The largest military-strategic operations were:

The final lifting of the 900-day siege of Leningrad in January 1944;

Korsun-Shevchenko operation. Liberation of Right Bank Ukraine;

In the summer of 1944, as a result of Operation Bagration, one of the strongest enemy groups, “Center,” was defeated, Belarus was liberated, and the liberation of the Baltic states (autumn 1944) and Poland (early 1945) began;

During the Iasi-Chisinau operation, Chisinau was liberated.

In 1944, the entire territory of the USSR was liberated from Nazi occupation. The Soviet Army began to liberate Eastern Europe. Soviet troops liberated Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia.

In June 1944 Soviet troops launched Operation Bagration in the Belarusian direction. A 100,000-strong group was surrounded by two counter strikes east of Minsk German troops. Soviet troops rushed into the resulting 400-kilometer breakthrough. By the end of the operation, when the general offensive began, almost the entire territory of the USSR was liberated. The Soviet Army entered East Prussia and the territory of Poland. The Allies launched a general offensive in Northern France at the end of July. In August, American and French troops landed in southern France. The Allied offensive coincided with the beginning of an anti-fascist uprising in the country. On August 18 it began in Paris and after 4 days the entire city was in the hands of the rebels. When the Allies approached the city, the blockaded garrison of Paris capitulated. By the end of 1944, France and most of Belgium were liberated. The Allies stood at the borders of Germany. The military failures of Germany and Japan in 1944 further aggravated the crisis of the ruling regimes. In Germany, it manifested itself in a conspiracy against Hitler, organized with the active participation of a group of senior Wehrmacht officers. The main participants in the conspiracy were quickly arrested, 5 thousand people were executed, including 56 generals and one field marshal, 4 field marshals committed suicide without waiting for arrest. The conspiracy gave impetus to the tightening of repression, and the destruction of all imprisoned opponents of the Nazi regime began.

In July 1944, a major offensive by Soviet troops began on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. In August, the Soviet Army entered Romania. King Michael ordered the arrest of Prime Minister General Antonescu and declared war on Germany. In the armistice signed on September 12, Romania confirmed the transfer of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the USSR. On September 5, Bulgaria also requested a truce. Miklai Horthy also tried to sign a truce with the allies, but the German command intervened. It displaced him. Power in Hungary passed into the hands of local fascists, who declared their intention to stand with Germany to the end. In September, the Soviet Army entered the territory of Yugoslavia, a significant part of which had already been liberated from German troops by the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia led by Josip Broz Pito. The entry of the Red Army on a broad front into Central and South-Eastern Europe immediately raised the question of further relations between the countries of this region with the USSR. On the eve of and during the battles for this vast and vital region, the USSR began to support pro-Soviet politicians in these countries - mainly from among the communists. At the same time, the Soviet leadership sought recognition from the United States and England of their special interests in this part of Europe. Given the fact of the presence of Soviet troops there, Churchill in 1944 agreed with the inclusion of all Balkan countries, except Greece, in the sphere of influence of the USSR. In 1944, Stalin achieved the creation of a pro-Soviet government in Poland, parallel to the exile government in London. The armed forces of the latter waged an armed struggle on the territory of Poland against both German and Soviet troops. In August 1944, they launched an uprising in Warsaw, which was ruthlessly suppressed by the Germans almost in full view Soviet army. Sharp disagreements arose between the USSR, on the one hand, and England and the USA, on the other hand, regarding what kind of government should exist in Poland.


The final stage of the Second World War.

Winter 1944

the main objective– lifting the blockade of Leningrad, liberating right-bank Ukraine

In January it was finally the blockade of Leningrad was lifted, which lasted 900 days. The northwestern part of the USSR territory was liberated.

Was held in January Korsun-Shevchenkovskaya operation, in the development of which Soviet troops liberated Right Bank Ukraine and the southern regions of the USSR (Crimea, the cities of Kherson, Odessa, etc.).

Summer 1944 The Red Army carried out one of the largest operations of the Great Patriotic War (Bagration). Belarus was completely liberated. This victory opened the way for advances into Poland, the Baltic states and East Prussia. In mid-August 1944, Soviet troops in the western direction reached the border with Germany.

IN end of August started Yassko-Kishinevskaya operation, as a result of which Moldova was liberated. The opportunity was created for the withdrawal of Romania, Germany's ally, from the war.

Vistula-Oder operation January 12 – February 3, 1945, Poland, most of Czechoslovakia and Hungary were finally liberated.

· In April 1945 - Berlin operation. It was aimed at the final defeat of fascism. Troops of the 1st (commander Marshal G.K. Zhukov), 2nd (commander Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky) Belarusian and 1st Ukrainian (commander Marshal I.S. Konev) fronts destroyed the Berlin enemy group and captured about 500 thousand people, a huge amount of military equipment and weapons.

The fascist leadership was completely demoralized, A. Hitler committed suicide. On the morning of May 1, the capture of Berlin and the Reichstag was completed(German Parliament) the Red Banner was hoisted, a symbol of the Victory of the Soviet people.

May 8, 1945 in the suburbs of Berlin - Act o unconditional surrender. 9th May The remnants of German troops in the Prague area were defeated. Therefore, May 9 became Victory Day of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War.

Victory:

Sources:

Mass heroism

Unity of front and rear

Successes of the partisan movement

Military art of commanders

Results:

The defeat of fascism

Expanding the country's borders

The beginning of the creation of a world system of socialism

Price:

Russia – 27 million people (10 million in combat, 17 million civilians)

Germany – about 8 million people

By 1944, the situation had changed even more in favor of the Soviet Union. The final period of the war in Europe began. But the path to its end was difficult. The fascist army still remained strong. Due to the absence of a second front, Germany continued to keep its main troops on the Soviet-German front. There were 236 of its divisions and 18 brigades operating here, which included more than 5 million people, 54 thousand guns, 5,400 tanks, 3 thousand aircraft. Germany still controlled the resources of almost all of Europe.

To strengthen the Eastern Front, the command of the German troops by the end of 1943 transferred 75 divisions from the west, a large number of combat vehicles weapons. However, German industry was no longer able to satisfy the continuously increasing demand for military equipment.

From the autumn of 1944 to military service More than 200 thousand people were mobilized into the German armed forces every month. But this replenishment did not compensate for the losses that if the German troops.

In December 1943, Stalin, in a “narrow circle of people,” raised the question of a new form of conducting the 1944 military campaign: superiority over the enemy in terms of strategic initiative, favorable location of troops, sufficient human and material and technical resources made it possible to conduct large operations not in one or two directions, but consistently along the entire front.

The offensive operations of 1944, called "Ten Stalinist blows", began immediately after the completion of the 1943 offensive, not allowing the enemy to come to his senses after the defeat in the battles near Kursk and the Dnieper . The task was to develop a sequence of attacks on the enemy that would be unexpected for him, be continuous, and would deprive him of the opportunity to maneuver his forces to repel the main attack.

Thus, the main task for 1944 was the following: to finally defeat the main German groups and complete the expulsion of the invaders from Soviet soil.

Features of military operations in 1944:

1) Almost the entire military campaign of 1944 was developed at the end of 1943. It was the Soviet troops who dictated the nature of actions at the front.

2) Offensive actions were carried out along the entire length of the front, but not simultaneously, but in the form of a series of successive operations on separate sections of the front.

3) These attacks were carried out on opposite sectors of the front, which did not give German troops the opportunity to transfer reserves.

4) The actions of the partisans were coordinated and carried out within the framework of a common strategic plan.

First hit, as a result of which the long-term defense of the Germans was broken, was inflicted by our troops in January 1944 near Leningrad and Novgorod . As a result of this blow, a half-million fascist army was defeated and thrown back to the Baltic States.

Second strike was inflicted in February - April 1944 in Right Bank Ukraine (Korsun-Shevchenko operation) . There, a group of Germans (10 divisions) in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky area was destroyed. After this, in the midst of the spring thaw, a large-scale offensive was launched. This was so unexpected for the Germans that, fleeing for their lives, they abandoned their equipment and weapons due to the impassability of the roads, and retreated across the river. Bug and Dniester. Right Bank Ukraine was liberated from the enemy. Soviet troops entered the territory of Moldova, and on March 26 they reached the border with Romania.

In April–May 1944 our troops inflicted third crushing blow against the enemy in the area of ​​Crimea and Odessa . It took the Germans 250 days to capture Crimea, and Soviet troops liberated it in 5 days (May 7 - 12, 1944).

Before the Germans had time to recover from the attacks in the south, in June 1944 was brought down on them fourth strike – in the Karelia region. As a result, the Red Army defeated the Finnish troops, liberated Vyborg and Petrozavodsk, and liberated part of the Karelo-Finnish Republic.

Under the influence of the successes of the Red Army, our allies were no longer able to delay further opening of a second front. On June 6, 1944, the American-British command, two years late, began a large landing in Northern France.

Fifth strike was inflicted on the Germans in June – August 1944 during the largest offensive operation in Belarus “Bagration” .

On May 20, 1944, the General Staff completed the development of the plan for the Belarusian offensive operation. It was included in the operational documents of Headquarters under code name "Bagration". The successful implementation of the plan of Operation Bagration made it possible to solve a number of other, no less important strategically tasks.

1) Completely clear the Moscow direction from enemy troops, since the front edge of the ledge was 80 kilometers from Smolensk;

2) Complete the liberation of the entire territory of Belarus;

3) Reach the coast of the Baltic Sea and the borders of East Prussia, which made it possible to cut the enemy’s front at the junctions of army groups “Center” and “North” and isolate these German groups from each other;

4) Create favorable operational and tactical prerequisites for subsequent offensive actions in the Baltic states, Western Ukraine, in the East Prussian and Warsaw directions.

Operation Bagration was carried out June 23 - August 29. To defeat the enemy, the Soviet Supreme High Command allocated fronts: 1st Baltic (Army General I.Kh. Bagramyan), 1st (Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky), 2nd (Army General G.F. Zakharov), 3rd (Army General I.D. Chernyakhovsky) Belarusian - a total of 17 armies, incl. 1 tank and 3 air, 4 tank and 2 Caucasian corps, cavalry-mechanized group, Dnieper military flotilla . The actions of the fronts were coordinated by Marshals of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky, G.K. Zhukov.

By the end of June 22, 1944, a front stretching over 1,100 km in Belarus ran along the line of Lake Nescherdo, east of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Zhlobin, along the Pripyat River, forming a huge ledge. Here the troops of Army Group Center defended, which had a well-developed network of railways and highways for wide maneuver along internal lines, blocking the Soviet troops’ path to Warsaw. When Soviet troops went on the offensive, it could deliver powerful flank attacks on the troops of the Baltic and Belorussian fronts

The fascist German troops occupied a pre-prepared, deeply echeloned (2.50-270 km) defense, which was based on a developed system of field fortifications and natural lines. Defensive lines ran, as a rule, along the western banks of numerous rivers that had wide swampy floodplains.

The plan of the Soviet command provided for a simultaneous breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses in 6 sectors in order to dismember his troops and defeat them piece by piece. Special meaning was given to the defeat of the most powerful flank groupings of the Nazis defending in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk, which provided conditions for the rapid advance of large forces of the 3rd and 1st Belorussian Fronts and the development of their success along converging directions to Minsk.

The surviving enemy troops were to be thrown back to a depth of 200-250 km into an area near Minsk unfavorable for defensive operations, cut off their escape routes, encircle them and eliminate them. Subsequently, building up the attack and expanding the front of the offensive, Soviet troops were supposed to reach the western border of the USSR.

The operation consisted of 2 stages. At the first (June 23 - July 4), the Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk, and Minsk operations were carried out. As a result of the 1st stage of the Belarusian operation, the main forces of Army Group Center were defeated, a 400-kilometer gap was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front, and Soviet troops were able to advance to the West.

At the 2nd stage (July 5 - August 29), the Vilnius, Bialystok, Lublin-Brest, Siauliai, and Kaunas operations were carried out.

During the operation, the partisans cut off the enemy’s retreat routes, captured and built new bridges and crossings for the Red Army, independently liberated a number of regional centers, and participated in the liquidation of encircled enemy groups. The Belarusian operation created the conditions for the further advance of the Red Army into German territory.

For participation in the Belarusian operation, more than 1,500 generals, officers, sergeants and soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 662 formations and units received honorary names after the names of the cities and localities they liberated. In honor of the operation, the Mound of Glory of the Soviet Army, the liberator of Belarus, was erected on the 21st km of the Minsk-Moscow highway. The liberation day of Minsk on July 3 is celebrated as Independence Day of the Republic of Belarus

As a result sixth strike (in July – August ) The Red Army drove the Germans back beyond the San and Vistula rivers with the liberation of Western Ukraine and consolidation of the bridgehead west of Sandomierz ( Lviv-Sandomierz operation ).

IN August 1944 (Iasso – Chisinau operation ) our troops inflicted seventh strike- in the Chisinau-Iasi region, where 22 German divisions were surrounded and defeated, forcing the Romanian army to surrender. As a result of this operation, Moldova was completely liberated, Romania and Bulgaria were withdrawn from the war.

As a result the eighth strike (in September - October 1944 ) near Tallinn and Riga German troops were defeated and expelled from the Baltic states, and Finland, which declared war on Germany, was also withdrawn from the war.

Ninth strike our troops inflicted in October 1944 between Tissa and Danube in Hungary and Yugoslavia . As a result of this blow, Hungary was withdrawn from the fascist bloc and a significant part of Yugoslavia was liberated. The troops crossed the Carpathian ridge and entered the territory of Czechoslovakia.

But it still remains Northern part Soviet-German front. In the plans of the fascist German command, a significant place was occupied by the issue of capturing the northwestern regions of the Soviet Union, mastering the Soviet Arctic, the sea routes of the Arctic Ocean and the seizure of the Murmansk railway. This would allow fascist Germany secure its northern flank, as well as isolate the USSR from outside world and prevent shipping between our northern ports and the ports of England and the United States. The Nazis also believed that the capture of the Soviet North would best ensure German communications for the removal of strategic raw materials from the USSR and supplying the troops of the 20th Mountain Army.

The tenth blow in October 1944 there was an operation troops of the Karelian Front and ships of the Northern Fleet to defeat the 20th mountain German army in Northern Finland , as a result of which the Pechenga area was liberated and the threat to the port of Murmansk and northern sea ​​routes THE USSR. Soviet troops occupied Pechenga on October 15, cleared the entire area of ​​nickel mines on October 23, and on October 25 entered the borders of allied Norway to liberate it from German troops.

Thus, 1944 ended with a complete and steady advantage of the Red Army over the Wehrmacht. In 1944, the entire territory of the USSR was cleared of Nazi invaders and military operations were transferred to the territory of Germany and its allies. The successes of the Soviet Army in 1944 predetermined the final defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945.

During the fighting in 1944, the Soviet Armed Forces destroyed and captured 138 divisions; 58 German divisions, which suffered losses of up to 50% or more, were disbanded and reduced to battle groups. In the battles for Belarus alone, 540 thousand were captured by the Red Army. German soldiers and officers. On July 17, 1944, up to 60 thousand of this composition, led by 19 generals, were marched through the streets of Moscow.

Belarusian operation 1944

Belarus, Lithuania, eastern regions of Poland.

Victory of the Red Army. Liberation of Belarus and Lithuania. Entry of Soviet troops into Poland.

