When was Plan Barbarossa created? Nazi dreams of a World Empire: Hitler's military plans after Barbarossa. Map of the German advance plan

Great Patriotic War

German attack plan on the USSR

Adolf Hitler studying a map of Russia

The Soviet-Finnish war served as a harsh lesson for the country's leadership, showing that our army, weakened mass repressions, is not ready for modern war. Stalin made the necessary conclusions and began to take measures to reorganize and re-equip the army. In the upper echelons of power there was complete confidence in the inevitability of war, and the task was to have time to prepare for it.

Hitler also understood our unpreparedness. In his inner circle, he said shortly before the attack that Germany had made a revolution in military affairs, ahead of other countries by three to four years; but all countries are catching up, and Germany may soon lose this advantage, and therefore it is necessary to solve the military problems on the continent in a year or two. Despite the fact that Germany and the USSR made peace in 1939, Hitler still decided to attack the Soviet Union, as it was a necessary step towards world domination by Germany and the “Third Reich”. German intelligence officers came to the conclusion that soviet army in many ways inferior to the German one - it is less organized, less prepared and, most importantly, technical equipment Russian soldiers leave much to be desired. It should be emphasized that the British intelligence service MI6 also played a role in inciting Hitler against the USSR. Before the war, the British managed to acquire the German Enigma encryption machine and thanks to this they read all the encrypted correspondence of the Germans. From Wehrmacht encryption they knew the exact timing of the attack on the USSR. But before Churchill sent a warning to Stalin, British intelligence tried to use the information they received to spark a German-Soviet conflict. She also owns a fake that was distributed in the United States - supposedly the Soviet Union, having received information about Hitler's impending attack, decided to get ahead of him and was preparing a preemptive strike on Germany. This disinformation was intercepted Soviet intelligence and reported to Stalin. The widespread practice of fakes caused him to distrust all information about the imminent Nazi attack.

Plan Barbarossa

In June 1940, Hitler instructed Generals Marx and Paulus to develop a plan for an attack on the USSR. On December 18, 1940, the plan, codenamed Plan Barbarossa, was ready. The document was produced in only nine copies, of which three were presented to the commanders-in-chief of the ground forces, air force and navy, and six were hidden in the safes of the Wehrmacht command. Directive No. 21 contained only a general plan and initial instructions on waging war against the USSR.

The essence of the Barbarossa plan was to attack the USSR, taking advantage of the enemy’s unpreparedness, defeat the Red Army and occupy the Soviet Union. Hitler placed the main emphasis on modern military equipment, which belonged to Germany, and the effect of surprise. The attack on the USSR was planned in the spring and summer of 1941; the final date of the attack was made dependent on the success of the German army in the Balkans. Setting a deadline for aggression, Hitler said: “I will not make the same mistake as Napoleon; when I go to Moscow, I will set out early enough to reach it before winter.” The generals convinced him that victorious war last no more than 4-6 weeks.

At the same time, Germany used the memorandum of November 25, 1940 to put pressure on those countries whose interests were affected by it, and above all on Bulgaria, which in March 1941 joined the fascist coalition. Soviet-German relations continued to deteriorate throughout the spring of 1941, especially with the invasion of Yugoslavia by German troops hours after the signing of the Soviet-Yugoslav Friendship Treaty. The USSR did not react to this aggression, as well as to the attack on Greece. At the same time, Soviet diplomacy managed to achieve a major success by signing a non-aggression pact with Japan on April 13, which significantly reduced tension on the Far Eastern borders of the USSR.

Tank group

Despite the alarming course of events, the USSR, until the very beginning of the war with Germany, could not believe in the inevitability of a German attack. Soviet supplies to Germany increased significantly due to the renewal of the 1940 economic agreements on January 11, 1941. To show Germany their “trust”, soviet government refused to take into account the numerous reports received since the beginning of 1941 about an attack being prepared on the USSR and did not take the necessary measures on its western borders. Germany was still viewed by the Soviet Union "as a great friendly power."

According to the “Barbarossa Plan,” 153 German divisions were involved in aggression against the USSR. In addition, Finland, Italy, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary intended to participate in the upcoming war. Together they fielded another 37 divisions. The invasion force consisted of about 5 million soldiers, 4,275 aircraft, 3,700 tanks. The troops of Germany and its allies were united into 3 army groups: “North”, “Center”, “South”. Each group included 2-4 armies, 1-2 tank groups, and from the air German troops were supposed to cover 4 air fleets.

The most numerous was the army group "South" (Field Marshal von Runstedt), consisting of German and Romanian soldiers. This group was tasked with breaking up Soviet troops in Ukraine and Crimea and occupy these territories. Army Group Center (Field Marshal von Bock) was supposed to defeat Soviet troops in Belarus and advance to Minsk-Smolensk-Moscow. Army Group North (Field Marshal von Leeb), with the support of Finnish troops, was to capture the Baltic states, Leningrad, and the Russian North.

Discussion of the OST plan

The final goal of the “Barbaros plan” was the destruction of the Red Army, access to the Ural ridge and the occupation of the European part of the Soviet Union. The basis of German tactics was tank breakthroughs and encirclements. The Russian company was supposed to become a blitzkrieg - a lightning war. Only 2-3 weeks were allotted to defeat the Soviet troops located in the western regions of the USSR. General Jodl told Hitler: “In three weeks this house of cards will fall apart.” The entire campaign was planned to be completed in 2 months.

German troops received instructions to carry out a policy of genocide towards the Slavic and Jewish populations. According to the OST plan, the Nazis intended to destroy 30 million Slavs, and the rest were to be converted into slaves. Were considered possible allies Crimean Tatars, peoples of the Caucasus. The enemy army was an almost perfect military mechanism. The German soldier was rightfully considered the best in the world, the officers and generals were excellently trained, the troops had a wealth of combat experience. The most significant drawback of the German army was the underestimation of the enemy’s forces - German generals considered it possible to wage war in several theaters at once: in Western Europe, V Eastern Europe, in Africa. Later, already during the Great Patriotic War, such miscalculations as lack of fuel and unpreparedness for combat operations in winter conditions would take their toll.

