Requisites
Abakumov’s arrest was like a bolt from the blue for me. For what, why? – they didn’t say a word about this to us, the staff workers. And there is no one to ask - the situation is not conducive. I was immediately removed from the post of the Secretariat and temporarily assigned to the reserve. The situation, you understand, is rotten. One day I came to collect my salary from the Personnel Department, and they said: “Go, Ivan Aleksandrovich, to Kazakhstan, you will be the head of the camp department in Karaganda.” I had to agree, but I refused - I wanted to go to the North to book a Moscow apartment. It was a pity to lose her: I had just settled in, she was the first in my life, I used to live in a communal apartment. I’m waiting for an appointment, but they call me to Pushkinskaya, to the Union Prosecutor’s Office, and arrest me. They brought me to Matrosskaya Tishina and took me for interrogation that same evening. When I heard that they were accusing me of enemy activity, I almost crushed a cut glass of water in my palm. Am I the enemy?!
I didn’t eat anything for nine days - no, I didn’t go on a hunger strike, I just couldn’t get a bite into my throat. I sit like an idol, and in confusion I think - what kind of enemy am I, what have I done against the workers’ and peasants’ government? I am of the most proletarian origin, I have been in the police since 1932, after the NKVD school I was on operational work. In 1936, he carried out an operation in China - it was necessary to deliver weapons through Mongolia for military units Mao Tse-Tung in Yan'an. And then the Japanese attacked China, Chiang Kai-Shek turned to us for help, Mao became close to the Kuomintang, and our work lost its meaning. Then Berzin filed a petition with Yezhov for my transfer to the RKKA Intelligence Department - that’s how I got there. Before the war, he was assistant to the head of the Special Operations Department at the General Staff, still working on China there, and in September 1941 he submitted a report to be sent to the active army.
They called me to the Directorate of Special Departments to see Abakumov. He looked at me point-blank and said: “You are behind the KGB life, you will be the deputy head of the department, we cannot give more.” And I hold the rank of senior battalion commissar, three sleepers in my buttonhole. But since there is a war, is it possible to refuse?
With the onset of cold weather, I moved to Lubyanka, a group of managers and a small part of the operational staff remained there - the main forces were evacuated to Kuibyshev. They worked day and night, slept when they had to, in fits and starts, and washed in the Inner Prison, where there was a shower. Oh, just to know that in ten years I will...
Less than six months later, I was made the head of the department, and in April 1943, shortly after the creation of the Smersh Main Directorate for the Defense of the Russian Federation, I was appointed head of the Secretariat. I denied it, explained that I liked operational work, but Abakumov was adamant: “I like it, I don’t like it - this is not a conversation!” To tell the truth, I was not drawn there because Broverman, who had previously been in charge of the Secretariat, was left there as a deputy. He placed people in positions, was in their honor, but here he had to stoop lower. The person may be harboring a grudge, how to work with him? But nothing, we worked together, mainly, I think, for the reason that they did not overlap: he was minding his own business - preparing information for Headquarters Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and I provided the rest.
From then on, I had to come into close contact with Abakumov. Although Viktor Semenovich was young, he enjoyed great authority; he was highly respected at the Smersh State Administration for the Protection of the Russian Federation. He paid most attention to investigative work, knew it well, and it was carried out actively. He kept a tight grip on the heads of departments in the center and at the fronts and did not give anyone any concessions. He was abrasive - yes, it happened in all sorts of ways, but there was no noticeable swagger behind him. On the contrary, if he happened to offend someone, he would then call them into his office and punish them back. I know from myself: sometimes he will start scolding in front of strangers so that they feel responsible, and at night he will take a moment and say - don’t pay attention, this was necessary for educational purposes.
The war ended, Abakumov was appointed Minister of State Security instead of Merkulov, and I remained in the Smersh State Security Administration. Seven months passed, I don’t remember exactly, I was getting ready to go on vacation then, received a ticket to Kislovodsk, and suddenly - a call to Abakumov. I show up, and he tells me: “Go to work as the head of the MGB Secretariat.” I stood at attention and - “I obey, Comrade Colonel General!” He got to work, and there again Broverman was cooking his “kitchen”, preparing memos to Stalin.
I had to work a lot, the document flow in the ministry was much greater than in the Smersh State Budgetary Institution. Abakumov - he is demanding, intolerant of any manifestations of negligence or illiteracy, and every day I reported to him mail: letters, government orders, encrypted messages, notes via HF. He usually received me at the end of the working day, at about 5 in the morning, and the report lasted about forty to fifty minutes. After that I went home to get some sleep, and at ten o’clock I was back at work. I worked until the evening, between nineteen and twenty-two I managed to take a nap for an hour or two, and at night I again prepared for the report. And so for five years...
Yes, I got distracted, it’s time to return to “Matrosskaya Tishina”. So, they noticed that I wasn’t eating anything, they called the prison doctor, and she gave me castor oil. I began to eat little by little, I don’t remember what, but there were no complaints about the food. They interrogated me politely, without rudeness or scuffles. Military prosecutors are educated, ceremonious people; with them you feel like a human being. And the questions were clear: what do I know about Abakumov, what are his habits, who did he talk to on the phone in front of me, what were these conversations about, did he appropriate trophy property, and so on. What is typical is that they wrote down in the protocol only what I said, and readily corrected the text if I disagreed with something. Then they asked tougher questions: did I take part in correcting the interrogation protocols of those arrested, what did this involve, were there any cases of misuse of funds intended for operational needs, what did Broverman report to me about his “kitchen”, why did I not send letters to the address? , written by prisoners of the Internal and Lefortovo prisons of the MGB?
During interrogations, I did not play around, I gave evidence to the best of what I knew. I had nothing to do with the Investigative Unit for Particularly Important Cases, I did not work with those arrested, I did not draw up or correct “generalized” interrogation protocols, I did not touch Broverman’s “kitchen” - he directly contacted the minister, and letters from prisoners were reported to Abakumov and passed on to him officials who he called me. This was the order established in the MGB before my arrival, and I strictly observed it.
And he didn’t hide anything about the operational amounts - he told everything that he heard from the guys from Abakumov’s personal security. It must be said that Viktor Semenovich did not like to drive a car, he preferred to walk, and on the streets he ordered those accompanying him to give one hundred rubles to beggars, mainly old women. He liked it when old women crossed themselves, thanking them for their alms. I also remembered that the guards brought Abakumov kebabs from “Aragvi” - he was partial to good kebabs. Investigators, it turns out, already knew about this - they interrogated the head of security Kuznetsov, bodyguard Agureev and the drivers who served the minister.
In February 1952, I was transferred to Lubyanka, and a few days later to Lefortovo, where MGB investigators replaced military prosecutors. There they interrogated me every night in order to deprive me of sleep and break my psyche, and when this did not work, they handcuffed me. The handcuffs used were “strict” - as you move your hands, they “jump” and squeeze even more tightly. Once they brought me to Ryumin. I didn’t know him before, I saw him briefly, but I didn’t have to talk. “You, Chernov, are not a stupid person,” he said. - You must understand that your fate is predetermined. Post everything you know. You have nowhere to go anyway. If you don’t testify, they will carry you out feet first. We don’t need small facts - talk about how Abakumov was preparing to seize power?” And then they started using threats, swearing and punching.
What they did to me is still hard to remember, although so much water has passed under the bridge. Konyakhin - the same one who had previously been the deputy head of the administrative department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), and now took Komarov’s place - stuck to his throat like a knife: “Tell me, how Abakumov planned to distribute ministerial portfolios?” “What are you talking about,” I answer, “what kind of briefcases?!” “Oh, so,” Konyakhin muttered. “We’ll send you to room 65, you’ll start talking there!”
Then I didn’t know what was in room 65. I’m standing, waiting, my hands behind my back, handcuffed, incredibly swollen, and he looks at me like a cat at a mouse, his eyes sparkle - and calls for a convoy. They led me - there were two guards behind me, an officer next to me, holding me by the elbow, and I felt his hand trembling. They brought me to the door with the number “65”, pushed me in, and there was Mironov, the head of the Internal Prison, and with him three “executors”. “Are you going to testify, you bastard?!” - Mironov shouted and, without waiting for an answer, gave a sign to the three. They took up rubber sticks and began to treat me en masse. I don’t remember how long the torture lasted, my mind went beyond my mind, and it ended with rectal prolapse...
The regime in Lefortovo prison is worse than ever: they were deprived of walks, a kiosk, books, they were fed from hand to mouth, I was hungry all the time. And the cold was very tormenting - winter was outside, and in my cell the heating was turned off, the walls were covered with frost. And the fact that they did not allow me to sleep, I somehow coped with this, the long-standing habit of resting in fits and starts, wherever necessary and in any position, affected. I pull my head into my shoulders, wrap myself tightly in my jacket and doze off, and when I hear that the warden is creeping up to the door to look through the peephole, I begin to blink. I have a light sleep, and my hearing is normal, but it’s difficult to approach the cell in Lefortovo silently, there are galleries and stairs made of metal. God forbid, if they notice that you are sleeping, they will instantly throw you in a punishment cell for violating the rules. What to expect from them: all guards are service workers, especially women.
