Soviet scorched earth tactics include many aspects: military, economic, and many others. In "The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry" (meaning the author's book "The Disappearance of the Jews of Eastern Europe." See "About the author" and about the book at the end of the article - RH note) I have touched only lightly on the subject of the demographic changes of Eastern European Jews. Here I want to focus on the economic side of the Second World War.

The German-Soviet non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939 provided for the following territorial redistribution: Estonia and Latvia passed into the Soviet sphere of interests, and Lithuania fell into the German one./1 After the defeat of Poland, Soviet government immediately began to exert strong pressure on Germany to renegotiate the treaty. In order to keep the peace, Hitler agreed to a second treaty, the so-called Friendship and Boundary Treaty of September 28, 1939, Germany gave up its interests in most of Lithuania in exchange for the area between the Vistula and the Bug with a population of about 3.5 million people, including over 300,000 Jews./2 This zone was under Soviet occupation for a very short time, but the Red Army destroyed almost the entire agricultural system, taking away livestock and farm equipment before retreating. As a result, the Germans had to bring food in large quantities to prevent starvation in this agricultural area. / 3 This episode was supposed to be a lesson for Germany, but, unfortunately, it did not.

While Germany was participating in the Western Campaign from May 10 to June 24, 1940, the Soviet Union occupied almost all of Lithuania between June 16 and 22 after the June 15 ultimatum - that is, including even the territory that was supposed to remain within the German borders. areas of interest according to the contract. This occupation is not only a gross violation of two Soviet-German treaties, but also of the Soviet-Lithuanian mutual assistance treaty (October 10, 1939). The German government was not notified of this action./4 Northern Bukovina, one of the areas of Romania that was outside the Soviet interests agreed upon in the treaty, was similarly appropriated by the Soviets, although in this case the Soviets pressed Germany to give their "consent "in the ultimatum period of 24 hours before the start of the occupation. I mention these events only because they demonstrate the determination with which the USSR destroyed the German strategic advantage while acquiring their own. They also show that Germany did not have definite military objectives regarding Soviet Union because otherwise it is impossible to imagine that she will have to put up with the Soviet usurpation of the strategically invaluable Lithuanian route to Leningrad and Moscow.

Scorched earth

Faced with a massive build-up of Soviet military power along the border, and alerted by new Soviet demands for unrealistic territorial concessions in Europe, Germany attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. The Soviets immediately began to kill German prisoners of war immediately after being captured or after a short interrogation. Even seriously wounded soldiers were not spared. Plenty of evidence exists to this effect at the West German Research Institute for Military History (Militaergeschichtliche Forschungsamt), which is known for its not at all pro-German bias, it estimates the percentage of prisoners German soldiers, who died in Soviet captivity in 1941-1942 in 90-95 percent. / 5A

Within a few days of the outbreak of hostilities, the Central Committee issued an order in the Kremlin for the troops to leave only scorched earth to the enemy. All valuable property was ordered to be destroyed, regardless of the needs of the remaining civilian population. For this, specially created detachments for the destruction of property were used. The aforementioned military research institute commented: “From the very beginning of the war, Stalin and the leadership of the Soviet Union showed through these measures how much they were concerned about this armed conflict with Germany, which for them was of a completely different character than just a “European war”.” /5 B

The measures taken by the Soviet Union in the period from 1940 to 1942 are aimed not only at further developing the Soviet war economy, but also at hurting the Germans, even at the cost of huge losses among Soviet citizens. Soviet scorched earth tactics included the deportation of millions of men, women and children; relocation of thousands of factories; destruction of almost all railway rolling stock; the destruction of most of the agricultural machinery, livestock and grain stocks; systematic destruction, burning and undermining of immovable infrastructure, stocks of all kinds, factory buildings, mines, residential areas, public buildings, government archives, and even cultural monuments; deliberate starvation among the civilian population who remained in the occupied territories. This policy shamelessly used the civilian population as a pawn. This policy is confirmed by so many sources that there can be no different opinions. It is strange that this topic has not yet been covered in the scientific literature. So far, this scorched earth policy has not been explored to the extent it deserves.

Long before the outbreak of the German-Soviet conflict, Stalin began to prepare for a future war in Europe, developing heavy industry in the Urals and Western Siberia, starting with the first five-year plan in 1928. His plans were long term. In the early 1930s, he had already announced his intention to overtake the most industrialized countries no later than June 1941 - the year when, according to numerous testimonies and statements by Soviet leaders, including Stalin's son, the Red Army hit Germany in late summer. /7 With the help of thousands of engineers and experts from Europe and North America, the core of the Soviet military industry was established in the region where Europe meets Asia. Millions of Soviet citizens were ruthlessly sacrificed in the quest to achieve military superiority of the USSR over Germany. The Ural industrial region was covered by an extensive network of power lines. In 1940, it was a rather sparsely populated area with only four percent of the Soviet population and produced 4 billion kWh of electricity, but the existing capacity was soon significantly increased./8 In other words, in terms of per capita electricity capacity in the Urals region became four times more. In preparation for the coming conflict, munitions factories were built along the entire southern Urals and Western Siberia. The railway network in this once sparsely populated area was greatly expanded by the start of the war./9

As soon as the Germans crossed the border, the Soviet Union set about implementing an economic mobilization plan. This plan also included the possibility that the enemy could occupy large areas of the country - as happened during the First World War. For this reason, detailed plans were created for where the dismantled factories were to be transported, and consistent instructions were made to destroy what could not be transported. The relationship between individual enterprises and their dependence on each other were also carefully taken into account. / 10 The carefully implemented plan included the dismantling and evacuation of equipment and people 8-10 days before the Red Army retreated from the territory where the plant or factory was located, then 24 hours were allotted to destroy the remaining valuable property with the help of special detachments. If necessary, the Soviet troops put up fierce resistance in order to provide sufficient time for the performance of their tasks by special detachments for the destruction of property.

Enterprises almost always moved towards the Ural industrial region, in particular to the area of ​​Sverdlovsk, Molotov, Ufa, Chkalov, and Magnitogorsk. This is a region where plants and factories were built a few years before the war and where dismantled and transported enterprises from the western regions of the Soviet Union began their work again./11

In just the first three months after the start of the war, more than 1,360 large industrial plants were moved. Due to tight control, the evacuated enterprises began to work again in an incredibly short time: only three to four weeks passed before large factories and enterprises again began to provide the Red Army with products. Workers had to work 12-14 hours a day, seven days a week. Within three to four months, Soviet production again reached pre-war levels./12
Evacuation

The "Soviet feat" was possible only because millions of skilled workers, managers, engineers and specialists were brought to these areas along with their factories. As early as February 1940, German scouts systematic deportations of Polish, Ukrainian and Jewish populations from Western Ukraine were reported./13 In June 1940, up to one million Jewish refugees from German-occupied Poland, as well as many hundreds of thousands of Poles, were deported to Siberia. Then, in the weeks leading up to June 22, 1941, mass deportations of the civilian population took place along the entire border with Germany, Hungary and Romania. The Soviets, informed by spies, Allied intelligence, and German traitors, lost no time in deporting those civilians most needed in the Ural industrial region./14

Soviet historians admitted several years ago that the Soviet Union had plans to rebuild the entire railway system long before the war for military purposes in a very short time. The goal was to prevent the Germans from getting hold of strategically important equipment. The Soviet success in this endeavor was almost complete: despite the huge number of railway cars, locomotives, and special equipment, transport in the border areas, intended for the deployment of troops in preparation for an attack on Europe, most of the rolling stock was withdrawn before the Germans struck his lightning strike on June 22, 1941. During the first five weeks, when the German troops pushed the Soviet troops inland, only 577 locomotives, 270 passenger cars and 21,947 railway freight cars fell into the hands of the Germans. In percentage terms, this amounted to only 2.3, 0.8 and 2.5 percent of the total./15

During the first few months of the war, one million railroad cars loaded with industrial equipment, raw materials, and people withdrew from the front line./16 I will not go into the specifics of the scope of the Soviet civilian deportation program. This is what I did in detail in The Dissolution. Suffice it to note here that before the war, more than 90 million people lived in the areas conquered by Germany during the Second World War. The Soviets deported about 25-30 million of them. They focused their efforts on the deportation of certain groups.

