Prices and salaries in Tsarist Russia at the beginning of the 20th century, based only on real documents: orders and decrees of the government and ministries of the Russian Empire, price lists, price tags, reports, extracts from books of income and expenses, menus and accounts of that time, starting from 1900.
Starting with the main product of those times - vodka.
Vodka in Tsarist Russia was sold only in special state-owned wine shops. Above the entrance to a liquor store, as at the entrance to any government agency, the state emblem flaunted: a double-headed eagle. The state maintained a monopoly on the production and sale of vodka. Two types of vodka were always sold here without any queue. Krasnogolovka (red cap), vodka, popularly called “kazenka”. The price for a bottle of this vodka (0.61 liters) at the beginning of the 20th century was 40 kopecks. And the second type of vodka is “Belogolovka” (white cap), this is double purified vodka.
A bottle of this vodka pre-revolutionary Russia cost 60 kopecks. Bottles with a capacity of a quarter (1/4 bucket) were sold in wicker baskets, which amounted to 3 liters. And the smallest bottles of vodka were 1/10 of a regular bottle, which people even then called “bastard” 0.061 liters. For such a bottle you had to pay only 6 kopecks in a state-owned wine store. At the same time, draft beer of cheap varieties “Svetloe”, “Venskoe”, “Starogradskoe”, “Munichskoe” at the beginning of the 20th century cost from 6 to 10 kopecks per liter. Bottled beer was more expensive due to the cost of glass, about 20 kopecks per bottle. Wine of expensive and prestigious brands reached 5-9 rubles per bottle. The capacity of a wine bottle in pre-revolutionary years was 0.75 liters. At the same time, for cheap bottled wine in different provinces of Russia you had to pay only 5-20 kopecks per liter. Cognacs cost from 3 rubles and ended with prices up to 100 rubles per bottle.
Well, these are all store prices, but how much did you have to pay for a shot of vodka (1/6 bottle = 100 grams) in a tavern, which in those days of pre-revolutionary Russia were already called taverns. In general, the difference between the tavern and its more ancient predecessor, the “tavern,” is that in the tavern you could only buy alcohol, and in the tavern, in addition to alcohol, you could also dine. So, in a cheap tavern on the outskirts provincial town, having paid 5 kopecks, you could drink half a shot, i.e. 50-60 grams of cheap and most likely highly diluted vodka. For a quick snack, they offered the most popular snack for vodka at all times - that's right, a pickled cucumber for just 1 kopeck. And you could eat to your heart’s content in these cheap taverns for only 10 kopecks. By the way, at the market for two kopecks you could easily choose a dozen selected pickled cucumbers (12 pieces).
It’s a completely different matter; these are decent taverns, or, in our opinion, cafes and restaurants. It cost 30-50 kopecks to dine here in the 1900s in Russia. But judging by the memoirs of contemporaries, this justified it. A glass of vodka in such a cultural establishment cost 10 kopecks, but it was definitely official vodka! Not spoiled. For a glass of beer (0.61 liters) you had to pay up to 10 kopecks. Tea with two lumps of sugar cost only 5 kopecks. Naturally, it was more expensive to eat in good, well-known restaurants. On average, for lunch in a decent restaurant of the 20th century in Imperial Russia you had to pay 1.5 - 2 rubles. This is the price for a regular lunch: first course, second course, salad, a couple of glasses of vodka, dessert, no frills. After lunch, the well-fed and respectable Russian citizens, at the exit from the restaurant, were vying with each other to persuade the cab drivers to take a cab ride. In large cities in those years, the only public transport was the tram; as a rule, the price was 5 kopecks without a transfer, and 7 kopecks with a transfer. But, of course, the main mode of transport was cabs driven by dashing cab drivers. Typically, cab drivers charged 20 kopecks for a trip in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century within the city. But the price was always negotiable and varied depending on the degree of supply/demand ratio. Although, even in those pre-revolutionary times, station cabs were the most expensive, who, without a twinge of conscience, announced 50 kopecks for often not very long trip from the station to the nearest hotel. Regarding stations and travel. Naturally, in those years we mostly traveled by rail. A first-class ticket to St. Petersburg from Moscow cost 16 rubles, and you could travel in a seated carriage for 6 rubles 40 kopecks. You could get to Tver from Moscow in first class for 7 rubles 25 kopecks, and in third class you could get there for 3 rubles 10 kopecks. The porters happily offered the service of carrying suitcases for 5 kopecks. Large luggage, occupying the entire cart, was taken to the train or back for a maximum fee of 10 kopecks. Let's return to hotels... In hotels for very wealthy gentlemen in luxurious rooms with all amenities, telephone, restaurant, etc. The cost of the room per day was 5-8 rubles. A hotel room without frills, but quite decent, cost 0.7-2 rubles per day. Furnished rooms cost 15-60 kopecks per day. In general, in pre-revolutionary Russia at the beginning of the 20th century, rented housing on average cost 20 kopecks per month for square meter.
List of prices of that time for products, although then everything was measured in pounds, the cost is indicated per kilogram for ease of perception:
A loaf of black stale bread weighing 400 grams - 3 kopecks,
A loaf of fresh rye bread weighing 400 grams - 4 kopecks,
A loaf of white butter bread weighing 300 grams - 7 kopecks,
Fresh harvest potatoes 1 kilogram - 15 kopecks,
Old harvest potatoes 1 kilogram - 5 kopecks,
Rye flour 1 kilogram - 6 kopecks,
Oat flour 1 kilogram - 10 kopecks,
Premium wheat flour 1 kilogram - 24 kopecks,
Potato flour 1 kilogram - 30 kopecks,
Plain pasta 1 kilogram - 20 kopecks,
Vermicelli made from premium flour 1 kilogram - 32 kopecks,
Second grade granulated sugar 1 kilogram – 25 kopecks,
Selected lump refined sugar 1 kilogram - 60 kopecks,
Tula gingerbread with jam 1 kilogram - 80 kopecks,
Chocolate candies 1 kilogram – 3 rubles,
Coffee beans 1 kilogram – 2 rubles,
Leaf tea 1 kilogram – 3 rubles,
Table salt 1 kilogram - 3 kopecks,
Fresh milk 1 liter – 14 kopecks,
Heavy cream 1 liter – 60 kopecks,
Sour cream 1 liter – 80 kopecks,
Cottage cheese 1 kilogram - 25 kopecks,
Cheese "Russian" 1 kilogram - 70 kopecks,
Cheese using foreign technology “Swiss” 1 kilogram - 1 ruble 40 kopecks
Butter 1 kilogram – 1 ruble 20 kopecks,
Sunflower oil 1 liter – 40 kopecks,
Steamed chicken 1 kilogram – 80 kopecks,
A dozen choice eggs - 25 kopecks,
Veal meat, steamed tenderloin, 1 kilogram – 70 kopecks,
Beef shoulder blade 1 kilogram – 45 kopecks,
Pork neck meat 1 kilogram - 30 kopecks,
Fresh river perch fish 1 kilogram - 28 kopecks,
Fresh river pike perch fish 1 kilogram – 50 kopecks,
Fresh fish catfish 1 kilogram – 20 kopecks,
Fresh fish bream 1 kilogram - 24 kopecks,
Frozen pink salmon fish 1 kilogram – 60 kopecks,
Frozen fish salmon 1 kilogram – 80 kopecks,
Frozen fish sturgeon 1 kilogram – 90 kopecks,
Black granular caviar 1 kilogram – 3 rubles 20 kopecks,
Pressed black caviar, 1st grade, 1 kilogram – 1 ruble 80 kopecks,
Pressed black caviar 2 grades 1 kilogram – 1 ruble 20 kopecks,
Pressed black caviar 3 grades 1 kilogram – 80 kopecks,
Salted red caviar 1 kilogram – 2 rubles 50 kopecks,
Vegetables fresh cabbage 1 kilogram - 10 kopecks,
Vegetables, pickled cabbage 1 kilogram - 20 kopecks,
Vegetables onions 1 kilogram - 5 kopecks,
Vegetables carrots 1 kilogram - 8 kopecks,
Vegetables, tomatoes, selected 1 kilogram - 45 kopecks.
A little about the cost of things at the beginning of the 20th century in Tsarist Russia:
Uniforms and military uniforms, which Russian officers were forced to purchase with their own money, and taking into account the low officer salary (which will be given at the end of the article), clearly cost them a lot.
Officer's dress boots - 20 rubles,
Dress officer's uniform - 70 rubles,
Chief officer's cap - 3 rubles,
Uhlan hat – 20 rubles,
Hussar staff cap – 12 rubles,
Gilded staff officers' epaulettes – 13 rubles,
Spurs – 14 rubles,
Dragoon and Cossack sabers – 15 rubles,
Officer's backpack - 4 rubles.
Clothing for civilians was much cheaper:
Weekend shirt – 3 rubles,
Business suit for clerks - 8 rubles,
Long coat – 15 rubles,
Cow boots – 5 rubles,
Summer boots - 2 rubles,
Garmon - 7 rubles 50 kopecks,
Gramophone - 40 rubles,
Grand piano of a famous brand - 200 rubles,
Car without additional equipment – 2,000 rubles,
The alternative and main means of transportation in those days, naturally, was the horse, which cost
Horse for a cart - 100 rubles,
Draft horse, working horse - 70 rubles,
Old nag for sausage - 20 rubles,
A good horse, on which it was not a shame to appear in front of people - from 150 rubles,
A good cash cow - from 60 rubles.
The average salary in the Russian Empire for factory workers and junior employees from 1880 to 1913 increased from 16 to 24 rubles per month.
The low-paid part of hired workers in Russia was the servant, who received per month: from 3 to 5 rubles for women and from 5 to 10 rubles for men.
Mostly workers at metallurgical plants in Moscow and St. Petersburg earned more. The salary of these workers at the beginning of the 20th century in Tsarist Russia ranged from 25 to 35 rubles. And representatives of the so-called labor aristocracy, i.e. professional turners, mechanics, foremen, and foremen received from 50 to 80 rubles per month.
The smallest salaries at the beginning of the 20th century were for junior ranks of civil servants in the amount of 20 rubles per month.
Ordinary post office employees and zemstvo teachers received the same amount junior classes, pharmacist assistants, orderlies, librarians, etc. Doctors received much more, for example, in zemstvo hospitals they had a salary of 80 rubles, paramedics 35 rubles, and the head of the hospital received 125 rubles a month. In small rural hospitals, where there was only one paramedic on staff, he received a salary of 55 rubles. High school teachers in women's and men's gymnasiums received from 80 to 100 rubles per month. The heads of postal, railway, and steamship stations in large cities had monthly salaries from 150 to 300 rubles. Deputies of the State Duma received a salary of 350 rubles, governors had salaries of about one thousand rubles, and ministers and senior officials, members State Council– 1,500 rubles per month.
In the army, officer salaries at the beginning of the 20th century in the Russian Empire, after an increase in 1909, were as follows. The second lieutenant had a salary of 70 rubles a month, plus 30 kopecks a day for guard duty and an additional 7 rubles for renting housing, for a total of 80 rubles. The lieutenant received a salary of 80 rubles, plus the same apartment and guard duty another 10 rubles, for a total of 90 rubles . A staff captain received a salary from 93 to 123 rubles, a captain from 135 to 145 rubles, and a lieutenant colonel from 185 to 200 rubles per month. A colonel in the Tsarist Army received a salary of 320 rubles per month from the Sovereign, a general in the position of division commander had a salary of 500 rubles, and a general in the position of corps commander had a salary of 725 rubles per month.
In Russia in the XVI -XVII centuries silver money was highly valued. In the middle of the 16th century in 1550, Ivan the Terrible established the first musketeer branch of the army in Russia - the Streletsky regiments. It was very difficult to get there, because in addition to good physical strength and endurance, you had to be able to use a musket, which at that time was a complex technical product. Due to improper use of a musket, a soldier could injure not only himself, but also his comrades. The Tsar's archers of the Moscow regiment were given a high salary - 4 rubles a year (in the middle of the 16th century, approximately 45 kopecks were minted from a thaler). The same amount of 4 rubles a year was the minimum noble salary. Streltsy in other cities received only two rubles per year, and gunners received a ruble. The only thing, in addition to the monetary salary, they were also given grain allowances. In peacetime, in addition to performing guard duty, the archers could engage in small trade and crafts.
The civilian population's salaries were also low. A craftsman, a clerk, a clerk in an order received 40 kopecks a month; carpenter, mason about 15 kopecks. But the prices were also low compared to Europe - a pound of rye (16 kg) cost 8 kopecks, a chicken - 1-2 kopecks, a cow - 80 kopecks, a gelding - 1 ruble, a good horse - 5 rubles.
Since the end of the Time of Troubles (1613), a thaler has already cost 64 kopecks. Since the 17th century, the salary of archers was increased: Moscow archers - 5 rubles per year, in other cities - 3.50 rubles. But prices during the Time of Troubles increased five to six times. Later, by 1620-1630, prices dropped slightly. But a cow already cost 2 rubles, a chicken 3 kopecks, bread - 3/4 kopecks per kg.
