Special operations of the KGB of the USSR. One of the most brilliant operations of the Soviet special services (5 photos). Secrete your own defeat

Allen Dulles said: “The intelligence services remain silent about successful operations, but their failures speak for themselves.” However, we still know of several successful operations of the USSR KGB abroad, which cannot be called failures.

Operation Whirlwind

Late in the evening of November 3, 1956, during negotiations with the Soviet side, USSR KGB officers arrested the new Minister of Defense of Hungary, Pal Malater. Already at 6 a.m. on November 4, the Soviet command sent the code signal “Thunder” on the air. It marked the beginning of Operation Whirlwind to suppress the Hungarian uprising.

The task of suppressing the rebellion was assigned to the Special Corps. In total, more than 15 tank, mechanized, rifle and air divisions, the 7th and 31st airborne divisions, and a railway brigade (more than 60 thousand people) took part in Operation Whirlwind.

To capture urban targets, special detachments were created, they were supported by 150 paratroopers and infantry fighting vehicles and 10-12 of them. Each detachment included members of the USSR KGB: Major General Pavel Zyryanov, Major General Kuzma Grebennik (to be appointed military commandant of Budapest), and the famous illegal immigrant Alexander Korotkov. Their tasks included organizing the capture and arrest of members of Imre Nagy's government.

In one day, all the main objects in Budapest were captured, members of the Imre Nagy government took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy.

On November 22 at 18.30, cars and a small bus lined up outside the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest, carrying diplomats and members of the Hungarian government, including Imre Nagy. The KGB colonel ordered the bus passengers to leave, but did not wait for a reaction. The bus was taken into a “box” by several armored personnel carriers. KGB Chairman Serov reported to the Central Committee that “I. Nagy and his group were arrested, taken to Romania and are under reliable guard.”

Elimination of Stepan Bandera

Eliminating Stepan Bandera was not so easy. He always went with bodyguards. In addition, he was under the care of Western intelligence agencies. Thanks to their assistance, several assassination attempts on the OUN leader were thwarted.

But the KGB knew how to wait. KGB agent Bogdan Stashinsky came to Munich several times (under the name Hans-Joachim Budait), trying to find traces of Stepan Bandera. A simple telephone directory helped in the search. Bandera’s pseudonym was “Poppel” (German fool), which is what Stashinsky found in the reference book. The address of the alleged victim was also listed there. Then a lot of time was spent preparing for the operation, finding escape routes, selecting master keys, and so on.

When Stashinsky next arrived in Munich, he already had the murder weapon (a miniature double-barreled device loaded with ampoules of potassium cyanide), an inhaler and protective pills.

The KGB agent began to wait. Finally, on October 15, 1959, at approximately one o'clock in the afternoon, he saw Bandera's car drive into the garage. Stashinsky used a pre-prepared master key and was the first to enter the entrance. There were people there - some women talking on the upper platforms.

Initially, Stashinsky wanted to wait for Bandera on the stairs, but he could not stay there for long - he could be discovered. Then he decided to go down the stairs. The meeting took place outside Bandera’s apartment on the third floor. The Ukrainian nationalist recognized Bogdan - he had already met him in church before. To the question “What are you doing here?” Stashinsky held out a bundle of newspaper towards Bandera’s face. A shot rang out.

Operation Toucan

In addition to acts of retaliation and organizing the suppression of uprisings, the KGB of the USSR also devoted a lot of effort to supporting those Soviet Union regimes abroad and the fight against undesirables.

In 1976, the KGB, together with the Cuban intelligence service DGI, organized Operation Toucan. It consisted in the formation of the necessary public opinion in relation to the regime of Augusto Pinochet, which has repeatedly stated that its main enemy and the enemy of Chile is the Communist Party. According to former officer KGB Vasily Mitrokhin, the idea of the operation belonged personally to Yuri Andropov.

"Toucan" had two goals: to give a negative image of Pinochet in the means mass media and stimulate human rights organizations to begin active efforts to exert external pressure on the leader of Chile. Information war was announced. In the third most popular American newspaper New York The Times published as many as 66 articles on human rights in Chile, 4 articles on the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia, and 3 articles on human rights in Cuba.