Gabriel Tsobekhia

The war with Nazi Germany is one of the most tragic periods in the history of our country and the whole world. Hitler’s strategy to capture and enslave peoples gave different results in European countries, and the war on the territory of the Soviet Union turned out to be completely different from what the fascist invaders imagined it to be, already at its first stage. Anyone familiar with , should be able to describe the Barbarossa plan briefly, know why it got its name, and the reasons for the plan's failure.

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Blitzkrieg

So what was Barbarossa's plan? Its other name is blitzkrieg, “lightning war.” The attack on the USSR, planned for June 22, 1941, was supposed to be sudden and quick.

To confuse the enemy and deprive him of the possibility of defense, the attack was planned simultaneously on all fronts: at first air force, then in several directions on the ground. Having quickly defeated the enemy, the fascist army was supposed to head towards Moscow and completely subjugate the country within two months.

Important! Do you know why the plan is named this way? Barbarossa, Frederick I of Hohenstaufen, King of Germany and Holy Roman Emperor, legendary ruler, became a classic of medieval military art.

Why was Hitler so confident in the success of the operation? He considered the Red Army weak and poorly prepared. German technology, according to his information, won both in quantity and in quality composition. In addition, the “lightning war” has already become proven strategy, thanks to which many European countries admitted their defeat in the shortest possible time, and the map of occupied territories was constantly updated.

The essence of the plan was simple. The gradual takeover of our country was to take place as follows:

• Attack the USSR in the border zone. The main attack was planned on the territory of Belarus, where the main forces were concentrated. Open the way for traffic to Moscow.
• Having deprived the enemy of the opportunity to resist, move towards Ukraine, where main goal was Kyiv and sea ​​routes. If the operation is successful, Russia will be cut off from the Dnieper, and the path to the southern regions of the country will open.
• At the same time, send armed forces to Murmansk from the countries Northern Europe. Thus, the path to the northern capital, Leningrad, opened.
• Continue the offensive from the north and west, moving towards Moscow without encountering sufficient resistance.
• Within 2 months, capture Moscow.

These were the main steps of Operation Barbarossa, and the German command was confident of its success. Why did she fail?

The essence of Barbarossa's plan

Progress of the operation

The lightning attack on the Soviet Union, called Barbarossa, was launched on June 22, 1941 at about 4 a.m. on several fronts.

Beginning of the invasion

After a sudden artillery attack, the effect of which was achieved - the population of the country and the troops were taken by surprise- deployed an offensive front to the border areas with a length of 3,000 kilometers.

• Northern direction - tank groups advanced on the North Western Front in the direction of Leningrad and Lithuania. In a few days, the Germans occupied the Western Dvina, Libau, Riga, and Vilnius.
• Central - offensive on the Western Front, attack on Grodno, Brest, Vitebsk, Polotsk. In this direction, at the beginning of the invasion, Soviet troops were unable to contain the attack, but held the defense much longer than expected under the “lightning war” plan.
• Yuzhnoye - attack by aviation and navy. As a result of the attack, Berdichev, Zhitomir, and Prut were captured. Fascist troops managed to reach the Dniester.

Important! The Germans considered the first phase of Operation Barbarossa successful: they managed to take the enemy by surprise and deprive him of his main military forces. Many cities held out longer than expected, but, according to forecasts, there were no further serious obstacles to the capture of Moscow.

The first part of the German plan was successful

Offensive

The German offensive against the Soviet Union continued on several fronts throughout July and August 1941.

• Northern direction. Throughout July, the German offensive continued, targeting Leningrad and Tallinn. Due to counterattacks, movement inland was slower than planned, and only by August did the Germans approach the Narva River and then Gulf of Finland. On August 19, Novgorod was captured, but the Nazis were stopped at the Voronka River for almost a week. Then the opponents finally reached the Neva, and a series of attacks on Leningrad began. The war ceased to be lightning fast, the northern capital could not be subjugated from the first attack. With the arrival of autumn, one of the most difficult and difficult periods of the war begins - the siege of Leningrad.
• Central direction. This is a movement with the goal of capturing Moscow, which also did not go as expected. It took German troops a month to reach Smolensk. Also, battles for Velikiye Luki were fought for a whole month. When trying to take Bobruisk, most of the divisions were attacked by Soviet soldiers. Thus, the movement of the Center group was forced to switch from offensive to defensive, and Moscow turned out to be not such an easy prey. The capture of Gomel was a major victory for the fascist army in this direction, and the movement towards Moscow continued.
• Yuzhnoe. The first major victory in this direction was the capture of Chisinau, but this was followed by the siege of Odessa for more than two months. Kyiv was not taken, which meant the failure of the movement in the southern direction. The Center armies were forced to provide assistance, and as a result of the interaction of the two armies, Crimea was cut off from the rest of the territory, and Ukraine on the eastern side of the Dnieper was in the hands of the Germans. In mid-October Odessa surrendered. By the beginning of November, Crimea was completely occupied by fascist invaders, and Sevastopol was cut off from the rest of the world.

Important! Barbarossa was brought to life, but it was very difficult to call what was happening a “lightning war.” Soviet cities did not surrender without a long, exhausting defense on both sides, or repelled the offensive. According to the plan of the German command, Moscow was supposed to fall by the end of August. But in fact, by mid-November, German troops had not yet even managed to approach the capital. The harsh Russian winter was approaching...

The German offensive against the Soviet Union continued in several directions

Operation failure

Already at the end of July, it became clear that Barbarossa’s plan would not be briefly implemented; the deadlines that were given for its implementation had long passed. Only in the northern direction did the actual offensive hardly diverge from the plan; in the central and southern directions there were delays, operations unfolded much more slower than the German command planned.

As a result of such a slow advance into the interior of the country, at the end of July Hitler changed the plan: not the capture of Moscow, but the capture of Crimea and blocking communications with the Caucasus in the near future became the goal of the German army.

