them, but also expressed sympathy for the partisans, as if
encouraging them to new performances.
Appearing in Verkhneudinsk to guard the road, the Americans declared that they could not take any measures against popular uprisings.

It was impossible to explain all these
action by America's anti-Japanese sentiment. It was seen that in the United
The states did not realize what the Bolsheviks were and what
american General Greves is acting on certain instructions. "

In their area of \u200b\u200bresponsibility, the Americans did not oppose the red
partisans. As a result, under the protection of the Americans in Primor, there were soon
large red forces were formed, reaching several thousand people.
This led to a conflict between Graves and Ataman Semyonov.

Here is what he wrote about this in his memoirs "About Me" G.M. Semyonov:

Chapter 3 coup in Siberia

"IN
at the same time, the Americans, with their ugly behavior, have always brought
disorder, causing deep discontent among the population. With the exception of
certain individuals, such as Major Borros, who is excellent
i understood our tasks and the ruinousness of communism and was with us in my soul,
most Americans, led by Major General Grevs, openly
supported the Bolsheviks, up to and including the sending of single people and
groups with information and all sorts of instructions to the red. Their
unfamiliarity with the situation in Russia was so
it is striking that they were completely sincerely amazed why the Russians were so
stubbornly resist the authorities of "the most advanced and progressive party",
preferring the horrors of royal despotism to enlightened rule
communist international. I believe that the reason for this was
the very low morale of American soldiers sent to Siberia,
and lack of discipline in the American army. Largely
soldiers of the American units carrying out the intervention were
deserters The great warrecruited in concentration camps on
Philippines, and were almost exclusively immigrants from Russia,
those who fled either from the prosecution of the law or from military service. Of
They endured nothing in Russia but hatred for their former fatherland.
and its state structure, so it is clear that all their sympathies
were on the side of the Reds. We, Russian nationalists, they considered
supporters of the old regime and therefore treated us with the same
the hatred with which they treated national Russia. I dont know,
who Major General Grevs was, but his course of action was undeniably
headstrong - because it is difficult to allow the government
instructed Grevs to openly and constantly oppose everything
russian nationalists, - indicates that in its moral
level, he is not far from his soldiers. One thing is certain: that she
the dislike that we Russians have for the Americans,
should be attributed by us not to the American people, but to the personal
account of Major General Grevs, whose criminal conduct
restored against the Americans the entire national-minded element
Siberia. "

A year after Grevs arrived in Russia, before
the American Government began to understand that the fall of the Government
A.V. Kolchak may have more serious consequences than just
internal Russian affairs. For this, an American was sent to Russia
ambassador.

Let us read again G.K. Ginsa:

Arrival of the American Ambassador.

“Another recipe for salvation was put forward by Sukin.
- We are on the eve of recognition, he usually declared, with every report to the Council of Ministers.

The president
Wilson, he once reported, was sending Ambassador Morris to Omsk.
The President wants to find out what the Omsk Government needs in order to
initiate systematic assistance. We are on the eve of a decisive
turn in the policy of the allies. After Morris arrives, we are recognized, and
help will take US sizes.

Morris has arrived.

it
there was a completely different Morris, not the one we saw in Vladivostok
in the fall of 1918, arrogant and sarcastic. His proud shaved face
it didn't look like an impenetrable mask now. It smiled affably
sympathized. But who knows, maybe this is a prejudice - to me
sometimes it seemed to hide an inner laugh.

Together with
General Grevs arrived by Morris. The same general from Vladivostok,
who encouraged the rioters on Suchan and refused to help the Japanese
the fight against the Bolsheviks.

Now General Grevs is different. He
expressed contempt for the Bolsheviks and such an ardent desire for their speedy
death that the French commissioner, Comte de Nartel, could not contain
smiles and quit notice a part: „mais qu` est-ce qu`il u perisait a
Souchan! "(Aside:" But what was he thinking on Suchan? ")"

But as it soon became clear, on the part of Grevs it was all a game to the public.
When in the fall of 1919 in Vladivostok on American ships began
arrive rifles purchased by the Kolchak government in the USA, Graves
refused to send them further by rail. His actions he
justified by the fact that the weapon could fall into the hands of parts of the chieftain
Kalmykov, who, according to Graves, with moral support
japanese was preparing to attack the American units.

Let's turn again to the memoirs of G.M. Semyonova:

Chapter 4 CONFLICT WITH OMSK

"IN
Omsk, a number of high-ranking officials of the Office of Military Communications were put on trial for
speculation in wagons, and the court passed a very harsh sentence to the accused,
relaxed by the admiral. Commission of Lieutenant General Katanaev opened
also that by order of the Irkutsk Governor Dunin-Yakovlev,
which, as I indicated above, being a socialist-revolutionary, was
in implacable opposition to the government and secretly collaborated with
red partisans, some of the weapons and equipment were removed at the station
Innokentievskaya allegedly for the needs of the local Irkutsk garrison. For me,
however, it was no secret that all the seized property was not sent
to Irkutsk, and to the partisan detachments of Shchetinkin, Kalashnikov, etc. Almost
all weapons and uniforms that came from America, not without the knowledge
general Grevs, an ardent opponent of the Omsk government, was transferred from
Irkutsk to the red partisans. The case was so ugly with
the point of view of morality and elementary decency of American
representatives in Siberia that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Omsk
government Sukin, being a great Americanophile, could hardly
to hush up the scandal that began to flare up. "

Under pressure
grevs' other allies nevertheless sent weapons to Irkutsk. But on this he
did not finish his "allied assistance" To the Russian Government A.V.
Kolchak. Moreover, from that moment on, he not only began to provide
material and organizational support for the "red partisans", but also
embarked on the path of active actions against the Omsk government. IN
a critical moment in the autumn of 1919, he participated in Haida's conspiracy against
Kolchak in the Far East, communicating between the Socialist-Revolutionary underground
and the Czechoslovakians.

Here is what G.K. Hins:

The Americans are friends of the SRs.

"Chapter
a peaceful delegation sent by the Irkutsk revolutionaries to the Bolsheviks,
Akhmatov confirmed that if there had been a clash of Soviet troops
with Japanese, then „ Political Center would do my best to
to create against Japan, together with Soviet Russia, a single
front. "Akhmatov added to this that in the summer of 1919 he had conversations with
individual representatives of American diplomacy and drew a conclusion,
that “America is ready to admit the existence of a buffer state, with
the inclusion of a representative of the communist forces in the government body "
("New Life" No. 93).