Investigator Sokolov was amazed: “How come you, Chernov, didn’t break down? Everyone breaks, but you hold on. Looks like you're sneaking around unnoticed during the day? We’ll have to set up a special post at your cell so that the warden won’t take his eyes off you.” But he didn’t expose me - either he forgot about the threat, or he felt sorry for me. You can’t fully understand them: either they swear and, baring their teeth, come at you with their fists, or they let you smoke. They light a cigarette and put it in my teeth - in handcuffs I’m helpless as a baby, I’m not even able to scratch myself.
They pressed hard, demanding that Abakumov’s conspiracy be exposed, and then they abruptly changed tactics - they decided to first dirty me from head to toe, so that there would be nothing to hope for. Confess, they say that you composed falsified letters from the “aviators” to the Leader of the Nations! I don’t care, this didn’t happen and that’s it, even if you cut it into pieces. Then they confronted Broverman, who muttered as if this was my job. “What are you weaving? – I shouted to Broverman in anger. – Are you settling scores with me for old things? Is it my fault that you were demoted?” Broverman is silent, looks away, and I’m shaking. “How long have you been beaten? – I ask him. “Third month,” he squeezed out. “What are you doing? - I turn to the investigators. “Are you using batons to force us to slander each other?!” And at least they drew up a protocol and didn’t include my words there.
The whole next day I didn’t sleep a wink – I thought and thought. Since something was investigated incorrectly in the Investigative Unit for particularly important cases, then they should answer, Ogoltsov as the first deputy minister who oversaw them, and, of course, Abakumov - he is responsible for everyone, but why do they need me? In my service, no violations were revealed, except perhaps for letters written by those arrested and not forwarded to the address... And Broverman - what is Broverman? He is for himself, I didn’t delve into his affairs!.. In general, I thought and thought and came up with nothing. How was I supposed to know that Ryumin didn’t have enough Jews in general’s and colonel’s uniform for the conspiracy, but nothing but fish and crab: I’m Russian, but my wife is Jewish!
After the confrontation, we were not interrogated for two weeks. I can’t imagine why. I then say to Zakharov, the deputy head of the Lefortovo prison: “If they don’t call you in for interrogation tomorrow, I’ll run away and break my head on the heating radiator!” They called me in and made me sign a protocol in which I admit that I edited those letters from the “aviators.” And when they saw that I wouldn’t sign, they took up their batons.
I held on for some days, and then... They had a well-established sadistic technique - they would turn you over on your back, take off your trousers, spread your legs and let them whip you with a rawhide whip. The pain is inexpressible, especially if they hit with a draw. After such torture, I drank a carafe of water, I was thirsty - everything inside was on fire. Here you can even sign that you strangled your own mother three years before you were born...
Since the summer of 1953, I have hardly been interrogated - so, sometimes they will call me to clarify some little thing, and that’s all. Thank God, they also stopped beating. I’m sitting in Lefortovo, month after month goes by, and when it’s all over, just guess. Of course, I don’t show curiosity - why? Once, back in the winter, I asked the investigator if there was enough material for a “tower”, he gestured to show what he was doing, so he didn’t ask any questions.
Spending two years in solitary confinement is a chore; you see only investigators and guards, and you can’t exchange a word with them. Once I asked to be transferred to a general cell, and the writer Lev Sheinin was assigned to me. He came up to me this way and that, asking who I was, why I was in prison, but I became so wild, unaccustomed to people, that I kept silent and even called myself by someone else’s name. And then, when we were transferred separately to the Inner Prison, we again ended up in the same cell and became friends. He, Lyova, is stingy, he won’t share anything from the prison stall for discharge, but nothing, he told different stories, consulted with me. “You know,” he says, “I’m not one of the last lawyers, after all, I’m a state counselor of justice of the 2nd class, in your opinion, a lieutenant general, but I can’t understand a damn thing about my business!” He listened to my opinion and praised me: “Well done, Ivan Aleksandrovich, you’re great at putting everything into order!”
From him I learned that Beria had been imprisoned. Sheinin, of course, was not told this, but Leva is smart - based on the nature of the entries in the interrogation protocol, he himself guessed everything and immediately wrote a letter to Khrushchev; they have known each other for a long time. The main thing was that there was a case when Lyova did him a favor: he was part of a commission that, on instructions from the Politburo, checked something in Ukraine, and drew up a certificate in favor of Khrushchev. And Rudenko was one of his friends, apparently he also put in a good word - in general, Lyova was soon released. At parting, he said: “Vanya, I understand, you are sitting in a position,” and promised to help through Rudenko: “You’ll see, Roman Andreevich is a man!”
1953 passed, 1954 came, and nothing became clearer in our case, it was a complete fog. There was, however, a surge - either in May or in June, I don’t remember exactly - incriminating material was presented for review in accordance with Article 206 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR, and then everything died down again for a long time. Over the summer I got stronger, took up physical training, walked twenty thousand steps around the cell every day, and waited to see what would happen next. They announced to me that the trial would take place in Leningrad, only in December, before departure. They took me there on a regular train, in a docked carriage, without handcuffs, as if I was not under arrest, but on a business trip. As the train started moving, Talanov, the new head of the Internal Prison, who was responsible for our delivery, looked into the compartment and politely asked: “Chernov, how are things settled?” “Great,” I respond. “Why don’t you give us wine along the way?” Talanov was amused and said: “When we take you back, we’ll definitely give it to you!”
We were tried in the district House of Officers. I had never met my lawyer before; we met directly at the court hearing. To this day I still don’t understand why it was needed. We didn’t talk about anything, only once I asked in a whisper: “The trial is going on, but not a word is said about me - they don’t question me and almost don’t mention me?” And he responded: “Very good. Sit and keep quiet."
When it was my turn to speak at the trial, I refused the testimony extracted from me during the preliminary investigation and firmly stated that I did not correct the “generalized” protocols of the “aviators” - such work was entrusted only to the masters of this matter. “Who do you consider masters?” - asked Rudenko, who supported the prosecution. “The Chief Master was Shvartsman, and the Master was Broverman,” I said without hesitation. “We know about you, Chernov,” Rudenko noted significantly. “You are a famous master of putting everything into order!” As he said this, I began to hope that there is truth on earth - I didn’t let you down, which means Lev Romanovich Sheinin kept his word!
At the trial, Broverman exposed everyone, especially me, and Abakumov behaved with great dignity. I won’t say anything about the others, I don’t remember, I had no time for that - I was waiting to see how everything would turn out. And when Rudenko demanded twenty-five years in prison for me, that’s when I realized what kind of benefactors I was dealing with. In the last word I denied guilt to Soviet power, and they gave me fifteen years, but not in prison, but in camps. Broverman grabbed a quarter, and the rest were shot. Abakumov, I remember, not a single vein in his face trembled, as if it wasn’t about him.
And then there were stages and camps - Petropavlovsk, Karaganda, Taishet, sunny Mordovia, Dubrovlag - all the political prisoners were eventually brought there. Everywhere the camp authorities asked me how everything had happened - they were interested, but of course you wouldn’t understand a damn thing from the newspapers. Either one of them spilled the beans, or else they found out about me, but the Benderaites passed me on “on the baton” and more than once made attempts on my life - they threw bricks from the roofs. It’s difficult for the Chekists to survive in the camps; everyone is against us.
I met Broverman in Yavaz. If I had come across him immediately after the verdict, I would have torn him to pieces, would have gnawed his throat, there was so much anger in me, but then we sat down on the logs and calmly talked. “If you have even a drop of conscience left in you,” I say, “write to the Supreme Court that you slandered me in order to save your life. Don’t drift, now they won’t shoot you.” He promised, but didn't write anything. And we never saw each other again. I heard a rumor that after serving his sentence he was sent to a mental hospital, but he did not show up there. In general, Broverman disappeared.
I was “re-educated” in the camps, and my loved ones were freed. They were given wolf passports, with which they were not allowed to do even the dirtiest work; they were driven from place to place, and tortured in every way. My mother, wife and eldest son died from grief and hardship... I sent complaints, many complaints, but under Khrushchev they were not allowed to go forward. It was later, already under Brezhnev, that prosecutor Rudenko relented and protested, admitting that I, Chernov, was not a traitor to the motherland, but only a saboteur and participant in a counter-revolutionary conspiracy. So it turned out that for no reason at all I sat for barbed wire instead of fifteen years, only fourteen and a half.
After the end of the Great Patriotic War, the Ministry of State Security was struck by massive corruption. KGB officers stole railroad cars, opened underground workshops, and closed cases for bribes. The head of the MGB, Abakumov, was eventually arrested. This example clearly shows how important it is to have competition among law enforcement agencies.
(In the picture above: Abakumov, Merkulov and Beria)
In Russian public opinion(and earlier in the Soviet Union) there is a strong opinion that “under Stalin there was order.” However, the archives show that even the “Order of the Sword Bearers” and the “cadre elite” - state security - were affected by corruption, arbitrariness, drunkenness and debauchery.