Opponents

PKNO, 1st Army of the Polish Army

BCR, Belarusian Regional Defense

Poland, Home Army

Commanders

Ivan Bagramyan (1st Baltic Front)

Ivan Chernyakhovsky (3rd Belorussian Front)

Georgy Zakharov (2nd Belorussian Front)

Georg Reinhardt (3rd Panzer Army)

Konstantin Rokossovsky (1st Belorussian Front)

Kurt von Tippelskirch (4th Field Army)

Georgy Zhukov (coordinator of the 1st and 2nd Belarusian Fronts)

Alexander Vasilevsky (coordinator of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic Fronts)

Alexey Antonov (development of the operation plan)

Walter Weiss (2nd Field Army)

Strengths of the parties

(at the start of the operation) 2.4 million people, 36 thousand guns and mortars, St. 5 thousand tanks, St. 5 thousand aircraft

(according to Soviet data) 1.2 million people, 9,500 guns and mortars, 900 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1,350 aircraft

178,507 killed/missing, 587,308 wounded, 2,957 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,447 guns and mortars, 822 combat aircraft

The exact losses are unknown. Soviet data: 381 thousand dead and missing, 150 thousand wounded, 158,480 prisoners David Glanz: lower estimate - 450 thousand total losses. Alexey Isaev: more than 500 thousand people Steven Zaloga: 300-350 thousand people, including 150 thousand prisoners (until the 10th of July)

Belarusian offensive operation, "Bagration"- a large-scale offensive operation of the Great Patriotic War, carried out from June 23 to August 29, 1944. It was named in honor of the Russian commander of the Patriotic War of 1812 P.I. Bagration. One of the largest military operations in the history of mankind.

Significance of the operation

During this extensive offensive, the territory of Belarus, eastern Poland and part of the Baltic states was liberated and the German Army Group Center was almost completely defeated. The Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses, partly due to the fact that A. Hitler prohibited any retreat. Germany was no longer able to make up for these losses.

Prerequisites for the operation

By June 1944, the front line in the east approached the line Vitebsk - Orsha - Mogilev - Zhlobin, forming a huge protrusion - a wedge facing deep into the USSR, the so-called “Belarusian balcony”. If in Ukraine the Red Army managed to achieve a series of impressive successes (almost the entire territory of the republic was liberated, the Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses in the chain of “cauldrons”), then when trying to break through in the direction of Minsk in 1943-1944, the successes, on the contrary, were quite modest.

At the same time, by the end of the spring of 1944, the offensive in the south slowed down, and the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to change the direction of efforts. As K.K. Rokossovsky noted,

Strengths of the parties

Data on the strengths of the parties differ in different sources. According to the publication “Operations of the Soviet armed forces in the Second World War,” on the Soviet side, 1 million 200 thousand people took part in the operation (excluding rear units). On the German side - as part of Army Group Center - 850-900 thousand people (including approximately 400 thousand in the rear units). In addition, at the second stage, the right wing of Army Group North and the left wing of Army Group Northern Ukraine took part in the battle.

The four fronts of the Red Army were opposed by four armies of the Wehrmacht:

  • The 2nd Army of Army Group Center, which held the area of ​​Pinsk and Pripyat, advanced 300 km east of the front line;
  • 9th Army of Army Group Center, which defended the area on both sides of the Berezina southeast of Bobruisk;
  • The 4th Army and the 3rd Tank Army of Army Group Center, which occupied the area between the Berezina and Dnieper rivers, as well as a bridgehead from Bykhov to the area northeast of Orsha. In addition, units of the 3rd Tank Army occupied the Vitebsk area.

Composition of the parties

The section shows the distribution of forces of the German and Soviet troops as of June 22, 1944 (the corps of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army army are listed in the order of their deployment from north to south, reserves are indicated separately first).

Germany

Army Group Center (Field Marshal Ernst Busch, Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Krebs)

  • 6th Air Fleet (Colonel General von Greim)

* 3rd Panzer Army (Colonel General Reinhardt) consisting of:

    • 95th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Michaelis);
    • 201st Security Division (Lieutenant General Jacobi);
    • Kampfgruppe von Gottberg (SS Brigadeführer von Gottberg);

* 9th Army Corps (Artillery General Wuthmann);

    • 252nd Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Meltzer);
    • Corps Group "D" (Lieutenant General Pamberg);
    • 245th Assault Gun Brigade (Hauptmann Knüpling);

* 53rd Army Corps (Infantry General Gollwitzer);

    • 246th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Müller-Büllow);
    • 206th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Heatter);
    • 4th Luftwaffe Air Field Division (Lieutenant General Pistorius);
    • 6th Luftwaffe Airfield Division (Lieutenant General Peschel);

* 6th Army Corps (Artillery General Pfeiffer);

    • 197th Infantry Division (Major General Hane);
    • 299th Infantry Division (Major General Junck);
    • 14th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Floerke);
    • 256th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Wüstenhagen);
    • 667 Assault Gun Brigade (Hauptmann Ullmann);
    • 281st Assault Gun Brigade (Hauptmann Fenkert);

* 4th Army (Infantry General Tippelskirch) consisting of:

    • tank-grenadier division "Feldherrnhalle" (Major General von Steinkeller);

* 27th Army Corps (Infantry General Voelkers);

    • 78th Assault Division (Lieutenant General Trout);
    • 25th Panzer-Grenadier Division (Lieutenant General Schürmann;
    • 260th Infantry Division (Major General Klammt);
    • 501st Heavy Tank Battalion (Major von Legat);

* 39th Panzer Corps (General of Artillery Martinek);

    • 110th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General von Kurowski);
    • 337th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Schünemann);
    • 12th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Bamler);
    • 31st Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Ochsner);
    • 185th Assault Gun Brigade (Major Glossner);

* 12th Army Corps (Lieutenant General Müller);

    • 18th Panzergrenadier Division (Lieutenant General Zutavern);
    • 267th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Drescher);
    • 57th Infantry Division (Major General Trowitz);

* 9th Army (Infantry General Jordan) consisting of:

    • 20th Panzer Division (Lieutenant General von Kessel);
    • 707th Infantry Division (Major General Hittner);

* 35th Army Corps (Lieutenant General von Lützow);

    • 134th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Philip);
    • 296th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Kulmer);
    • 6th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Heine);
    • 383rd Infantry Division (Major General Geer);
    • 45th Infantry Division (Major General Engel);

* 41st Army Corps (Lieutenant General Hoffmeister);

    • 36th Infantry Division (Major General Conradi);
    • 35th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Richert);
    • 129th Infantry Division (Major General von Larisch);

* 55th Army Corps (Infantry General Herrlein);

    • 292nd Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Jon);
    • 102nd Infantry Division (Lieutenant General von Bercken);

* 2nd Army (Colonel General Weiss) consisting of:

    • 4th Cavalry Brigade (Major General Holste);

* 8th Army Corps (Infantry General Hon);

    • 211th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Eckard);
    • 5th Jaeger Division (Lieutenant General Thumm);

* 23rd Army Corps (General of the Engineering Troops Tiemann);

    • 203rd Security Division (Lieutenant General Pilz);
    • 17th Panzer-Grenadier Brigade (Colonel Kerner);
    • 7th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General von Rappard);

* 20th Army Corps (Artillery General von Roman);

    • Corps Group "E" (Lieutenant General Feltsmann);
    • 3rd Cavalry Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel Boeselager);

In addition, Hungarian units were subordinate to the 2nd Army: 5, 12 and 23 reserve and 1 cavalry division. The 2nd Army took part only in the second phase of the Belarusian operation.

* 1st Baltic Front (Army General Bagramyan) consisting of:

* 4th Shock Army (Lieutenant General Malyshev);

    • 83rd Rifle Corps (Major General Soldatov);
    • reinforcement parts;

* 6th Guards Army (Lieutenant General Chistyakov);

    • 2nd Guards Rifle Corps (hereinafter referred to as Guards Rifle Corps)(Lieutenant General Ksenofontov);
    • 22nd Guards Rifle Corps (Major General Ruchkin);
    • 23rd Guards Rifle Corps (Lieutenant General Ermakov);
    • 103rd Rifle Corps (Major General Fedyunkin);
    • 8th Howitzer Artillery Division;
    • 21st Artillery Breakthrough Division;

* 43rd Army (Lieutenant General Beloborodov);

    • 1st Rifle Corps (Lieutenant General Vasilyev);
    • 60th Rifle Corps (Major General Lyukhtikov);
    • 92nd Rifle Corps (Lieutenant General Ibyansky);
    • 1st Tank Corps (Lieutenant General Butkov);

* 3rd Air Army (Lieutenant General Papivin);

* 3rd Belorussian Front (Colonel General Chernyakhovsky) consisting of:

    • 5th Artillery Corps;

* 11th Guards Army (Lieutenant General Galitsky);

    • 8th Guards Rifle Corps (Major General Zavodovsky);
    • 16th Guards Rifle Corps (Major General Vorobiev);
    • 36th Guards Rifle Corps (Major General Shafranov);
    • 2nd Tank Corps (Major General Burdeyny);
    • 7th Guards division of guards mortars (rocket artillery);

* 5th Army (Lieutenant General Krylov);

    • 45th Rifle Corps (Major General Gorokhov);
    • 65th Rifle Corps (Major General Perekrestov);
    • 72nd Rifle Corps (Major General Kazartsev);
    • 3rd Guards breakthrough artillery division;

* 31st Army (Lieutenant General Glagolev);

    • 36th Rifle Corps (Major General Oleshev);
    • 71st Rifle Corps (Lieutenant General Koshevoy);
    • 113th Rifle Corps (Major General Provalov);

* 39th Army (Lieutenant General Lyudnikov);

    • 5th Guards Rifle Corps (Major General Bezugly);
    • 84th Rifle Corps (Major General Prokofiev);

* 5th Guards Tank Army (Marshal Rotmistrov);

    • 3rd Guards tank corps (Major General Bobchenko);
    • 29th Tank Corps (Major General Fominykh);

* Cavalry mechanized group (Lieutenant General Oslikovsky);

    • 3rd Guards cavalry corps (Lieutenant General Oslikovsky);
    • 3rd Guards mechanized corps (Lieutenant General Obukhov);

* 1st Air Army (Lieutenant General Gromov);

* 2nd Belorussian Front (Colonel General Zakharov) consisting of:

* 33rd Army (Lieutenant General Kryuchenkin);

    • 70th, 157th, 344th rifle divisions;

* 49th Army (Lieutenant General Grishin);

    • 62nd Rifle Corps (Major General Naumov);
    • 69th Rifles Corps (Major General Multan);
    • 76th Rifle Corps (Major General Glukhov);
    • 81st Rifle Corps (Major General Panyukov);

* 50th Army (Lieutenant General Boldin);

    • 19th Rifle Corps (Major General Samarsky);
    • 38th Rifle Corps (Major General Tereshkov);
    • 121st Rifle Corps (Major General Smirnov);

* 4th Air Army (Colonel General Vershinin);

* 1st Belorussian Front (Army General Rokossovsky) consisting of:

    • 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps (Lieutenant General Kryukov);
    • 4th Guards Cavalry Corps (Lieutenant General Pliev);
    • 7th Guards Cavalry Corps (Major General Konstantinov);
    • Dnieper River Flotilla (1st Rank Captain Grigoriev;

* 3rd Army (Lieutenant General Gorbatov);

    • 35th Rifle Corps (Major General Zholudev);
    • 40th Rifle Corps (Major General Kuznetsov);
    • 41st Rifle Corps (Major General Urbanovich);
    • 80th Rifle Corps (Major General Ragulya);
    • 9th Tank Corps (Major General Bakharov);
    • 5th Guards Mortar Division;

* 28th Army (Lieutenant General Luchinsky);

    • 3rd Guards Rifle Corps (Major General Perkhorovich);
    • 20th Rifle Corps (Major General Shvarev);
    • 128th Rifle Corps (Major General Batitsky);
    • 46th Rifle Corps (Major General Erastov);
    • 5th Artillery Division Breakthrough;
    • 12th Artillery Breakthrough Division;

* 48th Army (Lieutenant General Romanenko);

    • 29th Rifle Corps (Major General Andreev);
    • 42nd Rifle Corps (Lieutenant General Kolganov);
    • 53rd Rifle Corps (Major General Gartsev);
    • 22nd Artillery Breakthrough Division;

* 61st Army (Lieutenant General Belov);

    • 9th Guards Rifle Corps (Major General Popov);
    • 89th Rifle Corps (Major General Yanovsky);

* 65th Army (Lieutenant General Batov);

    • 18th Rifle Corps (Major General Ivanov);
    • 105th Rifle Corps (Major General Alekseev);
    • 1st Guards Tank Corps (Major General Panov);
    • 1st Mechanized Corps (Lieutenant General Krivoshein);
    • 26th Artillery Division;

* 6th Air Army (Lieutenant General Polynin);

* 16th Air Army (Colonel General Rudenko);

In addition, the 1st Belorussian Front included the 8th Guards, 47th, 70th, 1st Polish and 2nd Tank Armies, which took part only in the second phase of the Belarusian operation.

Preparing the operation

Red Army

Initially, the Soviet command imagined Operation Bagration as a repetition Battle of Kursk, something like the new “Kutuzov” or “Rumyantsev”, with a huge consumption of ammunition with a subsequent relatively modest advance of 150-200 km. Since operations of this type - without a breakthrough into operational depth, with long, stubborn battles in the tactical defense zone of attrition - required large quantities of ammunition and relatively little fuel for mechanized units and modest capacity for restoring railways, the actual development of the operation turned out to be for the Soviet command of the unexpected.

The operational plan for the Belarusian operation began to be developed by the General Staff in April 1944. The general plan was to crush the flanks of the German Army Group Center, encircle its main forces east of Minsk and complete liberation Belarus. This was an extremely ambitious and large-scale plan; the instant destruction of an entire army group was planned very rarely during the war.

Significant personnel changes were made. General V.D. Sokolovsky failed to prove himself in the battles of the winter of 1943-1944 (Orsha offensive operation, Vitebsk offensive operation) and was removed from command of the Western Front. The front itself was divided in two: the 2nd Belorussian Front (to the south) was headed by G. F. Zakharov, who showed himself well in the battles in the Crimea, I. D. Chernyakhovsky, who had previously commanded the army in Ukraine, was appointed commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front (to the north).

Direct preparations for the operation began at the end of May. Specific plans were received by the fronts on May 31 in private directives from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

According to one version, according to the original plan, the 1st Belorussian Front was supposed to deliver one powerful blow from the south, in the Bobruisk direction, but K.K. Rokossovsky, having studied the area, stated at a meeting at Headquarters on May 22 that more than one should be delivered, but two main blows. He motivated his statement by the fact that in heavily swamped Polesie, with one breakthrough, the armies would bump into the back of each other’s heads, clog the roads in the near rear, and as a result, the front troops could only be used in parts. According to K.K. Rokossovsky, one blow should have been delivered from Rogachev to Osipovichi, another from Ozarichi to Slutsk, while encircling Bobruisk, which remained between these two groups. K.K. Rokossovsky's proposal caused heated debate at Headquarters; members of Headquarters insisted on delivering one strike from the Rogachev area, in order to avoid dispersal of forces. The dispute was interrupted by I.V. Stalin, who stated that the perseverance of the front commander spoke of the thoughtfulness of the operation. Thus, K.K. Rokossovsky was allowed to act in accordance with his own idea.

However, G.K. Zhukov argued that this version is not true:

A thorough reconnaissance of enemy forces and positions was organized. Information was collected in many directions. In particular, reconnaissance teams of the 1st Belorussian Front captured about 80 “tongues”. Aerial reconnaissance of the 1st Baltic Front spotted 1,100 different firing points, 300 artillery batteries, 6,000 dugouts, etc. Active acoustic and human intelligence reconnaissance was also carried out, studying enemy positions by artillery observers, etc. Through a combination of various reconnaissance methods and its intensity, the enemy grouping was revealed quite completely.