„The largest representatives
american diplomas in Siberia, "added Kolosov," there were three persons:
consul General Harris, who lived in Omsk, was definitely
who supported Kolchak, Ambassador Morris, who was constantly in
Vladivostok, standing in opposition, but, after a trip to Omsk, inclined
at the same time on his side, the third was General Grevs, determined
kolchak's opponent. They counted on support from the Americans
rebels, participants in the uprising of General Gaida in Vladivostok, who had
reason to count on America's help, in the event of an armed
intervention by Japan in suppressing the uprising. "
american diplomacy on several occasions on different occasions during
negotiations with representatives of the Siberian Democrats expressed that
sense that they find that only that “power in Siberia will be lasting, in
the creation of which will unite all the left democratic elements, in
especially the socialist-revolutionaries and the Bolsheviks. ""

Having left Russia, Grevs nevertheless did not stop his pro-Soviet activities.
In the spring - summer of 1922, in Vancouver and New York, he swore
testimony against Semyonov, saying that he allegedly was
opponent of Kolchak, gave orders to shoot American soldiers
at the instigation of Japan. Semyonov proved a lie with the help of General Knox
Grevs and American officers demanded the removal of their ex
commander from the army.

G.M. Semyonov "About me":

Chapter 10 INITIAL PROBLEMS IN EMIGRATION

"Most
skvirsky's active collaborator in his intrigue against me turned out to be
general Greves, who, after the termination of the civil procedure, spoke with
sworn testimony as a witness in a criminal charge
me by Senator Bohr in the execution in Transbaikalia of American soldiers in
the period of the allied intervention in Siberia.
<…>
This commission
was appointed, and General Grace gave his testimony,
who, despite the fact that he testified under oath, admitted in them
obvious and gross distortion of the truth, surpassed in its absurdity even
fantastic inventions of some New York newspapers.

Grevs
stated that not only had I never been an employee of Admiral Kolchak, but
opposed him with armed force, keeping the front in the rear of the territory,
subordinate to the admiral's government. Grevs further stated that the deceased
admiral Kolchak never gave me full power on the territory
russian eastern outskirts and that the shootings of American soldiers in
Transbaikalia were produced repeatedly, and for no reason, but
at the instigation of the Japanese command.

I easily refuted all innuendo
Grevs and proved their falsity, which caused a sharp statement by some
prominent officers of the American army, as defamatory
an oath. One of these officers, who brought their protest to a logical
end, there was Colonel Macroski, who did not stop before leaving for
resignation in protest against the continued stay of General Grevs in
the ranks of the army.

After the scandalous speech of General Grevs, I
turned to the commission with a request: how gentlemen senators consider
american army soldiers who deserted from their regiments and
joined the Red Army in Siberia? Do they consider them
criminals and deserters, or treat them like army chips,
opposing the national russian army... IN
the first case - on the basis of what laws is it imputed to me
punishment by the court of criminals and deserters captured with weapons in
hands during the battle, among other prisoners of the Red Army, and in the second
case - how gentlemen senators explain the armed uprising of officials
american army sent to Siberia to support national
forces of Russia, against these very forces on the side of the red international. "

Grevs lost the Semenov case and was soon forced to leave the army.

AND
of course, the apotheosis of the recognition of the merits of the "independent" American
general William Greves in front of the young Soviet republic on
the Kolchak front was the following document:

Document No. 48

Letter
people's Commissar for foreign affairs USSR M.M. Litvinova
general Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) I.V. Stvlin regarding publication in the USA
collection of documents on Soviet-Japanese relations
08.04.1934
Sov. Secretly Marked:
Krestinsky
Sokolnikov

A significant increase in Japanese propaganda in both European countries,
and especially recently in the United States it is necessary
strengthening our counter-propaganda. A study of the American press reveals
that even the part of the newspapers that is attuned to us
benevolently, often becomes the mouthpiece of Japanese arguments
due to the lack of our materials and information. This applies to all
the totality of our relations with Japan (the regime on the CER, fishing
question, border matters, non-aggression pact, etc.).

IN
as one of the most effective measures, the NKID offers
publication in the USA by one of the prominent American bourgeois publishers of the book -
collection of the most important documents of Soviet-Japanese relations since
occupation of Mukden1 and until very recently (with some
excursions into the history of pre-war Russian-Japanese and post-revolutionary
soviet-Chinese relations). So far, we can only talk about
documents already published in our press, and does not prejudge the question of
the later edition of a collection like the diplomatic "Red Book",
which would also contain unpublished correspondence. This collection
it would be necessary to preface a preface written according to our
directions and under our control, any prominent American
An "independent" publicist with a reputation as an expert
far Eastern affairs. As such could appear,
for example, Professor [litter] Schumann2, Major General Graves3, Ludwoll Denis (author
books "America Conquers Europe"), Louis Fisher4, Roy Howard5
(co-owner of the newspaper Scripps Trust - Howard, known for anti-Japanese
installation), etc. The main thoughts of the preface should be
the sequence of Soviet peace policy, an indication of the elements
common interests of the USSR and the United States in relation to Japanese expansion,
the possibility of removing the military danger in the event of the unification of peaceful
efforts of other countries.

The same book, with a foreword by a prominent European figure, could have been published in Europe, primarily in French.

The compilation of the documentary part of the collection can be done in Moscow.
Negotiations with possible authors of the foreword and editing
prefaces can be entrusted to the embassy in Washington.

When
the proposal will be accepted in principle, the NKID will find out in the USA
approximate size of chervonnoe and foreign exchange expenses to cover
which will require a special allocation.

LITVINOV

WUA RF. F. 05. Op. 14.P. 103.D. 117.L. 89-90. Copy.