The Ministry of State Security (MGB) was headed in 1946 by Viktor Abakumov, who during the war headed SMERSH and worked as Deputy Minister of Defense (de jure - Stalin's deputy). KGB personnel Viktor Stepakov (the book “Apostle of SMERSH”), Anatoly Tereshchenko, Oleg Smyslov (the book “Viktor Abakumov: Executioner or Victim”) in their biographies of the head of the MGB Abakumov recall how he and his apparatus went towards everyday and official decay.
Viktor Abakumov came from a working-class family, with virtually no education (4th grade school). He was a product of the decomposition of the NEP system and the transition to a totalitarian state, combining in himself a passion for beautiful life and at the same time a rigid system. In the late 1930s - early 1940s, Stalin, seeing how dangerous it was to delegate power powers only to state security (the NKVD of the times of Yagoda and Yezhov, which actually became a state within a state), began to create a system of checks and balances. The NKVD was divided into two parts - actually the Commissariat of Internal Affairs itself and state security; a little later, SMERSH appeared - formally army counterintelligence, but in fact KGB control over the army. At the same time, the Party Control Committee was strengthened.
The MGB, which was headed by Abakumov, mainly recruited army personnel, as well as “jackets” - civilians who graduated from humanitarian universities. A significant percentage of the new ministry was occupied by partisans and security officers who were engaged in sabotage activities during the war. Stalin, who gave the go-ahead for such personnel in the MGB, was confident that the ministry, unlike the NKVD of the 1930s with such personnel, would be guaranteed against “degeneration.” However, reality presented the darkest lessons.
Stalin's new system of checks and balances in the second half of the 1940s led to the fact that the security forces were looking for dirt on each other with tripled energy. Abakumov’s MGB was the first to fall, plunging into the mud of “rebirth,” for which the minister himself was eventually arrested in 1951, and shot in 1954.
But at the same time, the new Stalinist system at that time clearly began to demonstrate both class degeneration and the introduction of class justice (as under the Tsar). The overwhelming majority of cases against KGB criminals ended with symbolic punishments, and even if prison sentences were applied to them, they were in no way comparable to what people from other classes received for similar crimes.
Dry reports from the archives given by the above-mentioned authors speak best.
Immediately after the Second World War, many cases of captured atrocities arose against high-ranking officials of the MGB, but most of them were let go. Thus, the head of the Counterintelligence Directorate of the USSR Navy in 1943-1946, Lieutenant General P.A. Gladkov, was removed for illegally spending large public funds, appropriating cars, rationed products and manufactured goods. He also transferred three cars into personal ownership to his deputies - generals Karandashev, Lebedev and Dukhovich, organized the purchase in thrift stores and from private individuals of property for employees of the Navy Counterintelligence Directorate for 2 million 35 thousand rubles (with the then average salary in the country being 600 rubles ). In 1947, Gladkov got off with an administrative penalty.
In March 1947, the head of the UMGB for the Arkhangelsk region, A.I. Brezgin, by decision of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, was removed from his post and soon expelled from the party for the fact that, until the summer of 1945, he was the head of the counterintelligence department “Smersh” of the 48th Army in East Prussia, first organized the delivery of trophies (mainly furniture) to his Moscow apartment on three trucks with two trailers. Then Brezgin assembled a train of 28 cars with furniture, pianos, cars, bicycles, radios, carpets, etc., which arrived from Germany to Kazan, where the security officer received the post of head of the counterintelligence department of the Volga Military District. All this property was appropriated by Brezgin and his deputies - Pavlenko, Paliev and others. The security officers openly sold off the surplus. Years later, Paliev also had to answer for his excesses: in May 1949, he lost his position.
“Trophy cases” were investigated for a long time, and those responsible were often repressed in connection with the struggle between the clans of Minister of State Security Abakumov and Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs I.A. Serov. Arrest in December 1952 of Lieutenant General N.S. Vlasik, in 1946-1952. who worked as the head of the Main Security Directorate of the USSR Ministry of State Security, led to the subsequent conviction of the head of Stalin’s security (in January 1955) for official misconduct to 10 years of exile, followed by a quick amnesty. In total, Vlasik was charged with theft of trophy property worth 2.2 million rubles. In 2000, he was completely rehabilitated (posthumously).
In the central apparatus of the MGB, not only ministers and their deputies could count on receiving large illegal profits. It was not difficult for foreign intelligence workers to hide the expenditure of operational funds for their own needs. A certificate from the Personnel Directorate of the USSR MGB dated January 30, 1947 indicated that the former deputy head of the 4th Directorate of the MGB, Major General N.I. Eitingon ( known organization murders of Zhang Zuolin and Leon Trotsky), “among other senior officials, he admitted the possibility of using products and funds intended for operational purposes for purposes other than their intended purpose,” about which the leadership of the MGB “in relation to Eitingon limited himself to analysis and suggestion.” The indictment stated that Eitingon received 705 thousand rubles in “gifts” alone.
MGB officers abroad were also involved in plundering. The representative of the MGB task force on the Liaodong Peninsula, V.G. Sluchevsky, was expelled from the party in February 1949 for taking bribes from arrested Koreans from South Korea; The security officer got away with dismissal from the MGB. Advisor to the MGB in Czechoslovakia, Colonel V.A. Boyarsky, who had previously distinguished himself in robberies of the inhabitants of Manchuria, received a party reprimand in February 1952 for “excessive spending on personal services for himself and his apparatus” (about 500 thousand rubles). For Boyarsky, this episode had no consequences - in 1951 he was transferred to the apparatus of the MGB-MVD of Lithuania.
(Photo of Abakumov from the investigative file)
Some heads of local state security agencies were caught committing large speculative enterprises. K.O. Mikautadze, People's Commissar of State Security of the Adjarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, was sentenced to 8 years in prison for official crimes (released less than two years later due to an amnesty and illness). In 1944-1945, with the sanction of Mikautadze, his deputies - Skhirtladze and Berulava - together with other NKGB officers, through the speculator Akopyan, committed a number of frauds and speculative transactions.
Having provided Akopyan with a false ID of a state security officer, the security officers sent him to sell fruit, and he, under the guise of gifts for front-line soldiers and workers of the Leningrad automobile repair plant, exported 10 tons of tangerines and other fruits to other regions (at the same time, Akopyan took with him five more speculators, from whom he received for this trip 100 thousand rubles). Having sold the fruit, Hakobyan bought cars, motorcycles, clothes and other goods, which were then dismantled by employees of the Republican NKGB. Mikautadze’s wife received 50 thousand rubles from the resale of various goods.
In 1946, the newly appointed head of the MGB department, V.I. Moskalenko, took hams, sausages and other products from the warehouse, illegally organized a sewing workshop in the internal prison of the MGB, sewed four suits for free in this workshop and allowed other UMGB employees to sew suits for free. Moskalenko admitted his guilt only to using a prisoner tailor to sew suits. The Union MGB limited itself to Moskalenko’s explanation and, as “punishment,” appointed him Minister of State Security of the Estonian SSR.
It turned out that during 1943-1947, family members of a number of senior officials of the UMGB and MVD, including the families of Borshchev and the head of the department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Major General I.G. Popkov, “... systematically stole from the Spetstorg base the best hard-to-find industrial goods (wool, silk and etc.), food products.”
A frequent occurrence was the misappropriation of secret amounts intended to pay for the services of agents. The head of the KRO UMGB for the Chita region, Z.S. Protasenko, was expelled by the regional committee from the party in June 1951 for illegal expenditure of public funds: KRO employees were drinking and wasting 9,000 rubles intended to pay agents. The head of the Transport Department of the Ashgabat Ministry of State Security, A.G. Kochetkov, was expelled from the party in July 1946 for embezzling state funds: he made 10 false receipts on behalf of informants and received 2,900 rubles for them. The punishment turned out to be light - three years probation.
A clear example of the low morality of the MGB communists were the frequent cases of theft of party contributions by party organizers of security agencies. Party organizer of the UMGB in the Kemerovo region I.P. Emelyanov, a former experienced counterintelligence officer of SMERSH, in 1947-1949, through forgery of documents, embezzled and squandered 63 thousand rubles. party contributions. Party organizer (in 1949-1951) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the same region B.I. Kholodenin was expelled from the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for embezzlement and drinking of 3,662 rubles of party contributions, removed from office and then sentenced to 8 years of labor camp (released after a year and a half under the amnesty of 1953 of the year). The party organizer of the Biysk city department of the UMGB for the Altai Territory, A.K. Savelkaev, was expelled from the party in May 1948 for embezzling 2,069 rubles. party contributions “for drinking” and was dismissed from the “authorities”. Party organizer and head of the investigative department of the ROC of the MGB of the East Siberian Military District V.I. Saprynsky in December 1951 received a severe party reprimand for embezzling 13 thousand rubles of party contributions and was demoted.