During Operation Toucan, the KGB also fabricated a letter where American intelligence was accused of political persecution by the Chilean intelligence service DINA. Subsequently, many journalists, including Jack Anderson of the New York Times, even used this fabricated letter as evidence of the CIA's involvement in the unpleasant aspects of Operation Condor, aimed at eliminating political opposition in several South American countries.

Recruitment of John Walker

The KGB was known for its many successful recruitments of Western intelligence services. One of the most successful was the recruitment of American cryptographer John Walker in 1967.

At the same time, the American KL-7 encryption machine, which was used by all US services to encrypt messages, fell into the hands of the KGB. According to journalist Pete Earley, who wrote a book about Walker, the recruitment of the American cryptographer was "as if the US Navy had opened a branch of its communications center right in the middle of Red Square."

All the years (17 years!) until John Walker was declassified, the US military and intelligence forces found themselves in a stalemate. Wherever secret exercises took place, organized according to all the rules of secrecy, KGB officers were always nearby. Walker transmitted tables of keys to encryption codes every day, but he involved his family in his network of agents, which destroyed him.

He ended up in the dock thanks to the testimony of his ex-wife Barbara. He was sentenced to life imprisonment.

Release of Hezbollah hostages

On September 30, 1985, four employees of the Soviet embassy were captured in Beirut (two of them were KGB personnel Valery Myrikov and Oleg Spirin). The seizure took place according to the classics: blocking of cars, black masks, shooting, threats. Consular officer Arkady Katkov tried to resist, but one of the attackers stopped him with a machine-gun burst.

The Lebanese group “Khaled Bin al-Walid Forces” claimed responsibility for the seizure, but the Beirut KGB station established that the true organizers of the seizure were Shiite fundamentalists of Hezbollah and Palestinian Fatah activists. There was also information that the capture of Soviet diplomats was coordinated with radical representatives of the Iranian clergy, and the terrorists received the blessing of the religious leader of Hezbollah, Sheikh Fadlallah.

The capture had political goals. Hezbollah wanted to force Moscow to put pressure on Syria so that its government would abandon the operation to clear territories controlled by Fatah and Hezbollah in Tripoli and Beirut.

Despite the fact that Moscow fulfilled almost all the terrorists’ demands, they were in no hurry to return the hostages. Volume 6 of the book “Essays on the History of Russian Foreign Intelligence” indicates that the Center invited its resident in Beirut to meet with the then spiritual leader of Hezbollah and put pressure on him. The meeting took place, the resident went all-in and said that “the USSR showed maximum patience, but could move on to serious action.”

The idea was conveyed to the Ayatollah that if the Soviet hostages were not released, then a random Soviet missile (for example, an SS-18) could accidentally hit a Shiite shrine - the Iranian city of Qom or somewhere else during midday prayer. The Ayatollah thought for a moment, and then said that he hoped, with the help of Allah, to free the hostages.

The Beirut KGB station also recruited several representatives of Imad Mughniyah’s inner circle (he led the capture), and also arrested several of his relatives. Massive psychological pressure was justified: a month after the capture, the Soviet diplomats were free.

Political portraits. Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov Medvedev Roy Alexandrovich