Thus, they preferred the urban population to the rural, the skilled to the illiterate, the numerous educated minorities (Jews and Russians in Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic countries) to the more hostile indigenous population. Because the Soviets began their deportation program long before the outbreak of war, and because the western borderlands were not usually densely populated, Soviet cities that fell into German hands during the first few days and weeks of the war were greatly depopulated—by 90 percent in some cases and more than 50 percent on average. The share of deportees was greater in cities in Ukraine or Belarus than in the Baltic republics, and if these cities were near the western border, and not further east; and if they had large educated minorities, and were not dominated by the indigenous population./17

The scorched earth policy was extremely well prepared by the Soviets. An extensive armaments program was launched 13 years before 1941, long before Adolf Hitler was a real contender for the leadership of Germany. Significant investments have been made in rather sparsely populated and underdeveloped areas in order to develop its transport networks, power plants and heavy industry. However, there was a particular lack of social infrastructure, such as housing and hospitals, to provide for the millions of civilians who were deported here between 1940 and 1941. As a result, 15-20 million civilians died from epidemics, starvation, overwork, lack of shelter, lack of clothing and the harsh Siberian winter.

The collapse of the economy in the occupied eastern territories

The picture for the advancing German troops was extremely unfavorable. The railroad system is destroyed. There was no rolling stock. Water pipes and power plants were destroyed. In order to organize the production of raw materials and petroleum products, the Germans created the so-called economic headquarters "Vostok".

The Soviet scorched earth tactics very quickly forced the economic headquarters to intensify work on all types of production. Even the production of consumer goods was included in the program, because the industry in the occupied territories was unable to resume production after being almost completely destroyed and dismantled by the Soviets and the evacuation of most of the management personnel and technicians.

Electricity production amounted to 2.57 million kW in the occupied territories - which is about one-fourth of all pre-war Soviet production in these territories - less than one-eighth (300,000 kW) remained intact. Soviet destruction efforts were so meticulous that by the end of March 1943, production had been increased to no more than 630,000 kW, which was still only a quarter of the pre-war level. /18 (See Table 1.)

However, differences across regions were significant. In the Reichskommissariat (RK) Ostland (the Baltic states and Belarus), about half of the original capacity of 270,000 kW survived, and by the end of March 1943 almost 90 percent of the pre-war capacity had been returned to service. But in Ukraine, only 7 percent (145,000 kW) of electricity, with a capacity of 2.2 million kW, was still functioning. The thoroughness of the efforts of the Bolsheviks is evidenced by the fact that by the end of March 1943, it was possible to return to operation the capacities of no more than 350,000 kW. This is only 16 percent of pre-war capacities. In practice, even these capacities rarely worked at full capacity due to the guerrilla threat and the almost complete lack of coal supplies. It is obvious that industrial production has been dealt a mortal blow. As already mentioned, the production of electricity before the war amounted to 10 billion kWh annually in the occupied eastern territories. The German administration succeeded in generating only 750 million kWh of electricity from the time of the occupation until the end of 1942. For 1943 it was planned to increase this to 1.4 billion kWh - which was still 86 percent below the pre-war level - which was never reached, since only 1 billion kWh was actually produced./19 It is significant that the planned increase in production and extraction of products for 1943 was realized only in isolated cases. Actual production of basic raw materials or energy supplies fell far short of the stated targets, despite the increased focus on retooling the economy.

Consequences of planned destruction Soviet army industrial production are shown in table 2.


The main productions of coal, iron ore, steel, electricity, cement and other important ones were almost completely destroyed. Compared to pre-war levels, coal production averaged 2.4%, iron ore production 1.2%, steel production was nonexistent, electricity production was 8.8%, and cement production was 11.6%!

Another indication of the deplorable state of the economy in the territory of occupied Russia was the amount of labor. In 1940, there were 31.2 million Soviet specialists and workers./20 At the end of 1942, employment in industry (with the exception of Food Industry) amounted to only 750,000 people. If we consider employment only in industrial enterprises, that is, without taking into account handicrafts, the number of employees was only 600,000 (Table 3)

Six hundred thousand in an area where 75 million lived before the war is impossible! Even if we add an unknown number of people employed in the food industry, it is clear that industrial employment under the German administration was equivalent to one-tenth of the pre-war level. Worst of all, the productivity of this labor force was well below the pre-war norm. It is noteworthy that in the Baltic countries (the largest of which, Lithuania, had very little industry), only 8% of the population remained from the pre-war level, they nevertheless constituted a quarter of the entire industrial labor force under the German administration.

The Soviet deportations of skilled personnel led to forced measures such as the "posting" of about 10,000 civilian specialists from the Reich in order to overcome the severe shortage of personnel. / 21 Based on the available statistics, it can be argued that the Soviets deported at least 70% of the workers before the German occupation. This means that the number of workers employed under the German administration (generally less skilled than the deported workers) was between 2 and 3 million. Not more than a million people were employed in production, despite the huge need for workers, unemployment reached enormous proportions (50-70 percent) at the height of the gigantic demand for literally any kind of product.

According to Soviet data, before the start of the war in the areas occupied by the Germans by November 1941, 63% of coal, 68% of iron, 58% of steel, 60% of aluminum, 38% of grain and 84% of sugar were produced from the total production in the Soviet Union./22 The documents of the German economic headquarters "Vostok" show, in fact, very similar figures. The Soviets, with help, fires, destruction, sabotage and deportation of workers and the population, made it impossible to use these industrial capacities. Instead of increasing German military and economic power, these areas became a huge burden and added cost to the German economy.

Hunger

The following secret report of the German Economic Headquarters for the period October 1-10, 1941, describes the situation:

Some food has been found... it appears that virtually all supplies and raw materials have either been systematically removed from these areas or rendered unusable. Thus, raw materials are still found in small quantities, slightly easing the needs of the Reich .... Raw materials have not been supplied to factories for some time now. / 23

The same situation is in the case of food, especially grains. Reading the same report:

Our experience shows that the Russians systematically remove or destroy all food supplies. The urban population of the conquered cities would thus have to be fed by the Wehrmacht or starve. Obviously, by forcing us to provide additional food for the population, the Soviet leadership intends to aggravate the already difficult situation with the food of the German Reich. As a matter of fact, the current food situation allows us to feed the Russian population from our own stocks only if we reduce the supply to the army or reduce the rations of our own population./24
At the very beginning of the war, all efforts to destroy property were carried out in the agricultural sector and were timed to coincide with the destruction of machine and tractor stations. As a rule, these stations were found empty or with equipment unusable. At first, the cattle population remained intact. But over the following weeks, things took a turn for the worse. As the German army moved from west to east, there was practically no livestock, no grain, no fuel. The Luftwaffe and POWs reported that the Soviets were harvesting crops from the fields before retreating. After the occupation of Ukraine, it became obvious that the food situation would be getting worse. In many cases, even the seeds needed for sowing were distributed to help starving Ukrainians. This, in turn, further reduced the area under crops. It is estimated that 43 million tons of grain were produced in the occupied eastern territories under Soviet rule in 1940. Under the German administration, it was possible to harvest in 1941 about 13 million tons. One reason was that the German offensive in Russia was most rapid in the northern and central sectors, thus giving the Soviets time to destroy or evacuate much of the harvest in Ukraine. In 1942, even less was harvested, only 11.7 million tons. According to Dallin, the German administration succeeded in sowing about three-quarters of the pre-war acreage. Fertilizer was virtually non-existent, and yields per acre were lower in 1942 than in previous years. Compared to an average yield per hectare of approximately 2,200 pounds (14 bushels/acre) in Ukraine in the late 1930s, the Germans managed to produce only 1,500 pounds (10 bushels/acre). : The use of seed grain to alleviate the difficult food situation in the cities, the growing guerrilla threat and the shortage of workers and equipment greatly reduced the yield.