It came to very sophisticated methods of theft. Thus, party functionary A.I. Pulyakh in 1944-1951 worked as secretary of the Kemerovo Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and since 1951 - in the wake of the purge of the MGB from the Abakumov clan - he worked in a responsible position as deputy head of one of the Main Directorates of the USSR MGB. In June 1952, Pulyakh was expelled from the party for illegally receiving 42 thousand rubles in fees from the editor of the regional newspaper Kuzbass, both for unpublished articles and for materials from other authors and TASS. The criminal case against Pulyakh was dropped due to the 1953 amnesty.
Several bribe-takers and fraudsters from Abakumov’s inner circle received significant sentences. For example, the head of department “D” of the USSR Ministry of State Security, Colonel A.M. Palkin, received 15 years in camps for theft in October 1952 (although he was released early in 1956). Colonel P.S. Ilyashenko, who worked as the deputy head of one of the departments of the USSR Ministry of State Security, was sentenced to 10 years in prison in February 1953 for “theft of socialist property” (he was released in 1955). Other corrupt officials got off much easier. The head of the counterintelligence department of the Central Group of Forces, Lieutenant General M.I. Belkin, in the second half of the 40s, created a “black cash fund” and was engaged in speculation. In October 1951, he was arrested in connection with the defeat of Abakumov’s entourage and was released in 1953. However, Belkin was then dismissed from the “authorities” “due to facts of discredit.”
At the same time as Belkin, Lieutenant General P.V. Zelenin was arrested for embezzlement in Germany; in 1945-1947. worked as the head of UCR "Smersh" - UCR MGB in the Group Soviet troops in Germany. In 1953, he was amnestied, but then stripped of his general rank. And the former Commissioner of the MGB in Germany, Lieutenant General N.K. Kovalchuk, promoted to the Minister of State Security of Ukraine, escaped repression, although in 1952 he was accused of “bringing two carriages of captured items and valuables from the front”; however, in 1954 he was stripped of his title and awards.
(In the picture: Head of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR, Colonel General S.A. Goglidze, officer and foreman of the security units of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR in transport. An officer in the uniform of the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB) is visible from behind. 1947-52)
The head of the personnel department of special workshops No. 4 of the USSR Ministry of State Security, Kuznetsov, was involved in the theft of materials from the workshop and took bribes. So, in 1948, he received two bribes from the workers of the special workshops Vykhodtsev and Shevchuk in the amount of 850 rubles for issuing them documents on dismissal from the workshops. In the same year, for a bribe of 12 thousand rubles, Kuznetsov left the convicted Grinberg to serve his sentence in the Moscow region instead of deporting him to Vorkuta. In 1947, he received 4,800 rubles from a certain Bogomolova for the transfer of her convicted husband from prison to a camp, and then early release. Also, Kuznetsov, for 20 thousand rubles, contributed to the release from the camp to freedom “as disabled people” of two people convicted under Article 58 - certain Gorenshtein and Rivkin.
The arrest of MGB Minister Abakumov in July 1951 led to a large-scale purge of the leadership of the “authorities.” Data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Party Control Committee showed that up to 40% of the MGB personnel were subject to various types of punishment. This was the largest purge of the USSR security agencies for the entire period of their existence (except for the “political” purges in the late 1930s and after the arrest of Beria; but in the case of Abakumov, these were punishments of security officers for non-political articles).
What lesson can be learned from this story, except that it was at this time - in the late 1940s - early 1950s - that the formation of class justice in the country (which is still in effect today) was finally formalized? The system of checks and balances in law enforcement agencies is good for monitoring them and preventing the final degeneration of the “organs.” “War of all against all” - in the 2000s, almost the same system was created by Putin. Then the prosecutor's office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Drug Control Service and the FSB, the army and later the Investigative Committee restrained each other. We witnessed large-scale purges in the “authorities” that did not allow any department to gain the upper hand. Today in the system there is only one link that balances each other: the super agency Investigative Committee and the FSB. Outwardly, such a system looks monolithic, “stable”, but, as we know from the history of Russia, “stability” (stagnation) is the first step towards “perestroika”.
Also in the Interpreter’s Blog about the punitive system in the USSR.
Mikhail Dmitrievich Ryumin turned thirty-eight years old in September 1951. The arrogant, short, cruel, rude, stupid, bald, pot-bellied lieutenant colonel was not liked by many of his colleagues. What irritated them most was his pretentious arrogance. In the questionnaires, with an important look and without blinking an eye, he wrote down the unfinished higher education, and then could not explain what exams he took at the university. For example, this is how the operational secretary of the MGB, Major Burlaka, characterized Ryumin in a memo dated May 15, 1953:
“I got the impression that Ryumin was an illiterate person and often asked how this or that word was spelled or what punctuation marks should be used. He has a very small lexicon. I haven't read a single book from start to finish. An addiction to alcoholic beverages, having a good and timely lunch - that, perhaps, is the whole range of Ryumin’s interests.”
Misha Ryumin was born in 1913 in the village of Kabanyem, Shadrinsky district, Perm province, into the family of a middle peasant. He graduated from eight grades of school. From May 1929, he worked first as an accountant and then as an accountant of the Udarnik agricultural artel in Ural region. From April to June 1930 - student of the Shadrinsky accounting courses of the regional Union of Consumer Societies. Since February 1931 - accountant-instructor of the Kabanievo district collective farm, district communications department. After completing the Shadrinsky communications courses (studied from June to September 1931) - accountant, senior accountant, accountant-instructor of the Ural Regional Communications Department (September 1931 - June 1933).
Ryumin’s personal file also records his studies at the Komsomol department of the Communist University named after V.I. Lenin in 1931–1932, 1934 (Sverdlovsk).
From May 1934 to September 1935, Ryumin was already the chief accountant of the Sverdlovsk Regional Communications Department.
In September 1935, Mikhail Dmitrievich was drafted into the army. But he didn’t disappear there either: he served as a private at the headquarters of the Ural Military District, then as an accountant-economist there. At the end of his service, in July 1937, Ryumin returned to his previous job - chief accountant of the Sverdlovsk Regional Communications Department.
But very soon the former defender of the Motherland was accused of improperly spending funds and of using the patronage of the head of the regional communications department, who had by that time been arrested as an “enemy of the people.” According to N. Petrov, not without humor of course, “Ryumin acted intelligently. He understood how to escape. He immediately took off and left for Moscow. Here, after a month of looking for work, on September 13, 1937, he got a job as an accountant-auditor of the Financial Sector of the Central Administration of River Routes of the People's Commissariat of Water Resources of the USSR, and from September 1938 until the start of the war he worked as the chief accountant and head of the planning and financial department of the Moscow Canal Administration - Volga in Tushino. Here in 1939 he was accepted as a candidate member of the CPSU (b).
After the start of the war, Ryumin, given his “rare specialty,” was sent to study at High school NKVD of the USSR.
Since September 1941, Ryumin has been an investigator, senior investigator, deputy chief, head of the IV department of the Special Department of the NKVD - Counterintelligence Department of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the Arkhangelsk Military District.
On December 28, 1941, he was awarded the special rank of “junior lieutenant of state security”, on February 11, 1943 - “senior lieutenant of state security”, on June 18, 1943 - “captain”, on March 3, 1944 - “major”. In 1943, Ryumin was accepted as a candidate member of the party.
There was enough work in the Special Department of the NKVD, and then in the Counterintelligence Department SMERSH of the Arkhangelsk Military District. Among other things, Arkhangelsk hosted the British naval mission during the war, as well as the 126th Naval Base and Air Force Group. For example, in October 1943, the British naval mission in Arkhangelsk consisted of 52 people: 18 senior and middle officers, 34 junior officers and enlisted men. The apparatus of the English 126th port base consisted of 49 people: 10 senior and middle officers, 39 junior officers and privates. Moreover, the mission included many officers who certainly spoke Russian. Soon, counterintelligence officers established that the “military experts” sent by the British to work in the Arkhangelsk port for the most part did not correspond to their purpose, they did not know how to work in the specialties “assigned” to them, and therefore they tried to avoid participating in the repair of weapons and consulting on certain technical issues. dodge. In a word, real intelligence officers arrived who were engaged in military, economic and political intelligence, propaganda of anti-Soviet ideology, and the creation of a network of intelligence sources from among Soviet citizens. True, all intelligence and operational work on the British and Americans was concentrated in the counterintelligence department of the NKVD in the Arkhangelsk region. The special departments of the Arkhangelsk Military District and the White Sea Military Flotilla were ordered to transfer to the regional department all developments and agents for the British and Americans not related to the development of military personnel of the Red Army and Navy, and only in agreement with the KRO to carry out activities on relations between Soviet military personnel and foreigners. And this made a certain sense: according to counterintelligence data, as of September 1, 1943, of the 1,000 Soviet citizens whose contacts with foreigners were recorded by external surveillance, 90% were women.
Nevertheless, SMERSH had counterintelligence work and it was built against British intelligence mainly in two directions: identifying British intelligence officers, their connections and suppressing their activities at army and naval facilities. At the same time, they took into account the fact that, due to the nature of their official activities and in everyday life, the British had extensive communication with military personnel and the civilian population. All points of contact between the British and our citizens were taken into account in the operational work of military counterintelligence.