Special units and special operations of the KGB

Temporary special units and groups were created in the NKVD, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB back in the 1930s–1950s to perform a variety of tasks. However, on an ongoing basis, and primarily to combat terrorism, special forces were created under Andropov and on his initiative. According to legend, Andropov somehow came across a West German magazine with spectacular photographs: a group of strong guys in camouflage demonstrated their readiness to immediately carry out the most difficult order: to land in the desert, silently remove any security, seize a bridgehead, neutralize terrorists, free hostages. Andropov invited General Alexei Beschastny, head of the Seventh Directorate of the KGB, who was in charge of guarding the embassies in Moscow. The result of their meeting was the decision to create a special anti-terror unit within the structure of the State Security Committee, which, at Andropov’s suggestion, was called group “A”. Later journalists began to call it the Alpha Group. It was probably not a matter of chance acquaintance with a German magazine. Anti-terrorism groups already existed in Israel and the USA, in Germany and England, in Belgium and Spain. Their experience was used to create the Soviet group “A”. At Andropov’s suggestion, an experienced border guard, Hero of the Soviet Union, Major V. Bubenin, was appointed chief. Alpha was a top secret unit; the officers who served in it were not supposed to talk about the nature of their service even to their closest people. The official birthday of Alpha is July 29, 1974. Today there is a considerable literature about the work and history of Alpha. This special unit twice received orders to storm the White House in Moscow - in August 1991 and in October 1993 - and twice refused to carry out this order. Among Alpha veterans they remember Andropov. The first commander of group “A”, V. Bubenin, said in one of his interviews that Andropov made the decision to create this group and that it should be led by an experienced border guard. “Vitaly Dmitrievich, what was the reason for the creation of your group?” – “Terrorism... Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, being the Chairman of the KGB, more than once warned the country’s leadership that terrorist attacks, terrorist groups - distinguishing feature not only the West. And our citizens may be affected. But then, you know, somehow I couldn’t believe it.”

Alas, Andropov turned out to be right. He worked ahead of the curve and was on time. When terrorism became a reality, there was already Alpha. “You met with Andropov more than once. What impression do you have of this person?” “Of course, this is a personality. A man of deep knowledge and high culture.” - “Who was the group directly subordinate to?” “I only followed the orders of the Chairman. I only obeyed him." - “How many people were in the first group?” - “There were thirty of us.”

A few years later, at the suggestion of Yuri Drozdov, supported by Andropov, the Vympel sabotage and reconnaissance group was created. Its first commander was Captain 1st Rank Hero of the Soviet Union Evald Kozlov from the KGB naval border units. This group was preparing for operations outside Soviet borders, for example in Afghanistan. The order to carry out such an operation could only be given personally by the Chairman of the KGB and only in writing. When the decision to create Vympel was made, Yu. Andropov, according to Yu. Drozdov, called him and, handing over the papers, said: “Well, there you go. Work, create! And so that they have no equal.” According to Drozdov, Vympel really had no equal. And in terms of the degree of willingness to take risks, and in terms of the degree of operational ingenuity, and intelligence resourcefulness. Vympel officers knew several languages, they were obliged to independently work out any task, make the right decision and implement it. Some Vympel employees later underwent illegal training in NATO special forces. It was a powerful unit of the Soviet, and then Russian intelligence services. Vympel also received an order to storm the White House in October 1993 and did not carry it out. As a result, by Decree of President B. Yeltsin, Vympel was reassigned to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This led to the disintegration of the unit, which was now assigned other tasks. More than 100 officers resigned, many moved to the Main Security Directorate, to the Ministry of Emergency Situations. Only 50 people from the previous group remained in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

In 1980–1983, several more non-system units were created in the KGB. As for small special groups, capable of carrying out a wide variety of special operations, then such groups have always existed on a temporary basis, performing various types of tasks both on the territory of the USSR, and on the territory of socialist countries, and in other regions. For example, a considerable number of special operations were carried out in the Middle East, where the USSR supported not only Egypt and Syria, but also the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Of the many documents on this subject published in the Russian press, I will cite below only two, on which, in addition to Andropov’s signature, there are visas of almost all members of the Politburo.

"Top secret

Of particular importance

Special folder

STATE COMMITTEE

SECURITY UNDER THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR

No. 1071-A/OV

Comrade Brezhnev L.I.

Since 1968, the State Security Committee has maintained business conspiratorial contact with a member of the Politburo of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), head of the PFLP's external operations department, Wadia Haddad.

At a meeting with the KGB resident in Lebanon, held in April this year. city, Wadia Haddad in a confidential conversation outlined promising program sabotage and terrorist activities of the PFLP, which basically boils down to the following.

The main goal of special actions of the PFLP is to increase the effectiveness of the struggle of the Palestinian resistance movement against Israel, Zionism and American imperialism. Based on this, the main directions of the organization’s sabotage and terrorist activities are:

– continuation by special means of the “oil war” of the Arab countries against the imperialist forces supporting Israel;

– carrying out actions against American and Israeli personnel in “third countries” in order to obtain reliable information about the plans and intentions of the United States and Israel;

– carrying out sabotage and terrorist activities on Israeli territory;

– organization of sabotage actions against the diamond trust, the main capital of which belongs to Israeli, English, Belgian and West German companies.