During the time of Alexei Mikhailovich (the beginning of the second half of the 17th century) in the elite regiments of the new system (they were called elective regiments of the soldier’s system), the salary was: To an ordinary person not from a noble family - 90 kopecks per month, from a noble family or foreigners - 1.05 rubles, to a corporal - 1.20 rubles, sergeant - 1.35 rubles, warrant officer - 1.50 rubles, married people were paid an additional 15 kopecks per month. Widows were paid 22 kopecks a month. Boys, drummers, and cooks were paid 30 kopecks. This salary was paid only for six months (late spring - early autumn), i.e. when military companies were marching. In winter, they didn’t pay anything - they sent them home, or they paid half their salary for guard duty. The officer's salary was: colonel -45 rubles. per month, lieutenant colonel - 15 rubles, major - 14 rubles, captain - 7 rubles, lieutenant - 5 rubles.
A simple Russian soldier not in an elite unit received only 50 kopecks a month and one dress for a year. After carrying out monetary reform by Peter I, he reduced the silver content in the ruble to the weight of one taler (1 taler = 1 ruble = 100 kopecks) and due to an increase in taxes for maintaining Northern War with Sweden prices soon doubled. Nowhere in the West in the 16th - 18th centuries did the price of money fall as quickly as in Russia. But Peter’s monetary reform was the very first decimal monetary system in the world.
If we objectively consider the position of the army at the time of the death of the Russian Empire, a sad picture easily emerges. There is a myth about officers tsarist army. This will be somewhat surprising, but, in my opinion, it was created primarily by Soviet propaganda. In the heat of the class struggle, “gentlemen officers” were portrayed as rich, well-groomed and, as a rule, dangerous enemies, the antipodes of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army in general and its command staff in particular. This was especially evident in the film “Chapaev”, where instead of Kolchak’s rather poorly dressed and trained troops, Chapaev was confronted by the “Kappelites” in clean black and white uniforms, advancing in a “psychic” attack in a beautiful formation. According to high income, training was also assumed, and as a consequence, a high level of training and skills. All this was picked up and developed by fans of “The Russia We Lost” and the White Cause. Despite the fact that among them there are, of course, talented historians and simply amateurs military history Often the praise of officers reached the point of absurdity.
In fact, the situation with the combat training of officers was initially sad. And not the least role in this was played by the rather difficult financial situation of the officers. Roughly speaking, best students gymnasiums simply did not want to “pull the burden” in the service of an officer, when much simpler and more profitable career prospects in the civilian field opened up before them. It is no coincidence that the future Marshal Soviet Union, and at the beginning of the 20th century, cadet Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov wrote in his memoirs: “ Of course, it was difficult for my then comrades to understand my decision to go to military school. The fact is that I graduated from a real school, as noted above, with an average score of 4.3. With this score they usually entered higher technical educational institutions. To military schools, according to general idea, walked weakly theoretical training the youth. At the threshold of the 20th century, such an opinion about the command staff of the army was quite widespread."Boris Mikhailovich himself joined the army because" My parents lived very frugally, because my younger sister Yulia also started studying in Chelyabinsk at a girls’ gymnasium. I had to think more than once about the questions: how can I make life easier for my family? More than once the thought came to mind: “Shouldn’t I go into military service?” Secondary education would allow one to enter directly into a military school. I couldn’t even dream of studying at a higher technical institution for five years at my parents’ expense. Therefore, I have already, privately, firmly decided to go along the military line.»
Contrary to the cliche about officers as noble landowners, in fact, officers at the end of the Romanov era, although they came, as a rule, from the nobility, were close to commoners in their financial situation.
« The presence of land ownership even among the generals and, oddly enough, the guards was far from a frequent occurrence. Let's look at the numbers. Of the 37 corps commanders (36 army and one guards), data regarding land ownership is available on 36. Of these, five had it. The largest landowner was the commander of the Guards Corps, General. V.M. Bezobrazov, who owned an estate of 6 thousand dessiatines and gold mines in Siberia. Of the remaining four, one had no indication of the size of his estate, and each of the three had about one thousand dessiatines. Thus, in the highest command category, with the rank of general, only 13.9% had land ownership.
Of the 70 heads of infantry divisions (67 army and 3 guards), as well as 17 cavalry divisions (15 army and two guards), i.e. 87 people, 6 people have no information about property. Of the remaining 81, only five have it (two guards generals, who were large landowners, and three army generals, two of whom had estates, and one had his own house). Consequently, 4 people, or 4.9%, had land ownership.
Let's turn to the regiment commanders. As mentioned above, we analyze all the grenadier and rifle regiments, and half of the infantry regiments that were part of the divisions. This amounted to 164 infantry regiments, or 61.1% of the total. In addition, 48 cavalry (hussars, lancers and dragoons) regiments, which were part of 16 cavalry divisions, are considered.” If we compare these figures with similar ones for civil officials of the same classes, we get the following: “Let us turn to the list of civil ranks of the first three classes. In 1914, there were 98 second-class officials, of which 44 owned land property, which was 44.9%; third class - 697 people, of which 215 people owned property, which was 30.8%.
Let us compare data on the availability of land ownership among military and civilian officials of the corresponding classes. So, we have: second class ranks - military - 13.9%, civilians - 44.8%; third class - military - 4.9%, civilians - 30.8%. The difference is colossal.»
About the financial situation P.A. Zayonchkovsky writes: “ So, the officer corps, which included up to 80% of the nobles, consisted of the serving nobility and in terms of financial status was no different from the commoners“Quoting Protopresbyter Shavelsky, the same author writes: “ The officer was an outcast from the royal treasury. It is impossible to point out a class in Tsarist Russia that was worse off than the officers. The officer received a meager salary that did not cover all his urgent expenses /.../. Especially if he had a family, eked out a miserable existence, was malnourished, entangled in debt, denying himself the most necessary things.»
As we have already seen, the land holdings of even the highest command staff were in no way comparable to those of civil officials. This was partly a consequence of the fact that the salaries of officials were significantly higher than that of generals: “ As mentioned above, the annual salary of the division chief was 6,000 rubles, and the governor’s salary was from 9,600 thousand to 12.6 thousand rubles per year, i.e. almost twice as much.“Only the guardsmen lived lavishly. General Ignatiev colorfully, although perhaps somewhat tendentiously, describes his service in perhaps the most elite regiment of the army of the Russian Empire - the Life Guards Cavalry Regiment. He notes the enormous “cost” of serving in this regiment, which was associated with the cost of uniforms, two particularly expensive horses, etc. However, P.A. Zayonchkovsky believes that even this was not the most “expensive” regiment. He considers this to be the Life Guards Hussar Regiment, during service in which he had to spend 500 rubles a month - the salary of the division chief! In general, the Guard was a completely separate corporation, the existence of which brought great confusion to the career growth of officers.
On the one hand, the guard was staffed by the best graduates of schools. To do this, you had to get a “guards score” (more than 10 out of 12). Moreover, thanks to the system in which graduates chose their vacancies in order of average scores, the best cadets entered the guard. On the other hand, vacancies in the guard were available only in the elite educational institutions. For example, in the most elite Corps of Pages It was almost impossible for a non-nobleman to get in. Already fourth on the semi-official list of the most prestigious schools, Aleksandrovskoe always had a minimum of guards vacancies, and therefore Tukhachevsky was very lucky in that he was able to graduate as the best among the cadets. Thus, the already closed nature of the schools, which had a significant number of vacancies, greatly limited the entry of unborn cadets there. However, this was not the last obstacle to getting into the guard. According to an unspoken law, but firmly followed and noted by many researchers: joining the regiment must be approved by the officers of the regiment. This closeness and casteism could block the path up the career ladder for any “freethinker,” since loyal feelings were mandatory for service in the guard. Finally, we have already talked about the “property qualification”. Thus, first of all, rich, well-born officers ended up in the guard. True, they had to complete the school course with excellence, but most of the equally, if not more talented officers did not even have the opportunity to join the guards regiment. But the guard was the “forge of personnel” for the generals of the tsarist army! Moreover, promotion in the guard was, in principle, faster and easier. Not only did the guardsmen have a 2-rank advantage over army officers, but there was also no rank of lieutenant colonel, which further accelerated growth. We are no longer talking about connections and prestige! As a result, most of the generals came from the Guard; moreover, most of the generals who did not have an education at the General Staff Academy came from there. Eg " in 1914, the army had 36 army corps and 1 guard corps. ... Let us turn to the data on education. Of the 37 corps commanders, 34 had higher military education. Of these, the Academy General Staff 29 people graduated from the Artillery Academy, 2, engineering and law - 1 each. Thus, 90% had higher education. The three who did not have higher education included the commander of the Guards Corps, General. V.M. Bezobrazov, 12th Army Corps General. A.A. Brusilov and the 2nd Caucasian Corps, General. G.E. Berkhman. Of the listed corps commanders, 25 people in the past, and one (General Bezobrazov) currently served in the guard.»
It is difficult to agree with the author that this was explained solely by the “ability” of the guards. After all, it was they who first of all got to the highest positions, without having an education from the Academy of the General Staff, which the author himself admits: “ According to the “Schedule” of 1914, the Russian army consisted of 70 infantry divisions: 3 guards, 4 grenadiers, 52 infantry and 11 Siberian rifle divisions. Their commanders were lieutenant generals... By education: 51 people had higher military education (46 of them graduated from the General Staff Academy, 41 graduated from the Military Engineering Academy, 1 from the Artillery Academy). Thus, 63.2% had higher education. Of the 70 commanders of infantry divisions, 38 were guardsmen (past or present). It is interesting to note that of the 19 people who did not have a higher military education, 15 were guards officers. The guards' advantage was already showing here.“As you can see, the “guards advantage” affects the level of division commanders. Where does it go when the same people are appointed to the slightly higher post of corps chief? Moreover, for some unknown reason, the author was mistaken about G.E. Berkhman’s lack of higher education, and the rest of the generals were precisely from the guard. Bezobrazov, who did not have a higher education, but was very rich, generally commanded the Guards Corps. Thus, the guard was a “supplier” of academically uneducated officers to the highest echelons of the army.
We can talk about such a serious problem as the lack of fairness in the distribution of ranks and positions: richer and more well-born officers, once in the guard, had a much better chance of making a career than those who pulled the burden and were sometimes more prepared (if only because of less ceremonial conditions of service) army colleagues. This could not but affect the quality of training of senior command staff or the psychological climate. It is known that division into “castes” reigned in the army. As already mentioned, in special group The guardsmen stood out, having significant preferences among all officers. But it cannot be said that there were no frictions and differences within the guard and the rest of the army. Thus, the most educated officers traditionally served in the engineering troops and artillery. This was even reflected in jokes: “a handsome man serves in the cavalry, a smart man serves in the artillery, a drunkard serves in the navy, and a fool serves in the infantry.” The least prestigious was, of course, the infantry. And the “aristocratic” cavalry was considered the most prestigious. However, she also shared. So the hussars and lancers looked down on the dragoons. The 1st Heavy Brigade of the Guards Cavalry stood apart: the “courtiers” of the Cavalry Guards and the Life Guards Horse Regiment, “fought” for the title of the most elite regiment. In the foot guards, the so-called "Petrovskaya Brigade" - Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky regiments. But, as Minakov notes, even here there was no equality: Preobrazhensky was more well-born. In the artillery, the cavalry was considered the elite, but the serfs were traditionally considered “outcasts,” which came back to haunt them in 1915 during the defense of fortresses. Of course, it cannot be said that such differences do not exist in other armies, but there was nothing good in separating and isolating different types of troops from each other.
Almost the only opportunity to accelerate career growth for talented army officers was admission to the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff. The selection there was very careful. To do this, it was necessary to pass preliminary exams, and then entrance exams. At the same time, the best officers of the regiments initially surrendered them. According to Shaposhnikov, in the year of his admission, 82.6% of those who passed the preliminary exams passed the competition. However, despite such a careful selection of applicants, applicants had serious problems with general education subjects. " 1) Very poor literacy, gross spelling errors. 2) Poor overall development. Bad style. Lack of clarity of thinking and general lack of mental discipline. 3) Extremely poor knowledge of history and geography. Insufficient literary education“However, one cannot say that this applied to all General Staff officers. Using the example of B.M. Shaposhnikov, it is easy to see that many of them did not have even a shadow of the problems mentioned above in the document. However, it should be noted that subsequent problems with education in the Red Army were radically different from similar ones in the tsarist army. The image of a well-educated tsarist officer fairly idealized.
Training at the General Staff Academy lasted two years. In the first year, both military and general education subjects were covered, while military officers mastered disciplines related to the combat operations of units. In the second year, general education subjects were completed, and disciplines related to strategy were studied from the military. In addition, every day there were horse riding lessons in the arena. As Shaposhnikov notes, this was a consequence of the experience of Russian- Japanese war, when the division during the battles near the Yantai Mines, Orlov's division scattered, ending up in a high kaoliang, when the chief of staff's horse bolted and he could not stop it, leaving the division completely beheaded, since the division commander was wounded. Perhaps this was already unnecessary for the positional massacre of the First World War, but in response to the critical remark of Boris Mikhailovich himself about the archaic nature of the horse as a method of transportation compared to the automobile introduced in Europe, we note that Russian industry simply did not have the ability to supply the army with a sufficient amount of transport. Buying it abroad was expensive and quite reckless from the point of view of independence from foreign supplies.
The training itself also had significant shortcomings. For example, many authors note little attention to the development of initiative and practical skills in general. Classes consisted almost exclusively of lectures. The end result, instead of highly qualified staff workers, was theoreticians who did not always have an idea of how to act in a real situation. According to Ignatiev, only one teacher even focused on the will to win.