In total, during the war years, counterintelligence officers identified 100 personnel employees of the allied intelligence services in the Soviet North, but only 6 of them were expelled from the country.
However, despite such a wide field of activity, SMERSH officer Ryumin mastered primarily the art of falsifying cases.
“In the end, to his misfortune, he was noticed by the chief army counterintelligence officer Abakumov, who was in dire need of professional extractors of testimony,” emphasizes N. Petrov. - After all, it’s not all about beating up the defendants yourself. We also need to raise a shift.
In Arkhangelsk, Ryumin led the investigation into the case of I. P. Ermolin, a photojournalist for the newspaper “Patriot of the Motherland,” arrested in December 1944, the reason for whose arrest was only an external surveillance report that he had visited the English naval mission. Abakumov became interested in the case. As Ryumin later testified during interrogation: “When I arrived in Moscow with Ermolin’s case, the arrested man himself was taken to the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence. At the very first interrogation by Abakumov, Ermolin stated that he gave fictitious testimony as a result of beatings. Abakumov called me, and I told him how Ermolin’s case was falsified. Abakumov apparently liked my frankness, because when I answered his question: “Was Ermolin beaten hard?” - I answered: “They beat me as hard as I could,” he grinned and told me to report to the head of the investigative department of the Main Counterintelligence Directorate, Leonov, who told me that I would remain in the central office as a secondee.”
So Ryumin became a senior SMERSH investigator directly under Abakumov’s wing.”
It is worth noting one small touch to the biography of this “officer”. On July 31, 1944, he was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, II degree - “For exemplary performance of special tasks of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army,” and on September 13, 1945, the Order of the Red Star with the same wording. I think it’s not difficult to guess what was behind these in beautiful words…
But let’s return to N. Petrov’s story: “Since May 1946, he took the position of deputy head of the 2nd department of the 6th (investigative) department of the 3rd Main Directorate of the MGB. In 1948, Ryumin participated in the investigation started by Abakumov on Stalin’s orders in the “Marshal” case - to prepare materials for the arrest of Georgy Zhukov. He led the case of the arrested Hero of the Soviet Union, Major P.E. Braiko, beating him and forcing him to sign a testimony against “one of the Marshals of the Soviet Union.” Also, seeking testimony against Zhukov and Serov, he burned the tongue of the arrested former storekeeper of the Berlin NKVD operative sector A.B. with a cigarette. Kuznetsov.
In general, he “worked with passion” and tried. On March 19, 1948, he was awarded the rank of lieutenant colonel. Living conditions have improved. And in a completely traditional way for that time. Around 1949, Ryumin moved to a more spacious apartment No. 4 in building No. 4 on Staropimenovsky Lane, which had previously been occupied by the deputy head of the investigative unit, Rhodes, who had been demoted to Crimea. In September 1949, Ryumin was transferred to the position of senior investigator in the investigative unit of the MGB, and he took part in the interrogations of those arrested in the Leningrad case. He beat the arrested Solovyov (the former chairman of the Leningrad City Executive Committee, and at the time of his arrest the secretary of the Crimean regional committee). In his exculpatory statements to the military board in 1954, Ryumin directly indicated that, as in a number of other cases, the command to “beat Solovyov” was given by Stalin himself, who was monitoring the progress of the investigation.
At the same time, Ryumin remained in the position of senior investigator. His career, despite all his efforts, somehow stalled. And in May 1951 it malfunctioned. As Ryumin testified during the investigation: “The Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of State Security became interested in the incorrect information that I gave about my relatives. They demanded an explanation from me as to why I was hiding the compromising information that I knew about them.” It turned out that Ryumin hid the true property status of his father (and he was very wealthy), in addition, the father of Ryumin’s wife served in Kolchak’s army. And finally, Ryumin lost his investigative file on the bus. In addition, he was reprimanded by the party for not recording the testimony of the arrested doctor, Professor Ya. G. Etinger, who died under investigation by Ryumin. In general, the situation is almost hopeless.”
Thus, he was clearly threatened with dismissal from the authorities. A few years later, Mikhail Dmitrievich will remember: “I carefully thought and weighed everything. The fact is that by the summer of 1951 I found myself in a rather unpleasant, precarious position.”
So what does a “shibzdik,” as Stalin called him, do? He turns to the reception room of the Central Committee to Comrade Malenkov’s assistant Sukhanov. As P. A. Sudoplatov wrote, “the result of this meeting was fatal for the fate of the Soviet Jewish intelligentsia.”
Lieutenant Colonel Ryumin rewrote his denunciation letter eleven times while in the waiting room for about six hours. This is evidenced by Sudoplatov, who adds: Sukhanov “himself negotiated the contents of the letter to Stalin with Malenkov.”
When the leader read Ryumin's statement, he said:
Now, a simple person, how deeply does he understand the tasks of the state security agencies? But the minister is not able to figure it out.
“To Comrade STALIN I.V.
From a senior investigator of the USSR MGB
Lieutenant Colonel Ryumin M.D.
In November 1950, I was assigned to conduct an investigation into the case of the arrested Doctor of Medical Sciences, Professor Etinger.
During interrogations, Etinger admitted that he was a convinced Jewish nationalist, and as a result, he harbored hatred for the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Soviet government.
Further, having described in detail the ongoing enemy activities, Etinger also admitted that he, taking advantage of the fact that in 1945 he was entrusted with treating Comrade. Shcherbakov, did everything to shorten the latter’s life.
I reported Etinger’s testimony on this issue to the deputy head of the investigative unit, Comrade. Likhachev, and soon after that me and Comrade. Likhachev, along with the arrested Etinger, was summoned by Comrade. Abakumov.
During the “interrogation”, or rather the conversation with Etinger, comrade. Abakumov hinted to him several times that he should renounce his testimony about the villainous murder of Comrade. Shcherbakova. Then, when Etinger was taken from the office, Comrade. Abakumov forbade me to interrogate Etinger in the direction of revealing his practical activities and plans for terror, arguing that he - Etinger - would “lead us into the wilds.” Etinger understood Comrade's desire. Abakumov and, returning from him, during subsequent interrogations he renounced all his confessions, although his hostile attitude towards the CPSU (b) was irrefutably confirmed by secret eavesdropping materials and the testimony of his like-minded person, the arrested Brozolimsky, who, by the way, during the investigation also spoke about that Etinger expressed to him his hostile attitude towards Comrade. Shcherbakov.
Using these and other evidence, I continued to interrogate Etinger, and he gradually began to restore his previous testimony, about which I wrote daily reports for the management.
Around January 28–29, 1951, the head of the investigative unit for especially important cases, Comrade. Leonov and, referring to the instructions of Comrade. Abakumov, proposed to stop working with the arrested Etinger, and the case against him, as comrade put it. Leonov, “put it on the shelf.”
At the same time, I must note that after calling Comrade. Abakumov, who arrested Etinger, established a more severe regime for him, and he was transferred to Lefortovo prison, to the coldest and worst cell. Etinger was old - 64 years old, and he began to have attacks of angina pectoris, about which on January 20, 1951, the investigative unit received an official medical document, which stated that “in the future, each subsequent attack of angina pectoris may lead to an unfavorable outcome.”
Considering this circumstance, I several times raised the question with the leadership of the investigative unit about being allowed to truly participate in further interrogations of the arrested Etinger, and I was refused. It all ended with Etinger suddenly dying in early March and his terrorist activities remained uninvestigated.
Meanwhile, Etinger had extensive connections, including his like-minded people among major medical specialists, and it is possible that some of them were related to Etinger’s terrorist activities.
I consider it my duty to inform you that Comrade. Abakumov, according to my observations, has a tendency to deceive government agencies by concealing serious shortcomings in the work of the MGB bodies.
So, I am currently working on an investigative case on charges against a former deputy general director joint-stock company "Bismuth" in Germany Salimanov, who in May 1950 fled to the Americans, and then 3 months later returned to the Soviet zone of occupation of Germany, where he was detained and arrested.
Salimanov testified that in May 1950 he was fired from his job and was supposed to return to the USSR, but did not do this and, taking advantage of the lack of surveillance by the MGB, defected to the Americans.
Salimanov further said that, having betrayed his Motherland, he fell into the hands of American intelligence officers and, communicating with them, established that American intelligence has detailed information about the activities of the joint-stock company "Bismuth", which is engaged in the extraction of uranium ore.
These testimony of Salimanov indicate that the MGB organs poorly organized counterintelligence work in Germany.
Instead of informing government authorities about this and using the testimony of the arrested Salimanov to eliminate serious shortcomings in the work of the MGB in Germany, Comrade. Abakumov forbade recording Salimanov’s testimony in interrogation reports.
Ministry of State Security in different time agents of the American and British intelligence, and many of them, before their arrest, were secret employees of the MGB and double-dealed.
In his information on such matters, Comrade. Abakumov wrote: “We caught, we exposed,” although in reality: we were caught, we were exposed, and besides, we were led by the nose for a long time.