V. Haddad turned to us with a request to assist his organization in obtaining certain types of special technical equipment necessary to conduct certain sabotage operations.

By cooperating with us and asking for help, V. Haddad clearly understands our negative attitude in principle towards terrorism and does not pose to us questions related to this area of PFLP activity. The nature of our relationship with V. Haddad allows us, to a certain extent, to control the activities of the external operations department of the PFLP, to exert an influence on it that is beneficial to the Soviet Union, and also to carry out active measures in our interests with the help of his organization while maintaining the necessary secrecy.

Taking into account the above, we would consider it advisable at the next meeting to have a generally positive attitude towards Wadia Haddad’s request for assistance Popular Front liberation of Palestine assistance in special means. As for specific issues of providing assistance, it is understood that they will be resolved in each case separately, taking into account the interests of the Soviet Union and preventing the possibility of harming the security of our country.

We ask for consent

A year later, in one of the reports from the “Special Folder” one could read: “KGB of the USSR. May 16, 1975 No. 1218-A. To Comrade Brezhnev L.I. In accordance with the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU Committee state security On May 14, 1975, a batch of foreign weapons and ammunition (58 assault rifles, 50 pistols, including 10 with silent shooting devices, 34,000 cartridges) was transferred to the KGB intelligence confidant V. Haddad, the head of the external operations service of the NLF of Palestine. ). The illegal transfer of weapons was carried out in the neutral waters of the Gulf of Aden at night, in a non-contact manner, with strict observance of secrecy using a reconnaissance ship of the USSR Navy. Of the foreigners, only Haddad knows that these weapons were handed over by us. Chairman of the State Security Committee Andropov."

There is no reason to hide today the participation of the USSR KGB in this kind of secret operations, but there is no reason to assert that the KGB was able to control the activities of the Palestine Liberation Front. Meanwhile, in some publications the KGB is even held responsible for the activities of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) or the Japanese “Red Army”. According to a number of Western magazines, the KGB planned in 1969 to prevent the official declaration of Prince Charles as heir to the British throne by blowing up a bridge along which a column of carriages and limousines was supposed to move. Andropov and the KGB were credited not only with attempts to recruit Zbigniew Brzezinski, an adviser to the US President on national security, but destroy the port of New York by blowing up dams and military warehouses here. An attempt to assassinate Pope John Paul II was also attributed to the Soviet KGB, although no evidence was found to that effect. Yuri Andropov knew well that after the murder of the leader of Ukrainian nationalists Stepan Bender in 1961, which was the result of one of the KGB special operations, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee categorically prohibited such actions. Within the KGB structure, the corresponding groups were liquidated. However, some very dubious and risky special operations could be carried out by the intelligence services of the GDR, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. The KGB of the USSR could not completely control the work of all special services of the socialist countries.

Andropov also had to deal with very exotic operations, related, for example, to the complete destruction of the remains of Hitler and Goebbels. Back in 1945, after the fall of Berlin, the remains of Hitler, Eva Braun, Goebbels and his family discovered near an underground bunker were subjected to a thorough examination and later buried in the zone of Soviet military occupation. Few knew the burial place, but it existed and could be discovered over time by some admirers of Hitler. In March 1970, Andropov sent the following report to the CPSU Central Committee: “Sov. secret. Series “K”. KGB of the USSR. March 13, 1970 No. 655-A. Moscow... In February 1946, in Magdeburg (GDR), on the territory of a military town now occupied by the KGB Special Department for the 3rd Army of the GSVG, the corpses of Hitler, Eva Braun, Goebbels, his wife and children were buried. (Total – 10 corpses.)

Currently, the specified military camp, based on service expediency that meets the interests of our troops, is transferred by the army command to the German authorities.

Considering the possibility of construction or other excavation work in this area, which could lead to the discovery of a burial, I would consider it advisable to remove the remains and destroy them by burning.

This event will be carried out strictly in secret by the forces of the operational group of the Special Department of the KGB of the 3rd Army of the GSVG and properly documented.