German mounted reconnaissance on the outskirts of Mogilev, set on fire by the Red Army. 1941

German specialists were too dispersed to effectively ensure the supply of agricultural products. Of course, the Germans periodically tried to "comb" the area in order to find the accumulated supplies, but their efforts were not crowned with much success. In retreat, the Red Army also destroyed the entire agricultural distribution system, and the German administration was forced to create its own - not an easy task, given the wartime conditions. Not only too little time and difficult conditions did not allow to organize the distribution more successfully, but also the actions of the Bolsheviks who were putting up resistance in the occupied territories. All these difficulties arose not because of the "German mentality" or "German politics", which - contrary to the propaganda of the Soviets and the Allies, was aimed at finding an understanding with the liberated Slavic peoples.

Moving away from the ruthlessness that supposedly characterizes German occupation Russia, it is worth saying that the Germans had never before encountered the inhuman concept of total war applied by the USSR. Even the Jewish historian Alexander Dallin admits:

"The Soviet harvest was, in practice, much more efficient (emphasis added) than the German one. As a result, German peasants were often able to keep larger stocks than before the war. In all likelihood, hidden stocks remained quite significant. .."/26
Between 1941 and 1943, fifteen thousand railway wagons with agricultural equipment and machinery were sent from Germany to the occupied eastern territories under the so-called Ostackerprogramm ("Eastern Agricultural Program"). It included 7,000 thousand tractors, 20,000 thousand generators, 250,000 thousand steel ploughs, and 3,000,000 million scythes. In addition, thousands of bulls, cows, pigs, and stallions were sent to these areas for breeding purposes. Available statistics indicate that German agricultural assistance between July 1941 and 1943 amounted to 445 million RM (Reichsmark)" / 27

The pre-war Soviet harvest in 1940 amounted to 82 million tons of grain, of which about 30% was allocated for seeds and fodder purposes. Theoretically, the population of the USSR thus had access to 57 million tons, or slightly less than 800 grams per day per person. In practice, of course, this amount was less, since part of this amount was reserved in anticipation coming war with Germany./28 Of the thirteen million tons under the German administration in 1941, only 9 million tons were left for the indigenous population. Of this amount, 2 million tons were taken by the German troops. The amount requisitioned by the German army was indeed quite moderate. This is also evidenced by the fact that the Red Army used only 31.4 million tons of grain in 1940, in Last year peace! While another 350,000 tons were transported to Germany to provide for their civilian population./29 About 7 million tons remained for the population of the occupied territories.

On a per capita basis, this amounted to less than 400 grams per day (less than one pound) - two times lower than in 1940. Meat and fats were rarely available. But this average figure does not reflect the full picture. On the one hand, we noted that the yields were probably much higher than the German statistics show. This means that at least the rural population, which was in the majority, ate much better than the urban population. Also, many city dwellers were able to obtain food from peasants illegally, as it is difficult to control the black market. In this way, the cities received food from the peasants, which the German authorities were unable to trace, on the other hand, transport is often an insurmountable problem, so that even the minimum supply of food arrived in the cities either late or there was not enough for everyone. In addition, the guerrillas destroyed or confiscated a significant part of the collected grain. Finally, the German authorities often tried to give additional rations to factory workers. Of course, this was only possible at the expense of the rest of the population. The fact that the German authorities were unable to succeed in obtaining special rations for workers in important industries or for those engaged in heavy manual labor shows how serious the situation was./30 Those urban dwellers who were unemployed or had no property to trade the peasants were really in trouble: they were doomed to starvation.

The desperate situation with food in the cities is shown by regular secret reports of the East Economic Headquarters sent to Berlin:

November 11, 1941: Food shortages and lack of even the most basic consumer goods are the main reason why the morale of the Russian and Ukrainian population is becoming more and more depressed... Kyiv has not received any grain since its occupation on September 19, 1941... Partisans are stealing food civilian population at night. Food supplies are also burned by the partisans. Especially great difficulties exist in the area of ​​Army Group South, where it is impossible to feed all the prisoners of war because of their huge numbers.... The authorities are constantly trying to find enough food for the prisoners, although even buckwheat porridge is available only in limited quantities.... We are very concerned our ability to feed the urban population in the south. /31

December 8, 1941: The food situation in the city of Kharkov is extremely critical. There is practically no food for the population. There is almost no bread. /32

January 22, 1942: The regular distribution of food to the urban civilian population in the "South" zone is more and more limited, and the situation will not change for the foreseeable future. /33

February 23, 1942: Food supplies for the civilian population major cities so small as to cause serious concern. /33

March 1, 1942: The mood of the population is low due to food problems .... In a densely populated Donetsk region there is not enough food for the entire population. As a result, several thousand people died of starvation. In some cases, even highly qualified specialists and teachers were among the victims. /33

March 5, 1942: The food situation continues to be very serious and some cities are actually starving. In Pushkin, it was discovered that there was a sale of human flesh, passing it off as pork./33

March 16, 1942 (report of the rear commander of the Central region): in large cities (the food situation) continues to be unsatisfactory, and in Kharkov it is catastrophic. As time goes by, it becomes more and more difficult to feed the urban population... /33

June 3, 1942: The food situation in the cities is getting worse and worse, because part of the food stocks collected for the population and sowing have been destroyed by the partisans. /33

The constant efforts of the German authorities to ensure a sufficient supply of food for the civilian population were discounted by horrendously poor harvests, disastrous transportation, guerrilla attacks, destruction of food supplies by the Soviets, and the inability to conduct regular exchanges of goods between major cities and the countryside. While the food supply of the rural population and small towns was relatively sufficient, the civilian population from large cities and millions of prisoners were starving. Thus, the German reputation suffered for the actions of the Soviets.

German economic recovery efforts

Equipment worth one billion RM was imported from the Reich for the mining, energy and manufacturing industries in the occupied territories. To this must be added the significant costs for the transport sector, as well as for road construction equipment, which is estimated at more than one billion Reichsmarks. After deliveries of a significant amount of coal, which was used as fuel for civilian rail freight transport, German assistance for the reconstruction of industry and infrastructure amounted to over 2.5 billion RM./34 This amount does not include agricultural assistance in the amount of about half a billion Reichsmarks. The scale of German assistance in the civilian sector can be better appreciated if one realizes that the total volume of industrial production in these areas from the beginning of the occupation until the end of 1943 amounted to approximately 5 billion RM. (This figure includes finished products, repairs, etc.) / 35 Although the exact figure is unknown, it can be assumed that the total assistance amounted to just over 2 billion RM. / 36 In other words, the amount of German economic assistance (except for agriculture) was more than than the value of all industrial output during the occupation! The annual output per employee was RM 1,000 per year. For comparison: in Germany, a worker produced products worth 4,000 RM in 1936./37

Most of the production was absorbed by the German occupation army. Thus, the Soviet scorched-earth tactics reduced the supply of consumer goods for its own population of about 50 million to negligible levels. The production of consumer goods was practically zero, because the destruction and evacuation of all industrial enterprises and raw materials, the deportation of personnel by the Soviets, as well as the impossibility of quickly correcting the situation, thanks to the actions of the partisans. Thus, the urban population could offer nothing to the peasants in exchange for their products. And since the peasant was not able to buy anything with the money he received, he did not want to part with his products, and the exchange was disrupted.