Another problem was the enormous amount of time spent on some completely outdated items, such as drawing the terrain in line drawings. In general, this art was such a memorable subject that many memoirists write unkind words about it. ,
Contrary to the well-known myth about the generals’ passion for the French school of Grandmaison, “élan vitale”6, Shaposhnikov testifies to his sympathy for German theories. True, he notes that the top generals were not familiar with German methods of war.
In general, the strengths of the career officers of the tsarist army were their fighting spirit and readiness for self-sacrifice. And there could be no talk of carelessness like conversations about absolutely secret things in a cafe, which Shaposhnikov describes in “The Brain of the Army” in relation to the Austrian army. The concept of an officer’s honor was worth a lot to career military personnel. Young officers of the General Staff, after the reforms carried out by Golovin, received a generally good education, despite many shortcomings. What was especially important was that the tactics German troops was no longer a revelation for them, as it was for more senior commanders. The problem of the latter was a weak interest in self-development, in innovations both in technology and in the art of war. As A.M. Zayonchkovsky notes, the disastrous situation with the training of senior command personnel was partly a consequence of the General Staff’s inattention to the problem: “About Paying great attention to the training of troops and the improvement of junior command personnel, the Russian General Staff completely ignored the selection and training of senior command personnel: the appointment of persons who spent their entire lives after graduating from the academy in an administrative position immediately to the position of division chief and corps commander was not uncommon." Before Russo-Japanese War this situation was especially striking. There were jokes: “ in 1905–1906 Commander of the Amur Military District, Gen. N.P. Linevich, seeing the howitzer, asked in surprise: what kind of weapon is this?"The same author notes: " The same Lenevich (correctly Linevich - N.B.) did not know how to read maps properly and did not understand what train movement on schedule was. “And among the commanders of regiments and brigades,” Shavelsky further notes, “sometimes there were complete ignoramuses in military affairs. Military science was not loved by our military" Denikin echoes them:
"I The Japanese war, among other revelations, led us to the realization that command personnel need to learn. Forgetting this rule was one of the reasons for the dependence of many commanders on their headquarters. Before the war, the commander, starting from the position of regiment commander, could remain calm with the “scientific” baggage that he had once carried out from the military or cadet school; could not follow the progress at all military science, and it never occurred to anyone to inquire about his knowledge. Any inspection would be considered insulting... The general condition of the unit and partly only its control during maneuvers provided a criterion for the commander’s assessment. The latter, however, is very relative: given the inevitable conventionality of maneuvering actions and our general complacency during maneuvers, it was possible to make as many gross mistakes as we wanted and with impunity; the disapproving review in the description of large maneuvers, which reached the units after a few months, lost its sharpness.»
In addition, the officer corps at the highest echelons was extremely old. The corps commanders were distributed by age as follows: from 51 to 55 years old - 9 people, from 56 to 60 - 20, and from 61 to 65 - 7. Thus, over 75% of corps commanders were over 55 years old. Average age their age was 57.7 years. The division commanders were only slightly younger. From 51 to 55 years old - 17, from 56 to 60 - 48 and from 61 to 65 - 5. Thus, the bulk of the commanders of infantry divisions were over 55 years old. Their average age was 57.0 years. True, the commanders of cavalry divisions were on average 5.4 years younger. And this was after the “purge” carried out by the energetic Minister of War Roediger, who, however, quickly lost his portfolio and was replaced by the less firm Sukhomlinov. During his rather short reign, the certification commission that worked under his leadership was appointed: commanders of district troops - 6; their assistants – 7; corps commanders - 34; fortress commandants – 23; chiefs of infantry divisions - 61; chiefs of cavalry divisions - 18; bosses separate brigades(infantry and cavalry) - 87; commanders of non-separate brigades - 140; commanders of infantry regiments - 255; commanders of individual battalions - 108; commanders of cavalry regiments - 45. He also petitioned for the dismissal of the most mediocre commanders from the army. But Nicholas II became the problem. Now praised with all his might, the monarch cared little about the combat effectiveness of the army, paying much more attention to its uniform and loyalty to the throne. The tsar in every possible way prevented the removal of generals he liked and the financing of the army to the detriment of the fleet. The appointment of Yanushkevich, who was completely inappropriate for the position of Chief of the General Staff, for example, became possible only thanks to the patronage of the Sovereign. No less blame lies with the prime minister, since the distribution of budget funds largely depended on him. That is why he protected from dismissal the generals who showed talent in pacifying the rebels, and not on the battlefield. Quoting Polivanov’s diary P.A. Zayonchkovsky writes: “ “Received from E.V. journal of the Higher Attestation Commission regarding corps commanders; permission followed for the dismissal of the gene. Shutleworth; against the conclusion on the dismissal of the general. Krause and Novosiltseva - the highest resolution is to “leave”, but against the gene. Adlerberg: “I know him, he is not a genius, but an honest soldier: in 1905 he defended Kronstadt”" What blood it cost to appoint Rennenkampf, who had not distinguished himself in any way on the battlefields of Manchuria, but was the “hero” of the suppression of the 1905 revolution, as commander of the army invading East Prussia is well known.
True, it cannot be said that they did not try to rectify the situation. As the same Denikin writes “T one way or another, after the Japanese war the eldest was forced to study command staff. In the spring of 1906, the order of the Minister of War first appeared by order of the highest order: “Troop commanders should establish appropriate training for senior command personnel, starting with unit commanders up to and including corps commanders, aimed at developing military knowledge.” This innovation caused irritation at the top: the old people grumbled, seeing in it a desecration of gray hairs and an undermining of authority... But things progressed little by little, although at first there were some frictions and even oddities."It was possible to partially instill an interest in self-development in artillery: " Never before has military thought probably worked so intensively as in the years following the Japanese War. They talked, wrote, and shouted about the need to reorganize the army. The need for self-education has increased, and, accordingly, interest in military literature, causing the appearance of a number of new organs. It seems to me that if it were not for the lesson of the Japanese campaign and the subsequent recovery and feverish work, our army would not have withstood even several months of the test of a world war..." However white general He immediately admits that the work was proceeding at a very slow pace.
However, it cannot be said that these measures did not affect the combat effectiveness of the army. A.A. Svechin writes: “N e less progress should be noted both in relation to tactical training of troops and in improving the qualifications of middle and lower command personnel».
But this was not enough. It’s hard to disagree with A.M. Zayonchkovsky, who gave a very short, but also very succinct description of the Russian army before the First World War: “ In general, the Russian army went to war with good regiments, with mediocre divisions and corps, and with bad armies and fronts, understanding this assessment in in a broad sense preparation, but not personal qualities.»
The Achilles heel of the old army was the complete absence of any political preparation. The officers were ready to go to their own death, but they did not know how to lead. Svechin in his book “The Art of Driving a Regiment” points to the inability of career officers to communicate with soldiers, understand their needs and build discipline that is suitable not only in peacetime. We must understand that the days of Friedrich’s principle “a soldier should be more afraid of the non-commissioned officer’s stick than the enemy’s bullet” are long gone and it is impossible to keep a soldier at the front only by force. Alas, no one simply taught Russian officers this. And given the completely childish knowledge of social and political sciences It is not difficult to understand that the officers were completely disoriented when faced with the propaganda of the socialist parties. The separation of officers from the mass of soldiers also had an effect. For example, Ignatiev notes that scuffles in the 1st Guards Cavalry Division were not used solely due to Guards tradition. The so-called “tsug”, similar in meaning to modern hazing, was also considered a completely normal phenomenon. , All this was not noticeable for a significant part of the war, but the collapse of discipline, and as a consequence of the entire army in 1917, perfectly showed what inattention to the moral climate within the army team could lead to.
The outbreak of World War II completely revolutionized the officer training system. If before that they were preparing according to a completely harmonious system, getting from cadet corps at the school, and after graduation and service, the best of them could graduate from one of the academies, but now, although the schools continued to train lieutenants, but only according to a greatly reduced accelerated course. But they could not satisfy the needs of the army. A significant number of warrant officer schools were opened, producing officers with extremely poor skills and knowledge.
The most difficult situation was in the infantry. You can often see ratings like this:
« Our infantry regiments lost several sets of command staff during the World War. As far as I can judge from the data I have, only in a few regiments the loss of officers killed and wounded drops to 300%, but usually reaches 400 - 500% or more.
For artillery I do not have sufficiently complete data. Information for a number of artillery brigades indicates officer losses (over the entire war) of 15 - 40%. The losses of technical troops are even less. In the cavalry, losses are very uneven. There are parts that have suffered greatly, while in others the loss is completely insignificant. In any case, even the losses of the most damaged cavalry units are negligible in comparison with the losses of the infantry.”
The consequence of this situation was, on the one hand, a sharp “washing out” of the best-trained personnel. Those. Even those officers who were available and commanded units did not have sufficient education and experience by the end of the war. “The senior command (commanding) staff, taken from the army alone, does not represent such a large group in number that the results of its consideration could be applied to the entire Russian army without significant reservations...
First of all, when considering the data on the command staff, a significant percentage of temporary commanders strikes the eye: namely, 11 out of 32 regiments... According to the previous service before receiving the regiment, 27 regiment commanders (i.e., almost 85% of their total number) belong to the combat officers ; the remaining five held positions in various institutions and institutions of the military department (corps, military schools, etc.). Among the 32 regiment commanders there was not a single General officer. Headquarters. Undoubtedly, this is an accident, but a very characteristic accident, indicating a significant decrease in the number of infantry command personnel with higher military education... The qualifications for commanding regiments for the majority are very low:
from 1 to 3 months. at 8 regiments,
from 3 to 6 months. at 11 regiments,
from 6 to 12 months. at 8 regiments,
from 1 to 2 years. at 3 regiments,
more than 2 years. at 2 rows of regiments,
... The entire officer corps under study can be divided into 2 unequal, sharply different groups - into career officers and into wartime officers.
The first group includes all staff officers, almost all captains (9 or 10) and a small part of staff captains (7 out of 38).
The total number of career officers is 27, i.e. not a full 4% of the total. The remaining 96% are wartime officers»
So, the regular infantry officers have been knocked out. And who replaced them? This is where the very serious problem of the future Red Army lies. The fact is that the retired officers were replaced mainly by people who had completely insufficient training, both military and simply general education. The same author provides the corresponding tables:
| Educational qualification | Staff officers | Captains | Staff captains | Lieutenants | Second Lieutenants | Ensigns | Total | Percent of total |
| Higher education | - | - | 2 | 3 | 6 | 26 | 37 | 5 |
| Secondary education | 7 | 8 | 12 | 7 | 46 | 78 | 158 | 22 |
| Secondary incomplete | 4 | 2 | 3 | 20 | 37 | 81 | 147 | 20 |
| Secondary incomplete | - | - | 9 | 20 | 43 | 153 | 225 | 31 |
| Preparation at home and at work | - | - | 12 | 13 | 27 | 106 | 158 | 22 |
| Total | 11 | 10 | 38 | 63 | 159 | 444 | 725 | 100 |
These tables speak volumes. Firstly, it is clear that the rank of “captain” was almost unattainable for a wartime officer. It was the senior officers, therefore, who were most interesting as future cadres of the Red Army in terms of vocational training. On the other hand, they had already reached high positions under the “old regime” and therefore the incentive for a career in the new army under new conditions was not as strong for them and therefore were not as loyal as junior officers. Secondly, it should be noted the difference in general education. His level of education for career officers was equal, however, it should be noted that incomplete secondary education is not exactly what was required of an officer in such a technically intensive war as the First World War. But already among the staff captains there is complete discord. Officers appear with higher education. Obviously, these are wartime volunteers who initially chose the civilian path for themselves, but whose fate was changed by the Great War. As the famous military writer Golovin notes, this was the best material for obtaining officers, since an intellectual could easily escape conscription and therefore those who joined the army had not only the best general education, but also the best fighting spirit, and in some ways the best moral qualities than, for example, the notorious “Zemgusars”. On the other hand, many officers had not even a secondary, but a lower education or did not have general education at all. Only a little more than a third of the staff captains had completed secondary education. This suggests, on the one hand, that the intelligentsia did not really want to join the army. On the other hand, the image of an officer of the “old army” as a person from the “educated classes”, which became widespread in the mass consciousness thanks to Soviet cinema, is far from the truth. The army was replenished mainly by poorly educated people. There was also some advantage to this. After all, these statistics indicate the class affinity of wartime officers (and, obviously, they were the main contingent among staff captains who did not receive a secondary education) new government.
Among lieutenants, second lieutenants and especially warrant officers, the situation with education becomes even worse. Among warrant officers, only less than a quarter of officers had a complete secondary education, and less than a third of the total graduated from military schools, rather than warrant officer schools.
Thus, two features should be noted. Firstly, the infantry personnel were largely eliminated. Companies, and often battalions, were commanded by wartime officers who, in principle, did not have sufficient training. Moreover, wartime officers did not have a reasonable education to be able to make up for educational deficiencies in the future.
In general, we have to admit that even before Great War the officers had significant shortcomings in training. Moreover, if young commanders managed to receive an education in reformed schools and academies, then the senior, older command staff continued to lag far behind the requirements of the time in terms of their qualities. Theses about the loss of senior command personnel by the Red Army as a catastrophe are untenable. Even without mentioning the dubious benefits of elderly generals of the First World War during the Second World War, of which France is a brilliant example, one cannot help but see the superiority of the senior command staff of future opponents over domestic strategists, if not in talent, then in the level of training. Much more terrible was the killing of young officers during the First World War, and then the Civil War. Unfortunately, unlike Germany, the Republic of Ingushetia was unable to establish high-quality training for wartime officers, and this was for completely objective reasons: Russia simply did not have enough educated people. Like the Franco-Prussian war, the war on Eastern Front won largely the Berlin school teacher.