Chairman of the State Security Committee Andropov."

In accordance with Andropov’s proposal, with which members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee agreed, a group of soldiers and officers of the KGB special group dug up five shell boxes, used as coffins, containing the remains of these individuals. They were transported to a landfill, burned, and the ashes scattered to the wind. Thus, it was Yuri Andropov who put a symbolic final point in this dark chapter of German history. According to the testimony of the former director of the FSB, Army General Nikolai Kovalev, there is a special room in the FSB building where some personal belongings of Hitler, Himmler and other leaders of the Third Reich are still kept in one of the safes. It was also here that they decided to store the Fuhrer’s jaws, by which his corpse was once identified. by Miller Don

by Miller Don

Part 7 Special forces in air assault operations

From the book Commando [Formation, training, outstanding operations of special forces] by Miller Don

Part 9 Special Forces in the Fight against Terrorism (1968-1935) Challenge of Terrorist Organizations 1968 marked twenty years of fighting between Israel and various Palestinian rebel organizations. This struggle was fought in the dense thickets of the Jordan Valley, in the mountains and

From the book "Mossad" - the first half century author Kunz I

Special Forces Soldiers and officers of special forces in many countries are considered the most rude and bloodthirsty representatives of the armed forces. In Israel it was given great value education of the members of these units in the spirit of high morality and they are in

All four years of war German intelligence trustingly “fed” the misinformation that Lubyanka provided her

Summer 1941 Soviet intelligence officers began an operation that is still considered the “highest aerobatics” of secret warfare and has been included in textbooks on intelligence craft. It lasted almost the entire war and different stages was called differently - “Monastery”, “Couriers”, and then “Berezino”.

Her idea initially was to convey to the German intelligence center a targeted “misinformation” about an anti-Soviet religious-monarchist organization allegedly existing in Moscow, to force enemy intelligence officers to believe in it as real strength. And thus penetrate the Nazi intelligence network in the Soviet Union.

The FSB declassified the materials of the operation only after 55 years of Victory over fascism.

The security officers recruited a representative of a noble noble family, Boris Sadovsky, to work. With the establishment Soviet power he had lost his fortune and was naturally hostile towards her.

He lived in a small house in the Novodevichy Convent. Being disabled, I almost never left it. In July 1941, Sadovsky wrote a poem, which soon became the property of counterintelligence, in which he addressed the Nazi occupiers as “brother liberators” and called on Hitler to restore Russian autocracy.

It was he who was decided to be used as the leader of the legendary “Throne” organization, especially since Sadovsky was actually looking for an opportunity to somehow contact the Germans.

To “help” him, a secret Lubyanka employee, Alexander Demyanov, who had the operational pseudonym “Heine,” was included in the game.

His great-grandfather Anton Golovaty was the first ataman of the Kuban Cossacks, his father was a Cossack esaul who died in the first world war. The mother came from a princely family, graduated from the Bestuzhev courses at the Smolny Institute noble maidens and in the pre-revolutionary years she was considered one of the most striking beauties in the aristocratic circles of Petrograd.

Until 1914, Demyanov lived and was raised abroad. He was recruited by the OGPU in 1929. Possessing noble manners and a pleasant appearance, “Heine” easily got along with film actors, writers, playwrights, and poets, in whose circles he moved with the blessing of the security officers. Before the war, in order to suppress terrorist attacks, he specialized in developing connections between the nobles who remained in the USSR and foreign emigration. An experienced agent with such data quickly won the trust of the monarchist poet Boris Sadovsky.

On February 17, 1942, Demyanov - “Heine” crossed the front line and surrendered to the Germans, declaring that he was a representative of the anti-Soviet underground. The intelligence officer told the Abwehr officer about the Throne organization and that he had been sent by its leaders to communicate with the German command. At first they didn’t believe him, they subjected him to a series of interrogations and thorough checks, including a mock execution and the planting of weapons from which he could shoot his tormentors and escape. However, his restraint, clear line of behavior, and the credibility of the legend, supported by real-life persons and circumstances, eventually made the German counterintelligence officers believe.

It also played a role that even before the war, the Moscow station of the Abwehr* took note of Demyanov as a possible candidate for recruitment and even gave him the nickname “Max”.