It was not possible to capture Moscow, the situation of which was very difficult, within 2 months, as planned. Autumn has come. Weather conditions and serious resistance from the Soviet army caused the failure of the Barbarossa plan and the plight of the German army on the eve of winter. Traffic towards Moscow was stopped.

Serious resistance to the Soviet army is one of the reasons for the failure of the plan

Reasons for failure

The German command could not even imagine that such a well-thought-out Barbarossa plan, which gave excellent results in European countries, could not be implemented in the Soviet Union. The cities offered heroic resistance. It took Germany a little more than a day to take France. And about the same amount of time - to move from one street to another in a besieged Soviet city.

Why did Hitler's plan Barbarossa fail?

• The level of training of the Soviet army actually turned out to be much better than the German command had expected. Yes, the quality of technology and its novelty were inferior, but ability to fight, distribute forces wisely, think through a strategy - this undoubtedly bore fruit.
• Excellent awareness. Because of the heroic work of the intelligence officers, the Soviet command knew or could predict every move of the German army. Thanks to this, it was possible to give a worthy “response” to enemy attacks and assaults.
• Natural and weather conditions. Barbarossa's plan was supposed to be implemented in the favorable summer months. But the operation dragged on, and the weather began to play into the hands of the Soviet soldiers. Impassable, wooded and mountainous areas, inclement weather, and then severe cold - all this disorientated the German army, while soviet soldiers Wonderful fought in familiar conditions.
• Losing control over the course of the war. If at first all the actions of the fascist army were offensive, then after a short period they turned defensive, and the German command was no longer able to control events.

Thus, the implementation of Barbarossa in the USSR met with serious obstacles, and the operation was not carried out. Moscow was not taken within 2 months, as planned. The “Lightning War” unsettled the Soviet army only for a short time, after which the German offensive movement was stopped. Russian soldiers fought on their native land, which they knew very well. Cold, slush, dirt, wind, rain - all this was familiar to the defenders, but created significant obstacles for the German army.

Plan Barbarossa

What is the Barbarossa plan? History Lessons. Questions for the Exam. StarMedia

Conclusion

The attack on our country was planned on three fronts and had to be fast, impetuous and unexpected. However, unlike many European countries, such tactics did not take the Soviet command by surprise and were repulsed with honor. Operation Barbarossa was a failure. Brest, Odessa, Leningrad are cities that by their example showed the power and invincibility of the Soviet Union - a country that is not afraid of lightning attacks and knows how to provide worthy resistance.

The art of war is a science in which nothing succeeds except what has been calculated and thought out.

Napoleon

Plan Barbarossa is a plan for a German attack on the USSR, based on the principle of lightning war, blitzkrieg. The plan began to be developed in the summer of 1940, and on December 18, 1940, Hitler approved a plan according to which the war was to end in November 1941 at the latest.

Plan Barbarossa was named after Frederick Barbarossa, the 12th century emperor who became famous for his campaigns of conquest. This contained elements of symbolism, to which Hitler himself and his entourage paid so much attention. The plan received its name on January 31, 1941.

Number of troops to implement the plan

Germany was preparing 190 divisions to fight the war and 24 divisions as reserves. 19 tank and 14 motorized divisions were allocated for the war. The total number of contingents that Germany sent to the USSR according to different estimates ranges from 5 to 5.5 million people.

The apparent superiority in USSR technology is not worth taking into account, since by the beginning of the wars, Germany's technical tanks and aircraft were superior to those of the Soviet Union, and the army itself was much more trained. Suffice it to recall the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, where the Red Army demonstrated weakness in literally everything.

Direction of the main attack

Barbarossa's plan determined 3 main directions for attack:

• Army Group "South". A blow to Moldova, Ukraine, Crimea and access to the Caucasus. Further movement to the line Astrakhan - Stalingrad (Volgograd).
• Army Group "Center". Line "Minsk - Smolensk - Moscow". Advance to Nizhny Novgorod, aligning the Volna - Northern Dvina line.
• Army Group "North". Attack on the Baltic states, Leningrad and further advance to Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. At the same time, the “Norway” army was supposed to fight in the north together with the Finnish army.

Table - offensive goals according to Barbarossa's plan

	SOUTH	CENTER	NORTH
Target	Ukraine, Crimea, access to the Caucasus	Minsk, Smolensk, Moscow	Baltic states, Leningrad, Arkhangelsk, Murmansk
Number	57 divisions and 13 brigades	50 divisions and 2 brigades	29th Division + Army "Norway"
Commanding	Field Marshal von Rundstedt	Field Marshal von Bock	Field Marshal von Leeb
General goal	Get on line: Arkhangelsk – Volga – Astrakhan (Northern Dvina)

Around the end of October 1941, the German command planned to reach the Volga - Northern Dvina line, thereby capturing the entire European part of the USSR. This was the plan for the lightning war. After the blitzkrieg, there should have been lands beyond the Urals, which, without the support of the center, would have quickly surrendered to the winner.

Until about mid-August 1941, the Germans believed that the war was going according to plan, but in September there were already entries in the diaries of officers that the Barbarossa plan had failed and the war would be lost. The best proof that Germany in August 1941 believed that there were only a few weeks left before the end of the war with the USSR was Goebbels’ speech. The Minister of Propaganda suggested that the Germans collect additional warm clothes for the needs of the army. The government decided that this step was not necessary, since there would be no war in the winter.

Implementation of the plan

The first three weeks of the war assured Hitler that everything was going according to plan. The army rapidly moved forward, winning victories, but the Soviet army suffered huge losses:

• 28 divisions out of 170 were put out of action.
• 70 divisions lost about 50% personnel.
• 72 divisions remained combat-ready (43% of those available at the start of the war).

Over the same 3 weeks, the average rate of progress German troops inland was 30 km per day.

By July 11, the Army Group “North” occupied almost the entire Baltic territory, providing access to Leningrad, the Army Group “Center” reached Smolensk, and the Army Group “South” reached Kyiv. These were latest achievements, which were fully consistent with the plan of the German command. After this, failures began (still local, but already indicative). Nevertheless, the initiative in the war until the end of 1941 was on the side of Germany.