The headquarters tried to achieve maximum surprise. All orders to unit commanders were given personally by army commanders; telephone conversations concerning preparations for the offensive, even in coded form, were prohibited. The fronts preparing for the operation went into radio silence. Active excavation work was carried out at the forward positions to simulate preparations for defense. The minefields were not completely removed so as not to alarm the enemy; the sappers limited themselves to unscrewing the fuses from the mines. The concentration of troops and regroupings were carried out mainly at night. Specially designated General Staff officers on airplanes patrolled the area to monitor compliance with camouflage measures.

The troops conducted intensive training to practice the interaction of infantry with artillery and tanks, assault operations, crossing water obstacles, etc. Units were alternately withdrawn from the front line to the rear for these trainings. The training of tactical techniques was carried out in conditions as close as possible to combat conditions and with live shooting.

Before the operation, commanders at all levels down to the companies conducted reconnaissance, assigning tasks to their subordinates on the spot. Artillery spotters and officers were introduced into the tank units air force for better interaction.

Thus, the preparations for Operation Bagration were carried out extremely carefully, while the enemy was left in the dark about the upcoming offensive.

Wehrmacht

If the command of the Red Army was well aware of the German grouping in the area of ​​​​the future offensive, then the command of Army Group Center and the General Staff of the Third Reich Ground Forces had a completely wrong idea about the forces and plans of the Soviet troops. Hitler and the High Command believed that a major offensive should still be expected in Ukraine. It was assumed that from the area south of Kovel the Red Army would strike towards the Baltic Sea, cutting off army groups “Center” and “North”. Significant forces were allocated to counter the phantom threat. Thus, the Northern Ukraine Army Group had seven tank, two tank-grenadier divisions, as well as four battalions of Tiger heavy tanks. Army Group Center had one tank, two tank-grenadier divisions and only one Tiger battalion. In April, the command of Army Group Center presented its leadership with a plan to reduce the front line and withdraw the army group to better positions beyond the Berezina. This plan was rejected. Army Group Center defended in its previous positions. Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev and Bobruisk were declared “fortresses” and fortified with the expectation of all-round defense. Forced labor of the local population was widely used for construction work. In particular, in the zone of the 3rd Tank Army, 15-20 thousand residents were sent to such work.

Kurt Tippelskirch (then commander of the 4th Field Army) describes the mood in the German leadership as follows:

There was no data yet that would make it possible to predict the direction or directions of the Russian summer offensive that was undoubtedly being prepared. Since aviation and radio reconnaissance usually accurately noted large transfers of Russian forces, one could think that an offensive from them was not yet immediately threatened. Until now, only in one case were intensive railway transportations lasting for several weeks behind enemy lines in the direction of the Lutsk, Kovel, Sarny region recorded, which, however, were not followed by the concentration of newly arrived forces near the front. At times we had to rely only on guesswork. At the General Staff ground forces They considered the possibility of repeating the attack on Kovel, believing that the enemy would concentrate its main efforts north of the Carpathians on the front of Army Group Northern Ukraine, with the goal of pushing the latter back to the Carpathians. Army groups "Center" and "North" were predicted to have a "quiet summer." In addition, Hitler was particularly concerned about the oil region of Ploiesti. Regarding the fact that the enemy's first attack would follow north or south of the Carpathians - most likely to the north - the opinion was unanimous.

The positions of the troops defending in Army Group Center were seriously reinforced with field fortifications, equipped with numerous interchangeable positions for machine guns and mortars, bunkers and dugouts. Since the front in Belarus stood still for a long time, the Germans managed to create a developed defense system.

From the point of view of the General Staff of the Third Reich, preparations against Army Group Center were intended only to “mislead the German command regarding the direction of the main attack and to pull reserves from the area between the Carpathians and Kovel.” The situation in Belarus inspired so little fear in the Reich command that Field Marshal Busch went on vacation three days before the start of the operation.

Progress of hostilities

The preliminary stage of the operation symbolically began on the third anniversary of the German attack on the USSR - June 22, 1944. As in the Patriotic War of 1812, one of the most significant battle sites was the Berezina River. Soviet troops of the 1st Baltic, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts (commanders - Army General I. Kh. Bagramyan, Colonel General I. D. Chernyakhovsky, Army General G. F. Zakharov, Army General K.K. Rokossovsky), with the support of partisans, broke through the defenses of the German Army Group Center in many areas (commander - Field Marshal E. Bush, later - V. Model), surrounded and eliminated large enemy groups in the areas of Vitebsk, Bobruisk, Vilnius , Brest and east of Minsk, liberated the territory of Belarus and its capital Minsk (July 3), a significant part of Lithuania and its capital Vilnius (July 13), the eastern regions of Poland and reached the borders of the Narev and Vistula rivers and the borders of East Prussia.

The operation was carried out in two stages. The first stage took place from June 23 to July 4 and included the following front-line offensive operations:

  • Vitebsk-Orsha operation
  • Mogilev operation
  • Bobruisk operation
  • Polotsk operation
  • Minsk operation
  • Vilnius operation
  • Siauliai operation
  • Bialystok operation
  • Lublin-Brest operation
  • Kaunas operation
  • Osovets operation

Partisan actions

The offensive was preceded by an unprecedented scale partisan action. Numerous partisan formations operated in Belarus. According to the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement, during the summer of 1944, 194,708 partisans joined the Red Army troops. The Soviet command successfully linked the actions of partisan detachments with military operations. The goal of the partisans in Operation Bagration was, at first, to disable enemy communications, and later to prevent the withdrawal of defeated Wehrmacht units. Massive actions to defeat the German rear began on the night of June 19-20. Eike Middeldorf noted:

The partisans’ plans included carrying out 40 thousand different explosions, that is, only a quarter of what was planned was actually accomplished, but what was accomplished was enough to cause a short-term paralysis of the rear of Army Group Center. The head of rear communications of the army group, Colonel G. Teske, stated:

The main targets of the partisans' forces were railways and bridges. In addition to them, communication lines were disabled. All these actions greatly facilitated the offensive of the troops at the front.

Vitebsk-Orsha operation

If the “Belarusian balcony” as a whole jutted out to the east, then the area of ​​the city of Vitebsk was a “protrusion on a protrusion”, protruding even further from the northern part of the “balcony”. The city was declared a “fortress”; Orsha, located to the south, had a similar status. The 3rd Panzer Army defended in this sector under the command of General G.H. Reinhardt (the name should not be deceived; there were no tank units in the 3rd Panzer Army). The Vitebsk region itself was defended by its 53rd Army Corps under the command of General F. Gollwitzer ( English). Orsha was defended by the 17th Army Corps of the 4th Field Army.

The operation was carried out on two fronts. The 1st Baltic Front, under the command of Army General I. Kh. Bagramyan, operated on the northern flank of the future operation. His task was to encircle Vitebsk from the west and develop an offensive further southwest towards Lepel. The 3rd Belorussian Front, under the command of Colonel General I. D. Chernyakhovsky, operated further south. The task of this front was, firstly, to create a southern “claw” of encirclement around Vitebsk, and secondly, to independently embrace and take Orsha. As a result, the front was supposed to reach the area of ​​​​the city of Borisov (south of Lepel, southwest of Vitebsk). For operations in depth, the 3rd Belorussian Front had a cavalry-mechanized group (mechanized corps, cavalry corps) of General N. S. Oslikovsky and the 5th Guards Tank Army of P. A. Rotmistrov.

To coordinate the efforts of the two fronts, a special operational group of the General Staff was created, headed by Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky.

The offensive began with reconnaissance in force early in the morning of June 22, 1944. During this reconnaissance, it was possible to break into the German defenses in many places and capture the first trenches. The next day the main blow was dealt. Main role played by the 43rd Army, which covered Vitebsk from the west, and the 39th Army under the command of I.I. Lyudnikov, which surrounded the city from the south. The 39th Army had virtually no overall superiority in men in its zone, but the concentration of troops in the breakthrough area made it possible to create a significant local advantage. The front was quickly broken through both to the west and south of Vitebsk. The 6th Army Corps, defending south of Vitebsk, was cut into several parts and lost control. Within a few days, the corps commander and all division commanders were killed. The remaining parts of the corps, having lost control and communication with each other, made their way to the west in small groups. The Vitebsk-Orsha railway was cut. On June 24, the 1st Baltic Front reached the Western Dvina. The counterattack of Army Group North units from the western flank failed. In Beshenkovichi, “Corps Group D” was surrounded. N. S. Oslikovsky’s cavalry-mechanized group was introduced into the breakthrough south of Vitebsk, and began to quickly advance to the southwest.

Since the desire of the Soviet troops to encircle the 53rd Army Corps was undoubted, the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army G.H. Reinhardt turned to his superiors for permission to withdraw F. Gollwitzer’s units. On the morning of June 24, Chief of the General Staff K. Zeiztler flew to Minsk. He familiarized himself with the situation, but did not give permission to leave, not having the authority to do so. A. Hitler initially prohibited the withdrawal of the corps. However, after Vitebsk was completely surrounded, on June 25 he approved a breakthrough, ordering, however, to leave one - the 206th Infantry Division in the city. Even before this, F. Gollwitzer withdrew the 4th Air Field Division somewhat to the west to prepare a breakthrough. This measure, however, came too late.

On June 25, in the Gnezdilovichi area (southwest of Vitebsk), the 43rd and 39th armies united. In the Vitebsk area (the western part of the city and the southwestern outskirts), F. Gollwitzer's 53rd Army Corps and some other units were surrounded. The “cauldron” included the 197th, 206th and 246th Infantry, as well as the 6th Air Field Division and part of the 4th Air Field Division. Another part of the 4th Air Field was surrounded to the west, near Ostrovno.

In the Orsha direction the offensive developed quite slowly. One of the reasons for the lack of spectacular success was the fact that the strongest of the German infantry divisions, the 78th Assault, was located near Orsha. It was much better equipped than the others and, in addition, had the support of almost fifty self-propelled guns. Also in this area were units of the 14th Motorized Division. However, on June 25, the 3rd Belorussian Front introduced the 5th Guards Tank Army under the command of P. A. Rotmistrov into the breakthrough. She cut the railway leading from Orsha to the west near Tolochin, forcing the Germans to withdraw from the city or die in the “cauldron”. As a result, by the morning of June 27, Orsha was liberated. The 5th Guards Tank Army advanced southwest, towards Borisov.

On the morning of June 27, Vitebsk was completely cleared of the encircled German group, which the day before had been continuously subjected to air and artillery strikes. The Germans made active efforts to break out of the encirclement. During the day of June 26, 22 attempts were recorded to break through the ring from the inside. One of these attempts was successful, but the narrow corridor was sealed after a few hours. The group of about 5 thousand people who broke through was again surrounded around Lake Moszno. On the morning of June 27, Infantry General F. Gollwitzer and the remnants of his corps capitulated. F. Gollwitzer himself, the chief of staff of the corps, Colonel Schmidt, the commander of the 206th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Hitter (Buchner erroneously listed as killed), the commander of the 246th Infantry Division, Major General Müller-Bülow, and others were captured.

At the same time, small boilers near Ostrovno and Beshenkovichi were destroyed. The last large group of encirclement was led by the commander of the 4th Air Field Division, General R. Pistorius ( English). This group, trying to escape through the forests to the west or southwest, on June 27 came across the 33rd anti-aircraft division marching in columns and was scattered. R. Pistorius died in battle.

The forces of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian Fronts began to develop success in the southwestern and western direction. By the end of June 28, they liberated Lepel and reached the Borisov area. The retreating German units were subjected to continuous and brutal air strikes. There was little opposition to the Luftwaffe. The Vitebsk-Lepel highway, according to I. Kh. Bagramyan, was literally littered with dead and broken equipment.

As a result of the Vitebsk-Orsha operation, the 53rd Army Corps was almost completely destroyed. According to V. Haupt, two hundred people from the corps broke through to the German units, almost all of them were wounded. Units of the 6th Army Corps and Corps Group D were also defeated. Vitebsk and Orsha were liberated. The losses of the Wehrmacht, according to Soviet claims, exceeded 40 thousand dead and 17 thousand prisoners (the greatest results were shown by the 39th Army, which destroyed the main “cauldron”). The northern flank of Army Group Center was swept away, and thus the first step was taken towards the complete encirclement of the entire group.

Mogilev operation

As part of the battle in Belarus, the Mogilev direction was auxiliary. According to G.K. Zhukov, who coordinated the operation of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts, the quick push of the German 4th Army from the “cauldron”, which was created by attacks through Vitebsk and Bobruisk to Minsk, was meaningless. However, to speed up the collapse of German forces and speed up the advance, an offensive was organized.

On June 23, after effective artillery preparation, the 2nd Belorussian Front began crossing the Pronya River, along which the German defensive line passed. Since the enemy was almost completely suppressed by artillery, sappers within a short time built 78 light bridges for infantry and four 60-ton bridges for heavy equipment. After a few hours of battle, according to the testimony of prisoners, the number of many German companies fell from 80 - 100 to 15 - 20 people. However, units of the 4th Army managed to retreat to the second line along the Basya River in an organized manner. By June 25, the 2nd Belorussian Front had captured very few prisoners and Vehicle, that is, he has not yet reached the enemy’s rear communications. However, the Wehrmacht army gradually retreated to the west. Soviet troops crossed the Dnieper north and south of Mogilev; on June 27, the city was surrounded and the next day taken by storm. About two thousand prisoners were captured in the city, including the commander of the 12th Infantry Division R. Bamler and the commandant of Mogilev G. G. von Ermansdorff, who was later found guilty of committing numerous serious crimes and hanged.

Gradually, the retreat of the 4th Army lost its organization. The connection between the units and the command and with each other was broken, and the units were mixed up. Those departing were subjected to frequent air raids, which caused heavy losses. On June 27, the commander of the 4th Army, K. von Tippelskirch, gave an order by radio for a general retreat to Borisov and Berezina. However, many retreating groups did not even receive this order, and not all of those who received it were able to carry it out.

Until June 29, the 2nd Belorussian Front announced the destruction or capture of 33 thousand enemy soldiers. The trophies included, among other things, 20 tanks, presumably from the Feldhernhalle motorized division operating in the area.

Bobruisk operation

The Bobruisk operation was supposed to create the southern “claw” of a huge encirclement planned by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. This action was carried out entirely by the most powerful and numerous of the fronts participating in Operation Bagration - the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky. Initially, only the right flank of the front took part in the offensive. He was opposed by the 9th Field Army of General H. Jordan. As at Vitebsk, the task of crushing the flank of Army Group Center was solved by creating a local “cauldron” around Bobruisk. K. K. Rokossovsky’s plan as a whole represented the classic “cannes”: from the southeast to the northwest, gradually turning to the north, the 65th Army (reinforced by the 1st Don Tank Corps) advanced, from the east to the west the 3rd I am an army that includes the 9th Tank Corps. For a quick breakthrough to Slutsk, the 28th Army with the cavalry-mechanized group of I. A. Pliev was used. The front line in the area of ​​​​operation made a bend to the west at Zhlobin, and Bobruisk, among other cities, was declared a “fortress” by A. Hitler, so the enemy in some way himself contributed to the implementation of Soviet plans.