1 On the night of September 19, 1931, Japan, accusing the Chinese of the destruction of
district of Mukden (Shenyang) of the South Manchurian railway, introduced
troops on the territory of Northeast China.
2 Schumann Frederick
Lewis (1904-1981) - American historian and publicist, 1920-1930s.
advocated the normalization of relations between the United States and the USSR.
3 Graves
(Greves) William Sydney (1865-1940) - 1918-1920 commanding
uS Expeditionary Forces in Siberia and the Far East,
major general (1925), 1926-1928 commanded US troops in the zone
Panama Canal, retired from 1928, advocated the establishment
diplomatic relations with the USSR.
4 Fisher Louis (1896-1970) -
american journalist, since 1922 the correspondent of The Nation magazine in
Europe, repeatedly visited the USSR.
5 Howard Roy Wilson (1883-1964)
is an American journalist and publisher. Since 1912 President
information agency United Press. Since 1922, partner of the publishing
houses "Scripps". In 1936-1952. president of a publishing concern
Scripps - Howard.

Now it seems to me becoming apparent
The "objectivity" of the recollections of an American general who served
Kolchak "and the answer to the question:" who are you, General Grevs? "

In early 1918, President Wilson told me that he was being persuaded that American forces, together with Allied forces, would undertake an expedition to northern Russia and Siberia, and asked me to think about what he should answer to the French and British. As an argument in favor of this enterprise, the fact was cited that very large military depots are located in the vicinity of Arkhangelsk, which could fall into the hands of the Germans if they were not protected by the allied forces. In addition, a significant proportion of the people living in northern Russia remain loyal to allied commitments and are ready to join the Allied forces to reorganize the Eastern Front, or at least to pull back a significant part of the German troops to the East. As for Siberia, one of the reasons was that a significant contingent of Czech soldiers broke away from the Austrian army, which fought on the Eastern Front, and is now heading through Siberia to Vladivostok in order to get from this port by sea to France and again enter the war on the side of the Allies. ... It was reported that these Czechs were not well-armed and, moreover, lacked food to make such a transition, and they needed to be protected from detachments of German and Austrian prisoners who, after October revolution in Russia were released from prisoner of war camps and are now under the command german officers turned into well-organized and combat-ready detachments, aimed at capturing Russian military warehouses, placing them at the disposal of Germany and Austria, as well as pursuing the Russians who were helping the allies. In addition, it was said that the sacrifices made by Russia during the war give its people the right to any possible assistance that the allies could provide in maintaining order and establishing new social institutions. This consideration has already led to the dispatch to Siberia of the so-called Stevens Commission, designed to assist in the restoration of the work of the vital railways for this territory.

A few days later, the President and I discussed this issue in its entirety. I expressed the point of view of my army colleagues that the war on the Western Front must be won and that in order to achieve the fastest possible success, it is necessary to make every possible effort to concentrate the maximum number of troops there, ensuring numerical superiority, while their distribution across several theaters of military operations will lead , at best, to postpone the final victory, not giving the opportunity to achieve significant results in any of the areas. The President was so impressed by my arguments that he sent for the Chief of Staff and discussed with him the possibility of a successful recovery. Eastern Front and the impact of the proposed expedition on the combat capability of the Allied armies on the Western Front. During our third conversation, the President told me that he was satisfied with the unanimity of the military department, but for reasons other than purely military, he felt obliged to take a certain part in both expeditions. The circumstances that prompted the president to such a decision were diplomatic, and I refrained from discussing them. At that time I believed - and did not change my mind later - that the situation as it was presented to him justified such a decision, but subsequent events in both cases fully confirmed the validity of the opinion General Staff.

The Siberian Expedition, described by Major General Will Yam Graves, who commanded the American Expeditionary Force, was the most important of the two undertakings, and almost daily generated situations as delicate as they were dangerous. To a certain extent - although, I must admit, far from completely - we foresaw this, and the appointment of General Graves as commander of the American contingent, proposed by Chief of Staff, General March, met with my immediate and complete approval. When I was appointed Secretary of War, General Graves was Secretary of the General Staff, so I was in constant contact with him. Because of this, I knew him as a confident, educated and well-trained military man with common sense, humility and loyalty - qualities most needed in the many difficult situations that I could foresee. After completing this astonishing endeavor, I am more than satisfied with our choice of the American commander. A reckless, inconsistent officer as the commander of American forces in Siberia could easily create situations requiring disproportionate military efforts on the part of the Allies, and especially on the part of the United States, and could cause our country the most undesirable difficulties. The possibilities of their occurrence are found on almost every page of the following narrative.

General Graves cites, for example, the so-called Aide Memoire, written by President Wilson, which the General confirms, I personally handed over to him at the Kansas City train station. Since I was well aware of the restrictions that the President imposed on the participation of American forces in the Siberian operation, as well as the reasons why our government decided to participate in it, I did not want General Graves to leave the country without first meeting with me. personally. During this meeting, I wanted to draw his particular attention to some of the difficulties that he may face and to the special firmness that the President expected from him in following the above policy line. In this regard, I undertook an inspection trip to Leavenworth Military Prison and sent General Graves orders to meet with me in Kansas City, thus avoiding the delay in departure preparations that would have arisen if he had to come to me in Washington. Unfortunately, his train was late and our meeting was shorter than I had planned, but this time was enough. From that day until the return of the Siberian Expedition to the United States, General Graves followed the government's policy unswervingly, despite difficult and often outrageous circumstances. In Washington, I have often heard criticism of General Graves and accusations of unwillingness from the Allied military attachés and sometimes from the State Department. However, when I asked for detailed information, I was invariably convinced that the failures attributed to the general were nothing more than his refusal to deviate from the letter and spirit of the instructions given to him. In June 1919, I met with President Wilson in Paris, and he told me about the representations made to him by France and Britain, in which they complained about General Graves' stubbornness, his difficult nature and his inability to cooperate. However, when I reminded the President of the political line outlined in his Aide Memoire and dedicated the details of similar complaints that came to me in Washington, I was able to convince him that General Graves was completely loyal to his policy in the face of the desire of part of the Allied command to transform the Siberian Expedition military intervention and interference in the internal affairs of Russia, to which the president objected from the very beginning. At the conclusion of our meeting, the President smiled and said, “I guess this is an old story, Baker. People often get a reputation for being stubborn just because they are consistently right. ” One way or another, but at that time and afterwards, the President fully approved of General Graves' behavior. And if, in fact, the Siberian expedition turned out to be unjustified, if as a result it was not possible to achieve significant results - as it was in reality - then this is explained by the conditions prevailing at that time. It did not turn into a military adventure and, keeping others from such adventures, created conditions that made it necessary to withdraw the allied forces from Siberia, thereby preventing the conquest and appropriation of Russian land by other countries, whose interests in the Far East could easily lead to a violation a truce and, ultimately, to the establishment of a permanent colonial administration over the vast territory of the Russian Far East.