Along the way, a few words about investigative methods.
In the investigative part of particularly important cases, the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks is systematically and grossly violated Soviet government about the work of the MGB bodies in relation to recording calls for interrogation of arrested persons with interrogation protocols, which, by the way, in almost all cases are drawn up irregularly and in some cases biased.
Along with this, Abakumov introduced the practice of violations of other Soviet laws, and also pursued a line as a result of which, especially in cases of interest to the government, the testimony of those arrested under duress was recorded with unacceptable generalizations, often distorting reality.
I do not cite specific facts, although there are a lot of them, since the most complete picture in this regard can be provided by a special audit of cases with re-interrogation of those arrested.
In conclusion, I allow myself to express my opinion that Comrade. Abakumov did not always strengthen his position in the state apparatus and he is dangerous person for the state, especially in such a sensitive area as the Ministry of State Security. He is also dangerous because within the ministry, in the most key positions and, in particular, in the investigation department for particularly important cases, he placed “reliable”, from his point of view, people who, having received a career from his hands, gradually lose their party affiliation, turn into sycophants and obsequiously do everything that comrade wants. Abakumov.
“The beginning of the campaign of personnel purge of the MGB system, accompanied by the arrests of high-ranking employees, was initiated by a special decision of Stalin and the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks after considering the application of M.D. Ryumin, senior investigator of the investigative unit for especially important cases (OVD) of the USSR MGB,” comments letter from Ryumin N. Petrov. - It would be more accurate to say that Ryumin’s statement was more of a pretext, because the idea of carrying out purges and arrests in the MGB... had been brewing for Stalin for a long time. After Stalin received Ryumin’s statement in his hands, the time came to act. What did this investigator write? Ryumin's letter, dated July 2, 1951, contained a number of accusations against Abakumov. Firstly, he “extinguished” a very promising, from the point of view of the author of the letter, case of the doctor Ya. G. Etinger, arrested by the MGB, who could give important testimony about “saboteur doctors.” Secondly, Abakumov hid from the Central Committee important information about shortcomings in counterintelligence work in Germany at the Wismut enterprises where uranium ore was mined. And, finally, thirdly, he grossly violated the rules of investigation established by the decisions of the party and government. In the letter, Ryumin called Abakumov a “dangerous person” in an important government position.”
IN post-war years The positions of the Soviet regime were strengthened, and the emphasis was again placed on maintaining strict, military-like, discipline and order in society. The leading role in this process was given to the bodies of the Ministry of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR.
The People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB) of the USSR was formed on April 14, 1943 by decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) P 40/91 on the basis of the operational security departments and departments of the NKVD. Its activities were regulated by the “Regulations on the People's Commissariat of State Security of the USSR,” approved by Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 621-191ss of June 2, 1943. By Order of the NKGB No. 00107 of March 22, 1946, the People's Commissariat was renamed the Ministry of State Security (MGB) of the USSR.
The number of bodies of the MGB as of May 1946 was 137,672 people (including 22,008 secret personnel). During 1946 - 1952 were additionally transferred to the MGB from the Ministry of Internal Affairs internal troops(68,582 people), government communications troops, troops for the protection of especially important industrial enterprises and railways(7301 people), border troops, police and anti-banditry agencies. In total, by June 1952, the MGB apparatus numbered approximately 200,000 - 207,000 people. During this period, plans were developed to reduce staff by 30,000 - 35,000 people. The number of border troops on January 1, 1953 was about 190 thousand people.
The intelligence apparatus of the NKGB - MGB consisted of residents, agents and informants. Since January 1952 (MGB Order No. 0015), new categories were introduced instead: agent and special agent. All former agents and informants were transferred to the category of agents, and the most qualified ones performing especially responsible tasks were transferred to special agents. From now on, only department heads and superior officers had the right to recruit agents. By the same order, by March 15, 1952, the number of agents was reduced by 2-3 times.
During the period of the Nazi occupation, the apparatus of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR was located in Kupyansk (Kharkov region), Starobelsk, Kharkov. After his release, he returned to Kyiv to the old NKVD building at st. Vladimirskaya, 33. Now located here main building SBU.
After the transfer of internal troops (January 1947), government communications troops (August 1947) and border troops (October 1949) to the MGB from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, their counterintelligence services were also entrusted to the MGB.
The USSR MGB system was a branched scheme of directorates within 29 military districts scattered within Soviet republics and beyond. Considering the fact that after the end of the war the USSR found itself surrounded by hostile forces, counterintelligence agencies were entrusted with the task of countering any possible intelligence attacks from NATO countries.
During 1946 - 1954. (during its existence) counterintelligence, as well as other departments of the MGB in general, were actively engaged in identifying the remnants of the reconnaissance and sabotage residency of the Abwehr and the Gestapo, searching for agents of illegal foreign intelligence services, providing operational support for the trips of Soviet citizens abroad, protection state secrets, counterintelligence activities in industry and transport, etc.
DOCUMENTATION
Order of the USSR MGB No. 00322 On the organization of the Main Security Directorate of the USSR MGB on railway and water transport and its local authorities
REGULATIONS on the Special Meeting under the Minister of State Security of the USSR
Manual for advisers to the USSR Ministry of State Security under state security agencies in people's democracies
The MGB system in creating a republican hierarchy was in many ways similar to its predecessors, the NKVD and NKGB. Regional structures continued to be strictly subordinate to the central apparatus located in Moscow. Only during his decline did L. Beria try to decentralize the power structures, transferring a number of autonomous rights to the regions. However, after his arrest, everything returned to normal.
LEADERSHIP OF THE MGB OF THE USSR
People's Commissars - Ministers:
1. Sergei Romanovich SAVCHENKO (May 7, 1943 - August 24, 1949), GB commissar of the 3rd rank, from July 9, 1945 - lieutenant general;
DOSSIER
SAVCHENKO SERGEY ROMANOVYCH
(1904, Skadovsk, Dnieper district, Tauride province - 1966, Moscow). Born into a peasant family. Ukrainian. Party member since March 1930. Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the 2nd convocation.
In 1917 he graduated from the 4-class zemstvo school, in 1920 - 4 classes from the gymnasium. This year his parents died, in November S.R. Savchenko began working as a census taker, then as a night watchman, clerk and grain receiver in the food supply department of the 6th Army.
In state security agencies: from November 1921, operative of the Nikolaev GubChK. In 1922 - 1924 he served in the border guard in his native Skadovsk: operational briefer, registrar and clerk of the NGO for the protection of the border of the Black and Azov Seas of the Nikolaev GubChK (November 11, 1922 - April 1923), controller and senior controller of the border point (April - October 1923) and assistant to the authorized border post of the GPU (October 1923 - April 1924). In April - October 1924 - assistant to the authorized commandant's office of the 26th Pogo OGPU, Ochakov, then studied at the Higher Secondary School of the OGPU. After its completion - authorized commandant of the 25th POGO OGPU, Tiraspol (September - December 1925), assistant commandant for the 21st (December 1925 - February 1929) and 22nd POGO OGPU (February 1929 - September 1931). In September 1931 - April 1932, he was a student of advanced training courses for the Higher Professional School of the OGPU. After graduation, he taught at the special cycle of the 3rd border school of the OGPU in Moscow (April 1932 - June 1933), then held positions:
Head of the 5th Department - Deputy Head of the UPV NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR (May 20, 1939 - November 6, 1939)
Head of the 5th Department - Deputy Head of the UPV NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR (December 4, 1939 - October 3, 1940)
Deputy People's Commissar of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR (April 1 - August 12, 1941), Head of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR
Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR (August 12, 1941 - April 30, 1943), while from mid-September 1941 to early January 1942, he actually acted as People's Commissar, since People's Commissar V.T. Sergienko during this period was surrounded and in German-occupied territory.
Head of the OO Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Directorate of Construction Troops under Construction No. 565 of the Moscow Air Defense District (December 19, 1953 - March 1954)
Head of the KGB OO of the Construction Troops Directorate under Construction No. 565 of the Moscow Air Defense District (March - November 4, 1954)
By KGB order of February 12, 1955, he was transferred to the reserve. Soviet army for official inconsistency.
Awards: 2 Orders of Lenin (July 25, 1949), 4 Orders of the Red Banner (September 20, 1943, November 3, 1944, April 10, 1945, October 29, 1948), Order of Kutuzov II degree (20 November 1944), Order of Bohdan Khmelnitsky II degree (May 2, 1945), Order of the Red Star (February 14, 1941), badge “Honored Worker of the NKVD” (May 28, 1941), 6 medals.