It is interesting to note that the Red Army got into large quantities not knocked out personnel of technical troops. But it was precisely these people “with a learned piping and a velvet collar,” according to Shaposhnikov, who had the highest percentage of those who graduated from the Academy of the General Staff among those admitted there, which indicates the best preparation. So, out of 6 engineers who entered together with Shaposhnikov, all 6 graduated. Of 35 artillerymen, 20, but out of 67 infantry officers, only 19!
________________________________________________________________________
Shaposhnikov B.M. Memories. Military scientific works. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1974. p. 55 Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/shaposhnikov/index.html
There with. 52.
P.A. Zayonchkovsky (1904–1983): Articles, publications and memories about him. – M.: ROSSPEN, 1998. p. 46. Quoted from: http://regiment.ru/Lib/A/7.htm
Ibid. 47
Ibid. 46
Ibid. 50-51
Ibid page 51
Ignatiev A. A. Fifty years in service. - M.: Voenizdat, 1986. p. 58 Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/ignatyev_aa/index.html
MINAKOV S.T. SOVIET MILITARY ELITE IN THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE OF THE 20-30S http://www.whoiswho.ru/kadr_politika/12003/stm2.htm
Right there.
Shaposhnikov B.M. Op. op. With. 35
P.A. Zayonchkovsky Decree op. With. 41
There with. 42
http://www.grwar.ru/persons/persons.html?id=378
Minakov S.T. Decree op. http://www.whoiswho.ru/kadr_politika/12003/stm2.htm
Shaposhnikov B.M. Decree op. With. 129.
Zayonchkovsky P.A. Decree op. With. 27
Shaposhnikov B.M. Decree op. With. 127.
Ignatiev A.A. Decree op. With. 102
There with. 99
Shaposhnikov B.M. Decree op. With. 135
Shaposhnikov B.M., The brain of the army. - M.: Voengiz, 1927 Quoted from: http://militera.lib.ru/science/shaposhnikov1/index.html
Zayonchkovsky A. M. First World War- St. Petersburg: Polygon Publishing House LLC, 2002. - 878, p. ill., 64 colors ill. - (Military History Library).
pp.14–15. Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/h/zayonchkovsky1/index.html
P.A. Zayonchkovsky Autocracy and the Russian army at the turn of the 19th–20th centuries, M., 1973. p. 174 Quoted from: http://regiment.ru/Lib/A/18/4.htm
Ibid.
Denikin A.I. Old army. Officers / A. I. Denikin; preface A. S. Kruchinina. - M.: Iris-press, 2005. - 512 p.: ill. + insert 8 pp. - (White Russia). Circulation 3000 copies. ISBN 5–8112–1411–1. Quoted from: http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/denikin_ai4/index.html p. 109
Zayonchkovsky P.A. Decree op. With. 41-42
Right there.
Right there. P.38-39
There with. 40.
Denikin A.I. Decree op. With. 110–111.
There with. 221.
The Great Forgotten War. – M.: Yauza; Eksmo, 2009. – 592 p. With. 7.
Zayonchkovsky A.M. Op. op. With. 16.
Ignatiev A.A. Decree op. With. 57.
Right there. pp.44–46.
Kamenev A.I. History of officer training in Russia. - M.: VPA im. Lenin, 1990. p. 163 Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/science/kamenev2/index.html
On the question of the officer composition of the Old Russian Army towards the end of its existence. V. CHERNAVIN. Military collection of the society of adherents of military knowledge. Book 5, 1924, Belgrade. Quoted from http://www.grwar.ru/library/Chernavin-OfficerCorps/CC_01.html
Right there.
Right there.
Golovin N. N. Russia in the First World War / Nikolai Golovin. - M.: Veche, 2006. - 528 p. - (Military secrets of Russia). Circulation 3,000 copies. ISBN 5–9533–1589–9. With. 187 Quoted from: http://militera.lib.ru/research/golovnin_nn/index.html
Shaposhnikov B.M. With. 166–167.
1. On the question of the officer composition of the Old Russian Army towards the end of its existence. V. CHERNAVIN. Military collection of the society of adherents of military knowledge. Book 5, 1924, Belgrade. Taken from http://www.grwar.ru/library/Chernavin-OfficerCorps/CC_01.html
2. Zayonchkovsky A. M. The First World War - St. Petersburg: Polygon Publishing House LLC, 2002. - 878, p. ill., 64 colors. ill. - (Military History Library).
3.. Shaposhnikov B.M. Memories. Military scientific works. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1974. Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/shaposhnikov/index.html
4. P.A. Zayonchkovsky (1904–1983): Articles, publications and memories about him. – M.: ROSSPEN, 1998. Quoted from: http://regiment.ru/Lib/A/7.htm
5. Ignatiev A. A. Fifty years in service. - M.: Voenizdat, 1986. Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/ignatyev_aa/index.html
6.S.T.MINAKOV SOVIET MILITARY ELITE IN THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE OF THE 20-30S http://www.whoiswho.ru/kadr_politika/12003/stm11.htm
7.http://www.grwar.ru/persons/persons.html?id=378
8. Shaposhnikov B.M., The brain of the army. - M.: Voengiz, 1927 Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/science/shaposhnikov1/index.html
9. Kamenev A.I. History of officer training in Russia. - M.: VPA im. Lenin, 1990. Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/science/kamenev2/index.html
10. Denikin A.I. Old army. Officers / A. I. Denikin; preface A. S. Kruchinina. - M.: Iris-press, 2005. - 512 p.: ill. + insert 8 pp. - (White Russia). Circulation 3000 copies. ISBN 5–8112–1411–1. Quoted from: http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/denikin_ai4/index.html
Material support for officers of the Russian army during the reign of Alexander I
Nowadays there is a lot of talk about the need to raise the prestige of the military profession and revive the former glory of Russian officers. Russia’s participation in peacekeeping operations, the conduct of military operations in Chechen Republic, and the very turbulent domestic and foreign political situation forces us to pay closer attention to the person in uniform, his social position, which makes it possible to honorably fulfill his professional duty.
In many countries, the military profession is one of the highest paid, which is associated with the constant risk that accompanies this type of activity. But the state of the armed forces, the financial situation of military personnel depends on several components: the economic and political situation in the state, society’s understanding of the need for the army and the military profession.
In Russia, military personnel were traditionally treated with respect, which was associated with active foreign policy, frequent wars waged Russian state throughout the history of its existence. Constantly in need of highly professional army command staff, the Russian government tried to provide decent salaries for officers, established a pension or disability pay upon retirement, provided benefits for sending their children to state-owned educational institutions, and provided for families in the event of the death of an officer. This raised the prestige of the military profession, which became the main one for the Russian nobility. And although during the reign of Catherine II, according to the Charter of 1785 civil service ceased to be mandatory for nobles, many nobles still chose military affairs. In addition, military service for many was practically the only source of income, an opportunity to provide decent support for their families.
The era of Alexander I was a brilliant page in the military history of the Russian state. During the military reforms of the first decade of his reign, a combat-ready army was created, which made it possible to defeat the seemingly invincible Napoleon Bonaparte. But the victory came at a heavy price: great human and material losses, a general decline in the country's economy caused by Russia's participation in the anti-British economic blockade, the ruin of a large part of Central Russia during the hostilities of 1812, the enormous costs of maintaining the army, and complete financial disorder. However, the government, having waged almost continuous wars since 1805, with France (1805-1807, 1812-1814), Turkey (1806-1812) and Sweden (1808-1809) tried to take care of it to the best of our ability personnel army, paying special attention to the officer corps.
Contentment of officers of the Russian army in the first quarter of the 19th century. consisted only of cash salaries and rations (cash leave for the allowance of orderlies). Already in 1801, Alexander I, having ascended the throne, increased the salaries of officers by a quarter. The ration size was determined at 1 rub. 50 kopecks The number of rations depended on the rank of the officer and varied from 25 (cavalry colonel) to 3 (ensign of army infantry). That is, not only the material support of the officer, but also his orderly was determined by the height of the officer’s rank, which was fully consistent with the social structure Russian society that time. Rations were included in the salary and issued along with it.
By 1805, the salaries of military personnel were increased again, which was associated with preparations for military operations against France, the need to fill command positions in the army with experienced officers who retired during the reign of Paul I. According to the new position, colonels, depending on the type of troops, received from 1040 to 1250 rub. per year, lieutenant colonels - 690-970 rubles, majors - 530-630 rubles, captains, staff captains, captains and staff captains - 400-495 rubles, lieutenants - 285-395 rubles, second lieutenants, cornets and warrant officers - 236-325 rub. Cavalrymen received higher salaries, which was associated with expenses on horses, their food and harness. The salary of privates was also increased: from 9 rubles. 50 kopecks up to 12 rubles, and on top of that they received from 11 rubles for uniforms. 63 kopecks up to 15 rub. 18 ? cop. and for cavalry harness from 8 rubles. 10 ? cop. up to 16 rub. 94 1/3 kop.
In 1809, ensigns, sub-ensigns and lieutenants of the troops located in the border three Baltic and two Lithuanian provinces, as well as in the Bialystok region, had their salaries increased by another third.1
Before the War of 1812, the value of the salary issued changed, as it began to be issued in paper notes, the rate of which had fallen significantly compared to silver. But initially, salaries in banknotes were given to the troops at the then prevailing rate. At the end of the wars with France, only troops stationed in Georgia to conduct military operations in the North Caucasus received salaries in silver2, but by the end of Alexander’s reign their allowance was transferred to banknotes.
By 1825, the size of an officer's salary was finally determined: in the army infantry from 1200 rubles. per year up to 450 rubles. depending on the rank. In the guards and army cavalry the salary was slightly higher. The salaries of major generals were left the same: from 2,600 rubles. (major general) up to 8180 rub. (Field Marshal General). Since 1816, unit commanders and senior combat commanders were paid table money: regiment commander - 3,000 rubles, brigadier general - 4,000 rubles, division chief - 1,000 rubles. and corps commander - 10,000 rubles.3
And yet this salary was barely enough for a normal existence. The envoy of the Sardinian king to Russia, Count Joseph de Maistre, reported: “the military simply cannot exist anymore. Recently, one young officer said: “I have a salary of 1,200 rubles; a pair of epaulettes costs 200, and to have a decent appearance at court, I need half a dozen of them a year. So the account is very simple." I know officers who live only on their salaries, who simply do not go out, trying to take care of their uniforms. Outside of duty hours, they sit at home, like Trappist fathers, wrapped in greatcoats."4
The difficult financial situation in the state in the post-war period did not allow for a significant increase in officer salaries, which worried the emperor. Refusing to increase the salaries of quartermaster officials according to the new states developed by the Quartermaster General of the 1st Army E.F. Kankrin, Alexander wrote to the commander-in-chief of the 1st Army, Prince M.B. Barclay de Tolly on March 10, 1816: “Give everyone a decent salary has always been and is the object of my desires. But if, despite all this, even army officers, who in the field have earned the right to an increase in their salaries, remain to this day with those insufficient salaries that were determined by the States of 1802, then it would be unfair for them to be alone at this time; officials of the Quartermaster Department enjoyed the huge salary that was assigned according to the states of Kankrin."5
By increasing the salaries of generals, staff and chief officers, they cut costs on other parts of the military economy: forage, increasing the period of time for the army's horse grazing, and reducing the number of hoisting and combat horses in army infantry regiments. According to Barclay de Tolly, this could result in savings of 1,042,340 rubles for the 1st Army. (while 6,833,063 rubles were required for an increase in salary).6 More than once the emperor asked the commanders-in-chief of the 1st and 2nd armies, Prince Barclay de Tolly and Count Wittgenstein, to reconsider the cost of provisions.
The regime of severe austerity introduced in the army after the end French wars, forced him to save every penny, including on the salaries of officers whose behavior for some reason caused dissatisfaction with their superiors. Thus, the Chief of His Imperial Majesty’s Main Staff, Prince P. M. Volkonsky, refused the request of the Chief of the Main Staff of the 1st Army, I. I. Dibich (April 26, 1815), to issue a salary to Lieutenant Colonel Konovalov for the period from May 1, 1812 to 1 September 1814 at the silver rate, since his statement about illness during this period aroused doubts from Volkonsky. At his own peril and risk, the head of the quartermaster unit of the Main E.I.V. headquarters, Major General N.I. Selyavin gave 500 rubles to a needy officer. from government funds.7
Trying to alleviate the situation of officers, especially young officers who had just graduated from college, the government allocated the amounts necessary for uniforms and the purchase of a riding horse (120-150 rubles, and the same amount for a saddle with equipment). But this amount was sometimes only enough to pay off the debts and, upon arriving at the unit, the officer again borrowed money, sometimes from government funds, unable to pay off the debts on a timely basis. Sometimes this led to lengthy correspondence between high military authorities, which sorted out the financial claims of the Quartermaster Department against officers and financial misunderstandings between fellow servicemen. There is a known case when Selyavin was forced to enter into a lengthy correspondence with the Quartermaster General of the 1st Army, Major General Harting, regarding a debt of 214 francs to the Parisian tailor of the quartermaster's ensign Genn, when he was in Paris during the Russian army's overseas campaign. The ensign’s father and the Chief of the General Staff, Prince Volkonsky, were also involved in the discussion of the possibilities for resolving this issue, who gave advice to the unlucky debtor to henceforth live within his means.8
Since many nobles who wanted to become officers did not have the means to fulfill their desire, in 1817, by a special decree, 16-year-old nobles wishing to enter military service were given an allowance for travel to the capital, which “will sufficiently facilitate the means for noble youth to enter the service according to their rank."9 Poor young nobles could receive the necessary military education at public expense in secondary schools. military educational institutions and army schools.