Germany's failures in the North

Army “North” occupied the Baltic states without any problems, especially since there was practically no partisan movement there. The next strategic point to be captured was Leningrad. Here it turned out that the Wehrmacht was beyond its strength. The city did not capitulate to the enemy and until the end of the war, despite all efforts, Germany was unable to capture it.

Army Failures Center

Army "Center" reached Smolensk without problems, but was stuck near the city until September 10. Smolensk resisted for almost a month. The German command demanded a decisive victory and the advancement of troops, since such a delay near the city, which was planned to be taken without large losses, was unacceptable and called into question the implementation of the Barbarossa plan. As a result, the Germans took Smolensk, but their troops were pretty battered.

Historians today evaluate the Battle of Smolensk as a tactical victory for Germany, but a strategic victory for Russia, since it was possible to stop the advance of troops towards Moscow, which allowed the capital to prepare for defense.

Complicated the advance of the German army deep into the country partisan movement Belarus.

Failures of the Army South

Army “South” reached Kyiv in 3.5 weeks and, like Army “Center” near Smolensk, was stuck in battle. Ultimately, it was possible to take the cities due to the obvious superiority of the army, but Kyiv held out almost until the end of September, which also made it difficult for the German army to advance and significant contribution to thwart Barbarossa's plan.

Map of the German advance plan

Above is a map showing the German command's offensive plan. The map shows: in green – the borders of the USSR, in red – the border to which Germany planned to reach, in blue – the dislocation and plan for the advancement of German troops.

General state of affairs

• In the North, it was not possible to capture Leningrad and Murmansk. The advance of the troops stopped.
• It was with great difficulty that the Center managed to reach Moscow. At the time the German army reached the Soviet capital, it was already clear that no blitzkrieg had happened.
• In the South it was not possible to take Odessa and seize the Caucasus. By the end of September Hitler's troops They just captured Kyiv and launched an attack on Kharkov and Donbass.

Why Germany's blitzkrieg failed

Germany's blitzkrieg failed because the Wehrmacht prepared the Barbarossa plan, as it later turned out, based on false intelligence data. Hitler admitted this by the end of 1941, saying that if he had known the real state of affairs in the USSR, he would not have started the war on June 22.

The tactics of lightning war were based on the fact that the country has one line of defense on the western border, all large army units are located on the western border, and aviation is located on the border. Since Hitler was confident that all Soviet troops were located on the border, this formed the basis of the blitzkrieg - to destroy the enemy army in the first weeks of the war, and then quickly move deeper into the country without encountering serious resistance.

In fact, there were several lines of defense, the army was not located with all its forces on the western border, there were reserves. Germany did not expect this, and by August 1941 it became clear that the lightning war had failed and Germany could not win the war. The fact that the Second World War lasted right up to 1945 only proves that the Germans fought in a very organized and brave manner. Thanks to the fact that they had the economy of the whole of Europe behind them (speaking of the war between Germany and the USSR, many for some reason forget that the German army included units from almost all European countries) they were able to fight successfully.

Did Barbarossa's plan fail?

I propose to evaluate the Barbarossa plan according to 2 criteria: global and local. Global(reference point - the Great Patriotic War) - the plan was thwarted, since the lightning war did not work out, the German troops were bogged down in battles. Local(landmark – intelligence data) – the plan was carried out. The German command drew up the Barbarossa plan based on the assumption that the USSR had 170 divisions on the country’s border and there were no additional echelons of defense. There are no reserves or reinforcements. The army was preparing for this. In 3 weeks, 28 Soviet divisions were completely destroyed, and in 70, approximately 50% of the personnel and equipment were disabled. At this stage, the blitzkrieg worked and, in the absence of reinforcements from the USSR, provided desired results. But it turned out that the Soviet command had reserves, not all troops were located on the border, mobilization brought high-quality soldiers into the army, there were additional lines of defense, the “charm” of which Germany felt near Smolensk and Kiev.

Therefore, the failure of Barbarossa's plan must be considered a huge strategic mistake. German intelligence, led by Wilhelm Canaris. Today, some historians connect this man with English agents, but there is no evidence of this. But if we assume that this is really the case, then it becomes clear why Canaris palmed Hitler off with the absolute lie that the USSR was not ready for war and all the troops were located on the border.

Plan "Ost" About the Nazi program of extermination of entire nations

About the Nazi program of extermination of entire nations

Alexander Pronin

A truly cannibalistic document Nazi Germany became master plan“Ost” is a plan for the enslavement and destruction of the peoples of the USSR, the Jewish and Slavic population of the conquered territories.

An idea of ​​how the Nazi elite saw the war of destruction can be gained from Hitler’s speeches to the highest command staff Wehrmacht on January 9, March 17 and 30, 1941. The Fuhrer stated that the war against the USSR would be “the complete opposite of a normal war in the West and North of Europe”, it provided for “total destruction”, “the destruction of Russia as a state.” Trying to provide an ideological basis for these criminal plans, Hitler announced that the upcoming war against the USSR would be a “struggle of two ideologies” with “the use of brutal violence”, that in this war it would be necessary to defeat not only the Red Army, but also the “control mechanism” of the USSR, “ destroy the commissars and communist intelligentsia,” functionaries and in this way destroy the “worldview bonds” of the Russian people.

On April 28, 1941, Brauchitsch issued a special order “Procedure for the use of security police and SD in ground forces formations.” According to it, Wehrmacht soldiers and officers were relieved of responsibility for future crimes in the occupied territory of the USSR. They were ordered to be ruthless, to shoot on the spot without trial or investigation anyone who offered even the slightest resistance or showed sympathy for the partisans.

Citizens were destined for either exile to Siberia without means of subsistence, or the fate of slaves of the Aryan masters. The justification for these goals was the racist views of the Nazi leadership, contempt for the Slavs and other “subhuman” peoples who interfere with ensuring the “existence and reproduction of the superior race” allegedly due to its catastrophic lack of “living space”.

“Racial theory” and “theory of living space” originated in Germany long before the Nazis came to power, but only under them acquired the status of a state ideology that covered large sections of the population.