German economic assistance to the occupied Soviet territories amounted to approximately one percent of Germany's gross national product of those years./38 Even today, this figure is more than the assistance of industrialized countries to developing countries. West Germany, for example, has been helping about half a percent of GNP since 1960, a period of relative prosperity and low defense spending.

Indeed, the economic assistance of about 3 billion RM (including in the industrial and agricultural sector) to the occupied eastern territories is also equivalent to one fourth of the total gross capital investments in Germany in 1942 and 1943 (12 billion RM)./39

A comparison of traffic volumes between the Reich and the occupied eastern territories provides additional information.

If we take only the tonnage, then the Reich received about 20 percent more cargo from the eastern territories than from Germany to the East. Considering also about 2 million tons of grain delivered in 1943, /40 exchange for Germany was more profitable at first glance. However, shipments from the Eastern Territories were mainly miscellaneous raw materials and raw ore of rather low value in terms of money, while products from Germany were very high cost and quality (with the exception of coal for railway transport). Since the finished product is worth much more than the various raw materials, on the other hand, this exchange was much more profitable for the occupied eastern territories, although, of course, the scarcity of available data does not allow us to make calculations over a longer period, even within a large error. The Eastern Territories delivered agricultural products worth 1.6 billion Reichsmarks./41 The cost of supplies of German cars, tractors, generators, equipment of all kinds for industry and agriculture amounted to approximately 3 billion Reichsmarks. From this sum we must subtract the supplies of raw materials and ore produced during the period of occupation, as well as the various services rendered to the German army. It is not known what values ​​should be used for these calculations. However, in view of the very small amount of raw materials and the extremely low level of industrial production, this figure should be about 25 percent of the relatively small amount of 2 billion dollars.

Thus, the occupied eastern territories as such contributed practically nothing to economic terms in the fight against Bolshevism. In fact, they received incredibly generous rebuilding assistance. This assistance was hardly made out of purely altruistic motives. However, this was a unique period in the history of relations between the occupying power and the conquered territories of the country. It would be wrong to attribute the German economic collapse in the eastern territories to the efforts of the Soviets alone. All the factors mentioned here are undoubtedly very important. However, there is one more, no less important aspect. When Germany launched a preemptive strike against the USSR, it did so with almost no data on actual Soviet military power, the extent of Soviet arms production, or the Soviet preparations for total war. Worse, Germany was completely unprepared to overcome rough terrain, had no plans to manage the economy in the occupied territories, which could not work on its own, as it depended on directives and decrees from Moscow, since enterprises, of which all administrative, managerial and technical personnel were deported, they could not show private initiative. These additional problems made it impossible to establish an economy in the eastern territories. Chaos brought hunger, and starvation brought guerrilla support.

Thus various aid measures such as the Ostackerprogramm and the gigantic investment in agriculture in the occupied eastern territories were indeed doomed to failure because they did not address the cause of the problem.

Consequences

It is indisputable that the systematic Soviet dismantling of factories and their shipment to the Urals, the carefully planned removal and destruction of stocks of raw materials and food, and the large-scale deportation of civilians were begun long before June 22, 1941. Indeed, evidence indicates that these efforts were significantly activated ten to fourteen days prior to that date. Now we do not know if Stalin believed that the German offensive would take place on the exact date of June 22, 1941, although Sorge and others provided him with such information. Perhaps Stalin felt that Germany's military build-up was insufficient to allow her to attack on the day he was told. But that is beside the point. Both sides knew that the other would attack as soon as it was ready. This fact forever refutes the accusation of the Germans in a surprise attack on the unprepared, peace-loving Soviet Union.

The initial German military successes were achieved not because there was an element of surprise, but in spite of Stalin's knowledge of German preemptive action and in spite of the massive buildup of Soviet military forces to attack central Europe - which was the reason for Germany's preemptive war in the first place. Moreover, the allegation of systematic German brutality in Russia opens up as simple Soviet propaganda. Indeed, famine was widespread in the major cities of the German-occupied Soviet Union, large numbers of Soviet prisoners of war starved to death, Soviet cities were in ruins after the German forces retreated, and the Soviet population lost tens of millions of deaths during World War II. However, it is also known that the inhumane Soviet scorched earth tactics were the cause of famine in the German-occupied Soviet territories, the apocalypse of destruction unprecedented in the history of wars and the death of up to 20 million Soviet citizens, many of whom were deported to the cold wastelands of Siberia and the Urals, where epidemics, homelessness and medical care, unimaginable hard work and the extreme climate allowed only the hardiest to survive. Add the costly human wave tactics to Soviet military strategy, and it is clear that Soviet brutality alone is responsible for the incredibly huge human losses suffered by the peoples of the Soviet Union - more than 30 million people!

The real number of Soviet military casualties is not the main topic of this article, and space does not allow a detailed study of this topic here. However, an appendix has been added that attempts to arrive at a more realistic estimate of Soviet military casualties based on an analysis of post-war USSR census figures from 1959, 1970 and 1979 and a comparison with the 1939 Soviet census, adjusted to the greatest extent possible abroad and demographic changes in period from 1939 to 1945. Suffice it to say that the Soviet Union lost more than 25 percent of its male and nearly 9 percent of its female population. For the population that remained under Stalin's control at the peak of German expansion in Russia, the equivalent losses are 33% and 13%. Curiously, modern standard reviews of Soviet wartime casualties generally admit only 20 million people. Why this unusual understatement for a military ally? Recognition that the Soviet Union lost nearly 20 million civilians, rather than 6-7 million during World War II, would place the responsibility for most of the non-military losses on the Soviets themselves.

Naturally, the imaginary German excesses in Russia neatly fit into the "Holocaust" fairy tale. Eventually, the area of ​​the Soviet Union occupied by Germany was inhabited by over 3.5 million Jews until June 22, 1941. /42 If we add about one million Jewish refugees from eastern Poland at the beginning of 1940, it is obvious that in order to support the charge of genocide, it was necessary to lower the veil of silence around the Soviet long-term preparation, expectation, thoroughness, cruelty and scale of burning the earth during the Second World War . Since the historical framework in which the German massacres allegedly took place simply did not exist, it became necessary to create myths that outwardly seemed to be proved by what was obvious to everyone: the initial rapid German successes and the horrific destruction of Soviet cities and countryside after that. how the Germans were ousted from there.

It is our duty to remove this veil of silence and concealment and replace the myth of Soviet unpreparedness with the terrible truth of Soviet scorched earth.

Walter Sanning
Original article: Soviet Scorched-Earth Warfare: Facts And Consequences by Walter N. Sanning .
Published with minor abridgements, without appendix.