The government also considered the issues of maintaining officers who received wounds and injuries and were dismissed due to old age, illness and injury. According to the decree of May 21, 1803, officers who served 20 years without fault received a disability allowance, 30 years received half pay according to rank, and 40 years received full pay in the form of a pension. Those who became incapable of service due to injury were supposed to be provided with “decent service” content regardless of length of service. The length of service was counted from the moment of entry into active service (the time spent studying in the cadet corps was not counted). Since 1807, all officers who retired due to injury or injury were paid a lifelong pension in the amount of their full salary according to their rank, and were also paid for travel to their chosen place of residence. Officers assigned to disability support and who did not have their own home or estate were assigned apartments in the provincial cities of Central Russia, in Ukraine, in the Volga region and in Tobolsk. Officers dismissed for bad behavior, as well as persons who did not serve the required term, but applied for a pension after 8 years of retirement, received a lower pension salary of 1/3 of their salary. Even those dismissed by court decision could hope for a small pension, “so as not to be left without care and to provide them, out of philanthropy, with some means of subsistence.”
In 1805, in the Sergievskaya Hermitage near St. Petersburg, at the expense of the Counts Zubovs, the first invalid home for 30 officers was created. In 1807, following his model, state-run nursing homes for lower ranks were created in both capitals, Kyiv, Chernigov and Kursk.10
On August 18, 1814, on the anniversary of the Battle of Kulm, Alexander I established a special Committee for the Wounded to help poor wounded generals and officers. Funds for the Committee's needs came from the treasury and public donations. With the money collected by subscription by the publisher of the Russian Invalid, collegiate adviser Pesarovius (395 thousand rubles) in December 1815, 1,200 officers received pensions.11
In 1809, legislation began to formalize the provision of benefits to the families of deceased officers. For officer widows over 40 years of age or more younger age, but with physical disabilities that prevented them from getting married, pensions were established at 1/8 of their husbands’ salary. True, the pension was issued only to those who did not have real estate generating income in an amount exceeding the husband’s annual salary. Upon remarriage, the pension was lost. A pension was also given to orphans: daughters - until marriage or placement in an educational institution, sons - until the age of 16 or entering the service, as well as to a state-owned educational institution.
For officers who were killed or died from wounds, the pension to their widows was paid in full for life (from 1803 to 1809, the pension was paid even if they remarried). Pensions were also awarded to the mothers of fallen officers.12
Thus, the government of Emperor Alexander I tried to ensure that none of the military personnel who honestly fulfilled their duty to the Fatherland would be left without a means of subsistence or disgrace their rank by begging. It was even ordered to ensure that those “of them who, wishing better to evade from one place to another and bring the gullible into pity with their apparent poverty, rather than live peacefully where they can have an assigned allowance, do not behave in such behavior uncharacteristic of the rank of an officer.” 13
And in subsequent reigns, the Russian government invariably tried to take care of the financial situation of officers, regardless of the economic situation in the country, maintaining high social status defenders of the Fatherland in society, which continued to make the military profession one of the most significant in Russia.
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In the gigantic ruins of our politicized military history, sometimes we come across works that are not as much as many others, polluted by tendentious conjuncture. You will probably also discover in Barinov an ideological bias and reckless (even boastful) ambition of some of his conclusions.
But among the many colorful chaff, you will definitely find stainless grains of that “number and texture” that are extremely curious, because they are taken from documents and sworn confessions.
I have always been most interested in the state of the officer corps in the period that preceded the fall of the Empire. What were they like - those of our ancestors who, after 1917, fled to different and fiercely warring armies?...
Nikita Barinov.
TRAINING OF ROYAL ARMY OFFICERS (myths and reality)
If we objectively consider the position of the army at the time of the death of the Russian Empire, a sad picture easily emerges. There is a myth about the officers of the tsarist army. This will be somewhat surprising, but, in my opinion, it was created primarily by Soviet propaganda. In the heat of the class struggle, “gentlemen officers” were portrayed as rich, well-groomed and, as a rule, dangerous enemies, the antipodes of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army in general and its command staff in particular. This was especially evident in the film “Chapaev”, where instead of Kolchak’s rather poorly dressed and trained troops, Chapaev was confronted by the “Kappelites” in clean black and white uniforms, advancing in a “psychic” attack in a beautiful formation. Accordingly, high income also meant training, and as a consequence, a high level of training and skills. All this was picked up and developed by fans of “The Russia We Lost” and the White Cause. Despite the fact that among them there are, of course, talented historians and simply lovers of military history, the praise of the officers often reached the point of absurdity.
In fact, the situation with the combat training of officers was initially sad. And not the least role in this was played by the rather difficult financial situation of the officers. Roughly speaking, the best students of the gymnasium simply did not want to “pull the burden” in the service of an officer, when much simpler and more profitable career prospects in the civilian field opened up before them. It is no coincidence that the future Marshal of the Soviet Union, and at the beginning of the 20th century, cadet Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov, wrote in his memoirs: “My then comrades, of course, found it difficult to understand my decision to go to a military school. The fact is that I graduated from a real school, as noted above, with an average score of 4.3. With this score they usually entered higher technical educational institutions. In general, young people with weak theoretical training went to military schools. At the turn of the 20th century, such an opinion about the command staff of the army was quite widespread.” Boris Mikhailovich himself joined the army because “My parents lived very frugally, because my younger sister Yulia also began to study in Chelyabinsk at a girls’ gymnasium. I had to think more than once about the questions: how can I make life easier for my family? More than once the thought came to mind: “Shouldn’t I go into military service?” Secondary education would allow one to enter directly into a military school. I couldn’t even dream of studying at a higher technical institution for five years at my parents’ expense. Therefore, I have already, privately, firmly decided to go along the military line.”
Contrary to the cliche about officers as noble landowners, in fact, officers at the end of the Romanov era, although they came, as a rule, from the nobility, were close to commoners in their financial situation.
“The presence of land ownership even among the generals and, oddly enough, the guards was far from a frequent occurrence. Let's look at the numbers. Of the 37 corps commanders (36 army and one guards), data regarding land ownership is available on 36. Of these, five had it. The largest landowner was the commander of the Guards Corps, General. V.M. Bezobrazov, who owned an estate of 6 thousand dessiatines and gold mines in Siberia. Of the remaining four, one had no indication of the size of his estate, and each of the three had about one thousand dessiatines. Thus, in the highest command category, with the rank of general, only 13.9% had land ownership.
Of the 70 heads of infantry divisions (67 army and 3 guards), as well as 17 cavalry divisions (15 army and two guards), i.e. 87 people, 6 people have no information about property. Of the remaining 81, only five have it (two guards generals, who were large landowners, and three army generals, two of whom had estates, and one had his own house). Consequently, 4 people, or 4.9%, had land ownership.
Let's turn to the regiment commanders. As mentioned above, we analyze all the grenadier and rifle regiments, and half of the infantry regiments that were part of the divisions. This amounted to 164 infantry regiments, or 61.1% of the total. In addition, 48 cavalry (hussars, lancers and dragoons) regiments, which were part of 16 cavalry divisions, are considered.” If we compare these figures with similar ones for civil officials of the same classes, we get the following: “Let us turn to the list of civil ranks of the first three classes. In 1914, there were 98 second-class officials, of which 44 owned land property, which was 44.9%; third class - 697 people, of which 215 people owned property, accounting for 30.8%.
Let us compare data on the availability of land ownership among military and civilian officials of the corresponding classes. So, we have: second class ranks - military - 13.9%, civilians - 44.8%; third class - military - 4.9%, civilians - 30.8%. The difference is colossal."
About the financial situation P.A. Zayonchkovsky writes: “So, the officer corps, which included up to 80% of the nobles, consisted of the serving nobility and in terms of financial situation was no different from the commoners.” Quoting Protopresbyter Shavelsky, the same author writes: “The officer was an outcast from the royal treasury. It is impossible to point out a class in Tsarist Russia that was worse off than the officers. The officer received a meager salary that did not cover all his urgent expenses /.../. Especially if he had a family, eked out a miserable existence, was malnourished, entangled in debt, denying himself the most necessary things.”
As we have already seen, the land holdings of even the highest command staff were in no way comparable to those of civil officials. In part, this was a consequence of the fact that the salary of officials was significantly higher than that of generals: “As mentioned above, the annual salary of the head of a division was 6,000 rubles, and the salary of the governor was from 9,600 thousand to 12.6 thousand rubles per year, i.e. almost twice as much." Only the guardsmen lived lavishly. General Ignatiev colorfully, although perhaps somewhat tendentiously, describes his service in perhaps the most elite regiment of the army of the Russian Empire - the Life Guards Cavalry Regiment. He notes the enormous “cost” of serving in this regiment, which was associated with the cost of uniforms, two particularly expensive horses, etc. However, P.A. Zayonchkovsky believes that even this was not the most “expensive” regiment. He considers this to be the Life Guards Hussar Regiment, during service in which he had to spend 500 rubles a month - the salary of the division chief! In general, the Guard was a completely separate corporation, the existence of which brought great confusion to the career growth of officers.
On the one hand, the guard was staffed by the best graduates of schools. To do this, you had to get a “guards score” (more than 10 out of 12). Moreover, thanks to the system in which graduates chose their vacancies in order of average scores, the best cadets entered the guard. On the other hand, vacancies in the guard were available only in elite educational institutions. For example, it was almost impossible for a non-nobleman to get into the most elite Corps of Pages. Already fourth on the semi-official list of the most prestigious schools, Aleksandrovskoe always had a minimum of guards vacancies, and therefore Tukhachevsky was very lucky in that he was able to graduate as the best among the cadets. Thus, the already closed nature of the schools, which had a significant number of vacancies, greatly limited the entry of unborn cadets there. However, this was not the last obstacle to getting into the guard. According to an unspoken law, but firmly followed and noted by many researchers: joining the regiment must be approved by the officers of the regiment. This closeness and casteism could block the path up the career ladder for any “freethinker,” since loyal feelings were mandatory for service in the guard. Finally, we have already talked about the “property qualification”. Thus, first of all, rich, well-born officers ended up in the guard. True, they had to complete the school course with excellence, but most of the equally, if not more talented officers did not even have the opportunity to join the guards regiment. But the guard was the “forge of personnel” for the generals of the tsarist army! Moreover, promotion in the guard was, in principle, faster and easier. Not only did the guardsmen have a 2-rank advantage over army officers, but there was also no rank of lieutenant colonel, which further accelerated growth. We are no longer talking about connections and prestige! As a result, most of the generals came from the Guard; moreover, most of the generals who did not have an education at the General Staff Academy came from there. For example, “in 1914, the army had 36 army corps and 1 guard corps. ... Let us turn to the data on education. Of the 37 corps commanders, 34 had higher military education. Of these, 29 people graduated from the General Staff Academy, 2 from the Artillery Academy, and 1 from the Engineering and Legal Academy. Thus, 90% had higher education. The three who did not have higher education included the commander of the Guards Corps, General. V.M. Bezobrazov, 12th Army Corps General. A.A. Brusilov and the 2nd Caucasian Corps, General. G.E. Berkhman. Of the listed corps commanders, 25 people in the past, and one (General Bezobrazov) currently served in the guard.”
It is difficult to agree with the author that this was explained solely by the “ability” of the guards. After all, it was they who first got to the top positions, without having an education from the Academy of the General Staff, which the author himself admits: “According to the “Schedule” of 1914, the Russian army had 70 infantry divisions: 3 guards, 4 grenadiers, 52 infantry and 11 Siberian riflemen. Their commanders were lieutenant generals... By education: 51 people had higher military education (of which 46 graduated from the General Staff Academy, 41 graduated from the Military Engineering Academy, 1 from the Artillery Academy). Thus, 63.2% had higher education. Of the 70 commanders of infantry divisions, 38 were guardsmen (past or present). It is interesting to note that of the 19 people who did not have a higher military education, 15 were guards officers. The guards’ advantage was already showing here.” As you can see, the “guards advantage” affects the level of division commanders. Where does it go when the same people are appointed to the slightly higher post of corps chief? Moreover, for some unknown reason, the author was mistaken about G.E. Berkhman’s lack of higher education, and the rest of the generals were precisely from the guard. Bezobrazov, who did not have a higher education, but was very rich, generally commanded the Guards Corps. Thus, the guard was a “supplier” of academically uneducated officers to the highest echelons of the army.