Recently, an interesting Russian translation of the memoirs of William Sydney Graves, in the rank of brigadier general, who led the American occupation forces in Siberia and the Far East during the Civil War in 1918-1920, appeared on the Web.

He wrote the book American Adventures in Siberia when he was retired, in 1931, and even published it in a small edition in the USSR. As an objective view of a foreign military on the horrors of the Civil War.

The US Expeditionary Force in the amount of almost 8 thousand people operated on the territory from Vladivostok to Verkhneudinsk, guarding the Trans-Siberian Railway and delivering former Czechoslovak prisoners of war to their homeland.

Graves announced that he would pursue a policy of "non-interference in the internal affairs of Russia" and "complete neutrality", thus not opposing either side of the conflict. Moreover, according to the "whites", the Americans actually contributed to the rapid growth of "red" partisan detachments, of which the commander of the Trans-Baikal cossack army Grigory Semyonov.

In addition to Semyonov, the American general came into conflict with the ataman of the Ussuriysk army, Ivan Kalmykov, whom he suspected of wanting to seize American weapons sent by the United States to support the units of Admiral Alexander Kolchak.

Graves describes the horrors that were happening in Siberia under the rule of the White Cossacks and the Japanese occupation forces. Nobody disputes that the Bolsheviks were saints. But after the collapse of the USSR, we somehow began to rush from one extreme to another, whitewashing the “whites” and denigrating the “reds”, then we imagine Lenin as such a monster, then we shed tears on the film “Admiral”.

Blogger bulochnikov who posted the entry notes:

What a blessing that our revolutionary great-grandfathers resisted, did not surrender and won, did not allow the victory of the whites in Civil War in general and the notorious admiral in particular. Happiness for everyone; even for those who are now profoundly broadcasting about the victory of "red-bellied boors" and "Jewish commissars", yearning for the crunch of a French roll.

So what did General Graves write about? If anything, not a white-handed staff member, but a military officer who had a campaign against Spain and the Philippines behind him.

Admiral Kolchak surrounded himself with former tsarist officials, and since the peasants did not want to take up arms and sacrifice their lives for the return of these people to power, they were beaten, flogged with whips and killed in cold blood by the thousands, after which the world called them "Bolsheviks." In Siberia, the word "Bolshevik" means a person who neither word nor deed supports the return to power in Russia of representatives of the autocracy.

The soldiers of Semyonov and Kalmykov, protected by Japanese troops, roamed the country like wild beasts, killing and robbing people; if Japan wished, these killings could end in a day. If questions arose about these brutal killings, the answer was that those killed were Bolsheviks, and this explanation, obviously, was quite happy with the world. Conditions in Eastern Siberia were terrible, and there was nothing cheaper than human life. There were terrible murders, but not by the Bolsheviks, as the world thinks. I will be far from any exaggeration if I say that for every person killed by the Bolsheviks in Eastern Siberia, there are a hundred killed by anti-Bolsheviks.

Ataman Semyonov and General Graves.

It is difficult to imagine a person like Kalmykov existing in modern civilization; there was hardly a day without reports of the terrible atrocities committed by him and his troops.

Kalmykov remained in Khabarovsk and established his own regime of terror, violence and bloodshed, which eventually caused his own troops to mutiny and seek protection from the American army. Under the pretext of fighting Bolshevism, he groundlessly arrested any wealthy people, tortured to obtain their money and executed many on charges of Bolshevism. These arrests were so frequent that they intimidated all classes of the population; it is estimated that Kalmykov's troops executed several hundred people in the vicinity of Khabarovsk.

Ataman Ivan Kalmykov (center) and American officers.

It is surprising that the officers of the Russian tsarist army did not realize the need for changes in the practice used by the army under the tsarist regime. The atrocities committed east of Lake Baikal were so shocking that they left an open-minded person in no doubt about the veracity of many reports of excesses.

Russian monarchists' views on ethical fundraising are characterized by the following: Colonel Korf, a Russian liaison officer with the American command, told US intelligence officer Colonel Eichelberger that General Ivanov-Rinovi and General Romanovsky have enough power to stop a wave of criticism like me and all Americans, and American politics, and if I secure the funding of the Russian army by the United States in the amount of twenty thousand dollars a month, the propaganda against the Americans will be stopped.

American officer and Cossacks.

In March, a young woman, a village teacher, came to the headquarters of the American troops. She asked to provide security for herself and her brothers so that they could return to their village, Gordievka, and bury their father, who was killed by the troops of Ivanov-Rinov. The woman said that Russian troops came to Gordievka in search of young men for compulsory conscription, but the youth fled, and then the troops detained ten men in the village, whose age was higher than the conscript, tortured and killed them, and put guards at the bodies to prevent relatives to bury them. This sounded so cruel and unnatural that I ordered an officer with a small detachment to go to Gordievka and conduct an investigation, and informed the woman of my intentions. The officer sent to investigate reported the following:

Upon arrival at the Gordiev school building, I was greeted by a crowd of 70 or 80 men, all armed with rifles, mostly Russian army rifles, as well as some old single-shot 45-70 rifles. All the information I gathered was obtained in the presence of these 70 or 80 armed villagers and about 25 or 30 women. Most of the information was obtained from the wives of the victims, these women lost their feelings many times during this difficult ordeal for them. The first interviewee said that her husband walked to the school with his rifle to hand it over to the Russian military in accordance with orders. They seized him on the street, beat him on the head and torso with a rifle, and then took him to a house near the school, where they tied him with his hands tied to a pin in the rafters by the neck and beat him terribly on the torso and head until blood splattered even the walls of the room. ...

White Guard punishers and their victims.

The marks on his body showed me that he was also hung by his legs. Later, he was placed in a row with eight other men and shot at 14:00. There were ten men in the line, all were killed except one, whom the soldiers of Ivanov-Rinov left to die. Next, I interrogated a woman in whose house everyone was beaten and then shot behind her threshing floor. She stated that on the morning of March 9, 1919, at about 11:00, several officers of Ivanov-Rinov came to her house and forced her to take her husband to another house, but at 11:30 they took her husband back and beat him along with the others; They broke his arm, cut off his nails and knocked out all of his front teeth. Her husband was disabled and crippled.