Notes

  1. Helmdach, Erich. Täuschungen und Versäumnisse, Berg am See: 1979, p. 155.
  2. Brennecke, Gerhard. , Tuebingen: 1970, p. 303.
  3. Fischer, Ludwig, and Friedrich Gollert. Warschau unter deutscher Herrschaft, Cracow: 1942, p. 186.
  4. brennecke, Die Nürnberger Geschichtsentstellung, pp. 303 and 322.
  5. a. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg(Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Ed.), Stuttgart: 1983, Volume 4, p. 785.
    b. ibid., p. 782.
  6. Scott, John. Jenseits des Ural, Stockholm: 1944, p. 304.
  7. Helmdach, Erich. Uberfall? Der sowjetisch-deutsche Aufmarsch 1941, Neckargemuend/Germany: 1978, 4th Chapter.
  8. scott, Jenseits des Ural, p. 310.
  9. ibid., pp. 303 and 310.
  10. Telpuchowski, Boris Semionowitsch. Die Geschichte des Großen Vaterländischen Krieges 1941-1945, (Andreas Hillgruber and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, eds.), Frankfurt/Main: 1961, pp. 81-83, 86.
  11. Wirtschaftsstab Ost. Vierzehntagesbericht Wi Stab Ost (3.8.-16.8. 1941) , 30 August 1941, Military Archives Freiburg/Germany, Bestand RW 31/11.
  12. Telpuchowski, , p. 81 and 82.
  13. Aschenauer, Rudolf. Krieg ohne Grenzen, Leoni, 1982, p. 115.
  14. Sanning, Walter N. The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry, Torrance, Calif.: 1983, 3rd Chapter.
  15. Reichswirtschaftsministerium. Die UdSSR Anfang 1941, (Date unknown), Federal Archives Koblenz/Germany, Bestand R 24/817.
  16. Telpuchowski, Die Geschichte des Großen Vaterländischen Krieges, p. 84.
  17. sanning, The Dissolution, pp. 86-101.
  18. Wirtschaftsstab Ost, Chefgruppe W. Wirtschaftsgrößenordnungen fur die besetzten Ostgebiete, 3 March 1943, Military Archives Freiburg/Germany, Bestand RW 31/260.
  19. Reichsministerium fuer die besetzten Ostgebiete. , 20 November 1944. Military Archives Freiburg/Germany, Bestand RW 31/260.
  20. Telpuchowski, Die Geschichte des Großen Vaterländischen Krieges, p. 85.
  21. Bericht über die Tätigkeit der Chefgruppe Wirtschaft im Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, 20 November 1944, p. 4.
  22. Telpuchowski, Die Geschichte des Großen Vaterländischen Krieges, p. 78.
  23. Wirtschaftsstab Ost. Halbmonatsbericht Wi Stab Ost (1.-15.10.41), 2 November 1941, Military Archives Freiburg/Germany, Bestand RW 31/310.
  24. Memorandum dated October 3, 1941, titled Die Versorgung der Städte Rußlands im noch unbesetzten Gebiet, Military Archives Freiburg/Germany, Bestand RW 31/11.
  25. Dallin, Alexander. , London: 1957, p. 367.
  26. ibid.
  27. ibid., p. 368.
  28. Perspektiven zur Verpflegungsversorgung der U.d.S.S.R. im Winterfeldzug 1942/43, (Date unknown), Chef d.Vers.d.200.Schtz. Div. der 5. Armee, Military Archives Freiburg/Germany, Bestand RW 31/23Z.
  29. Dallin, German Rule in Russia, p. 375.
  30. Letter from the Reichsminister fuer die besetzten Ostgebiete dated 5 August 1942 to Ministerialdirektor Riecke concerning the food supply of the civilian population in the Occupied Eastern Territories ( Versorgung der Zivilbevolkerung in den besetzten Ostgebieten), Military Archives Freiburg/Germany, Bestand RW 31/310: contains excerpts from the secret monthly and special reports made by the Economic Staff East, the German military and the German civilian administration of the RK Ostland and the RK Ukraine.
  31. Wirtschaftsstab Ost, Halbmonatsbericht Wi Stab Ost (16.-31.10.41), 27 November 1941, Military Archives Freiburg/Germany, Bestand RW 31/68.
  32. Wirtschaftsstab Ost, Halbmonatsbericht Wi Stab Ost (1.-15.11.41), 8 December 1941, Military Archives Freiburg/Germany, Bestand RW 31/68.
  33. Letter from the Reichsminister für die besetzten Ostgebiete dated 5 August 1942 to Ministerialdirektor Riecke.
  34. Bericht über die Tätigkeit der Chefgruppe Wirtschaft im Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, p. five.
  35. ibid.
  36. Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1952(Statistical Yearbook of the Federal Republic of Germany), Statistical Office, Wiesbaden, lists the value of production of industrial countries before the Second World War. Net production reached the following shares of gross production in the years indicated: U.S.A. (1939) 43%; United Kingdonl (1935) 42%; Canada (1937) 42%; Norway (1937) 36%; Denmark (1939) 47%; Finland (1937) 42%; South Africa (1937) 45%.
  37. ibid.
  38. Klein, Burton H. Germany's Economic Preparations for War, Cambridge/Mass.: 1959, p. 256. The gross national product of the German Reich for 1942 and 1943 was given as RM 143 and RM 160 billion, respectively. Relative to the entire reconstruction assistance of about RM 3 billion (incl. agricultural aid of RM 445 million) provided to the Occupied Eastern Territories this amounts to 1%.
  39. ibid.
  40. Dallin, German Rule in Russia 1941-1945, p. 375.
  41. ibid.
  42. sanning, The Dissolution, p. 52.
  43. ibid., 4, Chapter.

About the author.

Walter N. Sanning is the pseudonym of a scientist and businessman who was born in 1936 to an ethnic German family in a region that was part of the former Soviet Union for decades. After growing up in military Germany, he migrated to the United States in the 1950s, where he met his future wife. He graduated from the prestigious Pacific Northwestern University with a bachelor's degree (cum laude) in business.

He went on to be a graduate student with a fellowship at East Coast Ivy League Universities where he concentrated on international business, finance and economics. He then taught business, finance, and economics at the undergraduate and graduate levels at a major West Coast University. The Sanning family moved to Germany in 1970, where he then worked for many years in a major financial institution and assumed a leading position there.

Walter Sanning is married and speaks English and German. He and his wife have four children, all born in the United States.

In 1983, writer Walter Sanning published The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewly, based on Jewish and Allied sources, the book The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewly, the German title for The Disappearance is Die Auflosung. In this excellent demographic study, based almost entirely on Allied and Jewish sources, Sanning concluded that Jewish losses in Hitler's territory were comparable to those of other affected peoples.

He devoted a great deal of time and effort to research in the American and German archives. He involuntarily has to deal with questionable estimates all the time; Israeli, German, Polish and Soviet archives were inaccessible to him; countless difficulties arose when working with Jewish statistics: who is a Jew (a hundred years ago this was clear, but in an era of cultural assimilation, religious indifference and mixed marriages, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish a Jew from a non-Jew); Zionist and Soviet statistics are unreliable, and in the US, Jews as such are not recorded at all.

Sanning proved that the vast majority of European Jews emigrated illegally, that is, bypassing official statistics, to Palestine, the United States and other countries. In addition, a significant part of the Jews ended up in the USSR, and much more than it is stated in the myths of the Holocaust ™.

Thus, according to Sanning, more than half of the Jews fled from the German-occupied part of Poland under the Soviet protectorate, and the Nazis welcomed when the Jews voluntarily left their occupation zone. These data cannot be confirmed by official figures, since the vast majority of these Jews were deported and a significant number died on the way to Siberia or in Soviet camps. In any case, the responsibility for their death lies with the USSR. Further, relying on census data and reports from various sources, such as the American Jewish Council for Relief of Russia, which existed during the war years, or the Soviet newspaper Ainikeit, published in Yiddish, Sanning came to the conclusion that the vast majority of Jews from the western regions The USSR (about 80%) were evacuated and saved. If the German Einsatzkommandos shot Jews, it was only as partisans, saboteurs and saboteurs.