The war against the USSR was considered by the Nazi elite primarily as a war against the Slavic peoples. In a conversation with the President of the Danzig Senate, H. Rauschning, Hitler explained: “One of the main tasks of German government is to forever prevent by all possible means the development of the Slavic races. The natural instincts of all living beings tell us not only the need to defeat our enemies, but also to destroy them.” Other leaders of Nazi Germany adhered to a similar attitude, primarily one of Hitler’s closest accomplices, Reichsführer SS G. Himmler, who on October 7, 1939 simultaneously took the post of “Reich Commissioner for Strengthening the German Race.” Hitler instructed him to deal with the issues of “returning” Imperial Germans and Volksdeutsche from other countries and creating new settlements as the German “living space in the East” expanded during the war. Himmler played a leading role in deciding the future that the population in Soviet territory up to the Urals should expect after the German victory.

Hitler, who throughout his political career advocated the dismemberment of the USSR, on July 16, at a meeting at his headquarters with the participation of Goering, Rosenberg, Lammers, Bormann and Keitel, defined the tasks of National Socialist policy in Russia: “The main principle is that so that this pie can be divided in the most convenient way, so that we can: firstly, own it, secondly, manage it and, thirdly, exploit it.” At the same meeting, Hitler announced that after the defeat of the USSR, the territory of the Third Reich should be expanded in the east at least to the Urals. He stated: “The entire Baltic region should become a region of the empire, Crimea with the adjacent regions, the Volga regions should become a region of the empire in the same way as the Baku region.”

At a meeting of the Wehrmacht high command held on July 31, 1940, dedicated to preparing an attack on the USSR, Hitler again stated: “Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states are for us.” He then intended to transfer the northwestern regions of Russia up to Arkhangelsk to Finland.

On May 25, 1940, Himmler prepared and presented to Hitler his “Some Considerations on the Treatment of the Local Population of the Eastern Regions.” He wrote: “We are extremely interested in under no circumstances uniting the peoples of the eastern regions, but, on the contrary, splitting them into the smallest possible branches and groups.”

A secret document initiated by Himmler called General Plan Ost was presented to him on July 15. The plan provided for the destruction and deportation of 80-85% of the population from Poland, 85% from Lithuania, 65% from Western Ukraine, 75% from Belarus and 50% of residents from Latvia, Estonia and the Czech Republic within 25-30 years.

45 million people lived in the area subject to German colonization. At least 31 million of them who would be declared “undesirable by racial indicators” were supposed to be evicted to Siberia, and immediately after the defeat of the USSR, up to 840 thousand Germans were to be resettled in the liberated territories. Over the next two to three decades, two more waves of settlers were planned, numbering 1.1 and 2.6 million people. In September 1941, Hitler stated that in the Soviet lands, which should become “provinces of the Reich,” it is necessary to carry out a “planned racial policy,” sending there and allocating lands not only to the Germans, but also to “Norwegians related to them by language and blood.” , Swedes, Danes and Dutch." “When settling the Russian space,” he said, “we must provide the imperial peasants with unusually luxurious housing. German institutions should be housed in magnificent buildings - governor's palaces. Around them they will grow everything necessary for the life of the Germans. Around the cities within a radius of 30-40 km there will be German villages striking in their beauty, connected by the most the best roads. There will be another world in which Russians will be allowed to live as they please. But on one condition: we will be masters. In the event of a rebellion, all we have to do is drop a couple of bombs on their cities, and the job is done. And once a year we will take a group of Kyrgyz people through the capital of the Reich, so that they become aware of the power and grandeur of its architectural monuments. The eastern spaces will become for us what India was for England.” After the defeat near Moscow, Hitler consoled his interlocutors: “Losses will be restored to a volume many times greater than theirs in the settlements for purebred Germans that I will create in the East... The right to land, according to the eternal law of nature, belongs to the one who conquered it, based on the fact that the old borders are holding back the growth of the population. And the fact that we have children who want to live justifies our claims to the newly conquered eastern territories.” Continuing this thought, Hitler said: “In the East there is iron, coal, wheat, wood. We will build luxurious houses and roads, and those who grow up there will love their homeland and one day, like the Volga Germans, will forever link their destiny with it.”

The Nazis had special plans for the Russian people. One of the developers of the Ost master plan, Dr. E. Vetzel, a referent on racial issues in the Eastern Ministry of Rosenberg, prepared a document for Himmler in which it was stated that “without complete destruction” or weakening by any means “the biological strength of the Russian people” to establish “German domination in Europe” will not succeed.

“This is not only about the defeat of a state centered in Moscow,” he wrote. - Achieving this historical goal would never mean a complete solution to the problem. The point, most likely, is to defeat the Russians as a people, to divide them.”

Hitler's deep hostility towards the Slavs is evidenced by the recordings of his table conversations, which from June 21, 1941 to July 1942 were conducted first by ministerial adviser G. Geim, and then by Dr. G. Picker; as well as notes on the goals and methods of occupation policy on the territory of the USSR, made by the representative of the Eastern Ministry at Hitler’s headquarters, W. Keppen, from September 6 to November 7, 1941. After Hitler’s trip to Ukraine in September 1941, Keppen records conversations at Headquarters: “At An entire block of Kyiv burned down, but there are still quite a few people living in the city. large number Human. They make a very bad impression, outwardly they resemble proletarians, and therefore their numbers should be reduced by 80-90%. The Fuhrer immediately supported the proposal of the Reichsfuehrer (H. Himmler) to confiscate the ancient Russian monastery located near Kyiv, so that it would not turn into a center for the revival of the Orthodox faith and national spirit.” Both Russians, Ukrainians, and Slavs in general, according to Hitler, belonged to a race unworthy of humane treatment and the expense of education.

After a conversation with Hitler on July 8, 1941, the chief General Staff of the ground forces, Colonel General F. Halder writes in his diary: “The Fuhrer’s decision to raze Moscow and Leningrad to the ground is unshakable in order to completely get rid of the population of these cities, which otherwise we will then be forced to feed during the winter. The task of destroying these cities must be carried out by aviation. Tanks should not be used for this. This will be a national disaster that will deprive not only Bolshevism of centers, but also Muscovites (Russians) in general.” Köppen specifies Halder’s conversation with Hitler, dedicated to the destruction of the population of Leningrad, as follows: “The city will only need to be encircled, subjected to artillery fire and starved to death...”.