The offensive near Bobruisk began in the south on June 24, that is, somewhat later than in the north and center. Bad weather At first it seriously limited the actions of aviation. In addition, the terrain conditions in the offensive zone were very difficult: they had to overcome an extremely large, half-kilometer wide, swampy swamp. However, this did not stop the Soviet troops; moreover, the appropriate direction was chosen deliberately. Since the German defense was quite dense in the well-passable Parichi area, the commander of the 65th Army, P.I. Batov, decided to advance somewhat to the southwest, through the swamp, which was relatively weakly guarded. The quagmire was crossed along the roads. P. I. Batov noted:

On the first day, the 65th Army broke through the defenses of the enemy, completely stunned by such a maneuver, to a depth of 10 km, and a tank corps was introduced into the breakthrough. Its left-flank neighbor, the 28th Army under the command of Lieutenant General A. A. Luchinsky, achieved similar success.

The 3rd Army of A.V. Gorbatov, on the contrary, met stubborn resistance. H. Jordan used his main mobile reserve, the 20th Panzer Division, against it. This seriously slowed down progress. The 48th Army under the command of P. L. Romanenko, advancing to the left of the 28th Army, was also stuck due to extremely difficult terrain. In the afternoon, the weather improved, which made it possible to actively use aviation: 2,465 sorties were carried out by aircraft, but progress still remained insignificant.

The next day, I. A. Pliev’s cavalry-mechanized group was introduced into the breakthrough on the southern flank. The contrast between the rapid offensive of P. I. Batov and the slow gnawing of the defense by A. V. Gorbatov and P. L. Romanenko was noticeable not only to the Soviet, but also to the German command. H. Jordan redirected the 20th Panzer Division to the southern sector, which, however, having entered the battle “on wheels”, was unable to eliminate the breakthrough, lost half of its armored vehicles and was forced to retreat to the south.

As a result of the retreat of the 20th tank division and introduction into battle on the 9th tank corps the northern “claw” managed to advance deeply. On June 27, the roads leading from Bobruisk to the north and west were intercepted. The main forces of the German 9th Army found themselves surrounded with a diameter of approximately 25 km.

H. Jordan was removed from the command of the 9th Army, and General of the Tank Forces N. von Forman was appointed instead. However, personnel changes could no longer affect the position of the encircled German units. There were no forces capable of organizing a full-fledged unblocking strike from the outside. An attempt by the reserve 12th Panzer Division to cut through the “corridor” failed. Therefore, the encircled German units began to independently make vigorous efforts to break through. Located east of Bobruisk, the 35th Army Corps under the command of von Lützow began preparing to break through to the north to link up with the 4th Army. On the evening of June 27, the corps, having destroyed all weapons and property that could not be carried away, attempted a breakthrough. This attempt generally failed, although some groups managed to pass between Soviet units. On June 27, communication with the 35th Corps was interrupted. The last organized force in the encirclement was General Hoffmeister's 41st Panzer Corps. Groups and individual soldiers who had lost control gathered in Bobruisk, for which they were transported across the Berezina to the west bank - they were continuously bombed by aircraft. The city was in chaos. The commander of the 134th Infantry Division, General Philip, shot himself in despair.

On June 27, the assault on Bobruisk began. On the evening of the 28th, the remnants of the garrison made a final attempt to break out, leaving 3,500 wounded in the city. The attack was led by the surviving tanks of the 20th Panzer Division. They managed to break through the thin Soviet infantry screen north of the city, but the retreat continued under air strikes, which caused heavy casualties. By the morning of June 29, Bobruisk was cleared. About 14 thousand Wehrmacht soldiers and officers were able to reach the positions of the German troops - most of them were met by the 12th Panzer Division. 74 thousand soldiers and officers died or were captured. Among the prisoners was the commandant of Bobruisk, Major General Haman.

The Bobruisk operation ended successfully. The destruction of two corps, the 35th Army and 41st Tank, the capture of both their commanders and the liberation of Bobruisk took less than a week. As part of Operation Bagration, the defeat of the German 9th Army meant that both flanks of Army Group Center were left exposed, and the road to Minsk was open from the northeast and southeast.

Polotsk operation

After the destruction of the front of the 3rd Tank Army near Vitebsk, the 1st Baltic Front began to develop success in two directions: to the north-west, against the German group near Polotsk, and to the west, towards Glubokoye.

Polotsk caused concern among the Soviet command, since this next “fortress” now hung over the flank of the 1st Baltic Front. I. Kh. Bagramyan immediately began to eliminate this problem: there was no pause between the Vitebsk-Orsha and Polotsk operations. Unlike most of the battles of Operation Bagration, near Polotsk the main enemy of the Red Army was, in addition to the remnants of the 3rd Tank Army, Army Group North represented by the 16th Field Army under the command of General H. Hansen. On the enemy side, only two infantry divisions were used as reserves.

On June 29, an attack on Polotsk followed. The 6th Guards and 43rd Armies bypassed the city from the south (the 6th Guards Army also bypassed Polotsk from the west), the 4th Shock Army - from the north. The 1st Tank Corps captured the town of Ushachi south of Polotsk and advanced far to the west. The corps captured a bridgehead on the western bank of the Dvina with a surprise attack. The counterattack planned by the 16th Army simply did not take place.

The partisans provided significant assistance to the attackers, intercepting small groups of retreating troops, and sometimes even attacking large military columns.

However, the defeat of the Polotsk garrison in the cauldron did not take place. The commander of the city’s defense, Karl Hilpert, voluntarily left the “fortress” without waiting for the escape routes to be cut. Polotsk was liberated on July 4. Failure in this battle cost Georg Lindemann, commander of Army Group North, his job. It should be noted that despite the absence of "cauldrons", the number of prisoners was significant for an operation that lasted only six days. The 1st Baltic Front announced the capture of 7,000 enemy soldiers and officers.

Although the Polotsk operation was not crowned with a defeat similar to what happened near Vitebsk, it brought significant results. The enemy lost a stronghold and a railway junction, the flank threat to the 1st Baltic Front was eliminated, the positions of Army Group North were bypassed from the south and were under the threat of a flank attack.

After the capture of Polotsk, organizational changes took place for new tasks. The 4th Shock Army was transferred to the 2nd Baltic Front, on the other hand, the 1st Baltic Front received the 39th Army from Chernyakhovsky, as well as two armies from the reserve. The front line moved 60 km to the south. All these measures were related to the need to improve the controllability of the troops and strengthen them before the upcoming operations in the Baltic states.

Minsk operation

On June 28, Field Marshal E. Bush was relieved of command of Army Group Center; his place was taken by Field Marshal V. Model, who was a recognized specialist in defensive operations. Several fresh formations were sent to Belarus, in particular the 4th, 5th and 12th tank divisions.

Retreat of the 4th Army beyond the Berezina

After the collapse of the northern and southern flanks at Vitebsk and Bobruisk, the German 4th Army found itself sandwiched in a kind of rectangle. The eastern “wall” of this rectangle was formed by the Drut River, the western by the Berezina, and the northern and southern by Soviet troops. To the west was Minsk, which was the target of the main Soviet attacks. The flanks of the 4th Army were actually not covered. The environment looked imminent. Therefore, the army commander, General K. von Tippelskirch, ordered a general retreat through the Berezina to Minsk. The only way for this was the dirt road from Mogilev through Berezino. The troops and logistical institutions accumulated on the road tried to cross the only bridge to the western bank of the Berezina under the constant destructive blows of attack aircraft and bombers. Military police withdrew from regulating the crossing. In addition, the retreaters were subject to attacks by partisans. The situation was further complicated by the fact that the retreating forces were joined by numerous groups of soldiers from units defeated in other areas, even from near Vitebsk. For these reasons, the crossing of the Berezina proceeded slowly and was accompanied by great sacrifices. It should be noted that the pressure from the 2nd Belorussian Front, located directly in front of the front of the 4th Army, was insignificant, since the plans of the Supreme High Command did not include expelling the enemy from the trap.

Battle south of Minsk

After the destruction of two corps of the 9th Army, K.K. Rokossovsky received new tasks. The 3rd Belorussian Front advanced in two directions, to the southwest, towards Minsk, and west, to Vileika. The 1st Belorussian Front received a symmetrical task. Having achieved impressive results in the Bobruisk operation, the 65th and 28th armies and the cavalry-mechanized group of I. A. Pliev turned strictly west, towards Slutsk and Nesvizh. The 3rd Army of A.V. Gorbatov advanced to the north-west, towards Minsk. The 48th Army of P. L. Romanenko became a bridge between these shock groups.

The front's offensive was led by mobile formations - tank, mechanized units and cavalry-mechanized groups. The horse-mechanized group of I. A. Pliev, quickly moving towards Slutsk, reached the city on the evening of June 29. Since the enemy in front of the 1st Belorussian Front was mostly defeated, resistance was weak. The exception was the city of Slutsk itself: it was defended by units of the 35th and 102nd divisions, which suffered serious losses. Soviet troops estimated the garrison of Slutsk to be approximately two regiments.

Faced with organized resistance in Slutsk, General I. A. Pliev organized an assault from three sides simultaneously. The flank coverage brought success: on June 30, by 11 a.m., Slutsk was cleared by a cavalry-mechanized group with the assistance of infantry that had bypassed the city.

The cavalry-mechanized group of I. A. Pliev captured Nesvizh by July 2, cutting off the Minsk group’s escape route to the southeast. The offensive developed quickly, with only small scattered groups of soldiers offering resistance. On July 2, the remnants of the German 12th Panzer Division were driven back from Pukhovichi. By July 2, the tank corps of K.K. Rokossovsky’s front approached Minsk.

Fight for Minsk

At this stage, German mobile reserves, withdrawn mainly from the troops operating in Ukraine, began to arrive at the front. The first, on June 26 - 28, to the northeast of Minsk, in the Borisov area, was the 5th Panzer Division under the command of General K. Dekker. It posed a serious threat, given that over the previous few months it had almost not participated in hostilities and was staffed almost to its normal strength (including in the spring, the anti-tank division was re-equipped with 21 Jagdpanzer IV/48 tank destroyers, and in June a fully staffed one arrived battalion of 76 “Panthers”), and upon arrival in the Borisov area it was reinforced by the 505th heavy battalion (45 Tiger tanks). The weak point of the Germans in this area was the infantry: these were either guard divisions or infantry divisions that had suffered significant losses.

On June 28, the 5th Guards Tank Army, the horse-mechanized group of N. S. Oslikovsky and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps set into motion with the goal of crossing the Berezina and advancing to Minsk. The 5th Panzer Army, marching in the middle of the battle formation, collided with the group of General D. von Saucken on the Berezina (the main forces of the 5th Panzer Division and the 505th Heavy Tank Battalion). D. von Saucken's group had the task of holding the Berezina line in order to cover the retreat of the 4th Army. On June 29 and 30, extremely tough fighting took place between this group and two corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army. The 5th Guards Tank Army advanced with great difficulty and heavy losses, but during this time the cavalry-mechanized group of N. S. Oslikovsky, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the riflemen of the 11th Guards Army crossed the Berezina, breaking the weak resistance of the police units, and began to cover the German division from the north and south. The 5th Panzer Division, under pressure from all sides, was forced to retreat with heavy losses after short but fierce street fighting in Borisov itself. After the collapse of the defense at Borisov, N. S. Oslikovsky's cavalry-mechanized group was aimed at Molodechno (northwest of Minsk), and the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps were aimed at Minsk. The right-flank 5th Combined Arms Army, at this time, was moving north strictly west, to Vileika, and the left-flank 31st Army followed the 2nd Guards Tank Corps. Thus, there was a parallel pursuit: Soviet mobile formations overtook the retreating columns of the surrounded group. The last line on the way to Minsk was breached. The Wehrmacht suffered serious losses, and the proportion of prisoners was significant. The claims of the 3rd Belorussian Front included more than 22 thousand killed and more than 13 thousand captured German soldiers. Coupled with the large number of destroyed and captured vehicles (almost 5 thousand cars, according to the same report), we can conclude that the rear services of Army Group Center were subjected to heavy blows.

North-west of Minsk, the 5th Panzer Division gave another serious battle to the 5th Guards. tank army. On July 1-2, a difficult maneuver battle took place. German tank crews announced the destruction of 295 Soviet combat vehicles. Although such claims should be treated with caution, there is no doubt that the losses of the 5th Guards. tank army were heavy. However, in these battles, the 5th TD was reduced to 18 tanks, and all the “tigers” of the 505th heavy battalion were also lost. In fact, the division lost the opportunity to influence the operational situation, while the strike potential of the Soviet armored units was by no means exhausted.

July 3, 2nd Guards. The tank corps approached the outskirts of Minsk and, after making a roundabout maneuver, broke into the city from the north-west. At this moment, the advanced detachment of the Rokossovsky Front approached the city from the south, and the 5th Guards was advancing from the north. tank army, and from the east - the advanced detachments of the 31st combined arms army. Against such numerous and powerful formations in Minsk there were only about 1,800 regular troops. It should be noted that the Germans managed to evacuate more than 20 thousand wounded and rear personnel on July 1-2. However, there were still quite a few stragglers in the city (mostly unarmed). The defense of Minsk was very short: by 13:00 the capital of Belarus was liberated. This meant that the remnants of the 4th Army and the units that joined it, more than 100 thousand people, were doomed to captivity or extermination. Minsk fell into the hands of Soviet troops, severely destroyed during the battles in the summer of 1941; in addition, retreating Wehrmacht units caused additional destruction to the city. Marshal Vasilevsky stated: “On July 5 I visited Minsk. The impression I was left with was extremely difficult. The city was heavily destroyed by the Nazis. Of the large buildings, the enemy did not manage to blow up only the house of the Belarusian government, the new building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus, the radio plant and the House of the Red Army. The power plant, railway station, most industrial enterprises and institutions were blown up."

Collapse of the 4th Army

The surrounded German group undertook desperate attempts escape to the west. The Germans even attempted attacks with knives. Since the army's control fled to the west, the actual command of the remnants of the 4th Field Army was carried out by the commander of the 12th Army Corps, W. Müller, instead of K. von Tippelskirch.

The Minsk “cauldron” was shot right through by artillery fire and aircraft, ammunition was running out, supplies were completely absent, so a breakthrough attempt was made without delay. To do this, those surrounded were divided into two groups, one led by W. Müller himself, the other was led by the commander of the 78th Assault Division, Lieutenant General G. Traut. On July 6, a detachment under the command of G. Traut, numbering 3 thousand people, attempted to break through at Smilovichi, but collided with units of the 49th Army and was killed after a four-hour battle. On the same day, G. Trout made a second attempt to get out of the trap, but before reaching the crossings across the Svisloch at Sinelo, his detachment was defeated, and G. Trout himself was captured.

On July 5, the last radiogram was sent from the “cauldron” to the army group command. It read:

On that desperate call there was no answer. The outer front of the encirclement quickly shifted to the west, and if at the moment the ring closed it was enough to travel 50 km to break through, soon the front passed 150 km from the boiler. No one made their way to the surrounded people from the outside. The ring was shrinking, resistance was suppressed by massive shelling and bombing. On July 8, when the impossibility of a breakthrough became obvious, W. Muller decided to capitulate. Early in the morning, he drove out, guided by the sounds of artillery fire, towards the Soviet troops, and surrendered to units of the 121st Rifle Corps of the 50th Army. He immediately wrote the following order:

"July 8, 1944. To all soldiers of the 4th Army located in the area east of the Ptich River!

Our situation after many days of heavy fighting became hopeless. We have fulfilled our duty. Our combat effectiveness has been practically reduced to nothing, and we cannot count on the resumption of supplies. According to the Wehrmacht High Command, Russian troops are already stationed near Baranovichi. The path along the river is blocked, and we cannot break through the ring on our own. We have a huge number of wounded and soldiers who have lost their units.