*Abwehr - the military intelligence and counterintelligence body of Germany in 1919-1944, was part of the Wehrmacht High Command.

Under it, he appeared in the card index of Moscow agents in 1941, under it, after three weeks of learning the basics of espionage, he was parachuted into the Soviet rear on March 15, 1942. Demyanov was to settle in the Rybinsk region with the task of conducting active military-political reconnaissance. From the Throne organization, the Abwehr expected the intensification of pacifist propaganda among the population, the deployment of sabotage and sabotage.

There was a two-week pause at the Lubyanka so as not to arouse suspicion among the Abwehr men at the ease with which their new agent was legalized.

Finally, "Max" transmitted his first disinformation. Soon, in order to strengthen Demyanov’s position in German intelligence and through him to supply the Germans with false data of strategic importance, he was hired as a liaison officer under the chief General Staff Marshal Shaposhnikov.

Admiral Canaris, the head of the Abwehr (nicknamed Janus, the “Sly Fox”) considered it his great success that he had obtained a “source of information” in such high spheres, and could not help but boast of this success to his rival, the head of the VI Directorate of the RSHA, SS-Brigadeführer Walter Schellenberg. In his memoirs written after the war in English captivity, he testified with envy that military intelligence had “her own man” near Marshal Shaposhnikov, from whom she received a lot of “valuable information.” At the beginning of August 1942, “Max” informed the Germans that the organization’s existing transmitter was becoming unusable and required replacement.

Soon, two Abwehr couriers arrived at the NKVD safe house in Moscow, delivering 10 thousand rubles and food. They reported the location of the radio they had hidden.

The first group of German agents remained at large for ten days so that security officers could check their appearances and find out if they had connections with anyone else. Then the messengers were arrested, and the radio they delivered was found. And “Max” radioed the Germans that the couriers had arrived, but the transmitted radio was damaged upon landing.

Two months later, two more signalmen appeared from behind the front line with two radio transmitters and various spy equipment. They had the task not only to help “Max”, but also to settle in Moscow themselves, collect and transmit their intelligence information via a second radio. Both agents were re-recruited, and they reported to the Walli headquarters - the Abwehr center - that they had successfully arrived and began the task. From that moment on, the operation developed in two directions: on the one hand, on behalf of the monarchical organization “Throne” and resident “Max”, on the other, on behalf of Abwehr agents “Zyubin” and “Alaev”, allegedly relying on their own connections in Moscow. A new stage of the secret duel has begun - Operation Couriers.

In November 1942, in response to a request from the Valley headquarters about the possibility of expanding the geography of the Throne organization to the cities of Yaroslavl, Murom and Ryazan and sending agents there for further work“Max” conveyed that the city of Gorky, where the Throne cell had been created, was better suited. The Germans agreed to this, and the counterintelligence officers took care of the “meeting” of the couriers. Satisfying the requests of the Abwehrites, the security officers sent them extensive disinformation prepared at the General Staff of the Red Army, and more and more enemy intelligence agents were called to false safe houses.

In Berlin they were very pleased with the work of “Max” and the agents introduced with his help. On December 20, Admiral Canaris congratulated his Moscow resident on being awarded the Iron Cross, First Class, and Mikhail Kalinin then signed a Decree awarding Demyanov the Order of the Red Star. The result of the radio games “Monastery” and “Couriers” was the arrest of 23 German agents and their accomplices, who had with them more than 2 million rubles of Soviet money, several radio stations, large number documents, weapons, equipment.

In the summer of 1944, the operational game received a new continuation called “Berezino”. “Max” reported to the “Valli” headquarters that he was “sent” to Minsk, which had just been occupied by Soviet troops. Soon the Abwehr received a message from there that numerous groups were making their way to the west through the Belarusian forests German soldiers and officers who were surrounded as a result of the Soviet offensive. Since the radio interception data indicated the desire of the Nazi command not only to help them break through to their own, but also to use it to disorganize the enemy rear, the security officers decided to play on this. Soon, People's Commissar of State Security Merkulov reported to Stalin, Molotov and Beria the plan for a new operation. The go-ahead was received.