Assessing the situation at the front, on October 9, Koeppen writes: “The Fuhrer gave an order to prohibit German soldiers from entering the territory of Moscow. The city will be surrounded and wiped off the face of the earth.” The corresponding order was signed on October 7 and confirmed by the main command of the ground forces in the “Instruction on the procedure for the capture of Moscow and the treatment of its population” dated October 12, 1941.

The instructions emphasized that “it would be completely irresponsible to risk one’s life German soldiers to save Russian cities from fires or to feed their population at the expense of Germany.” German troops were ordered to apply similar tactics to all Soviet cities, and it was explained that “what more population Soviet cities will rush to internal Russia“, the more the chaos in Russia will increase and the easier it will be to manage and use the occupied eastern regions.” In an entry dated October 17, Koeppen also notes that Hitler made it clear to the generals that after the victory he intended to save only a few Russian cities.

Trying to divide the population of the occupied territories in areas where Soviet power was formed only in 1939-1940. (Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Baltic states), the fascists established close contacts with the nationalists.

To stimulate them, it was decided to allow “ local government" However, the restoration of their own statehood to the peoples of the Baltic states and Belarus was denied. When, following the entry of German troops into Lithuania, nationalists, without the sanction of Berlin, created a government headed by Colonel K. Skirpa, the German leadership refused to recognize it, declaring that the issue of forming a government in Vilna would be decided only after victory in the war. Berlin did not allow the idea of ​​restoring statehood in the Baltic republics and Belarus, resolutely rejecting requests from “racially inferior” collaborators to create their own armed forces and other attributes of power. At the same time, the Wehrmacht leadership willingly used them to form volunteer foreign units who are under the command German officers participated in combat operations against partisans and at the front. They also served as burgomasters, village elders, in auxiliary police units, etc.

In the Reichskommissariat “Ukraine”, from which a significant part of the territory was torn away, included in Transnistria and the General Government in Poland, any attempts by nationalists not only to revive statehood, but also to create “Ukrainian self-government in a politically expedient form” were suppressed "

When preparing an attack on the USSR, the Nazi leadership attached paramount importance to the development of plans for using the Soviet economic potential in the interests of ensuring the conquest of world domination. At a meeting with the Wehrmacht command on January 9, 1941, Hitler said that if Germany “gets into its hands the incalculable riches of the vast Russian territories,” then “in the future it will be able to fight against any continents.”

In March 1941, for the exploitation of the occupied territory of the USSR, a paramilitary state-monopoly organization was created in Berlin - the Headquarters of the Economic Management “Vostok”. It was headed by two old associates of Hitler: Deputy G. Goering, Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Hermann Goering concern, State Secretary P. Kerner and Head of the Department of War Industry and Armament of the OKW, Lieutenant General G. Thomas. In addition to the “leadership group”, which also dealt with the workforce, the headquarters included industry groups, agriculture, organization of work of enterprises and forestry. From the very beginning, it was dominated by representatives of German concerns: Mansfeld, Krupp, Zeiss, Flick, I. G. Farben." On October 15, 1941, excluding the economic commands in the Baltic states and the corresponding specialists in the army, the headquarters numbered about 10, and by the end of the year - 11 thousand people.

The plans of the German leadership for the exploitation of Soviet industry were set out in the “Directives for Management in the Newly Occupied Areas,” which received the name Goering’s “Green Folder” based on the color of the binding.

The directives provided for organizing on the territory of the USSR the extraction and export to Germany of those types of raw materials that were important for the functioning of the German military economy, and for restoring a number of factories for the purpose of repairing Wehrmacht equipment and producing certain types of weapons.

Most of the Soviet enterprises producing civilian products were planned to be destroyed. Goering and representatives of military-industrial concerns showed particular interest in the seizure of Soviet oil-bearing regions. In March 1941, an oil company called Continental A.G. was founded, the chairman of the board of which was E. Fischer from the IG Farben concern and K. Blessing, a former director of the Reichsbank.

IN general instructions The organization “East” dated May 23, 1941 on economic policy in the field of agriculture stated that the goal of the military campaign against the USSR was “supplying the German armed forces, as well as providing food for the German civilian population for many years.” It was planned to realize this goal by “reducing Russia’s own consumption” by cutting off the supply of products from black earth soils. southern regions to the northern non-chernozem zone, including such industrial centers, like Moscow and Leningrad. Those who prepared these instructions were well aware that this would lead to the starvation of millions of Soviet citizens. At one of the meetings of the Vostok headquarters it was said: “If we manage to pump everything we need out of the country, then tens of millions of people will be doomed to starvation.”

Economic inspectorates operating in the operational rear of German troops were subordinate to the headquarters of the economic leadership "Vostok". Eastern Front, economic departments in the rear of armies, including technical battalions of specialists in the mining and oil industries, units engaged in the seizure of raw materials, agricultural products and production tools. Economic teams were created in divisions, economic groups - in field commandant's offices. In the units that exported raw materials and controlled the work of captured enterprises, specialists from German concerns were advisors. To the Commissioner for Scrap Metal, Captain B.-G. Shu and the inspector general for the seizure of raw materials, V. Witting, were ordered to hand over the trophies to the military concerns of Flick and I. G. Farben."

Germany's satellites also counted on rich booty for complicity in aggression.

The ruling elite of Romania, led by dictator I. Antonescu, intended not only to return Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, which it had to cede to the USSR in the summer of 1940, but also to obtain a significant part of the territory of Ukraine.

In Budapest, for participation in the attack on the USSR, they dreamed of getting the former Eastern Galicia, including the oil-bearing areas in Drohobych, as well as all of Transylvania.