Russian command promises:

A) medical care to all the wounded;

b) keep orders and bladed weapons for officers, and orders for soldiers.

We are required to: collect and hand over all available weapons and equipment in good condition.

Let's put an end to the senseless bloodshed!

I order:

Stop resisting immediately; gather in groups of 100 people or more under the command of officers or senior non-commissioned officers; concentrate the wounded at collection points; act clearly, energetically, showing comradely mutual assistance.

The more discipline we show when passing, the sooner we will be given allowance.

This order must be disseminated orally and in writing by all means available.

lieutenant general and commander

XII Army Corps.

The commanders of the Red Army were quite self-critical in assessing the actions to defeat the Minsk “cauldron”. The commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front, General G. F. Zakharov, expressed extreme dissatisfaction:

However, during July 8-9, the organized resistance of German troops was broken. The cleanup continued until July 12: partisans and regular units combed the forests, neutralizing small groups of encirclements. After this, the fighting east of Minsk finally stopped. More than 72 thousand German soldiers died, more than 35 thousand were captured.

Second stage of the operation

On the eve of the second stage of Operation Bagration, the Soviet side tried to exploit as much as possible achieved success, German - restore the front. At this stage, the attackers had to fight the arriving enemy reserves. Also at this time, new personnel changes took place in the leadership of the armed forces of the Third Reich. Boss General Staff ground forces K. Zeitzler proposed withdrawing Army Group North to the south in order to build a new front with its help. This proposal was rejected by A. Hitler political reasons(relations with Finland), and also because of the objections of the naval command: leaving the Gulf of Finland worsened communications with Finland and Sweden. As a result, K. Zeitzler was forced to resign as chief of the general staff and was replaced by G.V. Guderian.

Field Marshal V. Model, for his part, tried to erect a defensive line running from Vilnius through Lida and Baranovichi and seal the 400 km wide hole in the front. To do this, he had the only army of the Center group that had not yet been attacked - the 2nd, as well as reinforcements and the remnants of defeated units. In total these were obviously insufficient forces. V. Model received significant help from other sectors of the front: by July 16, 46 divisions were transferred to Belarus. However, these formations were introduced into battle gradually, often “on wheels,” and could not quickly change the course of the battle.

Siauliai operation

After the liberation of Polotsk, the 1st Baltic Front of I. Kh. Bagramyan received the task of attacking in the direction to the northwest, to Dvinsk and to the west, to Kaunas and Sventsyan. The general plan was to break through to the Baltic and cut off Army Group North from the other Wehrmacht forces. To prevent front troops from being stretched across different operational lines, the 4th Shock Army was transferred to the 2nd Belorussian Front. In exchange, the 39th Army was transferred from the 3rd Belorussian Front. Reserves were also transferred to the front: it included the 51st Army of Lieutenant General Ya. G. Kreiser and the 2nd Guards Army of Lieutenant General P. G. Chanchibadze. These changes caused a short pause, since on July 4 only two of the front armies had the enemy in front of them. The reserve armies were marching to the front, the 39th was also on the march after the defeat of the Vitebsk “cauldron”. Therefore, until July 15, the battle went on without the participation of the armies of Ya. G. Kreizer and P. G. Chanchibadze.

Expecting an attack on Dvinsk, the enemy transferred part of the forces of Army Group North to this area. The Soviet side estimated the enemy forces near Dvinsk at five fresh divisions, as well as a brigade of assault guns, security, sapper and penal units. Thus, the Soviet troops did not have superiority in forces over the enemy. In addition, interruptions in the supply of fuel forced Soviet aviation to greatly reduce activity. Because of this, the offensive that began on July 5 stalled by the 7th. Shifting the direction of the attack only helped to move forward a little, but did not create a breakthrough. On July 18, the operation in the Dvina direction was suspended. According to I. Kh. Bagramyan, he was ready for such a development of events:

The advance towards Sventsyany was much easier, since the enemy did not deploy such significant reserves in this direction, and the Soviet group, on the contrary, was more powerful than against Dvinsk. Advancing, the 1st Tank Corps cut the Vilnius-Dvinsk railway. By July 14, the left flank had advanced 140 km, leaving Vilnius to the south and moving to Kaunas.

The local failure did not affect the overall course of the operation. The 6th Guards Army went on the offensive again on July 23, and although its advance was slow and difficult, Dvinsk was cleared on July 27 in cooperation with the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front advancing to the right. After July 20, the introduction of fresh forces began to have an effect: the 51st Army reached the front line and immediately liberated Panevezys, after which it continued to move towards Siauliai. On July 26, the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps was brought into battle in its zone, which reached Siauliai on the same day. The enemy's resistance was weak, mainly separate operational groups acted on the German side, so Šiauliai was taken already on July 27.

The enemy quite clearly understood the intention of the Supreme High Command to cut off the North group. J. Friesner, commander of the army group, drew A. Hitler’s attention to this fact on July 15, arguing that if the army group did not reduce the front and withdraw, it would face isolation and, possibly, defeat. However, there was no time to withdraw the group from the emerging “bag”, and on July 23 G. Friesner was removed from his post and sent south to Romania.

The overall goal of the 1st Baltic Front was access to the sea, so the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps, as a mobile group of the front, was turned almost at a right angle: from west to north. I. Kh. Bagramyan formalized this turn with the following order:

By July 30, it was possible to separate the two army groups from each other: the vanguards of the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps cut the last railway between East Prussia and the Baltic states in the Tukums area. On July 31, after a rather intense assault, Jelgava fell. Thus, the front reached the Baltic Sea. In the words of A. Hitler, a “gap in the Wehrmacht” arose. At this stage, the main task of I. Kh. Bagramyan’s front was to maintain what had been achieved, since an operation to great depth would lead to a stretching of communications, and the enemy was actively trying to restore land communications between army groups.

The first of the German counterattacks was an attack near the city of Birzai. This town was located at the junction between the 51st Army, which had broken through to the sea, and the 43rd Army, which followed it on the right in a ledge. The idea of ​​the German command was to reach the rear of the 51st Army running towards the sea through the positions of the 43rd Army covering the flank. The enemy used a fairly large group from Army Group North. According to Soviet data, five infantry divisions (58th, 61st, 81st, 215th and 290th), the Nordland motorized division, the 393rd assault gun brigade and other units took part in the battle. On August 1, going on the offensive, this group managed to encircle the 357th rifle division 43rd Army. The division was quite small (4 thousand people) and was in a difficult situation. However, the local “cauldron” was not subjected to serious pressure, apparently due to the lack of enemy forces. The first attempts to relieve the encircled unit failed, but contact was maintained with the division and it had air supplies. The situation was turned around by the reserves brought in by I. Kh. Bagramyan. On the night of August 7, the 19th Tank Corps and the encircled division, which was fighting from inside the “cauldron,” united. Biržai was also detained. Of the 3,908 people who were surrounded, 3,230 people emerged in service and about 400 wounded. That is, the losses in people turned out to be moderate.

However, counterattacks by German troops continued. On August 16, attacks began in the Raseiniai area and west of Siauliai. The German 3rd Panzer Army tried to push the Red Army back from the Baltic Sea and restore contact with Army Group North. Units of the 2nd Guards Army were pushed back, as were units of the neighboring 51st Army. By August 18, the 7th, 5th, 14th tank divisions and the “Gross Germany” tank division (in the document erroneously called “SS division”) were established in front of the 2nd Guards Army. The situation near Siauliai was stabilized by the introduction of the 5th Guards Tank Army into battle. However, on August 20, an offensive began from the west and east towards Tukums. Tukums was lost, and for a short time the Germans restored land communications between Army Groups Center and North. The attacks of the German 3rd Panzer Army in the Siauliai area failed. At the end of August there was a break in the fighting. The 1st Baltic Front completed its part of Operation Bagration.

Vilnius operation

The destruction of the Wehrmacht 4th Army east of Minsk opened up tempting prospects. On July 4, I. D. Chernyakhovsky received a directive from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command with the task of attacking in the general direction of Vilnius, Kaunas and by July 12 liberating Vilnius and Lida, and subsequently seizing a bridgehead on the western bank of the Neman.

Without taking an operational pause, the 3rd Belorussian Front began the operation on July 5. The offensive was supported by the 5th Guards Tank Army. The enemy did not have sufficient forces for direct confrontation, however, Vilnius was declared by A. Hitler to be another “fortress”, and a fairly large garrison was concentrated in it, which was further reinforced during the operation and numbered about 15 thousand people. There are alternative points of view on the size of the garrison: 4 thousand people. The 5th Army and the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps broke through the enemy defenses and advanced 20 km in the first 24 hours. For infantry this is a very high pace. The matter was made easier by the looseness of the German defense: the army was confronted on a wide front by battered infantry formations and construction and security units thrown to the front. The army captured Vilnius from the north.

Meanwhile, the 11th Guards Army and the 5th Guards Tank Army were advancing further south, in the Molodechno area. At the same time, the tank army gradually shifted to the north, surrounding Vilnius from the south. Molodechno itself was taken by cavalrymen of the 3rd Guards Corps on July 5. A warehouse with 500 tons of fuel was seized in the city. On July 6, the Germans attempted a private counterattack against the 5th Guards Tank Army. It involved the 212th Infantry and 391st Security Divisions, as well as Hoppe's improvised armored group of 22 self-propelled artillery units. The counterattack had, according to German claims, limited success, but it was not confirmed by the Soviet side; only the fact of a counterattack is noted. He had no influence on the advance towards Vilnius, but the 11th Guards Army had to slightly slow down the pace of movement towards Alytus, repelling this and subsequent attacks (later the 11th Guards Army received counterattacks from the 7th and the remnants of the 5th tank divisions, security and infantry units). On July 7 - 8, the city was surrounded by units of the 5th Guards Tank Army from the south and the 3rd Guards mechanized corps from North. The garrison under the command of Major General R. Stagel took up a perimeter defense. The city was defended by a combined group of various parts, including the 761st Grenadier Brigade, artillery and anti-aircraft battalions and others.

On July 7, an uprising of the Polish nationalist organization Home Army broke out in Vilnius (Operation “Sharp Gate” as part of the “Storm” Action). Its detachments, led by local commander A. Krzhizhanovsky, numbered, according to various sources, from 4 to 10 thousand people, and they managed to take control of part of the city. The Polish rebels were not able to liberate Vilnius on their own, but they provided assistance to units of the Red Army.

By July 9, most of the key facilities in the city, including the railway station and airfield, were captured by units of the 5th Army and the 5th Guards Tank Army. However, the garrison stubbornly resisted.

I. L. Degen, a tanker who took part in the assault on Vilnius, left the following description of these battles:

The lieutenant colonel said that the enemy was holding the defense with only about a hundred infantry, a couple of German tanks and several guns - one or two, and that was it. (...)

And we, three tanks, crawled along the city streets, not seeing each other. The two German guns promised by the lieutenant colonel apparently multiplied by non-sexual division, and they began firing at us from guns from all sides. They barely had time to destroy them. (...)

The battle with the Germans in the city, in addition to Soviet units, was actively fought by Poles with red and white armbands (subordinate to the Polish government in London) and a large Jewish partisan detachment. They had red bands on their sleeves. A group of Poles approached the tank. I jumped down to them and asked: “Do you need help?” The commander, it seems, a colonel, almost with tears in his eyes, shook my hand and showed me where the Germans were shooting at them most intensively. It turns out that the day before they were left alone with the Germans without support. That’s why the lieutenant general turned out to be so kind to us... A lieutenant, whom I had already seen at the regimental headquarters, immediately came running and conveyed a request from the commander to support the battalion in the same direction that the Poles had just pointed out to me.

I found the battalion commander's NP in the basement. The battalion commander familiarized me with the situation and set the task. He had seventeen people left in the battalion... I grinned: well, if three tanks are considered a tank brigade, then why can’t 17 soldiers be a battalion... The battalion was assigned one 76-mm cannon. The crew had two armor-piercing shells left. This was all the ammunition. The gun was commanded by a young junior lieutenant. Naturally, the artillerymen could not support the battalion with fire. Their heads were filled with one thought: what would they do if they walked down the street German tanks?!

Starting from July 9, my tank did not leave the battle for three days. We have completely lost orientation in space and time. No one brought shells to me, and I was forced to think a thousand times before allowing myself another shot from a tank gun. Mainly supported the infantry with fire from two machine guns and tracks. There was no communication with the brigade or even with Varivoda.

Street fighting is a real nightmare, it's a horror that human brain unable to fully embrace. (...)

On July 13, fighting stopped in the city. The Germans surrendered in groups. Do you remember how many Germans the lieutenant colonel warned me about? One hundred people. So, there were five thousand captured Germans alone. But there were no two tanks either.

On the night of July 12-13, the German 6th Panzer Division, with the support of part of the Grossdeutschland division, broke through a corridor to Vilnius. The operation was personally led by Colonel General G. H. Reinhardt, commander of the 3rd Tank Army. Three thousand German troops came out of the “fortress”. The rest, no matter how many there were, died or were captured on July 13th. The Soviet side announced the death of eight thousand German soldiers in Vilnius and the surrounding area and the capture of five thousand. By July 15, the 3rd Belorussian Front captured a bridgehead across the Neman. Units of the Home Army were interned by the Soviet authorities.

While the assault on Vilnius was underway, the southern wing of the front was calmly moving west. The 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps captured Lida, and by July 16 reached Grodno. The front crossed the Neman. The large water obstacle was passed at a fast pace with moderate losses.

Wehrmacht units tried to neutralize the bridgeheads across the Neman. For this purpose, the command of the German 3rd Panzer Army created an improvised battle group from units of the 6th Panzer Division and the Grossdeutschland Division. It included two tank battalions, a motorized infantry regiment and self-propelled artillery. The counterattack on July 16 was aimed at the flank of the 72nd Rifle Corps of the 5th Army. However, this counterattack was carried out in a hurry; there was no time to organize reconnaissance. In the depths of the Soviet defense near the town of Vroblevizh, the battle group came across the 16th Guards, which had taken up defensive positions. anti-tank destroyer brigade, and lost 63 tanks during a difficult battle. The counterattack fizzled out, the bridgeheads beyond the Neman were held by the Russians.

Kaunas operation

After the battle for Vilnius, the 3rd Belorussian Front under the command of I. D. Chernyakhovsky was aimed at Kaunas and Suwalki, the latter big cities on the way to East Prussia. On July 28, front troops went on the offensive and advanced 5 to 17 km in the first two days. On July 30, the enemy’s defenses along the Neman were broken through; In the zone of the 33rd Army, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps was introduced into the breakthrough. The entry of the mobile formation into operational space put the Kaunas garrison in danger of encirclement, so by August 1, Wehrmacht units left the city.

However, the gradual increase in German resistance led to a relatively slow advance with serious losses. The stretching of communications, the depletion of ammunition, and growing losses forced the Soviet troops to suspend the offensive. In addition, the enemy launched a series of counterattacks on the front of I. D. Chernyakhovsky. So, on August 9, the 1st Infantry Division, 5th Tank Division, and the “Gross Germany” Division counterattacked the 33rd Front Army marching in the center and somewhat pushed it back. In mid-August, a counterattack by infantry divisions in the Raseinaya area even led to tactical (regimental level) encirclements, which, however, were soon broken through. These chaotic counterattacks led to the drying up of the operation by the 20th of August. From August 29, at the direction of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the 3rd Belorussian Front went on the defensive, reaching Suwalki and not reaching several kilometers to the borders of East Prussia.