I found that the floor of the room where these men were beaten was covered in blood, and all the walls were splattered with blood. The wire and rope loops that tied their necks were still hanging from the ceiling and covered in blood. I also found that some of the men were doused with boiling water and burned with hot irons heated in a small oven that I found in the room. I visited the place where these men were shot. They were lined up and shot, each body with at least three bullet holes, some with six or more. Obviously, first they were shot in the feet, and then higher in the torso.

The young officer conducting the investigation received and included in his report much more testimony, and the testimony that I am not citing is in every detail the same as the one quoted. This case seemed so disgusting to me that I ordered the officer to report to me personally. He was not a cadre, he was called up for the duration of the war. I will never forget what this officer said to me after I finished interviewing him. He declared:-

General, for God's sake, don't send me anymore on such expeditions. I could hardly restrain myself from ripping off my form, joining these unfortunates and helping them all that was in my power.

* * *

Turning to those fellow citizens who believe that it is necessary to fight Bolshevism regardless of US policy, I will note that I could never determine who exactly was a Bolshevik and why he was. According to the Japanese representatives and their paid puppets in Siberia, all Russians were Bolsheviks who did not want to take up arms and fight for Semyonov, Kalmykov, Rozanov, Ivanov-Rinov; But in the US criminal archives you will not find worse characters. According to the British and French representatives, everyone who did not want to take up arms and fight for Kolchak were Bolsheviks.

For the most part, the British provided military uniforms to the mobilized Russians. General Knox said Britain had supplied one hundred thousand kits to Kolchak's forces. This is partly confirmed by the number of Red Army soldiers wearing British uniforms. The fact that the Reds are wearing British uniforms disgusted General Knox that he is said to have later said that Britain should not supply Kolchak with anything, for everything supplied ends up with the Bolsheviks. Generally speaking, Red Army soldiers in British uniforms were the same soldiers who were given these uniforms while they were in Kolchak's army. A significant proportion of these soldiers were not inclined to fight for Kolchak. The methods used by the Kolchak people to mobilize Siberians caused anger that is difficult to calm. They went to the service, embittered by fear, not of the enemy, but of their own troops. As a result, after issuing weapons and uniforms, they deserted to the Bolsheviks in regiments, battalions, and one by one, on April 9, 1919, I reported:

The number of so-called Bolshevik gangs in Eastern Siberia has increased as a result of the order of mobilization and the extraordinary methods used in its implementation. The peasants and the working class do not want to fight for the Kolchak government.

The harsh measures used by the tsarist regime to prevent prisoners from escaping did not disappear by the time I passed through Irkutsk. I saw about twenty prisoners who had healthy chains chained to their ankles, to the end of which were attached large balls; for the prisoner to walk, he had to carry the ball in his hand.

In Krasnoyarsk, I learned something about General Rozanov, with whom I tried to work in Vladivostok. He was the very man who ordered his troops on March 27, 1919:

1. When occupying villages previously occupied by bandits (partisans), demand the extradition of the leaders of the movement; where you cannot capture the leaders, but have sufficient evidence of their presence, shoot every tenth inhabitant. If, when troops move through the city, the population, having the opportunity, does not report the presence of the enemy, monetary compensation is required from everyone without restriction. meets our troops with weapons, they should burn to the ground, shoot all adult men; property, houses, carts should be requisitioned for use by the army.

We learned that Rozanov held hostages, and for each of his supporters who met death, he killed ten hostages. He spoke of these methods used in Krasnoyarsk as working with a situation with gloves, but announced his intention to take off his gloves after arriving in Vladivostok in order to work with the situation without the restraint that he showed to Krasnoyarsk ... Rozanov was the third most abominable character of those , whom I knew in Siberia, although the level of Kalmykov and Semyonov was unattainable for him.

To indicate the combat capability of Kolchak's troops in August 1919, I will try to analyze the official messages that came to me. One of the reports read:

It is estimated that, with the exception of officials and the military, the Omsk government supports no more than 5% of the population. It is estimated that about 45% support the Reds, about 40% of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, about 10% are divided among other parties, and 5% remain on the military, officials and supporters of Kolchak.

From that time until the fall of the Omsk government, Kolchak's army was a retreating gang.

American soldiers on the streets of Vladivostok.

The ambassador and I left Omsk for Vladivostok around 10 August. We stayed in Novonikolaevsk, Irkutsk, Verkhneudinsk and Harbin. Until we found ourselves on the territory of Semyonov, nothing interesting happened. By this time, it was well known that Semyonov had organized what was known as "killing stations" and openly boasted that he could not sleep peacefully if he had not killed at least someone during the day. We stopped at a small station, and at our train was picked up by two Americans from the Russian Railways Service Corps. They told us about the killing of Semyonov by soldiers two or three days before our arrival, a whole train of Russians, in which there were 350 people. I don’t remember if there were only men, or also women. The Americans reported the following:

The train of prisoners passed the station, and at the station everyone knew that they would be killed. The Corps officers went to the execution site, but were stopped by Semyonov's soldiers. One hour and fifty minutes later, the empty train returned to the station. The next day, the two went to the scene of the murder and saw evidence of the mass execution. From the cartridges on the ground, it was clear that the prisoners were being shot from machine guns: the spent cartridges lay in heaps in places where they were thrown by machine guns. The bodies were in two recently dug ditches. In one trench the bodies were completely covered with earth, in the other many arms and legs were visible.

I doubt that in the history of the last half century there is at least one country in the world where murders would be committed even more calmly and with less fear of punishment than it was in Siberia under the regime of Admiral Kolchak. One example of cruelty and lawlessness in Siberia is a typical case in Omsk, Kolchak's residence, which occurred on December 22, 1918, just a month and four days after Kolchak assumed the powers of "Supreme Ruler". On this day in Omsk there was an uprising of workers against the Kolchak government. The revolutionaries succeeded in part, opening a prison and allowing two hundred arrested persons to escape, of whom 134 were political prisoners, including several members of the Constituent Assembly.