We can talk about such a serious problem as the lack of fairness in the distribution of ranks and positions: richer and more well-born officers, once in the guard, had a much better chance of making a career than those who pulled the burden and were sometimes more prepared (if only because of less ceremonial conditions of service) army colleagues. This could not but affect the quality of training of senior command staff or the psychological climate. It is known that division into “castes” reigned in the army. As already mentioned, guardsmen were allocated to a special group, having significant preferences among all officers. But it cannot be said that there were no frictions and differences within the guard and the rest of the army. Thus, the most educated officers traditionally served in the engineering troops and artillery. This was even reflected in jokes: “a handsome man serves in the cavalry, a smart man serves in the artillery, a drunkard serves in the navy, and a fool serves in the infantry.” The least prestigious was, of course, the infantry. And the “aristocratic” cavalry was considered the most prestigious. However, she also shared. So the hussars and lancers looked down on the dragoons. The 1st Heavy Brigade of the Guards Cavalry stood apart: the “courtiers” of the Cavalry Guards and the Life Guards Horse Regiment, “fought” for the title of the most elite regiment. In the foot guards, the so-called "Petrovskaya Brigade" - Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky regiments. But, as Minakov notes, even here there was no equality: Preobrazhensky was more well-born. In the artillery, the cavalry was considered the elite, but the serfs were traditionally considered “outcasts,” which came back to haunt them in 1915 during the defense of fortresses. Of course, it cannot be said that such differences do not exist in other armies, but there was nothing good in separating and isolating different types of troops from each other.
Almost the only opportunity to accelerate career growth for talented army officers was admission to the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff. The selection there was very careful. To do this, it was necessary to pass preliminary exams, and then entrance exams. At the same time, the best officers of the regiments initially surrendered them. According to Shaposhnikov, in the year of his admission, 82.6% of those who passed the preliminary exams passed the competition. However, despite such a careful selection of applicants, applicants had serious problems with general education subjects. “1) Very poor literacy, gross spelling errors. 2) Poor overall development. Bad style. Lack of clarity of thinking and general lack of mental discipline. 3) Extremely poor knowledge of history and geography. Insufficient literary education” However, it cannot be said that this applied to all General Staff officers. Using the example of B.M. Shaposhnikov, it is easy to see that many of them did not have even a shadow of the problems mentioned above in the document. However, it should be noted that subsequent problems with education in the Red Army were radically different from similar ones in the tsarist army. The image of a well-educated tsarist officer is fairly idealized.
Training at the General Staff Academy lasted two years. In the first year, both military and general education subjects were covered, while military officers mastered disciplines related to the combat operations of units. In the second year, general education subjects were completed, and disciplines related to strategy were studied from the military. In addition, every day there were horse riding lessons in the arena. As Shaposhnikov notes, this was a consequence of the experience of the Russian-Japanese War, when the division, during the battles near the Yantai mines, Orlov’s division scattered, ending up in a high kaoliang, when the chief of staff’s horse bolted and he could not stop it, leaving the division completely decapitated, since the commander division was wounded. Perhaps this was already unnecessary for the positional massacre of the First World War, but in response to the critical remark of Boris Mikhailovich himself about the archaic nature of the horse as a method of transportation compared to the automobile introduced in Europe, we note that Russian industry simply did not have the ability to supply the army with a sufficient amount of transport. Buying it abroad was expensive and quite reckless from the point of view of independence from foreign supplies.
The training itself also had significant shortcomings. For example, many authors note little attention to the development of initiative and practical skills in general. Classes consisted almost exclusively of lectures. The end result, instead of highly qualified staff workers, was theoreticians who did not always have an idea of how to act in a real situation. According to Ignatiev, only one teacher even focused on the will to win.
Another problem was the enormous amount of time spent on some completely outdated items, such as drawing the terrain in line drawings. In general, this art was such a memorable subject that many memoirists write unkind words about it. ,
Contrary to the well-known myth about the generals’ passion for the French school of Grandmaison, “élan vitale”6, Shaposhnikov testifies to his sympathy for German theories. True, he notes that the top generals were not familiar with German methods of war.
In general, the strengths of the career officers of the tsarist army were their fighting spirit and readiness for self-sacrifice. And there could be no talk of carelessness like conversations about absolutely secret things in a cafe, which Shaposhnikov describes in “The Brain of the Army” in relation to the Austrian army. The concept of an officer’s honor was worth a lot to career military personnel. Young officers of the General Staff, after the reforms carried out by Golovin, received a generally good education, despite many shortcomings. What was especially important was that the tactics of the German troops were no longer a revelation to them, as they were to more senior commanders. The problem of the latter was a weak interest in self-development, in innovations both in technology and in the art of war. As A.M. Zayonchkovsky notes, the disastrous situation with the training of senior command personnel was partly a consequence of the General Staff’s inattention to the problem: “Paying great attention to the training of troops and the improvement of junior command personnel, the Russian General Staff completely ignored the selection and training of senior command personnel: the appointment of persons who spent their entire lives after graduating from the academy in an administrative position immediately to the position of division chief and corps commander was not uncommon.” Before the Russo-Japanese War, this situation was especially clear. There were jokes: “in 1905-1906. Commander of the Amur Military District, Gen. N.P. Linevich, seeing the howitzer, asked in surprise: “What kind of weapon is this?” The same author notes: “The same Lenevich (correctly Linevich - N.B.) did not know how to read maps properly and did not understand what train movement on schedule was. “And among the commanders of regiments and brigades,” Shavelsky further notes, “sometimes there were complete ignoramuses in military affairs. Military science did not enjoy the love of our military.” Denikin echoes them:
“The Japanese War, among other revelations, led us to the realization that command personnel need to learn. Forgetting this rule was one of the reasons for the dependence of many commanders on their headquarters. Before the war, the commander, starting from the position of regiment commander, could remain calm with the “scientific” baggage that he had once carried out from the military or cadet school; may not have followed the progress of military science at all, and it never occurred to anyone to take an interest in his knowledge. Any inspection would be considered insulting... The general condition of the unit and partly only its control during maneuvers provided a criterion for the commander’s assessment. The latter, however, is very relative: given the inevitable conventionality of maneuvering actions and our general complacency during maneuvers, it was possible to make as many gross mistakes as we wanted and with impunity; the disapproving review in the description of large maneuvers, which reached the units after a few months, lost its sharpness.”
In addition, the officer corps at the highest echelons was extremely old. The corps commanders were distributed by age as follows: from 51 to 55 years old - 9 people, from 56 to 60 - 20, and from 61 to 65 - 7. Thus, over 75% of corps commanders were over 55 years old. Their average age was 57.7 years. The division commanders were only slightly younger. From 51 to 55 years old - 17, from 56 to 60 - 48 and from 61 to 65 - 5. Thus, the bulk of the commanders of infantry divisions were over 55 years old. Their average age was 57.0 years. True, the commanders of cavalry divisions were on average 5.4 years younger. And this is after the “purge” carried out by the energetic Minister of War Roediger, who, however, quickly lost his portfolio and was replaced by the less firm Sukhomlinov. During his rather short reign, the certification commission that worked under his leadership was appointed: commanders of district troops - 6; their assistants - 7; corps commanders - 34; commandants of fortresses - 23; chiefs of infantry divisions - 61; chiefs of cavalry divisions - 18; heads of individual brigades (infantry and cavalry) - 87; commanders of non-separate brigades - 140; commanders of infantry regiments - 255; commanders of individual battalions - 108; commanders of cavalry regiments - 45. He also petitioned for the dismissal of the most mediocre commanders from the army. But Nicholas II became the problem. Now praised with all his might, the monarch cared little about the combat effectiveness of the army, paying much more attention to its uniform and loyalty to the throne. The tsar in every possible way prevented the removal of generals he liked and the financing of the army to the detriment of the fleet. The appointment of Yanushkevich, who was completely inappropriate for the position of Chief of the General Staff, for example, became possible only thanks to the patronage of the Sovereign. No less blame lies with the prime minister, since the distribution of budget funds largely depended on him. That is why he protected from dismissal the generals who showed talent in pacifying the rebels, and not on the battlefield. Quoting Polivanov’s diary P.A. Zayonchkovsky writes: “Received from E.V. journal of the Higher Attestation Commission regarding corps commanders; permission followed for the dismissal of the gene. Shutleworth; against the conclusion on the dismissal of the general. Krause and Novosiltseva - the highest resolution to “leave”, but against the gene. Adlerberg: “I know him, he is not a genius, but an honest soldier: in 1905 he defended Kronstadt.” What blood it cost to appoint Rennenkampf, who had not distinguished himself in any way on the battlefields of Manchuria, but was the “hero” of the suppression of the 1905 revolution, as commander of the army invading East Prussia is well known.
True, it cannot be said that they did not try to rectify the situation. As the same Denikin writes, “One way or another, after the Japanese war, the senior command staff were also forced to study. In the spring of 1906, the order of the Minister of War first appeared by order of the highest order: “Troop commanders should establish appropriate training for senior command personnel, starting with unit commanders up to and including corps commanders, aimed at developing military knowledge.” This innovation caused irritation at the top: the old people grumbled, seeing in it a desecration of gray hairs and an undermining of authority... But things progressed little by little, although at first there were some frictions and even oddities.” It was also possible to partially instill an interest in self-development in artillery: “Probably never before has military thought worked as intensively as in the years following the Japanese war. They talked, wrote, and shouted about the need to reorganize the army. The need for self-education increased, and, accordingly, interest in military literature increased significantly, causing the emergence of a number of new bodies. It seems to me that if it were not for the lesson of the Japanese campaign and the subsequent recovery and feverish work, our army would not have withstood even several months of the test of the world war...” However, the white general immediately admits that the work was proceeding at a very slow pace.
However, it cannot be said that these measures did not affect the combat effectiveness of the army. A.A. Svechin writes: “No less progress should be noted in relation to the tactical training of troops and in improving the qualifications of middle and lower command personnel.”
But this was not enough. It’s hard to disagree with A.M. Zayonchkovsky, who gave a very short but very succinct description of the Russian army before the First World War: “In general, the Russian army went to war with good regiments, with mediocre divisions and corps, and with bad armies and fronts, understanding this assessment in the broad sense of preparation, but not personal qualities.”
The Achilles heel of the old army was the complete absence of any political preparation. The officers were ready to go to their own death, but they did not know how to lead. Svechin in his book “The Art of Driving a Regiment” points to the inability of career officers to communicate with soldiers, understand their needs and build discipline that is suitable not only in peacetime. We must understand that the days of Friedrich’s principle “a soldier should be more afraid of the non-commissioned officer’s stick than the enemy’s bullet” are long gone and it is impossible to keep a soldier at the front only by force. Alas, no one simply taught Russian officers this. And given their completely childish knowledge of social and political sciences, it is not difficult to understand that the officers were completely disoriented when faced with the propaganda of socialist parties. The separation of officers from the mass of soldiers also had an effect. For example, Ignatiev notes that scuffles in the 1st Guards Cavalry Division were not used solely due to Guards tradition. The so-called “tsug”, similar in meaning to modern hazing, was also considered a completely normal phenomenon. , All this was not noticeable for a significant part of the war, but the collapse of discipline, and as a consequence of the entire army in 1917, perfectly showed what inattention to the moral climate within the army team could lead to.
The outbreak of World War II completely revolutionized the officer training system. If before that they were trained according to a completely harmonious system, going from the cadet corps to the school, and after graduation and service the best of them could graduate from one of the academies, but now, although the schools continued to train lieutenants, but only according to a greatly reduced accelerated course. But they could not satisfy the needs of the army. A significant number of warrant officer schools were opened, producing officers with extremely poor skills and knowledge.
The most difficult situation was in the infantry. You can often see ratings like this:
“Our infantry regiments lost several sets of command staff during the World War. As far as I can judge from the data I have, only in a few regiments the loss of officers killed and wounded drops to 300%, but usually reaches 400 - 500% or more.
For artillery I do not have sufficiently complete data. Information for a number of artillery brigades indicates officer losses (over the entire war) of 15 - 40%. The losses of technical troops are even less. In the cavalry, losses are very uneven. There are parts that have suffered greatly, while in others the loss is completely insignificant. In any case, even the losses of the most damaged cavalry units are negligible in comparison with the losses of the infantry.”
The consequence of this situation was, on the one hand, a sharp “washing out” of the best-trained personnel. Those. Even those officers who were available and commanded units did not have sufficient education and experience by the end of the war. “The senior command (commanding) staff, taken from the army alone, does not represent such a large group in number that the results of its consideration could be applied to the entire Russian army without significant reservations...
First of all, when considering the data on the command staff, a significant percentage of temporary commanders strikes the eye: namely, 11 out of 32 regiments... According to the previous service before receiving the regiment, 27 regiment commanders (i.e., almost 85% of their total number) belong to the combat officers ; the remaining five held positions in various institutions and institutions of the military department (corps, military schools, etc.). Among the 32 regiment commanders there was not a single General officer. Headquarters. Undoubtedly, this is an accident, but a very characteristic accident, indicating a significant decrease in the number of infantry command personnel with higher military education... The qualifications for commanding regiments for the majority are very low:
from 1 to 3 months. at 8 regiments,
from 3 to 6 months. at 11 regiments,
from 6 to 12 months. at 8 regiments,
from 1 to 2 years. at 3 regiments,
more than 2 years. at 2 rows of regiments,
The entire officer corps under study can be divided into 2 unequal, sharply different groups - career officers and wartime officers.
The first group includes all staff officers, almost all captains (9 or 10) and a small part of staff captains (7 out of 38).
The total number of career officers is 27, i.e. not a full 4% of the total number. The remaining 96% are wartime officers."