Sanning also analyzed the demographics of Jews in other regions occupied by the Germans during World War II. He took into account the facts that the number of Jewish emigrants during the war (only from Constanta in Romania by sea left for Istanbul by sea), an unusually active pre-war emigration, as well as negative birth rates, etc.

All this data he took from allied, Jewish and pro-Zionist sources. Sanning then compared the results obtained with the results of the first census conducted immediately after the war in the respective states (most often in 1946, and sometimes in 1947) and deduced the figure of 1.27 million "missing" Jews, who, apparently, did not entered the census. In fact, a significant part of the "missing" emigrated after the war for understandable reasons. Why would a non-communist Jew stay in war-ravaged Poland, where anti-Semitism was strong, and power passed to the Stalinists? In view of such a gloomy prospect, any Jew at the first opportunity - and the borders were not very closed at that time - tried to get away from the country, to the USA, Palestine, France or somewhere else.

In one post-war Germany, there were 250 thousand Jews in the camps of "displaced persons", who then dispersed in all directions. Sanning traces this flow of emigrants and shows what, sometimes adventurous, ways the Jews got to their new home: Many lived for years in Iran or Cyprus, others, before reaching their destination, stopped by Morocco or Tunisia.

According to Sanning's estimates, 130,000 Jews perished in the USSR, and just over 300,000 Jews died in other countries occupied by the Germans.

You can read more about Sanning's research in Jürgen Graf's book The Great Lies of the 20th Century.

Few people were not amazed by the huge numbers of destroyed and destroyed material assets on the territory of the USSR during the Second World War: 38550 large and medium-sized industrial enterprises were completely or partially destroyed (Note 11 *), 1710 cities, more than 70 thousand villages and villages, 65 thousand railway lines and about 100 thousand collective farms and state farms, which amounted to direct damage of 700 billion Soviet rubles in pre-war prices (Note 15 *), as a result of which 25 million people lost their homes. However, not many people know that the "scorched earth" strategy was carried out by the retreating Soviet troops, partisans, and underground fighters throughout the war. This is effective and absolutely fair in relation to the advancing enemy, but in none of the documents of the war period you will find data on the number of material values ​​destroyed in this way. Paradoxically, it turns out that everything that was destroyed in the USSR during the war years was destroyed exclusively by the Nazis. The orders and directives of the Soviet leadership directly speak of the opposite.

"The Germans found empty barns, blown up shipyards, burned factory buildings. Instead of houses, they fought for rubble and snowdrifts" I. Ehrenburg, 11/18/41 (Note 15 *)

The Amur bridge across the Dnieper River in the Ukrainian city of Dnepropetrovsk in 1941 was blown up by the NKVD
- in October 1941, German sappers in Kyiv managed to clear the mines of the Opera House, the Pedagogical Museum, the State Bank, the University, St. Vladimir's Cathedral and other large buildings. The complex of Khreschatyk buildings was blown up by Soviet saboteurs, and there is still no consensus on who blew up the Assumption Cathedral of the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra, although it was the laying of mines that was carried out by Soviet miners when they left the city in 1941
- The Catherine Palace in Tsarskoe Selo (Pushkin), as well as another, smaller palace here, as well as Peterhof (Petrodvorets) were burned Soviet artillery(Note 18*)
- "during the assault on Taganrog, we (the advancing Germans - ed.) for the first time had the opportunity to observe the organized destruction of the city Soviet troops. Factories and institutions took off into the air one after another. ... When we broke into the city, we saw huge piles of burnt grain. In Taganrog, we were shown in practice the policy of "scorched earth" (Note 17 *)
- in 1942, in the cellars of the regional executive committee of Rostov-on-Don, the Wehrmacht discovered mines prepared for detonation of a collectively large explosive force, but the Red Army managed to blow up only the railway bridge across the Don, which was soon restored by the Germans (Note 16 *) - from those remaining on the territory of the Oryol region to By the end of the evacuation, 30450 tons of grain were burned on 25 2851. Not threshed bread in stacks was also burned. According to the information about the abandonment of the Red Army in the city of Liven, Oryol region, all valuable property was destroyed in the city, communications were blown up, Adam's mill, a rubber plant, a distillery, a water pump, soldiers and commanders of the Red Army broke the property of the townspeople. On 11/23/41, the last units of the Red Army, leaving the city, set fire to it in several places, even attempts were made to set fire to residential buildings. According to the report of the Secretary of the Trubchevsk Underground District Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks A. Burlyaev, before the Germans occupied Trubchevsk, on the instructions of the district committee of the party, a dry plant, a hemp plant, a bakery were blown up, a water pump and a power plant were damaged. Within the territory of Smolensk region during the retreat of the Red Army, all MTS were destroyed, ... rendered unusable ... inventory and spare parts. On the territory of the Oryol region, almost all large and medium-sized enterprises were disabled, even those related to the food industry, which worked to meet the needs of the local population. When the Red Army left the town of Toropets in the Kalinin Region, 15 enterprises were destroyed, including a distillery, a waste plant, an oil plant, a flax plant, a brick, tile, turpentine plants, MTS, 6 artels, a fish farm (Note 15 *)

07/01/1942 commander Black Sea Fleet Admiral F. Oktyabrsky and a member of the Military Council N. Kulakov sent a report to Stalin in Moscow, in which, among other things, it is noted: "... 2.3 having captured Sevastopol, the enemy did not receive any trophies. The city as such was destroyed and is a pile of ruins." (Note 14*)
- from the message of the Sovinformburo dated 11/21/41: "All plants and factories from the areas occupied by the Germans were evacuated to the Eastern regions of the Soviet Union ... Not a large number of enterprises that could not be evacuated, the Germans really captured ... but captured in the form of ruins, blown up and destroyed by Soviet troops (Note 14 *)
- systematically destroying all locomotive depots, water pumping stations and other railway equipment (repair shops, stations, arrows, frost-resistant water tanks) during their retreat, the Red Army forced Hitler to issue an order dated 12/27/1941, according to which the restoration of Soviet railways was 30 thousand German construction workers and engineers were sent (Note 4 *)
- in August 1941 in Vyborg, out of 25 installed Soviet F-10 radio mines (each containing from 140 to 4500 kg of TNT), the Finns managed to neutralize 8, only partially preserving the historical development of the city
- according to the "Report on measures taken to implement the order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 0428" of the Military Council of the Western Front on 11/29/1941 (12 days from the date of publication of this order): "... 398 Soviet settlements were burned and destroyed, most of which. ..teams of hunters from the military units of the front and sabotage groups of intelligence agencies of the special department "(Note 10 *)

In 1941, the NKVD officers laid 20 tons of tol in the dam of the Dneproges, the explosion of which destroyed part of the dam 165 meters long, causing a 20-meter wave. The wave washed away the coastal city strip and reached Marganets and Nikopol. Due to the fact that the NKVD did not warn anyone about the danger, according to approximate data, more than 100 thousand people died, of which about 20 thousand Red Army soldiers and about 80 thousand civilians and about 1.5 thousand Germans
- joint Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated 06/27/1941 "On the procedure for the export and placement of human contingents and valuable property"
- "All valuable property, raw materials and food stocks, grain on the vine, which, if it is impossible to export and left on the spot ... must be immediately rendered completely unusable, i.e. must be destroyed, destroyed and burned" (Approx. nine*)