Deputy People's Commissar - Minister:
ESIPENKO Daniil Ivanovich (August 16, 1943 - May 28, 1952), GB Colonel, from October 9, 1944 - GB Commissioner, from July 9, 1945 - Major General;
DROZDETSKY Pavel Gavrilovich (March 22, 1944 - July 13, 1946), GB commissar, from July 2, 1945 - GB commissar of the 3rd rank, from July 9, 1945 - lieutenant general;
BROVKIN Alexey Nikolaevich (October 24, 1951 - March 16, 1953), from November 17, 1951 - Colonel;
Deputy ministers - heads of the investigative unit:
(position introduced in 1952)
Deputy ministers - heads of the MGB Directorate (UMGB) for the Lviv region:
(position introduced in 1952)
Deputy People's Commissar - Minister for Personnel:
STUPNITSKY Mikhail Semenovich (August 6, 1943 - June 28, 1950), GB major, from December 22, 1943 - GB lieutenant colonel, from July 1945 - lieutenant colonel, from September 7, 1945 - colonel;
Structure of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR at the time of creation:
Secretariat
1st Directorate (intelligence)
2nd Directorate (counterintelligence)
4th Directorate (sabotage and reconnaissance)
5th Directorate or Department (cipher-decryption)
6th Directorate or Department (Security)
Investigation team
Department “A” (accounting and archiving)
Department “B” (use of operational equipment)
Department “B” (correspondence reading)
Human Resources Department
Administrative and economic management
Subsequently, the following changes occurred:
In October 1943, the Investigation Group was transformed into the Investigation Unit;
At the end of 1945 - beginning of 1946, the 4th Directorate was disbanded;
In 1946, the 6th Directorate (department) was transformed into the Security Directorate (department), the 5th Directorate (department) changed its number to the 6th, the 4th Directorate (investigative), the 5th Directorate (operational and secret-political), departments “D”, “O”, “R”, etc.
In January 1947, the Inspectorate under the Minister was created;
In 1949, on the basis of the operational units of the 5th Directorate, the 7th Directorate was created, the Police Directorate was transferred from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, the 6th Directorate (department) was removed from the MGB and transferred to the GUSS under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks;
In June 1950, the 1st Directorate was reorganized into the 1st Department.
Territorial bodies of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR:
UNKGB - UMGB in Vinnytsia region
UNKGB - UMGB for the Volyn region
UNKGB - UMGB for the Voroshilovgrad region
UNKGB - UMGB for the Dnepropetrovsk region
UNKGB - UMGB for Drohobych region
UNKGB - UMGB for the Zhytomyr region
UNKGB - UMGB for the Zaporozhye region
UNKGB - UMGB for the Izmail region
UNKGB - UMGB for the Kamenets-Podolsk region
UNKGB - UMGB for the Kyiv region
UNKGB - UMGB for the Kirovograd region
UNKGB - UMGB for the Lviv region
UNKGB - UMGB for the Nikolaev region
UNKGB - UMGB for the Odessa region
UNKGB - UMGB for the Poltava region
UNKGB - UMGB for the Rivne region
UNKGB - UMGB for the Stalin region
UNKGB - UMGB for the Stanislav region
UNKGB - UMGB for Sumy region
UNKGB - UMGB for the Kharkov region
UNKGB - UMGB for the Chernivtsi region
UNKGB - UMGB for the Chernihiv region
UNKGB - Office of the People's Commissariat of State Security
Central authority military counterintelligence became the 3rd Main Directorate of the USSR MGB. This perturbation was approved by Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1929-741ss of April 22, 1952 and declared by MGB Order No. 00286 of April 25, 1952.
In the central apparatus of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR, counterintelligence functions were assigned to the 2nd Directorate, which exercised general management of this type of activity. Given the border status of the Ukrainian Republic, special attention was paid to counterintelligence in this zone.
Management staff of the 2nd Directorate of the Ministry of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR
Chiefs:
MEDVEDEV Pavel Nikolaevich (June 1943 - November 3, 1947), lieutenant colonel of the State Security Service, from July 1943 - lieutenant colonel, from September 25, 1945 - colonel;
Deputy Chiefs:
GAVRISH Vasily Ivanovich (May 1945 - April 1946), colonel of the State Security Service, since July 1945 - colonel;
With the end of hostilities in Europe, the fronts were renamed into districts. On the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, counterintelligence departments of the MGB were stationed within the Kyiv, Carpathian, and Odessa military districts, as well as on the base of the Black Sea Fleet.
Counterintelligence Directorate (UKR MGB) for the Kyiv Military District
Chiefs:
Subordinate bodies:
OKR MGB for the 1st Guards. army
UKR MGB for Odessa Military District
Chiefs:
3. KARANDASHOV Sergei Petrovich (May 24, 1950 - January 24, 1952), major general of the coast service;
Counterintelligence Department (OCR MGB) for the Black Sea Fleet
Chiefs:
Deputy Chiefs:
UKR MGB for the Carpathian Military District
Chiefs:
Forging frames was carried out in closed educational institutions, scattered throughout the Soviet Union. There were four of them in Ukraine.
MGB EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS THAT EXISTED ON THE TERRITORY OF UKRAINE
School No. 302 (Lviv)
School No. 306 (Kharkov)
Kamenets-Podolsk School of Advanced Training for Officers (since October 1949);
Kharkov Secondary Border Military-Political School (since October 1949).
The goals and objectives of the MGB counterintelligence were somewhat different from the similar actions of SMERSH during the Second World War. Global conflict superpowers, which began on March 5, 1946 and went down in history under the name “ cold war“, forced the Soviet leadership to significantly reconsider the functions of the intelligence services, which were entrusted with the counterintelligence mission. The credo of their activities was not only preemption, but also active counteraction to enemy intelligence services seeking to destroy the country from the inside.
The Special Meeting under the Minister of State Security of the USSR is given the right to consider cases investigated by the bodies of the USSR Ministry of State Security:
a) about persons recognized as socially dangerous due to connections with the criminal environment or due to their past activities;
b) about crimes for which evidence, due to their nature, cannot be disclosed in court hearings;
c) other cases - according to individual Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR or resolutions of the Government of the USSR.
Cases are sent to the Special Meeting with the approval of the prosecutor.
In the cases under consideration, the Special Meeting under the Minister of State Security of the USSR had the right to apply:
a) deportation from permanent place of residence under the supervision of MGB authorities, with a ban on residence in sensitive areas, for a period of up to 5 years;
c) imprisonment (imprisonment in a camp or prison) for a term of up to 10 years, and in relation to persons brought under the Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 26, 1948 and November 17, 1951 - 20 years of hard labor;
e) eviction together with the family for permanent residence in remote areas (for a special settlement) under the supervision of the MGB - in cases provided for by separate Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR or decrees of the Government of the USSR;
f) deportation outside the Soviet Union;
g) compulsory treatment;
h) confiscation of property (full or partial) in the manner established by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated December 28(?) 1940.
3. The Chairman of the Special Meeting is the Minister of State Security of the USSR or his deputy, the members are the Deputy Ministers of State Security of the USSR. The Prosecutor General of the USSR or his deputy must participate in the meetings of the Special Meeting.
One of the main tasks of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR, in particular, from January 1947, was to counter the OUN and UPA. This work was to be coordinated by the 2-N Directorate created within the structure of the Ministry of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR, which was directly headed by the deputy ministers of the Ministry of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR. 2-N departments were created in all regional departments of the Ministry of State Security of the western regions of Ukraine (March 19, 1947). Thus, in the city of Lvov and the region, the number of staff of the 2-N department as of September 10, 1949 was 126 people. The MGB was subordinate to the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security, Border Troops, fighter battalions, and police agencies. In Ukraine, over 1,600 operatives, almost 18,000 agents, 25,000 soldiers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and 35,000 fighters of fighter battalions were transferred to the MGB.
Management of the “2-N” department of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR
Chiefs:
ARNAUTENKO Petr Egorovich (October 8, 1952 - May 1953), lieutenant colonel of the State Security Service, from December 15, 1952 - colonel of the State Security Administration
Deputy Chiefs:
SHORUBALKA Ivan Kirillovich (1947 - March 1950), major, lieutenant colonel;
CHEPAK Trofim Pavlovich (as of March 1950)
BYKOV Grigory Vasilievich (as of March 1950), major.