Access to the old German borders caused panic in East Prussia. Despite the assurances of Gauleiter E. Koch that the situation on the approaches to East Prussia had stabilized, the population began to leave the region.

For the 3rd Belorussian Front, the Kaunas operation ended the battles within the framework of Operation Bagration.

Bialystok and Osovets operations

After the creation of the Minsk “cauldron”, General G. F. Zakharov, like other front commanders, was given the task of moving deep to the west. As part of the Bialystok operation, the 2nd Belorussian Front played a supporting role - it pursued the remnants of Army Group Center. Leaving Minsk behind, the front moved strictly west - to Novogrudok, and then to Grodno and Bialystok. The 49th and 50th armies at first could not take part in this movement, since they continued fighting with German units that were surrounded in the Minsk “cauldron”. Thus, only one remained for the offensive - the 3rd Army. She started moving on July 5th. At first, enemy resistance was very weak: in the first five days, the 3rd Army advanced 120-125 km. This tempo is very high for infantry and is more characteristic of a march than an attack. On July 8 Novogrudok fell, on July 9 the army reached the Neman.

However, gradually the enemy built a defense in front of the front troops. On July 10, in front of the front positions, reconnaissance identified the remnants of the 12th and 20th tank and parts of four infantry divisions, as well as six separate regiments. These forces could not stop the offensive, but influenced the operational situation and slowed down the tempo of the operation.

On July 10, the 50th Army entered the battle. The Neman was crossed. On July 15, front troops approached Grodno. On the same day, the troops repulsed a series of counterattacks, causing serious damage to the enemy. On July 16, Grodno was liberated in cooperation with the 3rd Belorussian Front.

The enemy reinforced units in the Grodno direction, but these reserves were not sufficient, and in addition, they themselves suffered heavy losses in the battles. Although the pace of the front's advance had seriously dropped, from July 17 to 27 the troops broke through to the Augustow Canal, recaptured Bialystok on July 27, and reached the pre-war border of the USSR. The operation took place without noticeable enemy encirclement, which was due to the weakness of the mobile formations at the front: the 2nd Belorussian Front did not have a single tank, mechanized or cavalry corps, having only tank infantry support brigades. In general, the front completed all the tasks assigned to it.

Subsequently, the front developed an offensive against Osovets, and on August 14 occupied the city. The front also occupied a bridgehead beyond the Narev. However, the advance of the troops was quite slow: extended communications played their role, on the one hand, and frequent counterattacks by the strengthened enemy, on the other. On August 14, the Bialystok operation was terminated, and Operation Bagration also ended for the 2nd Belorussian Front.

Developing the success of the 1st Belorussian Front

After the liberation of Minsk, the front of K.K. Rokossovsky, like others, received a directive to pursue the remnants of Army Group Center. The first destination was Baranovichi, and in the future it was planned to develop an offensive towards Brest. The front's mobile group - the 4th Guards Cavalry, 1st Mechanized and 9th Tank Corps - was directly targeting Baranovichi.

Already on July 5, the Red Army forces encountered arriving enemy operational reserves. The 1st Mechanized Corps entered into battle with the 4th Tank Division, which had just arrived in Belarus, and was stopped. In addition, Hungarian units (1st Cavalry Division) and German infantry reserves (28th Light Division) appeared at the front. On July 5 and 6 there were intense battles, progress was insignificant, success was seen only in the 65th Army of P. I. Batov.

Gradually, the resistance near Baranavichy was broken. The attackers were supported by large air forces (about 500 bombers). The 1st Belorussian Front noticeably outnumbered the enemy, so resistance gradually weakened. On July 8, after a heavy street battle, Baranovichi was liberated.

Thanks to the success at Baranovichi, the actions of the 61st Army were facilitated. This army, under the command of General P. A. Belov, advanced in the direction of Pinsk through Luninets. The army operated in extremely difficult marshy terrain between the flanks of the 1st Belorussian Front. The fall of Baranovichi created a threat of envelopment of German troops in the Pinsk area and forced them to a hasty retreat. During the pursuit, the Dnieper River Flotilla provided significant assistance to the 61st Army. In particular, on the night of July 12, the vessels of the flotilla secretly ascended Pripyat and landed a rifle regiment on the outskirts of Pinsk. The Germans failed to destroy the landing force; on July 14, Pinsk was liberated.

On July 19, Kobrin, a city east of Brest, was half-encircled and the next day captured. The right wing of the front reached Brest from the east.

Were underway fighting and on the left wing of the front, separated from the right by the impassable swamps of Polesie. As early as July 2, the enemy began to withdraw troops from Kovel, an important transport hub. On July 5, the 47th Army went on the offensive and liberated the city on July 6. Front commander Konstantin Rokossovsky arrived here to directly lead the troops. On July 8, in order to seize a bridgehead on the Western Bug (the subsequent task is access to Lublin), the 11th Tank Corps was brought into battle. Due to disorganization, the corps was ambushed and irretrievably lost 75 tanks; corps commander Rudkin was removed from his post. Unsuccessful attacks continued here for several more days. As a result, near Kovel, the enemy retreated 12 to 20 kilometers in an organized manner and thwarted the Soviet offensive.

Lublin-Brest operation

Start of the offensive

On July 18, the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky went on the offensive in full force. The left wing of the front, which had until now remained largely passive, entered the operation. Since the Lviv-Sandomierz operation was already underway to the south, maneuvering with reserves was extremely difficult for the German side. The enemy of the 1st Belorussian Front was not only parts of Army Group Center, but also Army Group Northern Ukraine, commanded by V. Model. This field marshal thus combined the posts of commander of army groups “Center” and “Northern Ukraine”. In order to maintain communication between the army groups, he ordered the withdrawal of the 4th Tank Army beyond the Bug. The 8th Guards Army under the command of V.I. Chuikov and the 47th Army under the command of N. I. Gusev went to the river and immediately crossed it, entering the territory of Poland. K.K. Rokossovsky dates the crossing of the Bug to July 20, D. Glanz - to the 21st. Be that as it may, the Wehrmacht failed to create a line along the Bug. Moreover, the defense of the German 8th Army Corps collapsed so quickly that the help of the 2nd Tank Army was not needed; the tankers were forced to catch up with the infantrymen. The tank army of S.I. Bogdanov consisted of three corps and posed a serious threat. She quickly moved towards Lublin, that is, strictly to the west. The 11th Tank and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, with infantry support, turned to Brest, to the north.

Brest "cauldron". Storm of Lublin

At this time, Kobrin was liberated on the right wing of the front. Thus, a local “cauldron” began to form near Brest. On July 25, the encirclement ring around units of the 86th, 137th and 261st Infantry Divisions was closed. Three days later, on July 28, the remnants of the encircled group broke out of the “cauldron.” During the defeat of the Brest group, the Germans suffered serious casualties, which is noted by both belligerents (according to Soviet claims, 7 thousand corpses of German soldiers remained on the battlefield). Extremely few prisoners were taken - only 110 people.

Meanwhile, the 2nd Tank Army was advancing on Lublin. The need for its quick capture was due to political reasons. J.V. Stalin emphasized that the liberation of Lublin “... is urgently required by the political situation and the interests of independent democratic Poland.” The army received the order on July 21, and on the night of the 22nd began to carry it out. Tank units advanced from the battle formations of the 8th Guards Army. The 3rd Panzer Corps struck the junction between two German corps, and after a short battle, penetrated their defenses. In the afternoon the coverage of Lublin began. The Lublin-Puławy highway was blocked, and enemy rear establishments were intercepted on the road and evacuated along with the city administration. Part of the tank army forces did not have contact with the enemy that day due to interruptions in the fuel supply.

The success of the first day of the push to Lublin led to the Red Army overestimating its capabilities. The next morning, July 23, the city was stormed by tank corps. In the outskirts, the Soviet forces were successful, but the attack towards Loketka Square was parried. The attackers' problem was an acute shortage of motorized infantry. This problem was mitigated: the Home Army uprising broke out in the city. On this day, S.I. Bogdanov, who observed the assault, was wounded. General who replaced him. I. Radzievsky (previously the chief of staff of the army) energetically continued the assault. Early in the morning of July 24, part of the garrison left Lublin, but not everyone managed to retreat successfully. Before noon, in the center of the city, those storming it united with different sides units, and by the morning of July 25, Lublin was cleared.

According to Soviet data, 2,228 German soldiers were captured, led by SS Gruppenführer H. Moser. The exact losses of the Red Army during the assault are unknown, but according to a certificate from Colonel I.N. Bazanov (chief of army staff after S.I. Bogdanov was wounded), from July 20 to August 8, the army lost 1,433 people killed and missing. Taking into account the losses in the battle of Radzimin, the irretrievable losses of the army during the attack on Lublin and the assault could reach six hundred people. The capture of the city occurred ahead of schedule: the directive for the assault on Lublin, signed by A. I. Antonov and I. V. Stalin, provided for the occupation of Lublin on July 27. After the capture of Lublin, the 2nd Panzer Army made a deep push north along the Vistula, with the ultimate goal of capturing Prague, the eastern suburb of Warsaw. The Majdanek extermination camp was liberated near Lublin.

Seizing bridgeheads

On July 27, the 69th Army reached the Vistula near Puława. On the 29th, it captured a bridgehead at Pulawa, south of Warsaw. The crossing went quite calmly. However, not all units enjoyed the same success.

On July 30, the 69th, 8th Guards, 1st Polish and 2nd Tank armies received orders from K.K. Rokossovsky to seize bridgeheads across the Vistula. The front commander, as well as the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, intended in this way to create a base for future operations.

1. The chief of the front engineering troops should pull up the main crossing facilities to the river. Vistula and ensure the crossing of: 60th Army, 1st Polish Army, 8th Guards Army.

2. Army commanders: a) draw up army plans for crossing the river. Vistula, linking them with operational tasks performed by the army and neighbors. These plans clearly reflect the issues of interaction between infantry and artillery and other means of reinforcement, focusing on the reliable provision of landing groups and units with the task of preventing their destruction on the western bank of the river; b) organize strict control over the implementation of the forcing plan, while avoiding drift and disorganization; c) bring to the attention of commanders of all levels that the soldiers and commanders who distinguished themselves during the crossing of the river. Vistula, will be presented with special awards with orders up to and including the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

TsAMO RF. F. 233. Op. 2307. D. 168. L. 105–106

On July 31, the Polish 1st Army unsuccessfully attempted to cross the Vistula. Pointing to the reasons for the failure, the head of the political department of the Polish army, Lieutenant Colonel Zambrowski, noted the inexperience of the soldiers, lack of ammunition and organizational failures.

On August 1, the 8th Guards Army began to cross the Vistula at Magnushev. Its bridgehead was supposed to arise between the Pulawy bridgehead of the 69th Army and Warsaw. The initial plan envisaged crossing the Vistula on August 3-4, after strengthening the 8th Guards Army with artillery and crossing means. However, the commander of the army, V.I. Chuikov, convinced K.K. Rokossovsky to start on August 1, counting on the surprise of the attack.

During August 1 - 4, the army managed to conquer a vast area on the western bank of the river, 15 km along the front and 10 km in depth. The supply of the army in the bridgehead was ensured by several bridges built, including one with a carrying capacity of 60 tons. Taking into account the possibility of enemy attacks on a fairly long perimeter of the bridgehead, K.K. Rokossovsky on August 6 ordered the transfer of an “outsider” of the battles for the bridgehead, the 1st Army of the Polish Army, to Magnushev. Thus, the 1st Belorussian Front provided itself with two large springboards for future operations.

Tank battle near Radzimin

In the literature there is no single name for the battle that took place on the eastern bank of the Vistula in late July and early August. In addition to Radzimin, he is also tied to Warsaw, Okunev and Volomin.

The Lublin-Brest operation cast doubt on the reality of Model's plans to hold the front along the Vistula. The field marshal could fend off the threat with the help of reserves. On July 24, the 9th Army was recreated, and the forces arriving on the Vistula were subordinated to it. True, at first the composition of the army was extremely meager. At the end of July, the 2nd Tank Army began testing its strength. Radzievsky's army had the ultimate goal of capturing a bridgehead across the Narew (a tributary of the Vistula) north of Warsaw, in the Serock region. On the way, the army was supposed to capture Prague, a suburb of Warsaw on the eastern bank of the Vistula.

On the evening of July 26, the army's motorcycle vanguard encountered the German 73rd Infantry Division at Garwolin, a town on the eastern bank of the Vistula northeast of Magnuszew. This was the prelude to a complex maneuver battle. The 3rd and 8th Guards Tank Corps of the 2nd Tank Army were targeting Prague. The 16th Panzer Corps remained near Dęblin (between the Magnuszewski and Pulawy bridgeheads), waiting for the infantry to relieve it.

The 73rd Infantry Division was supported by separate elements of the "airborne" division "Hermann Göring" (a reconnaissance battalion and part of the division's artillery) and other scattered infantry units. All these troops were united under the leadership of the commander of the 73rd Infantry Division, Fritz Franek, into the "Franek" group. On July 27, the 3rd Tank Corps crushed the Hermann Goering reconnaissance battalion, 8th Guards. TK also achieved a breakthrough. Under threat of being overrun, the Franek group rolled back to the north. At this time, tank units began to arrive to help the beaten infantry division - the main forces of the Hermann Goering division, 4 and 19 tanks. divisions, SS divisions “Viking” and “Totenkopf” (in two corps: Dietrich von Saucken’s 39th Panzer Corps and Gille’s 4th SS Panzer Corps). In total, this group consisted of 51 thousand people with 600 tanks and self-propelled guns. The 2nd Tank Army of the Red Army had only 32 thousand soldiers and 425 tanks and self-propelled guns. (the Soviet tank corps roughly matched the size of the German division). In addition, the rapid advance of the 2nd TA led to a lag in the rear: fuel and ammunition were delivered intermittently.

However, until the main forces of the German tank formation arrived, the Wehrmacht infantry had to endure a heavy blow from the 2nd TA. On July 28 and 29, heavy fighting continued; Radzievsky’s corps (including the approaching 16th Panzer) tried to intercept the Warsaw-Siedlce highway, but were unable to break through the defenses of Hermann Goering. The attacks on the infantry of the "Franek" group were much more successful: in the Otwock area a weak point in its defense was found, the group began to be covered from the west, as a result of which the 73rd division began to retreat unorganized under attack. General Franek was captured no later than July 30 (Radzievsky’s report on his capture dates back to the 30th). Group "Franek" was broken into separate parts, suffered heavy losses and quickly rolled back to the north.

The 3rd Panzer Corps was aimed deep to the north-west with the aim of covering Prague, through Wołomin. It was a risky maneuver, and in the days that followed it almost led to disaster. The corps broke through the narrow gap between the German forces, in the face of the accumulation of enemy battle groups on the flanks. The 3rd Tank Corps was suddenly subjected to a flank attack at Radzimin. On August 1, Radzievsky orders the army to go on the defensive, but does not withdraw the 3rd Tank Corps from the breakthrough.

On August 1, Wehrmacht units cut off the 3rd Tank Tank, recapturing Radzimin and Volomin. The escape routes of the 3rd Tank Corps were intercepted in two places.