In a keynote speech at a meeting of SS leaders on October 2, 1941, the head of the Main Directorate of Imperial Security, R. Heydrich, stated that after the war, Europe would be divided into a “German great space”, where the German population would live - Germans, Dutch, Flemings, Norwegians, Danes both the Swedes and the “eastern space”, which will become a raw material base for German state and where the “German upper class” will use the conquered local population as “helots”, that is, slaves. G. Himmler had a different opinion on this matter. He was not satisfied with the policy of Germanization of the population of the occupied territories pursued by the Kaiser's Germany. He considered it erroneous that the old authorities were trying to force the conquered peoples to renounce only native language, national culture, lead a German way of life and comply with German laws.

In the SS newspaper “Das Schwarze Kor” dated August 20, 1942, in the article “Should we Germanize?”, Himmler wrote: “Our task is not to Germanize the East in the old sense of the word, that is, to instill in the population the German language and German laws , but to ensure that only people of truly German, Germanic blood live in the East.”

The achievement of this goal was served by the mass extermination of civilians and prisoners of war, which occurred from the very beginning of the invasion of German troops into the territory of the USSR. Simultaneously with the Barbarossa plan, the OKH order of April 28, 1941 “Procedure for the use of security police and SD in ground forces formations” came into force. In accordance with this order main role Four punitive units, the so-called Einsatzgruppen, designated by the letters of the Latin alphabet A, B, C, D, played a role in the mass extermination of communists, Komsomol members, deputies of regional, city, district and village councils, Soviet intelligentsia and Jews in the occupied territory. Einsatzgruppe A was assigned to Army Group North and operated in the Baltic republics (led by SS Brigade-Denführer W. Stahlecker). Einsatzgruppe B in Belarus (headed by the head of the 5th Directorate of the RSHA, SS Gruppenführer A. Nebe) was assigned to Army Group Center. Einsatzgruppe C (Ukraine, chief - SS Brigadeführer O. Rasch, inspector of the Security Police and SD in Königsberg) “served” Army Group “South”. Einsatzgruppe D, attached to the 2nd Army, operated in the southern part of Ukraine and Crimea. It was commanded by O. Ohlendorf, head of the 3rd Directorate of the RSHA (domestic security service) and at the same time the chief manager of the Imperial Trade Group. In addition, in the operational rear of the German formations advancing on Moscow, the punitive team “Moscow”, led by SS Brigadefuehrer F.-A., operated. Zix, head of the 7th Directorate of the RSHA (worldview research and its use). Each Einsatzgruppen consisted of 800 to 1,200 personnel (SS, SD, criminal police, Gestapo and order police) under the jurisdiction of the SS. Following on the heels of the advancing German troops, by mid-November 1941, the Einsatzgroups of armies “North”, “Center” and “South” exterminated more than 300 thousand civilians in the Baltic states, Belarus and Ukraine. They were engaged in mass murders and robbery until the end of 1942. According to the most conservative estimates, they accounted for over a million victims. Then the Einsatzgruppen were formally liquidated, becoming part of the rear forces.

In development of the “Order on Commissars”, the Wehrmacht High Command entered into an agreement on July 16, 1941 with the Main Directorate of Reich Security, according to which special teams of the Security Police and SD under the auspices of the head of the 4th Main Directorate of the Secret State Police (Gestapo) G Müller were obliged to identify politically and racially “unacceptable” “elements” among Soviet prisoners of war delivered from the front to stationary camps.

Not only party workers of all ranks, but also “all representatives of the intelligentsia, all fanatical communists and all Jews” were considered “unacceptable.”

It was emphasized that the use of weapons against Soviet prisoners of war is considered “as a rule, legal.” Such a phrase meant official permission to kill. In May 1942, the OKW was forced to cancel this order at the request of some high-ranking front-line soldiers, who reported that the publication of the facts of the execution of the lieutenants led to a sharp increase in the strength of resistance from the Red Army. From now on, political instructors began to be destroyed not immediately after captivity, but in the Mauthausen concentration camp.

After the defeat of the USSR, it was planned “within the shortest possible time” to create and populate three imperial districts: the Ingria district (Leningrad, Pskov and Novgorod regions), the Gothic district (Crimea and Kherson region) and the Memel-Narev district (Bialystok region and Western Lithuania). To ensure connections between Germany and the Ingermanland and Gotha districts, it was planned to build two highways, each with a length of up to 2 thousand km. One would reach Leningrad, the other would reach the Crimean Peninsula. To secure the highways, it was planned to create 36 paramilitary German settlements (strong points) along them: 14 in Poland, 8 in Ukraine and 14 in the Baltic states. It was proposed to declare the entire territory in the East that would be captured by the Wehrmach as state property, transferring power over it to the SS administrative apparatus headed by Himmler, who would personally resolve issues related to granting German settlers the rights to own land. According to Nazi scientists, it would have taken 25 years and up to 66.6 billion Reichsmarks to build highways, accommodate 4.85 million Germans in three districts and settle them down.

Having approved this project in principle, Himmler demanded that it provide for the “total Germanization of Estonia, Latvia and the General Government”: their settlement by Germans within about 20 years. In September 1942, when German troops reached Stalingrad and the foothills of the Caucasus, at a meeting with SS commanders in Zhitomir, Himmler announced that the network of German strongholds (military settlements) would be expanded to the Don and Volga.

The second “General Plan of Settlement”, taking into account Himmler’s wishes to finalize the April version, was ready on December 23, 1942. The main directions of colonization in it were named northern (East Prussia - Baltic countries) and southern (Krakow - Lviv - Black Sea region). It was assumed that the territory of German settlements would be 700 thousand square meters. km, of which 350 thousand are arable lands (the entire territory of the Reich in 1938 was less than 600 thousand sq. km).

The “General Plan Ost” provided for the physical extermination of the entire Jewish population of Europe, the mass murder of Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Bulgarians, Hungarians, and the physical extermination of 25-30 million Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians.

L. Bezymensky, calling the Ost plan a “cannibal document”, “a plan for the liquidation of the Slavs in Russia,” argued: “One should not be deceived by the term “eviction”: this was a familiar designation for the Nazis for killing people.”