On the day this happened, the Omsk commander-in-chief of Kolchak issued an order requiring all those released to return to prison, and stated that those who did not return within 24 hours would be killed on the spot. All members of the Constituent Assembly and a number of other prominent political prisoners returned to prison. On the same night, several Kolchak officers took the members of the Constituent Assembly out of prison, telling them that they would take them to the place of their trial for the crimes of which they were accused, and all were shot. There was nothing for this cruel and lawless murder to the officers. The conditions in Siberia were such that such atrocities could easily be hidden from the world. The foreign press constantly asserted that it was the Bolsheviks who were the Russians who perpetrated these terrible excesses, and the propaganda was so active that no one could even imagine that these atrocities were committed against the Bolsheviks.

Colonel Morrow, who commanded American troops in the Trans-Baikal sector, reported the most brutal, heartless and almost unbelievable murder of an entire village by Semyonov. When his troops approached the village, residents apparently tried to escape from their homes, but Semyonov's soldiers shot at them - men, women and children - as if they were hunting rabbits, and dumped their bodies at the scene of the murder. They shot not just one, but everyone in the village. Colonel Morrow forced a Japanese and a Frenchman to go with an American officer to investigate the massacre, and what I have to say is contained in a report signed by an American, a Frenchman and a Japanese. In addition to the above, the officers reported that they found the bodies of four or five men, who were apparently burned alive. People naturally wondered what might be the purpose of such gruesome killings. The purpose is similar to the reason why camp guards keep sniffer dogs and use other means to intimidate prisoners; to prevent escape attempts. In Siberia, the persecuted people were not prisoners, but those responsible for these horrors were convinced that all Russians should at least act as if they sincerely support the Kolchak cause. Such treatment has sometimes succeeded in causing people to hide their true sentiments for a time. This was the case in Siberia, and I am convinced that the Americans do not know anything about these terrible conditions.

When Americans first got to Siberia, most of us naturally expected that the experience of war and revolution would change the thinking of the government from the former ruling class, but when this ruling class began to commit terrible atrocities in Siberia, tolerate them and condone them, it became clear that they never learned anything.

Vladivostok knew well that from November 18, 1919 to January 31, 1920, Rozanov killed from five hundred to six hundred men, without commenting on his murders. First, a decision was made on the execution, then a military tribunal was assembled to legalize the intended murder; this was the method used by Rozanov. This procedure was well known in Vladivostok; in one of the cases, I personally checked the accuracy of the information at the request of a Russian woman who lived at one time in New York.

General Knox served in Russia as a military attaché under the tsarist regime. He could speak Russian and undoubtedly thought he understood Russians. He probably understood the character and characteristics of those Russians with whom he was associated in Petrograd, but I cannot believe that he understood the aspirations of the vast mass of the Russian people. If he understood these people, he probably would not have thought - and he obviously thought so - that Russian peasants and workers would take up arms and fight to bring to power the supporters of Kolchak who committed such atrocities. against those people who were looking for military support. General Knox shared with me his thought: "the poor Russians were just pigs."

Personally, I never thought that Kolchak had any chance of establishing a government in Siberia, but the belief of Knox and others like him that the masses were pigs, and they could be treated like pigs, hastened Kolchak's fall.

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William Graves
American intervention in Siberia. 1918-1920. Memories of the Expeditionary Force Commander

* * *

Foreword

In early 1918, President Wilson told me that he was being persuaded that American forces, together with Allied forces, would undertake an expedition to northern Russia and Siberia, and asked me to think about what he should answer to the French and British. As an argument in favor of this enterprise, the fact was cited that very large military depots are located in the vicinity of Arkhangelsk, which could fall into the hands of the Germans if they were not protected by the allied forces. In addition, a significant proportion of the people living in northern Russia remain loyal to allied commitments and are ready to join the Allied forces to reorganize the Eastern Front, or at least to pull back a significant part of the German troops to the East. As for Siberia, one of the reasons was that a significant contingent of Czech soldiers broke away from the Austrian army, which fought on the Eastern Front, and is now heading through Siberia to Vladivostok in order to get from this port by sea to France and again enter the war on the side of the Allies. ... It was reported that these Czechs are not well-armed and, moreover, lack food to make such a transition, and they need to be protected from the detachments of German and Austrian prisoners who, after the October Revolution in Russia, were released from prisoner of war camps and are now under the command of German officers turned into well-organized and combat-ready detachments, aimed at capturing Russian military warehouses, placing them at the disposal of Germany and Austria, as well as pursuing the Russians who were helping the allies. In addition, it was said that the sacrifices made by Russia during the war give its people the right to any possible assistance that the allies could provide in maintaining order and establishing new social institutions. This consideration has already led to the dispatch to Siberia of the so-called Stevens Commission, designed to assist in the restoration of the work of the vital railways for this territory.

A few days later, the President and I discussed this issue in its entirety. I expressed the point of view of my army colleagues that the war on the Western Front must be won and that in order to achieve the fastest possible success, it is necessary to make every possible effort to concentrate the maximum number of troops there, ensuring numerical superiority, while their distribution across several theaters of military operations will lead , at best, to postpone the final victory, without giving the opportunity to achieve significant results in any of the areas. The President was so impressed by my arguments that he sent for the Chief of Staff and discussed with him the possibility of a successful rebuilding of the Eastern Front and the impact of the proposed expedition on the combat capability of the Allied armies on the Western Front. During our third conversation, the President told me that he was satisfied with the unanimity of the military department, but for reasons other than purely military, he felt obliged to take a certain part in both expeditions. The circumstances that prompted the president to make such a decision were diplomatic, and I refrained from discussing them. At that time I believed - and did not change my opinion later - that the situation as it was presented to him justified such a decision, but subsequent events in both cases fully confirmed the validity of the General Staff's opinion.