DOSSIER
Saraev Roman Nikolaevich
1903 born in Zmiev, Kharkov province
1930 member of the CPSU(b)
Education: 1928 student of the working faculty at the Kharkov Institute of Technology
Achievement list
8.1920 - 9.1923 in the Zmievsky district political bureau of the Cheka - GPU (Kharkov province)
10.1923 - 7.1928 in the Kharkov district department of the GPU
7.1928 - 9.1930 commissioner, senior commissioner of the Belotserkovsky district department of the GPU
9.1930 - 12.1933 senior commissioner, operational commissioner, head of the 1st, 3rd department of the Secret Political Department of the Vinnytsia Operational Sector - regional department of the GPU
12.1933 - 5.1935 Head of the Secret Operations Department of the Poltava City Department of the GPU - NKVD
5.1935 - 8.1937 Head of the Secret Political Department of the Zaporozhye City Department of the NKVD (Dnepropetrovsk Region), Senior Lieutenant of State Security
4.8 - 11/15/1937 head of the IV department of the State Security Directorate of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, senior lieutenant of state security
10 - 11.1937 Head of the IV Department of the State Security Directorate of the NKVD Directorate for the Nikolaev Region, Senior Lieutenant of State Security
11.1937 - 1.1939 head of the IV department of the State Security Directorate of the NKVD Directorate for Kirov region, senior lieutenant of state security
1 - 12.1939 And. O. Head of the Economic Department of the NKVD Directorate for the Kirov Region, senior lieutenant-captain of state security
1.1940 - 3.1941 head of the Economic Department of the NKVD of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, captain of state security
3 - 9.1941 head of the Counterintelligence Department of the NKGB - NKVD of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, captain of state security
9.1941 - 7.1942 Head of the Special Department of the NKVD of the 7th Airborne Corps ( Western Front), State Security Captain
7.1942 - 5.1943 Head of the Secretariat of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Volkhov Front, captain-lieutenant colonel of state security
5 - 11.1943 Head of the Department of the NKVD Directorate for Chelyabinsk region, lieutenant colonel
11/15/1943 - 3/13/1946 Head of the NKVD Directorate for the Tarnopol - Ternopil Region, Lieutenant Colonel - Colonel
13.3.1946 - 28.1.1947 Head of the Department for Combating Banditry of the NKVD - Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, Colonel
28.1 - 23.3.1947 Head of the “2-N” Department of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR, Colonel
23.3 - .6.1937 Deputy Head of the “2-N” Directorate of the Ministry of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR, Colonel
6 - 4.9.1947 and. O. Head of the MGB Directorate for the Stanislavl Region, Colonel
4.9.1947 - 12.7.1950 Head of the MGB Directorate for the Stanislav Region, Colonel
9.1947 - 6.12.1951 Head of the “2-N” Directorate of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR, Colonel
6.12.1951 - 19.3.1953 Head of the MGB Directorate for the Kyiv Region, Colonel
19.3 - 25.9.1953 Head of the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Rivne region, colonel
10.23.1953 - 1954 Head of the IV Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, Colonel
1954 in reserve
23.3.1936 senior lieutenant of state security
21.4.1939 captain of state security
11.2.1943 lieutenant colonel
10/9/1944 Colonel
10/20/1944 Order of Bohdan Khmelnitsky I 1st degree- for the fight against national resistance in Western Ukraine
3.11.1944 Order of the Red Star - for long service
1/15/1945 Order of the Red Banner - for long service
10.4.1945 order Patriotic War 1st degree - for the fight against national resistance in Western Ukraine
12/10/1945 Order of Lenin - for long service
23.1.1948 Order of the Badge of Honor - in connection with the 50th anniversary of the Ukrainian SSR
10/29/1948 Order of the Red Banner - for the fight against national resistance in Western Ukraine
11/24/1950 Order of the Red Banner - for long service
DOSSIER
Drozdov Viktor Alexandrovich
1902 born in the village of Blizhnyaya Melnitsa, Kherson province
1966 died in Moscow
1927 member of the CPSU(b)
Achievement list
5.1920 - to the Red Army
9.1921 - authorized district Cheka - district department of the GPU (Ukrainian SSR)
1925 - 9.1929 assistant commissioner, senior commissioner of the Zaporozhye district department, head of the Accounting and Statistical Department of the Kherson district department of the GPU
9.1929 - 9.1932 commissioner of the Information Department, senior commissioner of the Secret Department, operational commissioner of the Secret Political Department, operational secretary, head of the V department of the Secret Political Department, deputy manager of the affairs of the GPU under the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR
9.1932 - 6.1933 assistant to the head of the Secret Political Department of the Donetsk Regional Department of the GPU
22.6.1933 - 7.1934 head of the Starobelsky district department of the GPU
7 - 8.1934 and. O. Head of the Starobelsky operational sector of the NKVD
8.1934 - 1935 head of the Starobel operational sector of the NKVD
1935 - 7.1937 Head of the Workers' and Peasants' Militia Directorate of the NKVD Directorate for Donetsk region, police major
7.1937 - 3.1938 Head of the Workers' and Peasants' Militia Department of the NKVD Directorate for the Kharkov Region, police major
3.1938 - 4.1941 Head of the Workers' and Peasants' Militia Directorate - Police of the NKVD Directorate for the Stalingrad Region, Major - Senior Police Major
4 - 8.1941 Deputy Head of the Police Department for Operations of the NKVD Directorate for the Moscow Region, Senior Police Major
8 - 10.1941 assistant to the head of the Special Group of the NKVD of the USSR, senior police major
10/7/1941 - Deputy Head of the 1st Department of the 1st Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR, senior police major
4.1942 assistant to the head of the 2nd department of the NKVD of the USSR, senior police major
4 - 1.6.1942 head of the II department of the IV department of the NKVD of the USSR, senior police major
1.6.1942 - 24.4.1943 Head of the III Department of the IV Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR, senior police major
24.4 - 2.9.1943 Head of the Department for Combating Banditry of the NKVD of the USSR, senior police major
2.9.1943 - 14.4.1944 people's commissar Internal Affairs of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Commissioner of State Security
9.5.1944 - 22.5.1945 Head of the NKVD Directorate for the Grozny Region, Commissioner of State Security
9.8.1945 - Head of the Department of Prisoners of War and Internees of the Operational Directorate of the Main Directorate for Prisoners of War and Internees of the NKVD of the USSR, Commissioner of State Security - Major General
2.1947 Head of the 1st Department of the 2nd Directorate of the Main Directorate for Prisoners of War and Internees of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, Major General
2.1947 - 9.9.1950 Head of the “2-N” Directorate of the Ministry of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR, Major General
2.1947 - 9.9.1950 Deputy Minister of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR, Major General
9.9.1950 - 1952 Head of Bureau No. 2 of the USSR Ministry of State Security, Major General
1952 - 3.1953 Head of the Department of the 2nd Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of State Security, Major General
10.1953 in reserve
1941 senior police major
Commissioner of State Security
9.7.1945 Major General
1943 Order of the Red Banner
1944 Order of Suvorov, 1st degree
1948 Order of the Red Banner
The order of Lenin
On April 22, 1947, the first order “On strengthening the fight against the nationalist underground and its armed gangs in the Ukrainian SSR” was issued, which concerned the 2-N departments.
The above order defined the main tasks of the 2-N departments as follows:
agent penetration into the underground environment of the OUN and UPA, its leadership;
capture and destruction of the underground leadership, their “operational” development;
identification and elimination of underground supply and communication channels;
moral corruption of the underground through the activities of agents and provocations;
promptly fighting operational groups, special groups.
Additionally, special departments were created in the structure of departments, such as:
1. Search and liquidation of members of the Central and regional OUN forces,
2. Operational development of the middle leadership levels of the underground,
3. Management of special combat teams,
4. Recruitment.
The most famous special operations of the Lvov department 2-N include: the liquidation of the leader of the UPA - Roman Iosifovich Shukhevych (1907-1950) on March 5, 1950 (agent nickname - “Wolf”), as well as field commanders UPA: P. Fedun (“Jackal”), V. Galasy (“Mole”), D. Klyachkovsky (“Rat”), G. Kravchuk (“Behemoth”), V. Sidor (“Warrior”).
In the context of the fight against the OUN - UPA, the MGB bodies competed with the special services of the Ukrainian nationalist underground, formed in the late 30s - early 40s. In essence, it was a war between the Soviet state and Ukrainian underground and sabotage special services within the country, which lasted until 1954.
Along with the fight against the nationalist underground, employees and agents of the Ministry of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR are directly related to repressive actions against civilians. Suffice it to recall the mass deportations of Ukrainians, Operation Vistula, involvement in the post-war famine of 1946 - 1947, the persecution of representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia during the Zhdanovshchina, etc.
By the beginning of the 50s, the structure of the MGB had undergone significant changes. By Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 21, 1952 military ranks MGB officers were abolished, and instead special ranks state security.
On the day of Stalin’s death - March 5, 1953 - at a joint meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, a decision was made to unite the MGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs into a single Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR under the leadership of L. Beria: divisions of 2 departments for a year ended up in a single ministry. The strengthening of the KGB power occurred on the initiative of L. Beria, who sought to become the master of the Kremlin after the death of the “father of nations.” The party nomenklatura and the military remembered the repressions of the 30s, so they did not want the security forces to be at the helm of the state again. Internal party disputes, the arrest of L. Beria and V. Abakumov led to a coup d'etat, with the removal of security officers from government administration. The actual victory of the party over the special services and the rise to power of N. Khrushchev led to political transformation. The Soviet Union turned from a totalitarian state into an authoritarian state.
The next and final reorganization of the intelligence services Soviet period in 1954, in connection with the liquidation of the MGB and the creation of the KGB, led to the unification of a fragmented and competing state security system. In this form it will exist until the collapse of the USSR. It will withstand the confrontation with Western intelligence and counterintelligence with honor, but will not be able to resist the corruption that was gradually corrupting the “office” from the inside.
Thus, the reformatting of the MGB during the years of Khrushchev’s funeral led to the emergence of the all-powerful KGB, which became “the last eagle of the Lubyanka nest.”