ORDER OF THE STATE OF THE SUPREME HIGH COMMAND No. 0428 dated 11/17/1941 "On the creation of special teams for the destruction of settlements in the rear of the fascist troops, 1941"
The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ORDERS:
1. Destroy and burn everything to the ground settlements in the rear of the German troops at a distance of 40-60 km in depth from the front line and 20-30 km to the right and left of the roads. To destroy settlements within the indicated radius of action, immediately drop aircraft, make extensive use of artillery and mortar fire, teams of scouts, skiers and partisan sabotage groups equipped with Molotov cocktails, grenades and explosives.
2. In each regiment, create teams of hunters of 20-30 people each to blow up and burn settlements in which enemy troops are stationed. To select the most courageous and politically and morally strong fighters, commanders and political workers in the hunting teams, carefully explaining to them the tasks and significance of this event for the defeat of the German army. Outstanding daredevils for courageous actions to destroy the settlements in which the German troops are located, to present to the government award.
3. In the event of a forced withdrawal of our units in one sector or another, take the Soviet population with them and be sure to destroy all settlements without exception so that the enemy cannot use them. First of all, for this purpose, use the teams of hunters allocated in the regiments.
4. The Military Councils of the fronts and individual armies systematically check how the tasks for the destruction of settlements in the radius indicated above from the front line are being carried out. Headquarters every 3 days to report in a separate summary how many and which settlements have been destroyed over the past days and by what means these results have been achieved.
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
I. Stalin, B. Shaposhnikov (Note 13*)

DIRECTIVE OF THE USSR Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "TO THE PARTY AND SOVIET ORGANIZATIONS OF THE FRONT-FRONT REGIONS" 06/29/41 No. P509
4) In the event of a forced withdrawal of units of the Red Army, to steal a rolling stock, not to leave a single locomotive, not a single wagon to the enemy, not to leave the enemy a kilogram of bread or a liter of fuel. Collective farmers must steal cattle, hand over grain for safety government bodies to transport it to the rear areas. All valuable property, including non-ferrous metals, grain and fuel, which cannot be exported, must be unconditionally destroyed
5) In areas occupied by the enemy, create partisan detachments and sabotage groups to fight against parts of the enemy army, to incite partisan war everywhere, to blow up bridges, roads, damage telephone and telegraph communications, set fire to warehouses, etc. In the occupied areas, create unbearable conditions for the enemy and all his accomplices, pursue and destroy them at every step, disrupt all their activities

DECISION of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of July 18, 1941 "ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FIGHT IN THE REAR OF THE GERMAN TROOPS" (Note 3 *)
- "When the units of the Red Army are forced to withdraw, it is necessary to steal the entire rolling stock, not to leave the enemy a single locomotive, not a single wagon, not to leave the enemy a kilogram of bread or a liter of fuel. The collective farmers must steal all the cattle, hand over the grain for safekeeping to state bodies for all valuable property, including non-ferrous metals, grain and fuel, which cannot be taken out, must be unconditionally destroyed. enemy army, to incite guerrilla warfare everywhere and everywhere, to blow up bridges, roads, damage telephone and telegraph communications, set fire to forests, warehouses, carts "(Note 5 *) (Compare with the previous one and find the differences)
- Directive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus dated 07/01/1941: "Destroy any communications behind enemy lines, blow up or damage bridges and roads, set fire to fuel and food depots, trucks and aircraft, arrange railway accidents ..." (Note 2 *)

Additional damage to the Soviet national economy was inflicted by local residents, who, in conditions of temporary anarchy, began to take away everything that they did not have time to destroy the retreating units of the Red Army and that was at least some value for them (Note 15 * and 16 *)
- you need to pay attention to the fact that during the hostilities many settlements passed several times from hand to hand and mercilessly, sometimes to the point of complete destruction, were destroyed by the opposing sides as a result of the fulfillment of the assigned combat missions
- as a result of the "scorched earth" tactics, the central historical part of Kyiv, the Dneproges, the Assumption Cathedral of the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra were destroyed by the NKVD (Note 1 * and 12 *)
- by 1943, only 10% of industrial and 50% of agricultural products were produced in the Soviet territories occupied by the Germans from the level of 1940 (Note 1 *)
- only in 1943 as a result of the "rail" war Soviet partisans more than 350 thousand railway rails were blown up, a large number of bridges and stations in the territories of the USSR occupied by the Germans (Note 6 *)
- Vitebsk and Smolensk were almost completely destroyed in 1941 by the retreating Soviet troops (Note 12 *)
- resort coast of the Black Sea: Yalta, Gurzuf, Simeiz, Livadia, Alupka, Baidar gates and other places were destroyed and burned by Soviet partisans in accordance with Stalin's order "Leave nothing to the enemy"
- starting in the autumn of 1943, the Wehrmacht, in accordance with the order of the High Command, during its retreat purposefully began to destroy everything that the Red Army could use for its supply and deployment (Note 8 *)

NOTES:
(Note 1 *) - L. Semenenko "The Great Patriotic War. How it was"
(Note 2 *) - I. Hoffman "Stalin's war of extermination"
(Note 3 *) - D. Zhukov "Russian police"
(Note 4 *) - A. Speer "The Third Reich from the inside. Memoirs of the Reich Minister of War Industry"
(Note 5 *) - Stalin's speech on the radio on 07/03/1941
(Note 6 *) - Special issue 9\2010 Dossier-collection "Steam locomotives and armored trains of the USSR"
(Note 7 *) - I. Lutsky "Sea and captivity. The tragedy of Sevastopol"
(Note 8 *) - F. Mellenthin "Tank battles. Combat use of tanks in WW2"
(Note 9 *) - B. Belozerov "Front without borders 1941-1945."
(Note 10 *) - "Encyclopedia of delusions. War"
(Note 11 *) - I. Vernidub "Ammunition of Victory"
(Note 12 *) - C. Ailesby "Plan Barbarossa"
(Note 13 *) - M. Solonin "The False History of the Great War"
(Note 14 *) - O. Greig "Stalin could attack first"
(Note 15 *) - I. Ermolaev "Under the banner of Hitler"
(Note 16 *) - V. Smirnov "Rostov under the shadow of a swastika"
(Note 17 *) - K. Meyer "German grenadiers. Memoirs of an SS general"
(Note 18 *) - E. Manstein "Lost Victories"

The "scorched earth" tactic involves the complete destruction of any objects during the retreat, so that they do not go to the enemy. During the Great Patriotic War, it was used by both the Soviet and German sides.

Manstein was one of the proponents of this tactic. In 1942-1944 he commanded the Don and South Army Groups. In the autumn of 1943, during the retreat to the Left-Bank Ukraine, Manstein, following Goering's order, used this technique.

He wrote: “In the zone 20-30 km in front of the Dnieper, everything that could help the enemy immediately continue his offensive on a wide front on the other side of the river was destroyed, destroyed or taken to the rear, that is, everything that could appear for him during the concentration of forces in front of our Dnieper positions, shelter or quartering, and everything that could facilitate his supply, especially the food supply of his troops.

According to the commander, stocks, household property and machines that could be used for military production were taken out of the abandoned areas. Non-ferrous metals, grain and industrial crops, as well as horses and cattle were also taken out.

At the same time, Manstein stipulates that "in the German army - in contrast to the rest - robbery was not allowed", "strict control was established to exclude the possibility of exporting any illegal cargo." According to the commander, the exported property and stocks were exclusively state property, not private property.

Manstein adds that a significant part of the local population then voluntarily followed the retreating units "in order to get away from the Soviets, which they feared." “Long columns were formed, which we later had to see also in eastern Germany,” the commander notes.

Scorched earth tactics

Scorched earth tactics- a method of warfare, implying the destruction of everything usable, or potentially useful to the enemy. It is usually used during a retreat (retreating, the troops leave behind a devastated territory) or in conditions of fighting partisans.

Originally the term referred to the practice of burning crops in the fields to destroy the enemy's food sources, the term now includes the destruction of shelters, vehicles, communications, industry, and industrial resources.