Aside from its implications for the world, the Siberian Expedition remains a mysterious undertaking. Indeed, even General Graves himself "... could never come to any satisfactory conclusion as to why the United States took part in this intervention at all." However, if you look at the situation in the world, you can find an adequate, albeit difficult, explanation. There was a war in the world. The most terrible military clashes were concentrated on the Western Front from the English Channel to the Swiss border, but the echo of this conflict affected the whole world, and everywhere, now in one place, then in another place, strange side adventures were started. All these "side effects" were, to one degree or another, peripheral echoes of the deepest shock of the central nervous system planets. Some of them were carefully planned to divert enemy forces or undermine their resources. Some were undertaken to bolster the spirit of the Allies in the midst of a protracted stalemate on the Western Front and carried a touch of romance, such as the capture of Jerusalem by Field Marshal Allenby and the expulsion of the infidels from the holy sites of Palestine. Some were the result of the outburst of the suppressed moods of the backward peoples against the background of the weakening of their containment by the colonial authorities, all of whose efforts were concentrated on the battles in Europe and which had neither the time nor the strength to maintain their power in remote territories. The success of the revolutions in Russia led to Moscow's loss of real power in the Far East and untied the predatory ambitions of such Cossack chieftains as Semyonov and Kalmykov. For a long time, the expanses of Siberia have been the arena of commercial and military adventures and conflicts between Germans, British, French and Japanese. Siberia itself was inhabited partly by semi-savage peoples, partly by political exiles, to which a large number of liberated prisoners of war were now added. The changing government in Moscow changed its attitude to the world war and Russia's participation in it, and these opposite opinions, hardly understood in distant Siberia, clouded the already vague idea of \u200b\u200bRussia's national interests. On the Western Front, nations were committed to one dominant aspiration, but in places like Siberia this understanding and tension was lacking. Siberia found itself in the same position as Sergeant Grisha, who had no idea why all this was, but understood that the old world had come into some incomprehensible general disorder.

In the conditions described above, military intervention by the allies no longer seems so unnatural given the complexities inherent in such situations. The nations concerned have no difficulty in finding that day-to-day circumstances suggest, if not require, changes in their policies. Most of the nations that had troops in Siberia were too busy with what was happening at their home to pay much attention to what was happening around Lake Baikal. Unsurprisingly, as a result, their military commanders were given more political freedom, and General Yui or General Knox felt that by taking advantage of the new turn of events, they would be able to make a big leap forward in achieving the goals of the Allies, while simultaneously meeting commercial and the territorial wishes of their governments as they understood them. General Graves's book provides evidence that at times similar ideas took root in the minds of some officials and in the United States. I cannot figure out how to explain the apparent conflict that arose between the War Department and the US Department of State over the Siberian operation, nor can I understand why the State Department attempted - and at times succeeded - to instill its ideas on policy in Siberia directly to the general. Graves. Perhaps the State Department was more impressed than I was by certain Allied views on expanding cooperation beyond what was stated in the Aide Memoire. Perhaps some of these judgments were simply a reflection of the Allies' dissatisfaction with what they could count on. However, they were not previously presented to the Secretary of State and were not considered by him as something that could affect the clearly formulated line of conduct of the United States in the Siberian expedition. Undoubtedly, one day all this will be carefully studied, and an inquisitive researcher will find documents, notes and reports of conversations in which it was proposed to change course based on some new facts, but even when they are all discovered, Siberia will remain a sergeant Grisha. The situation in Siberia will forever remain an illustration of the oddities generated in the periphery by the madness that prevailed in the center of the warring world.

Nevertheless, I cannot finish this preface without expressing, to the best of my ability, gratitude on behalf of our entire country to those soldiers who courageously and resignedly carried the service assigned to them by the country in that distant and mysterious land. Even warriors of Democracy cannot always understand the reasons behind certain strategic decisions. Political and military decisions are made in offices and general staffs, and soldiers follow orders. Therefore, those who found themselves on the shores of the White and Yellow Seas performed their service in the same way as those who were on the Marne and in the Meuse. And if it turns out that someone needs details to justify the Siberian expedition from the point of view national interests, they can, at least in part, find satisfaction in the knowledge that American troops in Siberia have behaved bravely and humanely. That they were following the orders of the commander, who acted with the high desire of their country to exert a stabilizing and beneficial influence on a vast territory inhabited by bewildered but friendly people. I also believe that they can be sure that history will find its advantages in what can be regarded as a failed outcome of the American intervention in Siberia, because if it were not for the presence of American soldiers in the allied forces, things could happen that would further complicate the situation in Russia and seriously influenced the future of the whole world.

Newton D. Baker

From the author

It's hard to write and even talk about Russia without being accused of sympathy soviet power... However, during my service in Siberia, the Russian Far East was completely cut off from the rest of Russia controlled by the Soviet government. Thus, I had no dealings with either the Soviet government or with any persons calling themselves its representatives.

The only authority with which I have been in contact during my entire service in Siberia is the Kolchak government, if you can call it a government. I doubt that without the support of foreign troops, Kolchak and his government would have been strong enough to act as a sovereign authority. In a treaty known as the Inter-Allied Railroad Agreement, which dealt with the maintenance and operation of railways in Siberia, all the nations that had troops there recognized Kolchak as the representative of Russia, and this is the highest degree of recognition that his government has ever achieved. No state has ever recognized Kolchak as the head of any existing de facto or de jure government of Russia.

The main reason that I decided to recall the facts and circumstances surrounding the intervention is the belief that, not only in the United States, but everywhere, there is a mistaken impression of the prescriptions under which American troops operated in Siberia. Another reason was the fact that the English Colonel John Ward wrote a book that creates - and, in my opinion, does it on purpose - the wrong impression about the behavior and loyalty to their duty of American troops stationed in Siberia. This book can be found in American libraries, and I don’t think it would be right for those Americans whom I had the honor to command if these unfair conclusions are left to posterity without refutation.

When writing this book, I did not set myself the goal of justifying any of my actions or actions of American troops in Siberia, since the Minister of War, the Honorable Newton D. Baker and the Chief of General Staff, General Peyton S. March, held their posts throughout the period when American troops stationed in Siberia, as shown below, made any excuse superfluous by giving the American troops their generous and all-encompassing approval. I received the following personal letter from the Minister of War, dated August 31, 1920:

“I have just finished reading your detailed report of May 26, concerning the operations of the American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia from July 1, 1919 to March 31, 1920. The Siberian Expedition has been fully completed, and now that its last act has become the subject of a report, I am pleased to congratulate you on the fact that as Expedition Commander you have invariably been able to act with such tact, energy and success.

The orders given to you were in line with the goals set out in the Aide Memoire issued by the State Department to announce to the world the missions and conditions for the use of American troops in Siberia. In this ambiguous situation, your responsibilities were often very complex and delicate, and due to the remoteness of your field of activity from the United States, you could rely only on your own resources and initiatives. Taking into account the difficulties with communication, ensuring publicity, and especially the biased interpretation of the state of affairs in Siberia and the actions of your team, the situation became even more complicated.