However, the collapse of the surrounded corps did not take place. August 2, 8th Guards. The tank corps, with an attack from the outside, broke through the narrow corridor towards the encircled. It was too early to rejoice at the salvation of those surrounded. Radzimin and Volomin were abandoned, and the 8th Guards. The tank and 3rd tank corps had to defend against enemy tank divisions attacking from several sides. On the night of August 4, at the location of the 8th Guards. as the last large groups of encirclement left. In the 3rd Tank Corps, two brigade commanders died in the cauldron. By August 4, Soviet infantry in the form of the 125th Rifle Corps and cavalry (2nd Guards Cavalry Corps) arrived at the battle site. Two fresh formations were enough to completely stop the enemy on August 4. It should be noted that the forces of the 47th and 2nd Tank Armies carried out a search for the soldiers of the encircled 3rd Tank Tank who remained behind the front line; the result of these activities was the rescue of several hundred encircled people. On the same day, the 19th Panzer Division and Hermann Goering, after unsuccessful attacks on Okunev, were withdrawn from Warsaw and began to be transferred to the Magnuszew bridgehead, with the goal of destroying it. The Germans' ineffective attacks on Okunev continued (with the forces of 4 TD) on August 5, after which the attackers' forces dried up.

German (and more broadly, Western) historiography evaluates the Battle of Radzimin as a serious success for the Wehrmacht by the standards of 1944. It is stated that the 3rd Tank Corps was destroyed or, at least, defeated. However, information about the actual losses of the 2nd Tank Army casts doubt on the validity of the last statement. From July 20 to August 8, the army lost 1,433 people killed, missing, and captured. Of this number, 799 people were responsible for the counterattack near Volomin. With the actual strength of the corps being 8-10 thousand soldiers, such losses do not allow us to talk about the death or defeat of the 3rd Tank Corps in the cauldron, even if it suffered all of them alone. It must be admitted that the directive to seize the bridgehead beyond the Narev was not implemented. However, the directive was issued at a time when there was no information about the presence of a large German group in the Warsaw area. The presence of a mass of tank divisions in the Warsaw area in itself made it unrealistic for the relatively small 2nd Tank Army to break into Prague, and even more so across the river. On the other hand, the counterattack of a strong group of Germans, despite their numerical superiority, brought modest results. The losses of the German side cannot be precisely clarified, since during the ten-day period of July 21-31, 9, the Wehrmacht army did not provide reports on the losses incurred. Over the next ten days, the army reported a loss of 2,155 dead and missing.

After the counterattack near Radzimin, the 3rd Tank Corps was withdrawn to Minsk-Mazowiecki for rest and replenishment, and the 16th and 8th Guards. tank corps were transferred to the Magnushevsky bridgehead. Their opponents there were the same divisions, “Hermann Goering” and the 19th Panzer, as at Radzimin.

Beginning of the Warsaw Uprising

With the approach of the 2nd Tank Army to Prague, the eastern district of Warsaw, the leaders of the underground Home Army decided on a large-scale uprising in the western part of the city. The Polish side proceeded from the doctrine of “two enemies” (Germany and the USSR). Accordingly, the goal of the uprising was twofold: to prevent the destruction of Warsaw by the Germans during the evacuation and at the same time to prohibit the establishment of a regime loyal to the USSR in Poland, as well as to demonstrate the sovereignty of Poland and the ability of the Home Army to act independently without the support of the Red Army. The weak point of the plan was the need to very accurately calculate the moment when the retreating German troops would no longer be able to resist, and the Red Army units would not yet enter the city. On July 31, when units of the 2nd Tank Army were a few kilometers from Warsaw, T. Bor-Komorowski convened a meeting of the commanders of the Home Army. It was decided to implement the “Storm” plan in Warsaw, and on August 1, a few hours after A. I. Radzievsky’s army went on the defensive, the uprising began.

At the end of the Battle of Radzimin, the 2nd Panzer Army was divided. The 3rd Tank Corps was withdrawn from the front line to the front rear for rest, the other two were sent to the Magnushevsky bridgehead. Only the 47th Army remained in the Warsaw area, operating on a wide front. Later it was joined by the 1st Army of the Polish Army. These forces initially did not provide assistance to the uprising. After this, the Polish Army made an unsuccessful attempt to cross the Vistula.

After the initial successes of the uprising, the Wehrmacht and SS began the gradual destruction of parts of the Home Army. The uprising was finally suppressed in early October.

The question of whether the Red Army could have provided assistance to the uprising, and whether Soviet leaders were willing to provide such assistance, is debatable. A number of historians argue that the stop near Warsaw is connected primarily with I.V. Stalin’s desire to give the Germans the opportunity to end the uprising. The Soviet position boiled down to the fact that assistance to the uprising was extremely difficult due to stretched communications and, as a result, supply interruptions, and increased enemy resistance. The point of view according to which the offensive near Warsaw stopped due to purely military reasons is shared by some Western historians. Thus, there is no consensus on this issue, but it can be stated that in fact the Home Army fought the Germans one on one in the rebellious Warsaw.

The fight for bridgeheads

The 8th Guards Army's main forces occupied the defense on the Magnushevsky bridgehead, and two more divisions were concentrated on the eastern bank in the Garwolin area due to K.K. Rokossovsky's fears about possible German counterattacks. However, the attacks of the German 19th Panzer Division and the Hermann Goering division, withdrawn from Radzimin, fell not on the rear of the bridgehead, but on its front, on its southern part. In addition to them, Soviet troops noted attacks by the 17th Infantry Division and the 45th Infantry Division, reformed after the death in the Minsk and Bobruisk “cauldrons”. To combat these forces, V.I. Chuikov had, in addition to infantry, a tank brigade and three regiments of self-propelled artillery. In addition, reinforcements gradually arrived at the bridgehead: on August 6, a Polish tank brigade and a regiment of IS-2 heavy tanks were thrown into battle. On the morning of August 8, it was possible to build bridges across the river, thanks to the anti-aircraft “umbrella” that the newly arrived three anti-aircraft divisions hung. Using the bridges, the 8th Guards Tank Corps, withdrawn from the 2nd Tank Army, crossed over to the bridgehead. This moment became a turning point in the struggle for the Magnushevsky bridgehead; in the following days, enemy activity dropped. The introduction of the “fresh” 25th Panzer Division did not help either. Then the 16th Tank Corps of the 2nd Tank Army arrived. By August 16, the enemy stopped attacks.

This battle was very difficult for the 8th Guards Army. From August 1st to August 26th total losses amounted to more than 35 thousand people. However, the bridgehead was retained.

At the Pulawy bridgehead, on August 2, the 69th Army, with the support of the Polish Army, united two small bridgeheads near Pulawy into a single one, 24 km along the front and 8 km in depth. From August 5 to 14, the Germans tried to destroy the bridgehead, but failed. After this, the army of V. Ya. Kolpakchi finally consolidated the bridgeheads, by August 28 creating a bridgehead fortification of 30 by 10 km.

On August 29, the front went on the defensive, although the right wing of the front still continued private operations. From this date, Operation Bagration is considered completed.

Polish Committee of National Liberation

On July 21, 1944, after the Red Army crossed the Curzon Line and entered Polish territory, the provisional government of Poland, also known as the Polish Committee of National Liberation, was created. It was created with the active participation of the USSR and with complete disregard for the emigrant government of Poland in London, and therefore is considered by many historians as a puppet. The Polish Committee of National Liberation included representatives of the Polish Workers' Party, the Polish Socialist Party, the Stronnitstvo Ludowe and Stronnitstvo Demokratychne parties. July 27 members Polish Committee national liberation arrived in Lublin (hence another name for this body - “Lublin Committee”). Initially, not recognized as the government of Poland by anyone except the USSR, it actually administered the liberated part of the country. Members of the émigré government were forced either to remain in exile or to join the Lublin Committee.

Results of the operation

The success of Operation Bagration significantly exceeded the expectations of the Soviet command. As a result of the two-month offensive, Belarus was completely cleared, part of the Baltic states was recaptured, and the eastern regions of Poland were liberated. In general, on a front of 1100 km, advances to a depth of 600 km were achieved. In addition, the operation jeopardized Army Group North in the Baltic states; The carefully constructed line, the Panther line, was bypassed. Subsequently, this fact greatly facilitated the Baltic operation. Also, as a result of the capture of two large bridgeheads beyond the Vistula south of Warsaw - Magnuszewski and Puławski (as well as the bridgehead at Sandomierz, captured by the 1st Ukrainian Front during the Lvov-Sandomierz operation), the groundwork was created for the future Vistula-Oder operation. In January 1945, the offensive of the 1st Belorussian Front began from the Magnuszewski and Puławski bridgeheads, stopping only at the Oder.

From a military point of view, the battle in Belarus led to a massive defeat for the German armed forces. A common view is that the Battle of Belarus is the largest defeat of the German armed forces in World War II. Operation Bagration is a triumph of the Soviet theory of military art due to the well-coordinated offensive movement of all fronts and the operation carried out to disinform the enemy about the location of the general offensive that began in the summer of 1944. On the scale of the Soviet-German front, Operation Bagration became the largest in a long series of offensives. It absorbed German reserves, seriously limiting the enemy's ability to fend off both other offensives on the Eastern Front and the Allied advance in Western Europe. For example, the “Greater Germany” division was transferred to Siauliai from the Dniester and, thus, was deprived of the opportunity to participate in repelling the Iasi-Kishinev operation. The Hermann Goering division was forced to abandon its position near Florence in Italy in mid-July, and was thrown into battle on the Vistula; Florence was liberated in mid-August, when Goering units unsuccessfully stormed the Magnuszew bridgehead.

Losses

USSR

The human losses of the Red Army are quite accurately known. They amounted to 178,507 dead, missing and captured, as well as 587,308 wounded and sick. These are high losses even by the standards of the Second World War, in absolute numbers significantly exceeding the casualties not only in successful, but even in many unsuccessful operations. So, for comparison, Berlin operation cost the Red Army 81 thousand irretrievable losses, defeat near Kharkov in early spring 1943 - just over 45 thousand irrevocably. Such losses are associated with the duration and scope of the operation, which was conducted on difficult terrain against a skilled and energetic enemy who occupied well-prepared defensive lines.

Germany

The issue of human losses of the Wehrmacht is debatable. The most common data among Western scientists is the following: 26,397 dead, 109,776 wounded, 262,929 missing and captured, and a total of 399,102 people. These figures are taken from ten-day casualty reports provided by the German armies. The extremely small number of killed is due to the fact that many of the dead were counted as missing in action; sometimes the entire division’s personnel were declared missing.

However, these figures have been criticized. In particular, the American historian of the Eastern Front D. Glantz drew attention to the fact that the difference between the numerical strength of Army Group Center before and after the operation was significantly larger. D. Glantz emphasized that the data from ten-day reports is minimum minimorum, that is, they represent a minimum assessment. Russian researcher A.V. Isaev, in a speech on the Echo of Moscow radio, estimated German losses at approximately 500 thousand people. S. Zaloga estimated German losses at 300-350 thousand people up to and including the surrender of the 4th Army.

It is also necessary to pay attention to the fact that in all cases the losses of Army Group Center are calculated, without taking into account the victims of Army Groups North and Northern Ukraine.

According to official Soviet data published by the Sovinformburo, the losses of German troops from June 23 to July 23, 1944 were estimated at 381,000 killed, 158,480 prisoners, 2,735 tanks and self-propelled guns, 631 aircraft and 57,152 vehicles. It is likely that these data, as is usually the case with claims for enemy losses, are significantly overestimated. In any case, the issue of human losses of the Wehrmacht in “Bagration” has not yet been settled.

In order to demonstrate to other countries the significance of the success, 57,600 German prisoners of war captured near Minsk were marched through Moscow - for about three hours a column of prisoners of war walked along the streets of Moscow, and after the march the streets were washed and cleared.

The scale of the disaster that befell Army Group Center is clearly demonstrated by the losses command staff:

Clearly demonstrates the scale of the disaster

3rd Panzer Army

53 Army Corps

General of Infantry Gollwitzer

captured

206th Infantry Division

Lieutenant General Hitter ( English)

captured

4th airfield division

Lieutenant General Pistorius

6th airfield division

Lieutenant General Peschel ( English)

246th Infantry Division

Major General Müller-Bülow

captured

6th Army Corps

General of Artillery Pfeiffer ( English)

197th Infantry Division

Major General Hane ( English)

missing

256th Infantry Division

Major General Wüstenhagen

39th Tank Corps

General of Artillery Martinek

110th Infantry Division

Lieutenant General von Kurowski ( English)

captured

337th Infantry Division

Lieutenant General Schönemann ( English)

12th Infantry Division

Lieutenant General Bamler

captured

31st Infantry Division

Lieutenant General Ochsner ( English)

captured

12th Army Corps

Lieutenant General Müller

captured

18th motorized division

Lieutenant General Zutavern

committed suicide

267th Infantry Division

Lieutenant General Drescher ( English)

57th Infantry Division

Major General Trowitz ( English)

captured

27th Army Corps

General of Infantry Völkers

captured

78th assault division

Lieutenant General Trout ( English)

captured

260th Infantry Division

Major General Klamt ( German)

captured

Army Corps of Engineers

Major General Schmidt

captured

35th Army Corps

Lieutenant General von Lützow ( English)

captured

134th Infantry Division

Lieutenant General Philip

committed suicide

6th Infantry Division

Major General Heine ( English)

captured

45th Infantry Division

Major General Engel

captured

41st Tank Corps

Lieutenant General Hoffmeister ( English)

captured

36th Infantry Division

Major General Conradi ( English)

captured

Commandant of Bobruisk

Major General Haman ( English)

captured

Reserve units

95th Infantry Division

Major General Michaelis

captured

707th Infantry Division

Major General Geer ( English)

captured

motorized division "Feldherrnhalle"

Major General von Steinkeller

captured

This list is based on Carell, is incomplete and does not cover losses incurred during the second phase of the operation. So, it lacks Lieutenant General F. Frank, commander of the 73rd Infantry Division, who was captured in late July near Warsaw, commandant of Mogilev, Major General Ermansdorf, and others. However, it demonstrates the scale of the shock experienced by the Wehrmacht and the losses of senior officers of Army Group Center.

In the summer of 1944, Soviet troops carried out a cascade of powerful offensive operations all the way from the White to the Black Seas. However, the first place among them is rightfully occupied by the Belarusian strategic offensive operation, which received a code name in honor of the legendary Russian commander, hero of the Patriotic War of 1812, General P. Bagration.

Three years after the start of the war, Soviet troops were determined to take revenge for the heavy defeats in Belarus in 1941. In the Belarusian direction, the Soviet fronts were opposed by 42 German divisions of the 3rd Panzer, 4th and 9th German field armies, a total of about 850 thousand . Human. On the Soviet side there were initially no more than 1 million people. However, by mid-June 1944, the number of Red Army formations intended for the attack was increased to 1.2 million people. The troops had 4 thousand tanks, 24 thousand guns, 5.4 thousand aircraft.

It is important to note that the powerful operations of the Red Army in the summer of 1944 coincided with the beginning landing operation Western allies in Normandy. The attacks of the Red Army were, among other things, supposed to draw back German forces and prevent them from being transferred from east to west.

Myagkov M.Yu., Kulkov E.N. Belarusian operation of 1944 // Great Patriotic War. Encyclopedia. /Ans. ed. ak. A.O. Chubaryan. M., 2010

FROM ROKOSSOVSKY’S MEMORIES OF THE PREPARATION AND BEGINNING OF OPERATION “BAGRATION”, May-June 1944.

According to General Headquarters, the main actions in the summer campaign of 1944 were to take place in Belarus. To carry out this operation, troops of four fronts were involved (1st Baltic Front - commander I.Kh. Bagramyan; 3rd Belorussian - commander I.D. Chernyakhovsky; our right neighbor 2nd Belorussian Front - commander I.E. Petrov, and , finally 1st Belarusian)...