On August 18, 1944, the Moscow radio station "Trone" reported to the Germans that "Max" accidentally ran into someone emerging from the encirclement. military unit Wehrmacht, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Gerhard Scherhorn. The “surroundings” are in great need of food, weapons, and ammunition. For seven days they waited in Lubyanka for an answer: the Abwehr men, apparently, were making inquiries about Scherhorn and his “troops.” And on the eighth a radiogram arrived: “Please help us contact this German part. We intend to drop various loads for them and send a radio operator.”

On the night of September 15-16, 1944, three Abwehr envoys landed by parachute in the area of Lake Pesochnoe in the Minsk region, where Scherhorn’s regiment was allegedly “hiding.” Soon two of them were recruited and included in the radio game.

Then the Abwehr sent two more officers with letters addressed to Scherhorn from the commander of Army Group Center, Colonel General Reinhardt, and the head of Abwehrkommando 103, Barfeld. The flow of cargo “breaking through from the encirclement” increased, and along with them came more and more “inspectors” who had the task, as they later admitted during interrogations, to find out whether these were the people they claimed to be. But everything was done cleanly. So clear that the last radiogram to Scherhorn, transmitted from Abwehrkommando 103 on May 5, 1945, after the surrender of Berlin, said:

“It is with a heavy heart that we must stop providing assistance to you. Due to the current situation, we are also no longer able to maintain radio contact with you. Whatever the future brings, our thoughts will always be with you."

It was the end of the game. Soviet intelligence brilliantly outplayed the intelligence of Nazi Germany.

The success of Operation Berezino was facilitated by the fact that real German officers who went over to the Red Army. They convincingly portrayed the surviving regiment, including recruited paratroopers and liaison officers.

From archival data: from September 1944 to May 1945, the German command carried out 39 sorties to our rear and dropped 22 German intelligence officers (all of them were arrested by Soviet counterintelligence officers), 13 radio stations, 255 pieces of cargo with weapons, uniforms, food, ammunition, medicines, and 1,777,000 rubles. Germany continued supplying “its” detachment until the very end of the war.

How to outwit the enemy and “feed” him with misinformation? The employees of the Soviet General Staff knew the answer to this question. A striking example of a clearly planned " theatrical production"is Operation Anadyr." Neither the Americans nor the British knew until the last moment what the General Staff was actually trying to do. And when they realized it, it was already too late.

The fact that our troops visited the Dark Continent was also not advertised for a long time. Although, back in 1988, the Americans “gently” hinted at this by making the film “Red Scorpion” with Dolph Lundgren in the title role.

Soviet military personnel visited Angola, Libya, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Egypt. The Pravda newspaper periodically wrote about this, but few believed those articles. But as time has shown, it was in vain. Now, thanks to the fact that many documents have been declassified, it has become known: a Soviet contingent of about 11 thousand people was stationed in Angola, with a little more in Ethiopia. The largest group was located in Mozambique - about 30 thousand people.

More than 50 thousand Soviet troops visited African countries

Soviet military personnel in Africa were mainly engaged in training local soldiers. But sometimes they themselves had to become direct participants in hostilities. As, for example, it was in Angola.

The urgent message arrived on September 30, 1985. It said that in Beirut terrorists had captured four employees of the Soviet embassy (two of them were representatives of the KGB).

The terrorist organization Hezbollah claimed responsibility for this, and activists from Fatah helped it. This was done by political considerations. The terrorists thus wanted to put pressure on Moscow so that it would “advise” Syria to leave the territories controlled by Hezbollah alone.

Hezbollah wanted to put pressure on Moscow

Soon, a representative of the Soviet intelligence services and the Ayatollah met in Beirut. During the conversation, the spiritual leader of the terrorist organization was told that if Hezbollah continued to be stubborn, then “quite by chance” some rocket would fall on one of the main Shiite shrines. For example, the Iranian city of Qom. The Ayatollah thanked Allah in response. That's where we parted ways. After some time, the hostages were released.

For a long time the fact that Soviet troops participated in Vietnam War, was hiding. True, the Americans themselves, in films about that armed conflict, very often presented the red units as their main opponents, and not the Vietnamese.
The first Soviet military personnel were sent to Vietnam in the spring of 1965, after the Americans began a massive bombing of that country.