So, the regular infantry officers have been knocked out. And who replaced them? This is where the very serious problem of the future Red Army lies. The fact is that the retired officers were replaced mainly by people who had completely insufficient training, both military and simply general education. The same author provides the corresponding tables:
Educational qualification Staff officers Captains Staff captains Lieutenants Second lieutenants Ensigns Total Percentage of the total
Higher education — — 2 3 6 26 37 5
Secondary education 7 8 12 7 46 78 158 22
Incomplete secondary 4 2 3 20 37 81 147 20
Incomplete secondary — — 9 20 43 153 225 31
Training at home and in the service — — 12 13 27 106 158 22
Total 11 10 38 63 159 444 725 100
Military training
Staff officers Captains
Staff captains
Lieutenants
Second Lieutenants Warrant Officers
Total Percent
Full peacetime school course 11 9 7 1 - - 28 4
Full course of wartime school - - 15 21 85 113 234 32
Warrant Officer School - - 8 37 67 315 428 59
Did not go to school (promoted for military distinction) - 1 7 4 7 16 35 5
These tables speak volumes. Firstly, it is clear that the rank of “captain” was almost unattainable for a wartime officer. It was the senior officers, therefore, who were most interesting as future cadres of the Red Army in terms of professional training. On the other hand, they had already reached high positions under the “old regime” and therefore the incentive for a career in the new army under new conditions was not as strong for them and therefore were not as loyal as junior officers. Secondly, it should be noted the difference in general education. His level of education for career officers was equal, however, it should be noted that incomplete secondary education is not exactly what was required of an officer in such a technically intensive war as the First World War. But already among the staff captains there is complete discord. Officers with higher education appear. Obviously, these are wartime volunteers who initially chose the civilian path for themselves, but whose fate was changed by the Great War. As the famous military writer Golovin notes, this was the best material for obtaining officers, since an intellectual could easily escape conscription and therefore those who joined the army had not only the best general education, but also the best fighting spirit, and in some ways the best moral qualities than, for example, the notorious “Zemgusars”. On the other hand, many officers did not even have a secondary education, but a lower one, or had no general education at all. Only a little more than a third of the staff captains had completed secondary education. This suggests, on the one hand, that the intelligentsia did not really want to join the army. On the other hand, the image of an officer of the “old army” as a person from the “educated classes”, which became widespread in the mass consciousness thanks to Soviet cinema, is far from the truth. The army was replenished mainly by poorly educated people. There was also some advantage to this. After all, these statistics indicate the class affinity of wartime officers (and, obviously, they were the main contingent among staff captains who did not receive a secondary education) of the new government.
Among lieutenants, second lieutenants and especially warrant officers, the situation with education becomes even worse. Among warrant officers, only less than a quarter of officers had a complete secondary education, and less than a third of the total graduated from military schools, rather than warrant officer schools.
Thus, two features should be noted. Firstly, the infantry personnel were largely eliminated. Companies, and often battalions, were commanded by wartime officers who, in principle, did not have sufficient training. Moreover, wartime officers did not have a reasonable education to be able to make up for educational deficiencies in the future.
In general, we have to admit that even before the Great War, officers had significant shortcomings in training. Moreover, if young commanders managed to receive an education in reformed schools and academies, then the senior, older command staff continued to lag far behind the requirements of the time in terms of their qualities. Theses about the loss of senior command personnel by the Red Army as a catastrophe are untenable. Even without mentioning the dubious benefit of elderly generals of the First World War during the Second World War, of which France is a brilliant example, one cannot help but see the superiority of the senior command staff of future opponents over domestic strategists, if not in talent, then in the level of training. Much more terrible was the killing of young officers during the First World War, and then the Civil War. Unfortunately, unlike Germany, the Republic of Ingushetia was unable to establish high-quality training for wartime officers, and this was for completely objective reasons: in Russia there simply was not a sufficient number of educated people. Like the Franco-Prussian War, the war on the Eastern Front was largely won by a Berlin schoolteacher.
It is interesting to note that large numbers of cadres of technical troops that were not knocked out ended up in the Red Army. But it was precisely these people “with a learned piping and a velvet collar,” according to Shaposhnikov, who had the highest percentage of those who graduated from the Academy of the General Staff among those admitted there, which indicates the best preparation. So, out of 6 engineers who entered together with Shaposhnikov, all 6 graduated. Of 35 artillerymen, 20, but out of 67 infantry officers, only 19!
________________________________________________________________________
Shaposhnikov B.M. Memories. Military scientific works. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1974. p. 55 Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian...ikov/index.html
There with. 52.
P.A. Zayonchkovsky (1904-1983): Articles, publications and memories about him. - M.: ROSSPEN, 1998. p. 46. Quoted from: http://regiment.ru/Lib/A/7.htm
There with. 47
There with. 46
There with. 50-51
Ibid page 51
Ignatiev A. A. Fifty years in service. - M.: Voenizdat, 1986. p. 58 Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian...v_aa/index.html
MINAKOV S.T. SOVIET MILITARY ELITE IN THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE OF THE 20-30S http://www.whoiswho.ru/kadr_politika/12003/stm2.htm
Shaposhnikov B.M. Op. op. With. 35
P.A. Zayonchkovsky Decree op. With. 41
There with. 42
Http://www.grwar.ru/persons/persons.html?id=378
Minakov S.T. Decree op. http://www.whoiswho.ru/kadr_politika/12003/stm2.htm
Shaposhnikov B.M. Decree op. With. 129.
Zayonchkovsky P.A. Decree op. With. 27
Shaposhnikov B.M. Decree op. With. 127.
Ignatiev A.A. Decree op. With. 102
There with. 99
Shaposhnikov B.M. Decree op. With. 135
Shaposhnikov B.M., The brain of the army. - M.: Voengiz, 1927 Quoted from: http://militera.lib.ru/science/shaposhnikov1/index.html
Zayonchkovsky A. M. The First World War - St. Petersburg: Polygon Publishing House LLC, 2002. - 878, p. ill., 64 colors. ill. — (Military History Library).
P.14-15. Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/h/zayonchkovsky1/index.html
P.A. Zayonchkovsky Autocracy and the Russian army on turn of XIX-XX centuries, M., 1973. p. 174 Quoted from: http://regiment.ru/Lib/A/18/4.htm
Denikin A.I. Old army. Officers / A. I. Denikin; preface A. S. Kruchinina. - M.: Iris-press, 2005. - 512 p.: ill. + insert 8 pp. - (White Russia). Circulation 3000 copies. ISBN 5-8112-1411-1. Quoted from: http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian..._ai4/index.html p. 109
Zayonchkovsky P.A. Decree op. With. 41-42
Right there. P.38-39
There with. 40.
Denikin A.I. Decree op. With. 110-111.
There with. 221.
The Great Forgotten War. - M.: Yauza; Eksmo, 2009. - 592 p. With. 7.
Zayonchkovsky A.M. Op. op. With. 16.
Ignatiev A.A. Decree op. With. 57.
Right there. P.44-46.
Kamenev A.I. History of officer training in Russia. - M.: VPA im. Lenin, 1990. p. 163 Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/science/kamenev2/index.html
On the question of the officer composition of the Old Russian Army towards the end of its existence. V. CHERNAVIN. Military collection of the society of adherents of military knowledge. Book 5, 1924, Belgrade. Quoted from http://www.grwar.ru/library/Chernav...orps/CC_01.html
Golovin N. N. Russia in the First World War / Nikolai Golovin. - M.: Veche, 2006. - 528 p. - (Military secrets of Russia). Circulation 3,000 copies. ISBN 5-9533-1589-9. With. 187 Quoted from: http://militera.lib.ru/research/golovnin_nn/index.html
Shaposhnikov B.M. With. 166-167.
1. On the question of the officer composition of the Old Russian Army towards the end of its existence. V. CHERNAVIN. Military collection of the society of adherents of military knowledge. Book 5, 1924, Belgrade. Taken from http://www.grwar.ru/library/Chernav...orps/CC_01.html
2. Zayonchkovsky A. M. The First World War - St. Petersburg: Polygon Publishing House LLC, 2002. - 878, p. ill., 64 colors. ill. — (Military History Library).
3.. Shaposhnikov B.M. Memories. Military scientific works. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1974. Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian...ikov/index.html
4. P.A. Zayonchkovsky (1904-1983): Articles, publications and memories about him. - M.: ROSSPEN, 1998. Quoted from: http://regiment.ru/Lib/A/7.htm
5. Ignatiev A. A. Fifty years in service. - M.: Voenizdat, 1986. Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian...v_aa/index.html
6.S.T.MINAKOV SOVIET MILITARY ELITE IN THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE OF THE 20-30S http://www.whoiswho.ru/kadr_politika/12003/stm11.htm
7.http://www.grwar.ru/persons/persons.html?id=378
8. Shaposhnikov B.M., The brain of the army. - M.: Voengiz, 1927 Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/science/shaposhnikov1/index.html
9. Kamenev A.I. History of officer training in Russia. - M.: VPA im. Lenin, 1990. Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/science/kamenev2/index.html
10. Denikin A.I. Old army. Officers / A. I. Denikin; preface A. S. Kruchinina. - M.: Iris-press, 2005. - 512 p.: ill. + insert 8 pp. - (White Russia). Circulation 3000 copies. ISBN 5-8112-1411-1. Quoted from: http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian..._ai4/index.html
“What are we fighting for?” - the question, in fact, during the war is not at all rhetorical, but the most pressing one. The idea is, of course, an important thing, but you won’t be satisfied with it alone at the front under bullets and shells - everyone wants to have at least a little money for personal expenses, everyone wants to be sure that in the event of injury and, especially death, their families will not be left behind abandoned, and after victory, their merits will be noted not only with medals. Meanwhile, when talking about the First World War, historians usually bypass such everyday details, focusing on the number of armies, cannons and machine guns, casualty figures, and pay attention to finances only in connection with issues of the global military economy. What kind of money was lying 100 years ago in the pockets of officers' jackets and soldiers' tunics - in the material of "Russian Planet".
Rich generals and humble lieutenants
At the beginning of the war, the “salary” of officers of the Russian army was determined by order of the War Ministry No. 141 of June 15, 1899. At one time, this order significantly increased the income of the military. In accordance with it, a full general received 775 rubles a month, a lieutenant general - 500, a colonel - 325, a captain (company commander) - 145 rubles. The lowest paid officer in peacetime was a second lieutenant (the equivalent in the cavalry is a cornet, among the Cossacks it is a cornet; the first officer rank in the army is conditionally equivalent to the current rank of lieutenant - RP), who received 55 rubles a month.
This “salary according to rank” consisted of three components - the salary itself, the so-called table money and additional salary. “Table money” was awarded to officers from the captain (company commander) inclusive and above, the amount of which depended on the position held. Generals and regiment commanders received impressive sums of canteen money for those times - from 475 to 225 rubles per month. The maximum amount of “table money” was received by generals and senior officers who held positions in the directorates of military districts, corps and division commissaries. Full generals, in addition to other payments, received another 125 rubles per month “representation money” for, as the name implies, various entertainment expenses.
The captain (company commander) received 30 rubles of “table money” per month. For comparison, lunch in an average restaurant in 1914 cost about 2 rubles per person, a kilogram of fresh meat cost about 50 kopecks, a kilogram of sugar - 30 kopecks, a liter of milk - 15 kopecks, and the average salary of an industrial worker without high qualifications was just over 22 rubles per month.
Traditionally, it was believed that “table money” was given to the commander so that he could regularly gather subordinate officers in his house for common dinners. At the beginning of the 20th century, this medieval tradition was still observed, although no longer regularly or universally. Junior officers (platoon commanders) were not entitled to table money - there were no officers under them, and soldiers were actually and legally then considered a different social stratum, because the rank of second lieutenant already gave personal nobility, completely cutting off its bearer from the lower mass of soldiers.
Just as traditionally, since the 18th century, in the Russian army there was a large gap in salaries between the senior command staff and the middle and junior officers. If generals and colonels received very substantial money even by the standards of the richest countries in Europe, then officers of lower ranks were quite rightly considered low-paid.
At the beginning of the 20th century, the salary of an army lieutenant (a nobleman who graduated from a military school) was only 2-3 times higher than the average salary of an unskilled worker. Therefore, in 1909, in order to increase the income of middle and junior officers (“staff officers” and “chief officers” in the army terminology of that time), the so-called “additional salary” was introduced. From now on, the lieutenant received another 15 rubles per month in addition to his salary, the captain - 40 rubles per month, and the lieutenant colonel - 55 rubles per month "additional salary".
For service in remote areas (for example, in the Caucasus, Turkestan, Omsk, Irkutsk, and Amur military districts), generals and officers had the right to receive increased, as they said then, “enhanced” salaries. Special privileges were retained in the guard - for officers of the guard units, the salary according to rank was determined higher by one step of their rank. Thus, for example, a guards lieutenant colonel received in rubles like an army colonel, that is, not 200, but 325 rubles per month.
In addition to all types of salaries, there were additional payments. Those officers who did not live in government apartments received “apartment money.” Their size depended on the rank of the officer and place of residence. All settlements Russian Empire Depending on prices and living conditions, they were divided into 8 categories. In “First Class localities” (the capital, large cities and provinces with high level prices) the captain, with a monthly salary of 145 rubles, received 45 rubles 33 kopecks per month “apartment money” (including 1.5 rubles per month “for the stable”), in cheaper areas of the 8th category “apartment money The captain's rent was 13 rubles 58 kopecks per month (including 50 kopecks monthly for renting a stable).
A full general in a 1st category locality received 195 rubles of “housing money” monthly. For comparison, renting a room in an apartment building in a working-class district of a provincial town in 1913 averaged 5.5 rubles per month, and a five-room apartment on Liteiny Prospekt in the center of St. Petersburg required about 75 rubles in rent per month.