You will be pleased to know that the Ministry of War from the very beginning relied on your assessments with full confidence, and I am happy to assure you that now your actions throughout the entire expedition are approved by the Ministry. "

In his report to the Minister of War for financial yearending June 30, 1920, the chief of staff wrote of the Siberian expedition: “The situation faced by the commander, his officers and soldiers turned out to be surprisingly difficult and risky. The way he accomplished his difficult task is worthy of the best traditions of our army. "

William S. Graves

The objectives of the military intervention in Siberia

April 6, 1917, the day the United States entered world war, I served in the War Office as Secretary of the General Staff. I have been a lieutenant colonel of the General Staff and its secretary since August 1914. Before that, I was secretary from January 1911 to July 1912.

Like all the other War Office officers, I had hoped to be relieved of my current duties and sent to serve in France, but Chief of Staff Major General New L. Scott refused my request. On September 22, 1917, General Scott reached the age of retirement by law, and was replaced by General Tasker H. Bliss, who had previously served as Deputy Chief of Staff. General Bliss retired on December 31, 1917, and Major General Peyton S. March was soon appointed Chief. He learned about his appointment while in France, and took up his new duties on March 1, 1918.

Upon arriving in the United States, General March informed me that he wanted me to continue in my current duties for about four more months, after which he intended to allow me to go to France. However, in May 1918 he said: "If anyone has to go to Russia, it is you." This remark quite surprised me, but since it was made as an assumption, I did not comment on it, realizing that General March was well aware of my desire to serve in Europe and that every opportunity that my current job duties gave me, I devoted to the study of conditions and military operations in France. I didn’t even think that American troops could be sent to Siberia, and I didn’t attach much importance to General March’s remark, since I didn’t expect that someone would really have to go there.

At the end of June 1918, General March announced that they intended to make me Major General of the National Army, after which I would be appointed as the commander of one of the divisions in the United States and was left without a permanent commander. This made me confident that the idea of \u200b\u200bsending troops to Siberia was abandoned or that I would definitely not be sent there. The next morning I told the general that I would like to command the 8th Division stationed at Camp Fremont, Polo Alto, California. He agreed, and soon my candidacy was presented to the Senate for approval in the rank of Major General of the National Army. On July 9, 1918, I was confirmed, after which I immediately informed General March that I wanted to leave for my division, and on July 13 I left Washington. On July 18, 1918, I took over as commander of the 8th Division and took up my new duties. I was very pleased and happy when I learned that in October it was decided to send the 8th division to France.

On August 2, 1918, in the afternoon, my chief of staff reported that an encrypted message had been received from Washington, and his first sentence was: "You must not pass on the contents of this message to any of your employees or anyone else." I asked the chief of staff who signed the message and he answered "Marshall." Then I said that Marshall had nothing to do with me or him, and ordered the deputy chief of staff to decipher the message. It instructed me to “take the nearest and fastest train to San Francisco and go to Kansas City, where to go to the Baltimore Hotel and ask the Secretary of War. If he is not there, then wait for his arrival. " This telegram struck me as one of the strangest dispatches the War Department has ever sent, and unless Marshall's signature had been mistakenly substituted for March, I would have been put in the dubious position of an officer who would either disobey the order or leave a unit. without telling anyone about who gave him this right and where he is going.

The telegram did not say why I was being summoned to Kansas City, nor how long I would be away, or whether I would ever return back. At the same time, such information could significantly influence how I prepare for my departure. I didn’t know what I should take from my clothes, and I doubted if this order meant an irrevocable change in my position. After looking at the schedule, I saw that the train to Santa Fe leaves San Francisco in two hours, so, having packed some things in a travel bag and something else in a small suitcase, I went to San Francisco. I caught the train but could not buy a sleeper ticket. On the way to Kansas City, I telegraphed the Secretary of War, Mr. Baker, at the Baltimore Hotel, telling him which train I would take. On the way, I tried to imagine what kind of secret mission we could talk about, and with fear I thought that it was about Siberia, although I did not see anything in the press that the United States intended to send troops to Russia.

At 10 o'clock in the morning, when I arrived in Kansas City, I was met by an employee who said that Mr. Baker was waiting for me in the station hall. Since there was very little time before the departure of his train, Mr. Baker immediately announced that, unfortunately, he had to send me to Siberia. With his characteristic generosity, he expressed his regrets and said that he knew about my unwillingness to go and that perhaps someday he would tell me why I should do it. Besides, he wanted me to know that General March was trying to save me from being sent to Siberia and wanted to send me to France. He said: "If in the future you want to curse the one who sent you to Siberia, know that I did it." Then he handed me a sealed envelope with the words: “This is the line of conduct of the United States in Russia, which you must follow. Weigh each step, because you will have to walk through a minefield. Goodbye, and God bless you. "

As soon as I got to the hotel, I opened the envelope and saw seven pages inside, entitled "Aide Memoire" without attribution, but at the end it read "State Department, Washington, July 17, 1918." After I carefully studied the document and felt that I understood the prescribed line of behavior, I went to bed, but could not sleep, continuing to reflect on how other nations are acting and why I was not informed about what was happening in Siberia. The next day, I read the document several more times to analyze and understand the meaning of each phrase. I felt that there could be no discrepancies in the understanding of the line of conduct of the United States and that I did not need any further clarification. The line of conduct prescribed for me was as follows:

The people of the United States want to win this war with all their hearts. The guiding principle of the United States government is to do whatever is necessary and effective to win it. It wants to cooperate with the Allied governments in any possible way and will willingly do so, since it does not pursue any goals of its own and believes that the war can only be won together and with close coordination of principles of action. It is ready to explore all possible strategies and actions in which the Allies would like to embody the spirit of this cooperation, and has confidently concluded that if it considers itself obligated to refuse to participate in any enterprise or activity, it should be understood that this is being done only because it considers it necessary to prevent these plans and actions. "

Grevs is an American adventure in siberia. Who are you, General Grevs? The objectives of the military intervention in Siberia

William Graves American intervention in Siberia. 1918-1920. Memories of the Expeditionary Force Commander

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Foreword

From the author

The objectives of the military intervention in Siberia

William Graves
American intervention in Siberia. 1918-1920. Memories of the Expeditionary Force Commander