For the first time this method war was described in Sun Tzu's The Art of War. The use of such tactics has been known since antiquity. Rationale for tactics in modern times owned by Prussian General Karl Ludwig von Full.

In the modern sense, this term has been used since the days of the Vietnam War, when American troops began to actively use napalm to destroy strategic enemy targets (mainly ground food depots), as well as places where the enemy was supposed to accumulate. The trick was that napalm, after hitting the ground, burned for a long time, penetrating into the narrow catacombs, filling the shelters with acrid smoke, thereby making them unsuitable for shelter.

Use of scorched earth tactics prior to World War II

  • Scythian campaign of Darius I

Use of scorched earth tactics in WWII

The use of "scorched earth" tactics by the Wehrmacht troops

The use of the tactics of "scorched earth" of the Red Army

At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, on July 3, 1941, I. V. Stalin made an appeal to the people with a speech in which the following words are present: “ With the forced withdrawal of Red Army units, it is necessary to steal the entire rolling stock, not to leave the enemy a single locomotive, not a single wagon, not to leave the enemy a single kilogram of bread, not a liter of fuel. The collective farmers must steal all the livestock, hand over the grain for safekeeping to state bodies for its removal to the rear areas. All valuable property, including non-ferrous metals, grain and fuel, which cannot be exported, must be unconditionally destroyed.

In areas occupied by the enemy, it is necessary to create partisan detachments, mounted and on foot, to create sabotage groups to fight against parts of the enemy army, to kindle guerrilla warfare everywhere and everywhere, to blow up bridges, roads, damage telephone and telegraph communications, set fire to forests, warehouses, convoys. In the occupied areas, create unbearable conditions for the enemy and all his accomplices, pursue and destroy them at every step, disrupt all their activities».

A few days later, on July 10, 1941, in a note to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Ukraine N. S. Khrushchev, I. Stalin addresses Khrushchev: “ Your proposals for the destruction of all property contradict the instructions given in Comrade Stalin's speech, where the destruction of all valuable property was discussed in connection with the forced withdrawal of Red Army units. Your proposals mean the immediate destruction of all valuable property, grain and livestock in a zone of 100-150 kilometers from the enemy, regardless of the state of the front. Such an event can demoralize the population, cause discontent Soviet power, to upset the rear of the Red Army and create, both in the army and among the population, a mood of obligatory withdrawal instead of determination to repulse the enemy» .

On November 17, 1941, the Order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was issued, obliging " in the event of a forced withdrawal of our units in one sector or another, take the Soviet population with them and be sure to destroy all settlements without exception so that the enemy cannot use them. First of all, for this purpose, use the teams of hunters allocated in the regiments» .

Unlike the troops of the Wehrmacht, the troops of the Red Army subsequently did not use the scorched earth tactics on enemy territory.

Use of scorched earth tactics after World War II

  • Vietnam War USA. In the 1960s, Americans used herbicides and defoliants, and napalm was also actively used.
  • Burning of Kuwaiti oil rigs by Iraqi soldiers during the Gulf War

see also

Notes


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Scorched earth tactics- a method of warfare in which the retreating troops carry out the complete and large-scale destruction of all stocks vital for the enemy (food, fuel, etc.) and any industrial, agricultural, civilian facilities in order to prevent their use by the advancing enemy.

The term "scorched earth" applies only to combat operations, during which retreating troops destroy objects of paramount importance to the enemy.

"Scorched earth" tactics are prohibited by Protocol I of the 1977 Geneva Convention.

History

This section contains far from all historical examples.

6th century BC e.

The first known case in history of using this tactic is the war of the Scythians with the army of Darius I, around 512 BC. e. who invaded the Black Sea steppes (see Book IV of the History of Herodotus).

15th century

At the end of 1474 during the struggle between the Ottoman Empire and the Principality of Moldavia. Numerous Ottoman troops led by the Rumelian Beylerbey Suleiman Pasha entered the territory of the Moldavian Principality. Using the tactics of "scorched earth", the Moldavian prince Stefan III defeated the enemy at Vaslui (January 10, 1475).

19th century

Napoleonic Wars

Pyrenean Wars

During the (third) Napoleonic invasion of Portugal in 1810, as the Portuguese retreated to Lisbon, they were ordered to destroy all food supplies that the French could get. The order was given due to the marauding of the French troops and the mistreatment of citizens during previous invasions.

After Battles of Busaku Masséna's army marched on Coimbra, where much of the Old University and the city's library were sacked, houses and furniture were destroyed, and several civilians were killed. There were cases of looting by British soldiers, but such cases were usually investigated and the perpetrators punished. When the French troops reached the Torres-Vedras line near Lisbon, the French soldiers said that the city was more like a wasteland. When Massena reached the city of Viseu, wishing to replenish the dwindling food supplies of the army, the city was empty, and the only provisions left were grapes and lemons, the use of which in large quantities was more of a laxative than a source of calories. Low morale, hunger, disease, and indiscipline weakened the French army and forced it to retreat the following spring.

American Civil War

This tactic was used extensively by Union forces under Sheridan and Sherman during the American Civil War. General Sherman used this tactic during his march to the Atlantic. Sherman's goal was to break the will and destroy enemy logistics by burning or destroying crops and other resources that could be used by Confederate supporters. During the campaign, his men burned all the court books in front of the courthouse so that the planters could not prove their ownership of the land. Another incident occurred when for thirty-six days Sherman's army moved through Georgia, meeting with little resistance, plundering the countryside and its inhabitants.

Other instances of the use of tactics during the civil war are also known.

20th century

The Great Patriotic War
Vietnam War

One of the largest and most famous cases of the use of "scorched earth" tactics is Operation Ranch Hand, which was carried out by the US Army during the Vietnam War to destroy the jungle in Laos and South Vietnam.

Gulf War

The current position of society

Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions of 1977 prohibits the destruction of supplies and sources of food and drinking water for the civilian population in the course of hostilities.

It is prohibited to attack or destroy, remove or render unusable objects essential for the survival of the civilian population, such as food supplies, food-producing agricultural areas, crops, livestock, supply facilities drinking water and supplies of the latter, as well as irrigation facilities, specifically for the purpose of preventing their use by the civilian population or the adverse party as a means of subsistence, regardless of the motive, whether for the purpose of starving civilians, forcing them to leave, or for any other reason. Article 54, Amendments to Protocol I of the 1977 Geneva Conventions

Nevertheless, cases of the use of "scorched earth" tactics are still noted.

Among the countries that have not yet ratified Protocol I are the USA, Israel, Iran, Pakistan.

see also

Notes

  1. English version of the Supplement to Protocol 1 of the 1977 Geneva ConventionPDF(English)
  2. Translation of the Addendum to Protocol 1 of the 1977 Geneva ConventionPDF
  3. 516, 514 BC e .: there are different justifications for relatively close dates.
  4. A.O. Chubaryan. History of Europe. Volume 2. Medieval Europe. Chapter V
  5. Personal memoirs of Grant Ulysses, chapter XXV: "supplies within the reach of Confederate armies I regarded as much contraband as arms or ordnance stores. Their destruction was accomplished without bloodshed and tended to the same result as the destruction of armies. I continued this policy to the close of the war. Promiscuous pillaging, however, was discouraged and punished. Instructions were always given to take provisions and forage under the direction of commissioned officers who should give receipts to owners, if at home, and turn the property over to officers of the quartermaster or commissary departments to be issued as if furnished from our Northern depots. But much was destroyed without receipts to owners, when it could not be brought within our lines and would otherwise have gone to the support of secession and rebellion. This policy I believe exercised a material influence in hastening the end.” (English)