In addition to “apartment”, generals and colonels regularly received “fodder money” - to feed their horses (on average 10-15 rubles per horse monthly), and “travel allowance” during service moves and various business trips. “Travel allowance” included “passage money” and daily payments. “Transporters” were still paid according to an old, almost medieval scheme - a lieutenant general, for example, was paid for the passage of an entire caravan of 12 horses, a colonel was entitled to less - only 5 horses.
Naturally, in most cases, generals on business trips traveled by train, and the difference in rubles between the cost of one train ticket and the passage of many horses was pocketed. For example, this calculation method was shamelessly used by General Vladimir Sukhomlinov, who served as Minister of War of the Russian Empire from 1909 to 1915. As the highest leader of the military department, he constantly traveled on business trips to military districts throughout the country. Of course, the minister traveled by train, but the “travel” and “passage” money he was paid was based on trips on two dozen horses at a speed of 24 miles a day. With the help of such a simple bureaucratic scheme, the Minister of War “legally” put several tens of thousands of additional rubles in his pocket every year.
Rubles “lifting” and “stray”
In addition to salaries of all types and additional payments, there were also one-time payments for some groups of officers. For example, all students in the six military academies that existed in the Russian Empire by 1914 received 100 rubles annually “for books and educational supplies.”
Junkers who graduated from military schools, upon promotion to officers, were entitled to a one-time allowance “for acquisition” (that is, the purchase of a full set of officer’s uniform) in the amount of 300 rubles, as well as additional money for the purchase of a horse and saddle. Subsequently, officers of the Russian imperial army were required to purchase uniforms at their own expense. In 1914, a uniform cost approximately 45 rubles, a cap - 7, boots - 10, a sword belt - 2-3 rubles, and the same amount of shoulder straps.
Therefore, from the moment war was declared, all generals and officers Russian army in July-August 1914, the so-called military raise money was paid. They were intended for the purchase of camping clothing and equipment. Their size was established depending on rank: generals - 250 rubles, staff officers from captain to colonel - 150 rubles. At the beginning of the First World War, second lieutenants, lieutenants and staff captains were entitled to 100 rubles of “military raise money.” At the same time, “military allowances” were paid to officers in the active army at double the rate, at army and front headquarters - at one and a half times the rate, and at the usual rate to officers who remained in the rear.
From the moment war was declared, all officers of the Russian Imperial Army received increased (“enhanced”) salaries. So, if in peacetime a lieutenant colonel received a monthly basic salary of 90 rubles (not counting additional salary, “canteen money” and other additional payments), then the increased basic salary in wartime was already equal to 124 rubles per month.
But, in addition to these payments, payments of “table money” and “additional salary” were also “intensified”, and “portion money” was also added to them - payments that were supposed to compensate officers “ special conditions and the high cost of camping life.” As a result, with all the additional payments, during the First World War, the lieutenant colonel received about 360 rubles a month, not counting “housing money” and “fodder money” for the maintenance of at least a couple of horses.
Each officer position was assigned a rank by order of the Minister of War, according to which the amount of “field portion money” was established. The corps commander (full general) received the maximum - 20 “portioned” rubles per day, the minimum - 2 rubles 50 kopecks - received the platoon commander.
From the moment the war began, the senior command staff of the Russian Imperial Army, in addition to salaries according to rank and a mass of additional payments, began to receive considerable “extra money”. For example, the front commander received an additional 2 thousand rubles per month. As a result, such a commander with the rank of full general received at least 5 thousand rubles a month. For comparison, in the fall of 1914, for this amount one could hire 250 unskilled workers in the city or 500 female workers in the countryside for a month.
The First World War was also the first war of technology. Therefore, for the first time, technical specialists began to earn big money from it. For example, aviators received, as they said then, stray money - 200 rubles a month for officers and 75 rubles for “lower ranks.” “Valentines” were awarded monthly to those pilots who spent at least 6 hours in the air. The additional maintenance for balloon crew members was calculated in the same way. True, the military bureaucracy, in order to save money, introduced a provision according to which “flying” money could not be paid for more than 6 months a year - as if pilots in wartime did not fly year-round.
Money for captivity and wounds, military pensions
In case of injury and departure from the front, officers retained an “enhanced” salary according to their rank and all additional payments, including “table money”. But instead of “field ration” money, wounded officers received “daily allowance” - 75 kopecks per day when treated in a hospital and 1 ruble per day when treated in their own apartment.
Additionally, all officers who were wounded or sick at the front were given a benefit upon discharge from a medical institution. The amount of such benefit was determined depending on various circumstances and marital status: for generals and colonels - from 200 to 300 rubles, from lieutenant colonels to captains - from 150 to 250 rubles, for all junior officers - from 100 to 200 rubles.
Wounded officers who lost part of their property at the front could claim compensation for these losses in the amount of “military raise money” due to their rank (from 100 to 250 rubles). In addition, “military allowance” was paid to the officer whenever he returned from the hospital to the active army.
If an officer was captured, his family was paid half of his salary and “table money.” “Apartment money,” if the officer and his family did not occupy a government apartment, were paid to the prisoner’s family in full. It was assumed that upon returning from captivity, the officer was to receive the remaining half of the payments for the entire time he was in captivity. Only those who went over to the enemy’s side in captivity were deprived of such payments.
If an officer went missing, then until his fate was clarified, the family was paid a “temporary allowance” in the amount of one third of the salary and “table money” of the missing person.
The families of officers killed in the war and officers who retired due to injury or length of service received a pension. Its payment was regulated by the “Charter on pensions and one-time benefits for military department officials and their families” adopted on June 23, 1912.
By age, the pension was awarded to officers who had “service” of at least 25 years. In this case, they were paid a pension in the amount of 50% of their last salary, which was calculated taking into account all payments - basic and “enhanced” salaries, “canteens” and other additional money (except for “housing”, one-time benefits and wartime additional payments).
For each year served beyond 25 years, the pension increased by 3%. For 35 years of service, a maximum pension was awarded in the amount of 80% of the total amount of the last salary. A preferential calculation of length of service was provided for in order to obtain the right to a pension. Such benefits, for example, were given by serving in a warring army - a month of service at the front was counted as two. The maximum benefit was given to those who fought as part of garrisons surrounded and besieged by the enemy fortresses - in this case, a month military service counted as a year when calculating length of service. The time spent in captivity did not provide any benefits, but it was taken into account in length of service.
IN individual cases The Tsar personally appointed higher pensions. Thus, they established pensions for the Minister of War, members of the Military Council of the Russian Empire, commanders of military districts and corps commanders.
In special cases, the king decided to grant personal pensions. For example, in 1916, Nicholas II assigned a personal pension to Vera Nikolaevna Panaeva, the widow of a colonel, the mother of three officer sons who died at the very beginning of the First World War and posthumously awarded with orders St. George. The brothers who fell in battle served together in the 12th Akhtyrsky Hussar Regiment. Boris Panaev died in August 1914 while leading a cavalry charge against the Austrians. Two weeks later, in September 1914, Guriy Panaev died. The third brother, Lev Panaev, died in January 1915. By the decision of the emperor, their mother was assigned a lifelong pension in the amount of 250 rubles monthly.
Widows and children of officers were entitled to pensions if their husbands and fathers were killed at the front or died from wounds received in battle. Widows received such pensions for life, and children until they reached adulthood.
At the beginning of the war the number of military pensioners was very small. If in January 1915, at the end of mobilization, 4 million 700 thousand people served in the army of the Russian Empire, then the number of pensioners of the “military land department cash desk” was less than 1% of this figure - just over 40 thousand.
Kopecks of the “lower ranks”
Now let's move on to the story of what kind of money the Russian Empire paid to millions of peasants, whom the general mobilization dressed in soldiers' greatcoats. Soldiers conscript service theoretically were on full government support. And the small salary they were entitled to was, in fact, pocket money to cover minor personal needs.
In peacetime, a private in the Russian Imperial Army received 50 kopecks a month. With the beginning of the war, not only officers, but also privates were entitled to an “enhanced salary,” and a private in the trenches began to receive as much as 75 kopecks monthly.
Privates who have risen to the rank of “non-commissioned officers” (what is in modern army RF is called " non-commissioned officers"), received noticeably more. The highest paid of the soldiers was the sergeant major (a rank equal to the modern "sergeant major"), who in wartime received 9 rubles per month. But there was one sergeant major for a whole company - 235 people of the “lower ranks”.
In the guards regiments, where there was an increased salary, a private in wartime received 1 ruble, and a sergeant major received 9 rubles 75 kopecks monthly.
However, despite such penny salaries, there was a careful detailing of soldier’s kopecks depending on the military specialty. For example, a private who performed the duties of a regimental bugler received 6 rubles a month in wartime (in the guard - 6 rubles 75 kopecks), and a private with the qualification “gunsmith of the 1st category” received as much as 30 rubles monthly. This was already equal to the average city salary, but there were even fewer such craftsmen in the army capable of servicing and repairing complex weapons than sergeant majors.
Only the few non-commissioned officers and sergeants who remained for long-term service in peacetime had a noticeably better financial situation. In addition to full government support and the penny soldiers' salaries due by rank, they were also paid the so-called “additional salary” - from 25 to 35 rubles per month, depending on rank and length of service. Their families were also paid money for renting housing in the amount of 5 to 12 rubles per month.
During wartime, soldiers' pay was paid one month in advance at the beginning of each month. When conscripted into the army during mobilization, soldiers received a kind of “raise allowance” depending on their rank - a private called up from the reserve received a lump sum of 1 ruble, and a sergeant major received 5 rubles.
The soldiers' meager salaries were supposed to compensate for the full government provision; the state and the army fed the soldiers, dressed them from head to toe, and provided them with everything they needed. In theory, according to the norms established by law, everything looked good here - the conditions of soldier’s life in the barracks and even at the front were more satisfying and more prosperous than the standard peasant life of the early 20th century in Russia. But in practice, at the height of the war, everything turned out differently.
Already three months after the start of hostilities, the troops began to feel a shortage of clothing and shoes. According to the War Ministry, in 1915 the Russian army received only 65% of the required number of boots. Subsequently, this deficit only intensified. For example, at the end of 1916, one of the reports from the command of the rear Kazan Military District addressed to the Chief of the General Staff indicated that there was “no uniform” in the district, and therefore 32,240 mobilized were sent to the active army in their clothes and bast shoes urgently purchased by the district command . The problems with the shortage of soldiers' shoes were not resolved until the end of the war.
The soldiers were fed three times a day. The cost of a soldier's daily ration in peacetime was 19 kopecks. General A.I. Denikin recalled in his memoirs about the soldier’s diet: “In terms of the number of calories and taste, the food was quite satisfactory and, in any case, more nutritious than what the peasant masses had at home.”
Indeed, the rank and file of the tsarist army ate better than the average Russian peasantry. Suffice it to say that, according to existing standards, a soldier was entitled to over 70 kilograms of meat per year - while according to statistics in 1913, the average per capita consumption of meat in the Russian Empire was less than 30 kilograms.
However, during the protracted war, the government reduced food supply standards several times and cut soldiers' rations. For example, by April 1916, the rate of meat distribution to soldiers was reduced by 3 times.
Soldier's "charity"
Wounded soldiers upon discharge from the hospital received a one-time allowance, which, depending on the rank (from private to sergeant-major), ranged from 10 to 25 rubles, that is, 10 times less than the similar allowance given to officers.
Shortly before the start of the war, the law of June 25, 1912 “On the care of lower military ranks and their families” was the first in Russia to provide pensions for soldiers who were injured and lost their ability to work during army service. In case of complete loss of ability to work and if such a serviceman required constant care, he received a pension in the amount of 18 rubles per month. This was the maximum possible soldier's pension, while the minimum size (with a slight decrease in working capacity of up to 40%) was only 2 rubles 50 kopecks per month.
The same law introduced state support for soldiers' families for the first time. If the families of officers lived off their salaries and “housing money”, then the families of soldiers for their fighting fathers and husbands received a “feed quota” - a small amount based on the cost at the place of residence of 27 kg of flour, 4 kg of cereal, 1 kg of salt and half a liter of vegetable oil per month. This “feed quota” was received by the wives and children of mobilized soldiers under 17 years of age. Children under 5 years old received half the benefit. As a result, a soldier’s family received no more than 3-4 rubles per month per person, which, before the onset of large-scale inflation, made it possible not to die of hunger.
It is characteristic that the Russian bureaucracy perceived the missing officers and soldiers differently. If in this case the officer was subject to the presumption of innocence, and his family received a “temporary allowance” in the amount of one third of the missing person’s salary, then in relation to the soldiers everything was different. The families of those who were called up for mobilization, in the event of their breadwinners going missing, were deprived of the right to receive money at the “feed rate” - just as the families of deserters and defectors were deprived of such a right.
After February revolution, due to the increase in inflation during the war, by May 1917 the salaries of the “lower ranks” in the army were increased. Now soldiers, depending on their rank, began to receive from 7 rubles 50 kopecks to 17 rubles per month. In the navy, sailors' salaries were even higher - from 15 to 50 rubles.
However, from the start of the war until March 1, 1917, the amount of paper money in the country increased almost 7 times, and the purchasing power of the ruble decreased by 3 times. Over the summer of 1917, the purchasing power of the ruble would fall another 4 times - by October, amounting to only 6-7 pre-war kopecks. That is, in fact, soldiers’ salaries, despite the sharp increase in numbers, will remain at the same level. However, by October 1917, millions of peasants in soldiers' greatcoats Those who had not yet deserted from the disintegrating army were not worried about their penny salary, but about much more global and pressing issues of land and peace.