We prepared for the battles carefully. The drawing up of the plan was preceded by a lot of work on the ground. Especially at the forefront. I literally had to crawl on my stomach. Studying the terrain and the state of the enemy defense convinced me that on the right wing of the front it would be advisable to launch two strikes from different areas... This ran counter to the established view, according to which during an offensive one main strike is delivered, for which the main forces and means are concentrated . Taking a somewhat unusual decision, we resorted to a certain dispersion of forces, but in the swamps of Polesie there was no other way out, or rather, we had no other way to the success of the operation...

The Supreme Commander-in-Chief and his deputies insisted on delivering one main blow - from the bridgehead on the Dnieper (Rogachev area), which was in the hands of the 3rd Army. Twice I was asked to go into the next room to think over Stavka’s proposal. After each such “thinking through” it was necessary to new strength defend your decision. Having made sure that I firmly insisted on our point of view, I approved the operation plan as we presented it.

“The persistence of the front commander,” he said, “proves that the organization of the offensive was carefully thought out.” And this is a reliable guarantee of success...

The offensive of the 1st Belorussian Front began on June 24. This was announced by powerful bomber strikes on both sections of the breakthrough. For two hours the artillery destroyed defensive structures enemy at the forefront and suppressed his fire system. At six o'clock in the morning, units of the 3rd and 48th armies went on the offensive, and an hour later - both armies of the southern strike group. A fierce battle ensued.

The 3rd Army on the Ozeran and Kostyashevo front achieved insignificant results on the first day. The divisions of its two rifle corps, repelling fierce counterattacks by enemy infantry and tanks, captured only the first and second enemy trenches at the Ozeran-Verichev line and were forced to gain a foothold. The offensive also developed in the 48th Army zone with great difficulties. The wide swampy floodplain of the Drut River extremely slowed down the crossing of infantry and especially tanks. Only after a two-hour intense battle did our units knock the Nazis out of the first trench here, and by twelve o’clock in the afternoon they captured the second trench.

The offensive developed most successfully in the 65th Army zone. With the support of aviation, the 18th Rifle Corps broke through all five lines of enemy trenches in the first half of the day, and by mid-day it had gone 5-6 kilometers deep... This allowed General P.I. Batov to bring the 1st Guards Tank Corps into the breakthrough.. .

As a result of the first day of the offensive, the southern strike group broke through the enemy’s defenses at a front of up to 30 kilometers and a depth of 5 to 10 kilometers. The tankers deepened the breakthrough to 20 kilometers (Knyshevichi, Romanishche area). A favorable situation was created, which we used on the second day to bring General I.A. Pliev’s cavalry-mechanized group into battle at the junction of the 65th and 28th armies. She advanced to the Ptich River west of Glusk and crossed it in places. The enemy began to retreat to the north and northwest.

Now - all forces for a rapid advance to Bobruisk!

Rokossovsky K.K. Soldier's duty. M., 1997.

VICTORY

After breaking through the enemy defenses in Eastern Belarus, the Rokossovsky and Chernyakhovsky fronts rushed further - along converging directions towards the Belarusian capital. A huge gap opened in the German defenses. On July 3, the Guards Tank Corps approached Minsk and liberated the city. Now the formations of the 4th German Army were completely surrounded. In the summer and autumn of 1944, the Red Army achieved outstanding military successes. During the Belarusian operation, the German Army Group Center was defeated and driven back 550 - 600 km. In just two months of fighting, it lost more than 550 thousand people. A crisis arose in the circles of the top German leadership. On July 20, 1944, at a time when the defenses of Army Group Center in the east were bursting at the seams, and in the west Anglo-American formations began to expand their bridgehead for the invasion of France, an unsuccessful attempt was made to assassinate Hitler.

With the arrival of Soviet units on the approaches to Warsaw, the offensive capabilities of the Soviet fronts were practically exhausted. A respite was required, but it was at that moment that an event occurred that was unexpected for the Soviet military leadership. On August 1, 1944, at the direction of the London exile government, an armed uprising began in Warsaw, led by the commander of the Polish Home Army, T. Bur-Komarovsky. Without coordinating their plans with the plans of the Soviet command, the “London Poles” essentially took a gamble. Rokossovsky's troops made great efforts to break through to the city. As a result of heavy bloody battles, they managed to liberate the Warsaw suburb of Prague by September 14. But the Soviet soldiers and soldiers of the 1st Army of the Polish Army, who fought in the ranks of the Red Army, failed to achieve more. Tens of thousands of Red Army soldiers died on the approaches to Warsaw (the 2nd Tank Army alone lost up to 500 tanks and self-propelled guns). On October 2, 1944, the rebels capitulated. The capital of Poland was liberated only in January 1945.

Victory in the Belarusian operation of 1944 came at a high cost to the Red Army. Only irretrievable Soviet losses amounted to 178 thousand people; more than 580 thousand military personnel were wounded. However, the general balance of forces after the end of the summer campaign changed even more in favor of the Red Army.

TELEGRAM OF THE US AMBASSADOR TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE US, September 23, 1944

This evening I asked Stalin how satisfied he is with the ongoing battles for Warsaw by the Red Army. He replied that the ongoing battles had not yet brought serious results. Due to heavy German artillery fire, the Soviet command was unable to transport its tanks across the Vistula. Warsaw can only be taken as a result of a wide encircling maneuver. However, at the request of General Berling and contrary to the best use of the Red Army troops, four Polish infantry battalions nevertheless crossed the Vistula. However, due to the heavy losses they suffered, they soon had to be withdrawn. Stalin added that the rebels were still fighting, but their struggle was now causing the Red Army more difficulties than real support. In four isolated areas of Warsaw, rebel groups continue to defend themselves, but they have no offensive capabilities. Now in Warsaw there are about 3,000 rebels in arms in their hands, in addition, where possible, they are supported by volunteers. It is very difficult to bomb or shell German positions in the city, since the rebels are in close fire contact and mixed with German troops.

For the first time, Stalin expressed his sympathies for the rebels in front of me. He said that the Red Army command has contacts with each of their groups, both by radio and through messengers making their way into the city and back. The reasons why the uprising began prematurely are now clear. The fact is that the Germans were going to deport the entire male population from Warsaw. Therefore, for men there was simply no other choice but to take up arms. Otherwise they faced death. Therefore, the men who were part of the rebel organizations began to fight, the rest went underground, saving themselves from repression. Stalin never mentioned the London government, but said that they could not find General Bur-Komarovsky anywhere. He had apparently left the city and was “commanding through a radio station in some secluded place.”

Stalin also said that, contrary to the information that General Dean has, the Soviet Air Force was dropping weapons to the rebels, including mortars and machine guns, ammunition, medicine, and food. We receive confirmation that the goods arrive at the designated location. Stalin noted that Soviet aircraft drop from low altitudes (300-400 meters), while our Air Force drops from very high altitudes. As a result, the wind often blows our cargo to the side and it does not reach the rebels.

When Prague [a suburb of Warsaw] was liberated, Soviet troops saw the extreme extent to which its civilian population was exhausted. The Germans used police dogs against ordinary people in order to deport them from the city.

The Marshal showed in every possible way his concern for the situation in Warsaw and his understanding of the actions of the rebels. There was no noticeable vindictiveness on his part. He also explained that the situation in the city would become clearer after Prague was completely taken.

Telegram from US Ambassador to the Soviet Union A. Harriman to US President F. Roosevelt on the reaction of the Soviet leadership to Warsaw Uprising, September 23, 1944

US. Library of Congress. Manuscript Division. Harriman Collection. Cont. 174.

With every month of 1944, the front inexorably rolled back to the west. There was no doubt that the aggressor was doomed to defeat. But it was also clear that he would resist to the end. The countries of the anti-Hitler coalition made a joint decision: the only way to end the war was the unconditional surrender of Germany.

By the beginning of 1944, the troops of Nazi Germany and its allies still held a significant part of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, and stood at the walls of Leningrad, on the Karelian Isthmus. A significant part of Europe was under Hitler's heel. The Allies fought in southern Italy. Germany managed to increase the production of weapons and carry out total mobilization, but the strategic initiative had already been lost by Hitler’s generals. The sharpness and correct assessment of the situation disappeared in their decisions. And vice versa, a number of operations of the Soviet command at the final stage of the war became exemplary in the history of military art.

In 1944, attempts at a large-scale offensive along the entire front were no longer made, but operations were carried out sequentially in various sectors. This transfer of attacks from one direction to another forced the German command to transfer forces from one section of the Soviet-German front to another.

Fighting qualities personnel The Red Army has grown up. the warriors gained experience, skillfully acted in the offensive, and were eager to expel the invaders from their native land as quickly as possible. Hatred towards the invaders grew during the liberation of cities and villages, when soviet soldiers saw traces of destruction, violence and atrocities committed by the Nazis against the local population. Nothing could stop such soldiers.

The year 1944 began with an offensive near Leningrad, as a result of which the city was completely released. Almost simultaneously with this, the operation to liberate Right Bank Ukraine developed. Troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front and 2nd Ukrainian Front (I.S. Konov) surrounded the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky enemy group. The onset of a thaw made combat operations difficult. The enemy tried to break the ring. A group of German troops managed to break through the formations of our troops in the Vatutina sector.

In mid-April, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front approached the foothills of the Carpathians. And by the end of March 25, formations of the 2nd Ukrainian Front reached the state border of the USSR.

Exit to the border. The summer of 1944 arrived. The German command believed that the Red Army would continue its offensive in the southern direction. However, since the spring of 1944, preparations have been underway for an operation code-named “Bagration”. The configuration of the front at the site of the operation represented a huge ledge. The flanks were the most protected. It was against them that powerful strikes were planned. The terrain with its rivers, lakes, swamps, and forests was convenient for the defenders and, on the contrary, created great problems for the attackers. In three years, the Nazis turned the cities of Belarus into strong fortified zones. What was so easily abandoned in 1941, now, in the summer of 1944, had to be recaptured, relying on courage, heroism and dedication Soviet soldiers.

The Belarusian operation began on June 23, 1944. Thus Soviet Union fulfilled the obligation to conduct major operation simultaneously with the opening of a second front. On June 6, Allied troops crossed the English Channel and fought their way across (Northern France.

The offensive in Belarus was carried out by forces of four fronts. Zhukov was at the command post commander 3rd) by the army of General A.V. Gorbatova. Participant civil war, one of the few survivors of the meat grinder of the repressions of the 30s, subjected to cruel torture in the dungeons of the NKVD, but not incriminating either himself or any of his comrades (like K.K. Rokossovsky), he was released shortly before the 1st war. The army commander was concerned with achieving victories while saving as many soldiers' lives as possible. Having information about the weaknesses of the enemy’s defense, he suggested that Zhukov change the breakthrough site. Zhukov supported him. With a bold strike, the tank corps managed to capture the crossings across the Berezina, and a significant group of Nazi troops found themselves in a cauldron. The aviation dealt blow after blow. Fuel and lubricants burned, military equipment, covering the battlefield with ominous fire. Hundreds and thousands of German soldiers died, deceived by Hitler.

A well-thought-out, long-term enemy defense system turned into “cauldrons” - Bobruisk, Minsk, Mogilev, Vitebsk. On July 3, Minsk, or rather its ruins, was liberated. The Soviet soldiers were met by the few surviving residents of the Belarusian capital.

Having superiority in forces, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front developed an offensive. However, the enemy, skillfully maneuvering, organized short counterattacks. On July 29, the advanced units of the front reached Viola and immediately began crossing it. Most of those who crossed in the first ranks died, but the bridgehead on the western bank of the Bkl River was retained. Stern and rarely revealing his feelings, Zhukov, talking about his meeting with the surviving soldiers, wrote: “... I could not listen without excitement and a feeling of bitterness that such brave people were dying.”

The victories won by the Red Army in Belarus and the western regions of Ukraine contributed to the offensive allied forces in the West. The Germans had to leave Normandy. And gradually they began to retreat to the borders of Germany.

The successful operations of the Red Army on the Karelian Isthmus led to the withdrawal of one of Germany's allies, Finland, from the war. The Baltic enemy group, numbering more than 30 divisions, was squeezed in a small part of the territory of Latvia, where it was captured in May 1945. In the struggle for the liberation of the Baltic states from Nazi troops, Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian military formations that were part of the Red Army took an active part Army. Vilnius, Tallinn, and Riga were liberated.

The general contours of the Red Army's combat operations were outlined back in November 1944 by the forces of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. It was necessary to defeat the German Army Group A and completely liberate Poland. This operation went down in history as the Vistula-Oder operation. The start of the offensive was accelerated by events in Western Front. At the end of December 1944, German troops launched an offensive in the Ardennes on Belgian territory and began to push back the Allied troops, who found themselves in an extremely unfavorable, almost hopeless, position. However, fulfilling their allied duty and at the request of the leadership of the United States and Great Britain, Soviet troops went on the offensive on January 12, 8 days ahead of schedule, pulled back some of the divisions from the west and thereby saved the Anglo-American units from defeat.

On January 17, 1945, Warsaw was liberated. The offensive developed so rapidly that at times the advanced units of the Soviet troops found themselves surrounded by the retreating Wehrmacht forces. In February, Red Army units crossed the Oder, the last major water barrier before Berlin.

The fighting on the bridgeheads captured after crossing the Oder was unusually fierce.

On these same days, when Soviet troops were fighting from the Vistula to the Oder, the operation in East Prussia began. The enemy resisted desperately, the advance of our troops was slow. Everything on this land was adapted for defense: both Teutonic castles and fortresses of the times Seven Years' War, and reinforced concrete pillboxes, even cities and villages. In these battles he received a mortal wound Commander Z-m Belorussian Front I.D. Chernyakhovsky is the youngest of all front commanders. He was not yet forty years old. The soldiers loved him for his fearlessness and simplicity. He never allowed himself to humiliate a subordinate. A.M. took command of the front. Vasilevsky. A former tsarist staff captain, he was drafted into the Red Army in 1919 and linked his fate with it. Calm, decisive, proactive, Vasilevsky always behaved with dignity.

The culmination of the operation was the assault on Koenigsberg. Perfectly defended and provided with everything necessary, with a selected garrison, the city seemed impregnable. But, having carefully prepared, the Soviet command unleashed the full power of artillery and aviation on the enemy. Assault groups burst into the city. Its commandant O. Lash noted: “It was impossible to imagine before that such a fortress as Konigsberg would fall so quickly.”

Battle for Berlin. It was April 1945. The Red Army was preparing to storm Berlin. Everyone wanted to end the war as soon as possible and understood that this would happen in a matter of weeks. The death of each of his comrades was all the more bitter. After the war, some military leaders, for example General A.V. Gorbatev, expressed the opinion that it would be enough to surround Berlin and put the squeeze on the remnants of Hitler’s troops in it, force them to capitulate, saving the lives of many Soviet soldiers. At Headquarters in the spring of 1945, questions were not posed this way. The leaders of the USSR believed that delaying hostilities could lead to the Germans opening a front in the west. He announced that Hitler had committed suicide on April 30 and proposed to begin negotiations on a truce. This was reported to Stalin, who demanded to negotiate only on unconditional surrender. There was no response from Hitler's successors, and hostilities resumed. But the next day, at 15:00, the Berlin defense headquarters ordered the cessation of hostilities. Berlin has fallen. During the assault on the German capital, Soviet troops lost 300 thousand killed and wounded. The remnants of German troops in northern Germany, pressed against the Baltic Sea coast, also capitulated. On May 9, the act of unconditional surrender of Germany was signed. It was Victory.