In Vietnam, the Soviet military trained local soldiers in military craft

Operation Vietnamese Throw, of course, was strictly classified. Therefore, the military were dressed in civilian clothes before being sent, and their letters from there were subject to strict censorship. As a result, it turned out as if the soldiers had gone not to war, but to rest in exotic country. In total, about 10 thousand Soviet troops were sent to Vietnam. Their main task was to train the Vietnamese in military skills. In addition, about 2 thousand tanks, 700 aircraft and 7 thousand guns were sent there. Our specialists also deployed an air defense system over Vietnam.

This 1976 operation was carried out jointly with Cuban intelligence services. The KGB and DGI began to form the “correct” public opinion in relation to the Pinochet regime.

According to former KGB officer Vasily Mitrokhin, the operation was personally invented by Andropov. The main task was to denigrate the image of Pinochet in the media as much as possible and force human rights activists from outside to put pressure on the leader of Chile.

The purpose of the operation is to tarnish the image of the Chilean leader

And it started spinning. The New York Times alone published about 70 articles alleging human rights violations in Chile. But the main thing is the fabricated letter. It stated that US intelligence had been subjected to political persecution by the Chilean DINA.

This name was given to one of the most secret and large-scale operations of the USSR. From the military, in fact, it was extremely necessary difficult task: secretly from the American intelligence services to deliver missiles, bombs and combat units to Cuba. In total, more than 230 thousand tons of material and technical resources and over 50 thousand personnel.

To pull it all off, serious preparation and a high-quality “legend” for meticulous opponents were required. Therefore, transports were taught as a relocation of the military forces of the USSR. In order for everything to correspond to the legend, dummies of tanks, guns and other equipment were placed on the ships.

Only the highest military officials knew about the details of the operation.

The strictest secrecy was maintained. Only the highest military officials knew about the true direction of the transports. Everyone else was told that the cargo needed to be delivered to Chukotka. More precisely, to the port of Anadyr. Actually, that is why the operation was given such a name.

For a long time, American intelligence agencies could not understand what was happening. Only in mid-October 1962, after analyzing all the data, did the CIA realize that a red “nuclear umbrella” had opened over Cuba. The USSR General Staff managed to deceive the Stars and Stripes.

Operation Whirlwind

In one day, all the main objects in Budapest were captured, members of the Imre Nagy government took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy.

Elimination of Stepan Bandera

When Stashinsky next arrived in Munich, he already had the murder weapon (a miniature double-barreled device loaded with ampoules of potassium cyanide), an inhaler and protective pills.

Operation Toucan

In addition to acts of retaliation and organizing the suppression of uprisings, the KGB of the USSR also devoted a lot of effort to supporting regimes that were favorable to the Soviet Union abroad and fighting those that were undesirable.

In 1976, the KGB, together with the Cuban intelligence service DGI, organized Operation Toucan. It consisted of forming the necessary public opinion in relation to the regime of Augusto Pinochet, who repeatedly stated that his and Chile’s main enemy was the Communist Party. According to former KGB officer Vasily Mitrokhin, the idea of the operation belonged personally to Yuri Andropov.

“Toucan” had two goals: to give a negative image of Pinochet in the media and to stimulate human rights organizations to begin active efforts to exert external pressure on the leader of Chile. Information war has been declared. The third most popular American newspaper, the New York Times, published as many as 66 articles on human rights in Chile, 4 articles on the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia and 3 articles on human rights in Cuba.

During Operation Toucan, the KGB also fabricated a letter accusing American intelligence of political persecution of the Chilean intelligence service DINA. Subsequently, many journalists, including Jack Anderson of the New York Times, even used this fabricated letter as evidence of the CIA's involvement in the unpleasant aspects of Operation Condor, aimed at eliminating political opposition in several South American countries.

Recruitment of John Walker

The KGB was known for its many successful recruitments of Western intelligence services. One of the most successful was the recruitment of American cryptographer John Walker in 1967.

He ended up in the dock thanks to the testimony of his ex-wife Barbara. He was sentenced to life imprisonment.