“The General Plan Ost” belongs to history - the history of the forced relocation of individuals and entire nations,” said the report of the modern German researcher Dietrich Achholz at a joint meeting of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation and the Christian Peace Conference “Munich Agreements - General Plan Ost - Benes Decrees. Causes of flight and forced relocation in Eastern Europe” in Berlin on May 15, 2004 - This story is as old as the history of humanity itself. But Plan Ost opened up a new dimension of fear. It represented a carefully planned genocide of races and peoples, and this in the industrialized era of the mid-20th century!” We are not talking here about the struggle for pastures and hunting grounds, for livestock and women, as in ancient times. The Ost master plan, under the guise of a misanthropic, atavistic racial ideology, was about profits for big capital, fertile lands for large landowners, wealthy peasants and generals, and profits for countless petty Nazi criminals and hangers-on. “The murderers themselves, who, as part of the SS task forces, in countless units of the Wehrmacht and in key positions of the occupation bureaucracy, brought death and fires to the occupied territories, only a small part of them were punished for their actions,” stated D. Achholz. “Tens of thousands of them “dissolved” and could some time later, after the war, lead a “normal” life in West Germany or somewhere else, for the most part avoiding persecution or at least censure.”

As an example, the researcher cited the fate of the leading SS scientist and expert Himmler, who developed the most important versions of the Ost master plan.” He stood out among those dozens, even hundreds of scientists - Earth researchers of various specializations, specialists in territorial and demographic planners, racial ideologists and eugenics specialists, ethnologists and anthropologists, biologists and doctors, economists and historians - who supplied data to the killers of entire nations for their bloody work. “It was this “master plan Ost” of May 28, 1942 that was one of the high-quality products of such killers at their desks,” the speaker notes. It really was, as the Czech historian Miroslav Karni wrote, a plan “in which scholarship and advanced technical techniques were invested scientific work, ingenuity and vanity of leading scientists fascist Germany”, a plan “that transformed the criminal phantasmagoria of Hitler and Himmler into a fully developed system, thought out to the smallest detail, calculated to the last mark.”

The author responsible for this plan, full professor and head of the Institute of Agronomy and Agrarian Policy at the University of Berlin, Konrad Meyer, called Meyer-Hetling, was an exemplary example of such a scientist. Himmler made him head of the "main staff service for planning and land holdings" in his "Imperial Commissariat for the Strengthening of the Spirit of the German Nation" and first as a Standarten and later as an SS Oberführer (corresponding to the rank of colonel). In addition, as a leading land planner in the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture, who was recognized by the Reichsfuehrer of Agriculture and the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Regions, in 1942 Meyer was promoted to the position of chief planner for the development of all areas subject to German control.

From the beginning of the war, Meyer knew in every detail about all the planned abominations; Moreover, he himself drew up decisive conclusions and plans for this. In the annexed Polish regions, as he officially announced already in 1940, it was assumed “that the entire Jewish population of this region, numbering 560 thousand people, had already been evacuated and, accordingly, would leave the region during this winter” (that is, they would be imprisoned in concentration camps, where will undergo systematic destruction).

In order to populate the annexed areas with at least 4.5 million Germans (until now 1.1 million people had permanently lived there), it was necessary to “expel 3.4 million Poles train by train.”

Meyer died peacefully in 1973 at the age of 72 as a retired West German professor. The scandal surrounding this Nazi killer began after the war with his participation in the Nuremberg war crimes trials. He was indicted along with other SS ranks in the case of the so-called General Office for Race and Resettlement, sentenced by a United States court to a minor punishment only for membership in the SS and released in 1948. Although in the verdict the American judges agreed that he, as a senior SS officer and a person who worked closely with Himmler, should have “known” about the criminal activities of the SS, they confirmed that there was “nothing aggravating” for him under the “Ost General Plan” it cannot be argued that he “knew nothing about evacuations and other radical measures”, and that this plan “was never put into practice” anyway. “The prosecution representative really could not present undeniable evidence at that time, since the sources, especially the “master plan” of 1942, had not yet been discovered,” D. Achholz notes bitterly.

And the court even then made decisions in the spirit of the Cold War, which meant the release of “honest” Nazi criminals and potential future allies, and did not think at all about attracting Polish and Soviet experts as witnesses.”

As for the extent to which the Ost master plan was implemented or not, the example of Belarus clearly demonstrates. Emergency state commission by solving the crimes of the invaders, she determined that only the direct losses of this republic during the war years amounted to 75 billion rubles. in 1941 prices. The most painful and severe loss for Belarus was the extermination of over 2.2 million people. Hundreds of villages and hamlets were deserted, and the urban population sharply decreased. In Minsk at the time of liberation, less than 40% of the population remained, in the Mogilev region - only 35% of the urban population, Polesie - 29, Vitebsk - 27, Gomel - 18%. The occupiers burned and destroyed 209 of 270 cities and regional centers, 9,200 villages and hamlets. 100,465 enterprises were destroyed, more than 6 thousand km railway, 10 thousand collective farms, 92 state farms and MTS were plundered, 420,996 houses of collective farmers and almost all power plants were destroyed. 90% of machine tools and technical equipment, about 96% of energy capacity, about 18.5 thousand vehicles, more than 9 thousand tractors and tractors, thousands of cubic meters of wood, lumber were exported to Germany, hundreds of hectares of forests, gardens, etc. were cut down. By the summer of 1944, only 39% of the pre-war number of horses, 31% of cattle, 11% of pigs, 22% of sheep and goats remained in Belarus. The enemy destroyed thousands of educational, health, scientific and cultural institutions, including 8825 schools, the Academy of Sciences of the BSSR, 219 libraries, 5425 museums, theaters and clubs, 2187 hospitals and outpatient clinics, 2651 children's institutions.

Thus, the cannibalistic plan for the extermination of millions of people, the destruction of the entire material and spiritual potential of the conquered Slavic states, which in fact was the Ost master plan, was carried out by the Nazis consistently and persistently. And all the more majestic, grandiose is the immortal feat of the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, partisans and underground fighters, who did not spare their lives to rid Europe and the world of the brown plague.